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I. Prologue: A Journey into the Soviet 
Governance of Culture 
On one of the many afternoons I spent at the Lithuanian Archives of Art and 
Literature, I was carefully examining a list of spheres of responsibility of the 
Soviet Ministry of Culture. The list contained entries on music and fine arts, 
libraries and houses of culture,1 theatre and sculpture, and specialised and 
higher education in the arts, but none on cinema, radio, television or publishing. 
Reading this list, I was somehow reminded of the famous nomenclature de-
scribed by Jorge Luis Borges, quoting a Chinese encyclopaedia, Heavenly Em-
porium of Benevolent Knowledge, which divided all existing animals into “(a) 
those that belong to the Emperor; (b) embalmed ones; (c) those that are trained; 
(d) suckling pigs; (e) mermaids; (f) fabulous ones; (g) stray dogs; (h) those that 
are included in this classification; (i) those that tremble as if they were mad; (j) 
innumerable ones; (k) those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush; (l) et 
cetera; (m) those that have just broken the flower vase; (n) those that at a dis-
tance resemble flies”.2 What is striking about both lists is that they are strangely 
incomplete and their classificatory schemes appear alien or even arbitrary. The 
way in which the ministry list included and excluded particular categories of 
culture in its list resembled the obscure conceptual premises of Borges’s list of 
animals. The ministry’s list could be understood in a Borgesian spirit as a typi-
cal classification, which is inevitably arbitrary or speculative, but yet not dys-
functional: such lists exercise a power of selection and are held together by the 
power of a classifier.3
More than 40 years ago, Foucault acknowledged that this elaborate text of 
Borges inspired him to write a book about ordering in science.4 To put it sim-
ply, Foucault argued that in order to understand any list as an indicator of real-
ity, one must look more widely and reconstruct a certain regime of knowledge, 
which would often be generated and supported by (state) institutions.5 Drawing 
                                      
1 A similar institution to the French maison de la culture. See Ann White, De-Stalinization and 
the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, 1953-
1989 (London and New York, Routledge, 1990). 
2 Jorge Luis Borges, “John Wilkins’s Analytical Language” (1942), in Selected Non-Fictions, ed. 
E. Weinberger (Penguin, New York, 1999), 231. 
3 Borges, 231. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973), xv. 
5 Since then both Foucault and Borges have been widely referred to by various scholars who have 
encountered a list of some kind. A relevant example is a recent essay about Soviet telephone 
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on this Foucaultian approach, I began my journey into ordering in cultural pol-
icy. Why were some objects listed as governable by the Ministry of Culture and 
others not? How could such different objects possibly be labelled with one term 
(“culture”) and accommodated in one administrative structure? What kind of 
governmental rationales and techniques made that list possible? Indeed, the fact 
that I ended up sitting with this list was a consequence of one question: What 
does it mean to govern and what makes culture governable? 
That question underlies this study, which deals with the construction of 
state cultural policy in Lithuania as just such a project of governance and 
knowledge. Today, one would struggle to find a state that does not engage in the 
systematic financing of arts and other practices labelled as “cultural” and does 
not feature administrative apparatus specifically designed to govern cultural 
matters. When I began my academic career as an art historian and curator of 
contemporary art in Lithuania, I was rather taken aback by how easy it was for 
young creators to receive financial and institutional support from state institu-
tions in order to implement their ideas. The government’s list of cultural prac-
tices was clearly quite flexible. For example, I was quite fascinated that they 
would allocate taxpayers’ money for someone to install a cage with a live 
rooster in an art gallery. A state-subsidised cultural newspaper would then pay 
an art critic to go to that gallery and describe his or her impressions of this 
rooster. On the one hand, I found it incredibly stimulating that individual crea-
tive ideas could be implemented.6 On the other, I started to wonder: where did 
this framework of support for individual creativity come from? How was it pos-
sible to fund a rooster installation with taxpayers’ money? Why should culture, 
in its most diverse guises, matter not only to private connoisseurs but also to the 
state? It was from this personal practical experience that I became interested in 
state cultural policy. 
The chronological orientation of this study is the result of another side-
ways manoeuvre. During the early stages of my research, my initial idea was to 
explore the post-Soviet transformation of state cultural policy in the transition 
from authoritarian to liberal democratic policy in Lithuania. The 1990s were a 
time of energetic economic transformation in the post-Soviet countries, and 
state administration of culture was no exception in this process. During my pilot 
fieldwork, I encountered an interesting phenomenon. As I mentioned, in the 
Lithuania of 1999 it was possible to get state funding to exhibit a rooster in a 
gallery: this means that unusual ideas were supported. There were organs, ap-
pointed by the state government (the Ministry of Culture, departments for cul-
                                                                                                                                  
directories by Lars Kleberg, “K semiotike telefona,” in Varietas et Concordia. Essays in Hounour 
of Pekka Pesonen, eds. B. Hellman, T. Huttufnen, G. Obatning (Helsinki: Helsinki University, 
2007), 366. For a good discussion of the history of a list-making and its analytical consequences 
for organising, see Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification 
and Its Consequences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000), 137-9. 
6 I refer to Jonas Zagorskas’s installation “A Chicken Eating a Roasted Chicken” in the 
Akademija gallery, a part of Student Art Days 1999, curated by Agn Gintalait and Egl Rindze-
viit, in Vilnius, Lithuania. 
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ture in the municipalities), which financed a great variety of organisations, is-
sued legislation concerning various aspects of “culture” and published their 
programmatic statements and reports. This means that administration and legis-
lation were developed in relation to state intervention in cultural practices. Yet 
many Lithuanian cultural operators7 argued that there was “no such thing as a 
state cultural policy in Lithuania”.8 Apparently, the mere fact of having actual 
financial support and organisational structures was not enough to constitute a 
“state cultural policy”. This was a puzzle, leading me to wonder: what does it 
mean to have a state cultural policy? What does it mean for an administrative 
body to govern something so broadly defined as culture? At this point, I started 
to inquire into the construction of “state cultural policy” as meaning-making.  
I began my pilot fieldwork by examining cultural policy documents writ-
ten during the 13 post-Soviet years (1990-2003), and I was quite struck by a 
peculiar discourse. In the documents, “culture” was listed as a heterogeneous 
sphere, which involved, among other things, the contemporary arts and heritage, 
libraries and ethnic minorities’ culture. Then “culture” was described as a 
whole, which consisted of different parts and yet was more than their sum. Both 
as a whole and parts, it had “states” that were measurable. However, the preci-
sion of currently available measurements was doubtful, and calls for “better 
knowledge” based on a better “diagnosis” were voiced. On the basis of “diagno-
sis” or at least “familiarisation with the current state”, the ministry was envi-
sioned as being endowed with the ability to act upon “culture”, as it possessed 
many “instruments” for doing so. And it did have to act because something was 
happening to “culture” all the time: it was changing continuously, being influ-
enced from outside and within; moreover, it was endangered. The notion of 
“identity” rarely occurred without accompanying descriptive phrases, such as 
“being on the verge of extinction” in the policy documents; the notion of “cul-
ture” was coupled with “risks”. A discourse on securitisation was mobilised to 
describe those “current states” as endangered and to underline the pressing need 
for a state policy.9 In other words, I saw a very particular model of action (feed-
back-based steering, the need to rely on systematic measurements and predic-
tions) crystallising out of the particular contents of state cultural policy docu-
                                      
7 From now on I will use the term “cultural operator” to refer to the agents who fall within the 
sphere of formal cultural policy. The category includes cultural intellectuals, policy-makers, 
artists, and other employees of cultural sector. The term was coined in Western thought about 
cultural policy and was not used in the Soviet Union (“cultural worker” was a more narrow term, 
which referred to the employees of the sector under the Ministry of Culture, but not for example, 
creative artists or intellectuals). I find “cultural operators” useful because it does not discriminate 
between these agents, all of whom participated in the discourses analysed here. 
8 “Ar yra Lietuvoje kultros politika?” A verbatim of roundtable discussion at the Writers’ Union, 
Vilnius, Lithuania (4 May 2000). 
9 This is a summary of what I have analysed in detail in Egle Rindzeviciute, “Discursive Realities: 
The Construction of National Identity in the Documents of Lithuanian Cultural Policy,” in Con-
temporary Change in Lithuania, ed. E. Rindzeviciute (Huddinge: Baltic and East European 
Graduate School, 2003). 
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ments. Intuitively, I thought that probably it was this model of governance that 
functioned as a meaning-giving framework, which otherwise integrated the very 
heterogeneous sphere of culture and the actions of state administration into 
something called “policy”. From where did the policy document writers draw 
this vocabulary? How did this imagination of governance come into being?  
This dissertation explores the historical creation of this discourse of the 
steering of culture, the construction of state cultural policy as a special mode of 
governance, based on measurement and calculation and assisted by scientific 
knowledge and technologies. It suggests that this creation started neither with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, nor with the Soviet occupation of 
Lithuania in 1940. A crucial date was 1948, the year that the American mathe-
matician Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics: Or Control and Communica-
tion in the Animal and the Machine. It appeared exactly 100 years after The 
Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the little book that 
gave birth to the language and imagination and went on to inspire many scien-
tists, cultural intellectuals and managers and to change their understanding of 
governance.10 Thus, my study of state cultural policy discourse found itself 
situated in a broader field of scholarship about the natural sciences in govern-
ance, the history of which could be traced back at least a few centuries.  
The development of state cultural policy, as the British sociologist Jim 
McGuigan has noted, could be seen as part of the larger ambition of the modern 
state to regulate wide spheres of life: production, trade, society, nature.11 Con-
sequently, I was eager to delve more deeply into the origins of the cybernetic 
discourse of cultural policy because I found the way in which the history of 
cybernetics was interwoven with issues of politics, science and administration 
quite extraordinary. Both in the democratic West and the Soviet Union, the de-
velopment of cybernetics was strongly affected by Cold War polarisation.12 The 
Soviets banned cybernetics in the early 1950s; however, after the death of Stalin 
it was rehabilitated and even widely propagated as the science for governance of 
man-made and natural systems. The rise of cybernetics coincided with Soviet 
rule in Lithuania; thus, my study turned back to the pre-1990 period, and my 
reconstruction found itself embedded in the narrative of the demise and fall of 
the Soviet Union.13 The book that resulted from this journey deals with two 
stories. 
                                      
10 It also became a bestseller, just like his later The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics 
and Society (1950), Freeman Dyson, “The Tragic Tale of a Genius,” The New York Review 14 
July (2005), 10. 
11 Jim McGuigan, Rethinking Cultural Policy (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004), 36.  
12 Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,” Criti-
cal Inquiry 21, no.1 (1994), 228-266. 
13 Titles indicating the life cycle of the Soviet Union are abundant, but see particularly John B. 
Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993); Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (London: Macmillan, 
1998/2002); and the collection of documents, Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet 
Union, 1917-1991 (London: Routledge, 1999). The Baltic states happened to play an active role 
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The first story is that of the birth of modern state cultural policy in Lithua-
nia and the Soviet Union. It examines the continuities and disruptions of this 
modern state cultural policy under changing political regimes. The adjective 
“modern” is added to specify that “cultural policy” refers to a formal pro-
gramme and/or course of action discerned by dedicated public or state organisa-
tions. In Lithuania, such a modern state cultural policy was first formulated 
when the nation-state was established in 1918 (and lasted for about 22 years, 
until it was Sovietised). Modern Soviet cultural policy was the product of the 
1917 Russian Revolution. The Soviet Union developed its own particular ver-
sion of illiberal Marxist-Leninist cultural policy, which was imposed on Lithua-
nia and the other occupied Baltic countries. Sheila Fitzpatrick demonstrated that 
the formulation of early Soviet cultural policy was marked by struggles and 
fierce disagreements among leaders and artists, which took place in the context 
of social and economic changes in Russia between 1917 and World War II.14 
However, by 1940, when the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States, the ad-
ministrative and ideological model of Soviet cultural policy had already been 
consolidated. Nevertheless, it experienced further changes during de-
Stalinisation (post-1956), many of which were associated with a scientific-
technological leap after World War II.  
The second story is about the translation of cybernetic techno-sciences into 
instruments for the governance of culture (from now on, I will use the term 
“techno-sciences” interchangeably with “science and technology”). Why focus 
on cybernetics? A wide range of contemporary scholars from various disci-
plines, such as Katherine Hayles, Bosse Holmqvist and David Noble drew at-
tention to the impact of cybernetics on contemporary notions of control and 
governance in the (neo) liberal democratic West.15 Cybernetics was included in 
the anthology of the most influential intellectual concepts.16 But even more 
important (and ambivalent) was cybernetics’ role in the Soviet Union. Loren 
Graham and Slava Gerovitch, historians of Soviet science, and political scien-
tists David Holloway, Mark Beissinger and Ilmari Susiluoto, to name just a few, 
noted that, in addition to its applications in military technology, biology and 
                                                                                                                                  
in this cycle, hence Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End of the 
Soviet Empire (London, New York: Routledge, 2003). 
14 The most important change was replacing the rather democratic and innovative arts-oriented 
cultural policy of the New Economic Policy period with rigid Stalinist control. Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
The Commissariat of Enlightenment. Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts under 
Lunachiarsky October 1917–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).  
15 Katherine N. Hayles, How We Became Post-Human. Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bosse Holm-
qvist, “Individens åldern är förbi”. Några nedslag i femtiotalets människosyn, (Stockholm: 
Brutus Östlings bokförlag, 2004); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of 
Industrial Automation (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a French account 
on intellectual influences of cybernetics, see Céline Lafontaine, L’Empire cybernétique. Des 
machines à penser à la pensée machine (Paris: Seuil, 2004). 
16John Lechte, Key Contemporary Concepts: From Abject to Zeno’s Paradox (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 48-50.  
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linguistics, cybernetic theory contributed greatly to the revamping of Soviet 
“scientific governance”.17 Others could not help but notice that in terms of 
techno-science Soviet governance came to be configured in ways that often 
were not unlike those used in the liberal democratic West.18 Thus, to analyse the 
translation of cybernetics into state governance is to question the existing defi-
nitions of authoritarian and liberal governance, probably some of the most im-
portant notions for state cultural policy studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
17 David Holloway, “The Political Uses of Scientific Models: The Cybernetic Model of Govern-
ment in Soviet Social Science,” in The Use of Models in the Social Sciences, ed. L. Collins (Boul-
der: Westview Press, 1976); Loren Graham, Science, Philosophy, and Human Behaviour in the 
Soviet Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to 
Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Mark R. 
Beissinger, Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988); Ilmari Susiluoto, The Origins and Development of 
Systems Thinking in the Soviet Union: Political and Philosophical Controversies from Bogdanov 
and Bukharin to Present-Day Re-Evaluation (Helsinki: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia, 1982). 
18 William E. Halal, “Convergence of a ‘New Capitalism’ and a ‘New Socialism’: Economic 
Systems in an Information Age,” Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal 19, no.6 
(1988), 561. Whilst this view was rather popular in the West, the Soviet Union officially fostered 
strongly negative attitude. The literature is abundant, but for an early account see Andrew L. 
Feenberg, “Transition or Convergence: Communism and the Paradox of Development,” in Tech-
nology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism, ed. F. 
J. Fleron Jr. (New York, London: Praeger, 1977). 
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II. Introduction: Theoretical Framework and 
Method 
In 1989, a journalist from the magazine Domains of Culture visited the town of 
Visaginas (Sniekus). This town was the home of the Ignalina nuclear plant, 
which featured the RBMK reactors, the same type that had exploded in Cherno-
byl three years before. However, the reason for the journalist’s visit was not a 
concern about environmental disaster but the fact that Visaginas, a typical So-
viet mono-industry, purpose-built settlement, did not have any churches. The 
year 1989 was a time of national upheaval, anti-Soviet sentiments and a Catho-
lic religious revival in Lithuania.1 Thus, he asked a senior citizen what it was 
like to live in a town that never had a place for religious congregation. In reply, 
the local pointed towards the Ignalina nuclear plant, whose two red and white-
striped towers loomed on the horizon and said, “Here is our church; there is no 
need of a better one!”2  
This Lithuanian pensioner was not alone in his views. As the British cul-
tural historian Orlando Figes put it, the entire Soviet regime could be defined by 
its belief in science and technology.3 Since the very inception of the Soviet 
Union, the belief in industrialisation based on scientific discoveries and techno-
logical innovations was propagated by its first leader, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin. In 
Lenin’s words, “the war taught us [...] that those who have the best technology, 
organisation, discipline and the best machines emerge on top”.4 In both its early 
and later stages, Soviet techno-scientific modernisation was fuelled by external 
and internal conflict. During his massive industrialisation campaign for the en-
tire country, Joseph Stalin relentlessly purged the scientists and engineers who 
did not agree with his view, calling them “enemies” and “saboteurs”.5 World 
                                      
1 For Soviet repression of the Catholic Church and its importance for the construction of Lithua-
nian national identity, see Stanley V. Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in 
Soviet Lithuania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). 
2 Rta Marcinkeviien, “Miestas be bažnyi,” Kultros Barai 1 (1989), 46. Hereafter, Kultros 
barai is abbreviated into KB. 
3 Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2002), 512-13. 
4 Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, Pol’noe sobranie Vol.26 (Moscow: Gossudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo poli-
ticheskoi literatury, 1967-70), 116, cf Rudra Sil, Managing Modernity: Work, Community and 
Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan and Russia (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2002), 222. 
5 Loren Graham, The Ghost of Executed Engineer: Technology and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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War II and the Cold War reinforced the further securitisation of Soviet techno-
sciences, but also brought with them increased civil applications of these 
techno-sciences. Already under Lenin, but especially after the death of Stalin, 
some techno-scientific innovations spilled over into governance of the state, its 
industries and society. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet leaders Nikita 
Khrushchev and later Leonid Brezhnev proudly proclaimed the exercise of a 
particular mode of rule known as “scientific governance”.6 This governance 
drew strongly on the principles and technologies of Wiener’s cybernetics: since 
the 1960s, scholars noted that the prevailing Soviet metaphor of economy and 
society was no longer a mechanical machine but an electronic cybernetic one.7  
Previous Research and Problem Areas 
It is in this context of techno-scientific modernisation that I studied the con-
struction of Soviet state cultural policy. In short, the dissertation examines how 
“Soviet state cultural policy” was assembled as an intellectual and material ma-
chinery of governance through an interaction between the techno-scientific, 
political and cultural fields. My general research question, “What does it mean 
to govern and what makes culture governable?” was narrowed down to three 
sub-questions. The study asks under what economic and administrative condi-
tions did cybernetics (and systems theory) as scientific knowledge and technol-
ogy contribute to making “culture” governable in Soviet Lithuania after World 
War II? How was the relation between cybernetic techno-science, culture and 
governance constructed by Soviet Lithuanian scientists, humanities intellectuals 
and policy makers? Did their approaches differ? And finally, did the meanings 
of state governance of culture change for Soviet Lithuanian cultural policy offi-
cials and intellectuals from the late 1940s to 1980s and if yes, how? Guided by 
these questions, my analysis sought to reconstruct and explore the historical 
development of a particular discourse of governance, which used the compo-
nents of techno-science and was applied to culture. Located within the rather 
open field of culture studies,8 the dissertation is based on interdisciplinary re-
                                      
6 On Soviet Taylorism and particularly Aleksei Gastev see Beissinger. On Soviet management see 
Jeremy R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), 12-27; on pre-Soviet management in Russia, see Don K. Rowney, Tran-
sition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State (Ithaca and Lon-
don: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
7 Robert F. Miller, “The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Soviet Administrative Debate,” 
in The Dynamics of Soviet Politics, eds. P. Cocks, R. V. Daniels, N. Whittier Heer (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 153. It is appropriate to note that the Fordist 
assembly line came to prevail in Soviet industry only in the late 1950s. 
8 I approach “culture studies” in a way similar to Tony Bennett who has recently charted a distinc-
tion between the “sociology of culture” and “culture studies” comparable to that of the “sociology 
of science” and “science studies”. The essence of Bennett’s approach is that the “cultural” is 
neither to be explained by external “social relations” as their “representation,” nor collated with 
“social”. Instead, he suggested focusing on the “work of culture” or the ways it is worked upon 
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search. In the following sections, I will position my research in relation to exist-
ing studies of the history of science and technology and cultural policy. 
a) Cybernetic Techno-science 
First and foremost, the story of cybernetics has been an object of study for his-
torians of science. For example, Otto Mayr and Stuart Bennett, meticulously 
trace the history of feedback control in engineering, locating its origins in pre-
vious centuries.9 However, Western scholars from a broad range of disciplines 
have been engaged in exploring the widely dispersed effects of cybernetics for 
two decades.10 Historical studies of cybernetics have also come to be closely 
related to issues of political history, being addresses in relation to the Cold War 
in urban studies and science and technology studies (STS).11 My inspiration for 
focusing on cybernetics in the study of the Soviet governance of culture came 
from reading Slava Gerovitch’s book From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History 
of Soviet Cybernetics (2002). In his detailed study, Gerovitch argues that it was 
partially due to its Western origin that cybernetics was initially banned and later 
attributed with an exceptionally high status by Soviet scientists. The popularity 
of cybernetics, apparently without parallel in any other science in the Soviet 
Union after World War II, produced ambivalent side effects: it was officially 
propagated as a universal science of governance, the foremost science of control 
to be used not only in electronic engineering, but also for steering the state and 
                                                                                                                                  
and mobilised to work on something else. Tony Bennett, “The Work of Culture,” Cultural Sociol-
ogy 1, no. 1 (2007), 31-47. 
9 Otto Mayr, The Origins of Feedback Control (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970); Stuart 
Bennett, A History of Control Engineering 1800-1930 (Stevenage: Peregrinus, 1979). The devel-
opment of automation (cybernetic technologies) also attracted Marxist criticism. Noble, 39, 57-
66. 
10 For a great overview of control techniques in engineering and Fordism and Taylorism see 
James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution. Technological and Economic Origins of the Informa-
tion Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 294-301; but also 
David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control and Computing before 
Cybernetics (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002); David Mindell, 
Jérôme Segal and Slava Gerovitch, “From Communications Engineering to Communications 
Science: Cybernetics and Information Theory in the United States, France and the Soviet Union,” 
in Science and Ideology. A Comparative History, ed. M. Walker (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 72. 
11 Cold War logics permeated both technological strategies and discourses. See Jennifer S. Light, 
From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), also Paul N. Edwards, The 
Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996). Indeed one of the first Russian versions of operational systems 
that enabled the Internet, developed in the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, was called 
UNAS as opposed to the American UNIX (“u nas” in Russian means “here with us” while “u 
nikh” refers to “there with them”). Julian Cooper, “The Internet as an Agent of Socio-Economic 
Modernization of the Russian Federation,” in Modernisation in Russia since 1900, eds. M. Kan-
gaspuro and J. Smith (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2006), 286. 
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society. This is why the history of Soviet cybernetics, for Gerovitch, was a his-
tory of the degradation of scientific terminology into a language of the ideology 
of the ruling Party, empty cyberspeak, comparable to George Orwell’s new-
speak. As Gerovitch noted, a similar transformation of cybernetics (from a sci-
entific theory to a language of governance) also took place in the West.  
Besides Cold War polarisation, there was another aspect to the intertwin-
ing of the political and techno-scientific dimensions in the history of cybernet-
ics. Recently a number of historians of science and technology have studied 
how scientific theories and engineered machines were used to re-conceptualise 
societies and states. Among the most distinctive contributions is the study by 
the German historian Otto Mayr who argues that James Watt’s steam regulator 
represented a key technological and conceptual breakthrough for the Industrial 
Revolution.12 Mayr argues that the automatic control enabled by a steam regula-
tor was used as a metaphor to describe the mechanism of liberalism, especially 
the self-regulation of economy.13 Working in a similar spirit to Mayr, the histo-
rian Jon Agar has published a splendid study on how the computer emerged as a 
machine of governance.14 Similarly, David Mindell has published extensively 
on the intellectual impact of systems theory, which stretched beyond engineer-
ing into organisational science.15 Finally, historians of ideas have charted how 
operations research, systems theory and cybernetics influenced organisational 
science, whilst others have studied its implications for literature and the social 
sciences.16 The history of cybernetics has thus been addressed as an interna-
tional phenomenon and as a necessarily interdisciplinary subject, but also as a 
case of an especially productive relationship between techno-science and gov-
ernance of the state. My study builds on both approaches (Cold War securitisa-
                                      
12 Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). It is a popular cliché in the history of 
science and technology to label centuries according to their “key machine”: thus the 17th and early 
18th centuries would be seen as the age of clocks, the later 18th and the 19th centuries the age of 
steam engines, while the 20th century, according to Wiener, was the age of communication and 
control. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and in the 
Machine (Cambridge: The Technology Press of MIT, 1965), 39. See also Andrew Barry, Political 
Machines: Governing a Technological Society (London: Athlone, 2001). 
13 Mayr, Authority, Liberty and Automatic Machinery, 127-9; Bennett, A History of Control Engi-
neering, 1-5. 
14 The early impact of the computer on governing in the USA and Britain is thoroughly analysed 
in Jon Agar, The Government Machine. A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003). 
15 David A. Mindell, “Bodies, Ideas, and Dynamics: Historical Perspectives on Systems Thinking 
in Engineering.” In MIT Working Paper Series, ESD-WP-2003-01.23, 23 January 2003, < 
http://esd.mit.edu/wps/2003.htm> (5 May 2008). 
16 Holmqvist. See also an informative edited collection, Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. 
Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers. The Systems Approach in Management and Engineer-
ing, World War II and After (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000); Hayles; Reinhold 
Martin, The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media and Corporate Space (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003). 
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tion and conceptual search for a model of governance) and extends them into 
the social and political effects of cybernetic techno-science in the Soviet Union.  
It is important to add that the history of cybernetics occupied a special 
place in Soviet historiography: it was paramount in the techno-scientifically 
oriented “modernisation” approach to Soviet history. As opposed to the totali-
tarian and revisionist schools,17 the representatives of the modernisation ap-
proach considered that to describe Party governance as a one-way flow of deci-
sions from the centralised administrative hierarchy, enabling a total control of 
population, was incorrect. Although it was heavily centralised, Party rule would 
be better characterised not by domination, but by ongoing negotiation with insti-
tutions and individuals. For instance, Gerovitch and Nikolai Krementsov re-
jected this central governance-focused approach by showing that the internal 
personal and institutional contests among scientists contributed towards making 
Soviet science and technology.18  
Besides rejecting the idea of central domination, the modernisation ap-
proach suggested that Soviet history should be interpreted as a part of broader 
Western history. They saw Soviet developments as being open to external influ-
ences, especially the international transfer of knowledge. This was especially 
evident in the history of sciences and technologies. After World War II, West-
ern technology evolved towards sophisticated intelligent machinery, which de-
manded the free flow of information and corresponding administrative struc-
tures, all of which were expected to transform society by making individuals 
more egalitarian and mobile. In the process of transferring new technologies 
from the West, the Soviet Union also imported a particular “technical rational-
ity”.19 The studies published in the 1960s and the 1970s argued that imported 
Western technology would transform the Soviet regime from within, and be-
cause of technological isomorphism, the communist and capitalist systems 
would eventually converge (the convergence theory was eagerly rejected by 
Soviet scientists).20 The symbiosis between Marxism and cybernetics was ex-
                                      
17 The totalitarian school was strongly influenced by the ideas of Hannah Arendt and regarded the 
Soviet system as centrally dominated. These studies focused on the central organs of government 
and Realpolitik conducted by individuals and studied how the centralised control succeeded or 
failed to repress the lower levels. The revisionist school explained the various Soviet develop-
ments as a result of lower level politics, especially internal institutional struggles, which often 
undermined the centrally set policies. The recent and growing studies of Soviet everyday life also 
belong to the revisionist approach. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New 
York: A Harvest Book, 1994). 
18 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak; Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). 
19See Frederic J. Fleron Jr., “Introduction,” in Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-
Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism, ed. F. J. Fleron Jr (New York, London: Praeger, 
1977), 3. 
20 This is largely the argument underlying the conference proceedings edited by Fleron, Technol-
ogy and Communist Culture; also Scott Shane, Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the 
Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994). Yet Erik Hoffmann quite correctly pointed out that 
the introduction of computers in decision-making will not vest more political power in computer 
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pected to modify the hegemonic Marxist-Leninist ideology.21 Furthermore, the 
outcomes of Soviet techno-scientific transfer were considered in light of West-
ern debates about technocracy and democracy. Curiously, whilst technocracy 
was seen as a threat to Western democratic processes, especially participation, 
some saw it as a potentially democratising force in the Soviet regime, as the 
growing power of experts was expected to limit the power of the Party.22 It 
must be noted that a different view was proposed by later scholars, such as 
Rudra Sil, who argued that the Soviet regime was prone to adjust the elements 
of Western rationalisation of management borrowed from the West, especially 
sciences and technologies, to their local norms and institutions.23  
After 1991, the modernisation school, especially techno-science studies, 
fell victim to the revised political context of academic research. To my knowl-
edge, the excellent, stimulating studies, such as those by Erik Hoffmann, Wil-
liam Conyngham and Mark Beissinger, are hardly used now for understanding 
the post-Soviet transformation.24 It appears that during the Cold War, the 
techno-scientific development of the Soviet Union was of strategic importance 
to the West, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union interest in the scientific-
technological aspect of Soviet governance declined (which may well have to do 
with the fact that during the 1990s Russia ceased to be a military threat and 
appeared to be incapable of producing major techno-scientific innovations; 
though recent years have demonstrated the efforts of the Russian government to 
reverse this trend). Instead, it seems that ethnicity and nationalism were consid-
ered to have had the most important role in the demise and doom of the Soviet 
Union.  
                                                                                                                                  
technicians (thus there would not be a computer-technocracy), Erik P. Hoffmann, “Technology, 
Values, and Political Power in the Soviet Union: Do Computers Matter?” in Technology and 
Communist Culture, 401-407. 
21 Silviu Brucan, The Dissolution of Power: A Sociology of International Relations and Politics 
(New York: Knopf, 1971), xii, cf Frederic J. Fleron Jr., “Introduction,” in Technology and Com-
munist Culture, 53. As Halal has put it, “systems of political economy tend to gradually incorpo-
rate both democratic and free enterprise principles so as to converge toward the democratic free 
enterprise mode”. Halal, 553-572. 
22 Soviet developments were connected to the Western debates about technocracy and democracy. 
See for example Leon Smolinski, Technocratic Elements in Soviet Socialism (Hamilton: McMas-
ter University, 1970); Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: 
Sage, 1990). Curiously, whilst technocracy was seen as a threat to Western democratic processes, 
especially participation, some saw it as a potentially democratising force in the Soviet regime, as 
it would limit the power of the Party. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet 
Politics (New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 
23 Sil. 
24 Interestingly, although the famous historian of the Soviet Union Fitzpatrick drew attention to 
the modernisation approach in Soviet studies which was formulated in the 1960s-1970s and cur-
rently tends to be forgotten in the distinction between totalitarian school and revisionists, yet she 
did not mention Soviet science and technology studies as relevant to Soviet political history. 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Politics as Practice. Thoughts on a New Soviet Political History,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no.1 (2004), 27-54. 
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This current lack of appreciation for the achievements of the modernisa-
tion school is particularly true for the history of Lithuania (as well as the other 
two Soviet Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia). In their historiographies, na-
tionalism studies had a particular impetus, because Baltic nationalist movements 
played a crucial role in breaking away from the Soviet Union. However, West-
ern scholarship about Soviet Baltic/Lithuanian techno-science and governance 
is also very scarce when compared with Soviet Russian or Western scholarship. 
At the time of writing, there is no single professional historian or sociologist of 
science and technology in Lithuanian academic institutes. Normally, technology 
and sciences have been only briefly touched upon in general histories of the 
country,25 described either by natural scientists, such as Laimutis Telksnys and 
Jonas Kubilius,26 or by dedicated amateur historians, such as Jonas Rudokas.27 
It is little wonder then that Soviet attempts at cybernetically-equipped “scien-
tific governance” are in the recent, but somewhat forgotten past.  
My dissertation seeks to bridge this gap in empirical knowledge, re-
actualise the modernisation approach in Soviet studies and contribute to the 
general historiography of science and technologies with a new, interdisciplinary 
study. Equally, my work is distinctive beacuse the above-mentioned studies 
concentrated either on the politics of science and technology conducted at the 
highest echelons of the Central Committee and the Academy of Sciences28 or 
analysed strategically important sectors, such as the military or large-scale 
heavy industrial management.29 In this context, my study of cultural policy, a 
                                      
25 Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, Baltic States: The Years of Dependence (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2006).  
26 Laimutis Telksnys and Antanas Zilinskas, “Computers in Lithuania,” IEEE Annals 3 (1999), 
31-37; Jonas Kubilius, “Kibernetikos pradžia Lietuvoje,” Mokslas ir gyvenimas 6 (1999). 
27 The only monograph about the history of Lithuanian science and technology in 1957-1965 was 
written by an engineer. This study focused on the period of Khrushchev’s economic councils’ 
(sovnarkhoz) reform, which entailed a decentralisation of the economy and coincided with the 
scientific and industrial boom in Lithuania. The Lithuanian SSR was subsequently entitled to 
more autonomous decision-making in many areas of industry. The book sought to rehabilitate the 
Soviet period by focusing on the “positive” story of the development of “un-ideologised machin-
ery” and progressive high-tech industries. The author re-enacted a typical Soviet strategy of the 
neutralisation of technologies which justified borrowing from the West. He also expressed a 
nationalistic pro-Lithuanian stance regarding the policies of scientific and industrial managers, 
mostly expressed in recruiting local, ethnic Lithuanian or at least non-Russian, staff both in aca-
demic institutes and factories, hence its title The History We Can be Proud of. Jonas Rudokas, 
Istorija, kuria galime didžiuotis (Vilnius: Gairs, 2002). 
28Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917–1970) 
(London: University of California Press, 1984); Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet 
Union: A Short History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
29 Azrael; Beissinger; William J. Conyngham, Industrial Management in the Soviet Union. The 
Role of CPSU in Industrial Decision-making, 1917-1970 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1973); William J. Conyngham, The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management, Socioeco-
nomic Development and the Search for Viability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); 
Michael E. Urban, The Ideology of Administration. American and Soviet Cases (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1982). 
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field that, unlike economic planning, heavy industries or military defence did 
not obviously demand techno-scientific governance, is particularly instructive 
because it clearly shows how broadly some of the ideas and techniques of gov-
ernance have been disseminated and appropriated in the Soviet Union. Never-
theless, the foremost task of my research was to provide a new understanding of 
the history of Soviet state cultural policy itself as a field of interdisciplinary 
interactions. Soviet cybernetics, the object of transfer from the West, was in-
strumental to knowledge production and the calculation-based governance of 
culture. I will now explain how I constituted state cultural policy as my research 
subject in greater detail. 
b) Cultural Policy 
Policy, according to the Oxford English Dictionary is “a course of action 
adopted and pursued by government, party, ruler, statesman, etc; any course of 
action adopted as advantageous or expedient”. 30 The term was similarly de-
fined in New Keywords, as it was seen to contain “plans, programs, principles” 
or “the course of action of some kind of actor”.31 In this sense, the term “pol-
icy” refers to purposive action of both an individual and an organisation, though 
in the scholarship “policy” is traditionally attributed to organisational bodies 
rather than to human beings.32 To study cultural policy, as Tony Bennett noted, 
is to address “relations of culture and governance, which take a more specific 
form; it is to speak of the ways in which, through a variety of means (legal, 
administrative, and economic), governments seek (through a range of specially 
constructed entities: ministries of culture, departments of heritage, arts councils) 
to provide, regulate and manage cultural resources and the uses to which they 
are put”.33
Modern state cultural policy is a historical phenomenon. Generally, there 
was a trend for states to take up the sponsorship of fine arts, institutionalise the 
sponsoring bodies and eventually re-define those activities as a state cultural 
policy. However, historically, definitions of “state cultural policy” have dif-
fered.34 The meaning of “state” depended on the type of political regime and its 
organisation. State cultural policy organs could be those of the central govern-
                                      
30 Oxford English Dictionary, <http://www.oed.com> (7 November 2007). 
31 Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg and Meaghan Morris, New Keywords: A Revised Vocabu-
lary of Culture and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 258. 
32 There can be important individuals and entire policies can be named after them, like the famous 
French Minister of Culture André Malraux. However those individuals are usually enabled to act 
by their institutional positions, like minister of culture or prime minister, president and so on.  
33 Tony Bennett, “Cultural Policy – Issues of Culture and Governance,” Folke Snickars, ed., 
Culture, Society and Market. The Swedish Research Seminar Held at Sigtuna, January 24-25, 
2000 (Trelleborg: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 2001), 13. 
34 For one of the earliest overviews of different models of state cultural policy see Milton C. 
Cummings, Jr. and J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Who’s to Pay for the Arts? The International 
Search for Models of Arts Support (New York: ACA Books, 1989), also Toby Miller and George 
Yúdice, Cultural Policy (London: Sage Publications, 2002). 
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ment, of municipalities or “at arm’s length”, such as councils or other entitled 
non-governmental organisations. In turn, “culture” could be defined both in a 
narrow sense (fine arts, heritage) or a broad sense (anthropological, as a way of 
life, subcultures). The word “policy” could then refer to a written programme or 
legislation; however, it could also mean non-formalised actions or the side-
effects of state regulations and actions.35 The rationales for “state cultural poli-
cies” encompassed a broad area, from nation-building to the social welfare of 
artists, from the enlightenment of the population to ethnic management and 
gender equality, to mention just a few. In the West, the notion of culture as a 
policy object changed from being reserved primarily for the fine arts (“high 
culture”) to an “entire way of life”.36 Leftist thinkers, first and foremost, the 
British scholar Raymond Williams, were among the first to argue for expanding 
the definition and re-formulating state priorities from supporting “the arts for 
their own sake” to mobilising cultural policies for various social, and later, eco-
nomic objectives.37 Such an “utilitarisation” of cultural policy was both wel-
comed and doubted.38 In the Soviet Union, culture was defined in policy dis-
courses both as “a way of life” (expressed in the Russian catch-word 
kul’turnost’ or cultured-ness) and high culture. However, one should not look 
for a particular coherence in cultural policy concepts: I will show that the con-
cept of “culture” in Soviet policy-making was loosely defined and mainly an-
chored in administrative divisions.39  
In this study, I will use the terms “cultural policy” and “governance of cul-
ture” interchangeably, even though I am aware that the notion of governance is 
somewhat broader (a formal state policy could be understood as one among 
many forms or arts of governance, but I will discuss these issues in the next 
section). For the Soviet state to govern culture, it had to have, first and fore-
                                      
35 Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern State (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheat-
sheaf, 1997); Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason (Glenview, IL: Scott Fores-
man/Little, Brown, 1988). Among the state policy instruments the most visible are legislation, 
financing and organisation-building. 
36 In Sweden this process was studied by Sven Nilsson, Kulturens vägar: Kultur och kulturpolitik 
i Sverige (Malmö: Polyvalent, 1999); Anders Frenander, Kulturen som kulturpolitikens stora 
problem: Diskussionen om svensk kulturpolitik under 1900-talet (Hedemora: Gidlund, 2005); 
Tobias Harding, Nationalising Culture (Linköping: Linköping University Press, 2007). 
37 For discussion of Williams’s theory of culture, Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science 
(London: Sage Publications, 1998), 93-97; also see John Eldridge and Lizzie Eldridge, Raymond 
Williams. Making Connections (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); for his policy implica-
tions see In From the Margins: A Contribution to the Debate on Culture and Development in 
Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1997), 27-30, 33-37. 
38 Many scholars pointed out that such objective-setting contributed to seeing state cultural policy 
as constantly failing in the tasks of increasing social cohesion or economic growth. For the most 
representative view see Geir Vestheim, “Instrumental Cultural Policy in Scandinavian Countries: 
A Critical Historical Perspective,” The International Journal of Cultural Policy 1, no. 1 (1994), 
57-71; but also Oliver Bennett, “Cultural Policy, Cultural Pessimism and Postmodernity,” Inter-
national Journal of Cultural Policy 4, no.1 (1997), 67-84. 
39 For a useful overview of Marxist, Leninist and Stalinist notions of “culture,” as well as “cul-
tured-ness” (kul’turnost’) see White, 17-20. 
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most, a formal state policy. In my study, I focus on a particular organisation, 
namely, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, which is part of the central state appara-
tus. Hereafter I will use “state cultural policy” or “state governance of culture” 
to designate a course of action upon culture that is brought about by the Minis-
try of Culture.  
It would not be an overstatement to note that scholarly cultural policy stud-
ies exploded in the 1990s and well into the new century.40 Various aspects of 
state cultural policy were explored by sociologists (Tony Bennett, Jim McGui-
gan), historians (Anders Frenander), political scientists (Kim Eling) and arts 
management scholars (Ruth Bereson) to name just a few.41 Inevitably, the 
agenda of state cultural policy studies has been defined in different ways. Some 
sought to criticise existing state mechanisms for governing culture. Others tried 
to conceptualise different analytical relations between scholarly analysis and its 
object, policy-making. My dissertation relates to the second effort. As Bennett 
put it, one agenda for cultural studies would be the study of “the ways in which 
critical discourses are translated into the policy process and its bureaucratic 
mechanisms”.42 Building on this idea, my study emphasises that the relationship 
between the two is mutual: I will demonstrate how the policy process and bu-
reaucratic mechanism were mediated by techno-sciences and served as re-
sources for critical discourse even in an authoritarian regime. 
One of the tasks of cultural policy studies has been to elucidate and ex-
plore the textual and administrative actions of the state and other organisations 
on culture.43 Such studies are usually interested in what was conceptualised and 
                                      
40 By which I mean academic research, whilst more applied cultural policy studies date back to 
the 1970s. Alongside numerous research institutes and study programmes in cultural policy, 
international and national scholarly journals and an international bi-annual conference were 
launched. Cultural policy studies sought to differentiate themselves from the earlier studies on 
“politics of/by culture,” but the boundary between the two was often blurred, as for instance in 
Miller and Yúdice, 29-33. 
41 The scholarship was concerned with a variety of issues. The uses of “culture” to influence 
social change were discussed in Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science. The changing conceptu-
alisation of “culture” in Swedish cultural policy was studied by Frenander. Cultural policy to-
wards opera was studied as a production of statehood itself by Ruth Bereson, The Operatic State: 
Cultural Policy and the Opera House (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). State cultural 
policy studies as a leftist critical project was defended in McGuigan. There was a search for the 
“real” agent behind cultural policy decision-making in France in Kim Eling, The Politics of Cul-
tural Policy in France (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999). Notably, no similar study of Soviet state 
cultural policy has been done so far. On the other hand, I have not encountered any study of 
Western state cultural policy from the perspective of techno-scientific governance. 
42 Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science, 4. 
43 They also may or may not be involved in studying “cultural politics” or “politics by culture”. 
The latter focus is placed on the power struggles which use or reflect on cultural policy (as docu-
ments or an administrative system). Currently the “cultural politics” studies of the Soviet Union 
prevail: like Fitzpatrick, Brudny and others, they rather focus on the power struggles of individu-
als or their groups and less on the administration and definition of culture. For example Brudny in 
his chapter about “politics by culture” did not define either culture or politics. Yitzhak M. 
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materially constructed as “culture” by state policy.44 In contrast, my concern is 
about what was meant by “policy” or “governance”. I ask how governance as 
such (of culture) was conceptualised and materially constructed. As explained 
in the prologue, my interest in Soviet cultural policy originated from an inquiry 
into the transformation of post-Soviet state cultural policy in Lithuania. In my 
pilot study I encountered the question: what was the departure point for this 
transformation (liberalisation, democratisation)? Just as with techno-science, I 
encountered an incredible lack of published research about state cultural policy 
in the post-World War II Soviet Union; the Lithuanian SSR had received even 
less attention from researchers.45 It seemed that current cultural policy literature 
mainly used a model of communist cultural policy that was shaped in the 1920s 
and 1930s.46 As the American historian of Soviet media, Kristin Ey-Roth 
pointed out, this lack of interest in Soviet cultural policy in the second half of 
the 20th century was probably rooted in a perception that Soviet cultural policy 
had not changed much since its Stalinist inception.47 Another reason could be a 
particular trend in Soviet historiography. The ongoing revisionist turn in Soviet 
studies did not favour central governance-oriented studies. Instead, revisionist 
studies called for re-examining post-Stalinism from the perspective of the ordi-
nary person and focused on everyday life. These studies attempted to counteract 
the prevailing centralised “censorship and control”-focused research used by 
representatives of the totalitarian school. Because I focus on central institutions 
whilst aiming to transcend the simplistic domination paradigm, my study of 
Soviet cultural policy also falls within the agenda of the modernisation school. 
Certainly, some aspects of Soviet state cultural policy were addressed in 
studies of “Soviet culture”, especially the arts. Although they recently came to 
include design, visual and public culture, not to mention quickly growing field 
of Soviet film studies, Soviet cultural studies were traditionally rather elitist and 
                                                                                                                                  
Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 28-56;  
44 Frenander. 
45 For Soviet Lithuanian cultural policy as an ideological control of art styles and artists, see 
Juozapas Romualdas Bagušauskas and Arnas Streikus, eds., Lietuvos kultra sovietins ideologi-
jos nelaisvje. 1940-1990 dokument rinkinys (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventoj genocido ir rezistenci-
jos tyrimo centras, 2005); Danut Blažyt-Baužien, “Kultrin autonomija sovietinje Lietuvoje: 
realyb ar regimyb?” Metai 8/9 (2002), 131-146; Vidmantas Jankauskas, “Dailinink pedagog 
persekiojimas pokario metais.” XIX-XX a. Lietuvos dail. Edukacinis aspektas (Vilnius: Vilniaus 
dails akademijos leidykla, 2000); Stephen P. Dunn, Cultural Processes in the Baltic Area under 
Soviet Rule (Berkeley: University of California, 1966); Albertas Zalatorius, “The Condition of 
Culture and the Situation of the Artist,” Lituanus 38, no.4 (1992), 
<http://www.lituanus.org/1992_4/92_4_03.htm> (5 May 2008). 
46 A good example is Miller and Yúdice, who derive a model of “command culture” of state 
cultural policy relying solely on pre-World War II studies of Russia and Fascist regimes. Note 
that they did not consider either the administrative structure or principles of management of So-
viet cultural policy at all. Miller and Yúdice, 107-115. 
47 Kristin Joy Roth-Ey, Mass Media and the Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s (Unpub-
lished dissertation, Princeton University, 2003), 29.  
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oriented towards the individual, focusing on how the Soviet regime treated art-
ists (mainly the leading ones) and controlled art styles.48 This approach was 
especially evident in studies of cultural diplomacy.49 However, Soviet state 
cultural policy was not only a policy of fine arts consisting of the control of 
movement and expression of artists. It involved the administration of a very 
large body of “cultural workers”, who mainly ran clubs and culture houses. 
Being in charge of the population’s leisure time and combining entertainment 
and enlightenment, these “cultural workers” constituted a majority of the em-
ployees in the cultural sector. Only a few studies have dealt with this aspect in a 
more systematic way; the most important one is White’s study of cultural 
enlightenment after World War II.50  
My dissertation aims to fill in this gap in Soviet Lithuanian cultural policy 
studies by presenting new historical data and offering a different approach to 
Soviet governance of culture. It demonstrates how the ministry’s administration 
of culture was shaped by a broader modern mentality regarding techno-
scientifically assisted governance. Thus, my study looks at state cultural policy 
at large and not at its special sectors. It investigates the very intention to govern 
such a large, loosely defined, heterogeneous field. It shows that, to a large ex-
tent, cybernetic language contributed to the rationalisation of culture as govern-
able. Finally, I argue that this techno-scientific language and these models con-
tributed to making obvious the failure of the communist regime and served as a 
vehicle for criticising the very Soviet ambition to govern at that scale, by those 
means, and for those purposes. 
This not only opens a wide vista for my research but also sets limits. I fo-
cus on a republic ministry and not an all-union one (notably, there was no sepa-
rate Russian Ministry of Culture, Russia being administered directly by the all-
union ministry). The primary reason for this focus is to contribute to Lithuanian 
(and in general Baltic) scholarship by casting light on a field and period which 
remains to be systematically explored. Being one of the first books about Soviet 
cultural policy that would focus on other countries than Russia, it also contrib-
utes to Soviet cultural studies. While the Baltic countries were only occupied by 
the Soviets in 1940, they were the first to break away from the Soviet Union in 
1990. Hence, Lithuanian history provides my study of techno-scientific govern-
ance of culture with a context of radical political change.  
                                      
48 See for example Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revo-
lution to Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Susan E. Reid and 
David Crowley, eds., Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern 
Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000); also John B. Dunlop, “Soviet Cultural Politics,” Problems of Com-
munism November-December (1987), 34-56.  
49 Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History 
(London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2004); David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cul-
tural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Theoretical Framework: Governmentality 
If my focus on cybernetics was inspired by Gerovitch, my investigation of the 
meaning of governance was inspired by Foucault’s ideas about governmentality. 
Recently a Foucaultian framework for studies of knowledge and governance 
regimes was advocated by Bennett for cultural policy studies;51 their application 
for the studies of modern governance was developed by British sociologists 
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller during the 1990s.52 I will now briefly discuss this 
theoretical perspective and explain how it was used in my research.  
The governmentality perspective was famously outlined by Foucault in his 
lecture “Gouvernmentalité” at the Collège de France in February 1978. Foucault 
coined the term “governmentality” to “distinguish particular mentalities or ways 
of thinking about government and administration”.53 In its most general sense, 
the Foucaultian governmentality perspective was a part of the broader intellec-
tual mission to study “governance without government”.54 A typical govern-
mentality study focused not on the central apparatuses of the state but on “a 
rationality of government [...] a way or system of thinking about the nature and 
practice of government”. Governance (note that many governmentality scholars 
use “governance” and “government” synonymously whilst I do not) is defined 
in a broad way as the “‘conduct of conduct’, [...] a form of activity aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of some persons or person”.55 Foucault origi-
nally distinguished the “governmentalisation of the state” as a particular histori-
cal phenomenon, during which the central state government delegated regula-
tive powers to non-state organisations. Yet I do not seek to identify “govern-
mentality” as a particular mode of Soviet governance of culture.56 Rather, I use 
                                      
51 Tony Bennett, “Culture and Governmentality,” in Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmen-
tality, eds. J. Z. Bratich, J. Packer, C. McCarthy (Albany: State University of New York, 2003); 
Bennett, Culture. A Reformer’s Science; Tony Bennett, The Birth of Museum. History, Theory, 
Politics (London: Routledge, 2002).  
52 Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Govern-
ment,” The British Journal of Sociology 43, no.2 (1992), 173-205. 
53 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality (London: Sage, 1999), 2. 
54 For a brief overview of the scholarship, see Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, 
“Introduction: A World of Governance: The Rise of Transnational Regulation,”in Transnational 
Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, eds. M.L. Djelic and K. Sahlin-Andersson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7-13. 
55 Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality. An Introduction,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, eds. G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991), 2, 3. 
56 For example, Miller and Yúdice conceptualise the relation between culture and governance as 
anthropological (differences between populations) and aesthetic (differences between tastes) and 
take Foucault’s concept of governmentality as a description of an historical period, during which 
cultural policy emerged. Miller and Yúdice, 3-7. Meanwhile I am trying to clarify the mecha-
nisms which enabled a meaningful governance of culture as a broader mentality of modern gov-
ernance, which could be seen as only relatively limited to a particular period (modern) and defi-
nitely not restricted to population or political regimes. 
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the ideas about knowledge, state and governance developed within this concep-
tual approach to study the relationship between cybernetics and cultural policy. 
In recent decades, many studies that distinguish “governance” as a special 
mode of rule have been published.57 Some emphasise that “governance” oper-
ates with indirect and voluntary means, such as rules and regulations.58 As Rose 
concisely put it, governing is a particular mode of exercising power, which 
could be defined as being different from domination:  
 
To dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity of action of 
the dominated. But to govern is to recognise that capacity of action and 
to adjust oneself to it. To govern is to act upon action. This entails try-
ing to understand what mobilises the domains or entities to be gov-
erned: to govern one must act upon these forces, instrumentalise them 
in order to shape actions, processes and outcomes in desired directions. 
Hence, when it comes to governing human beings, to govern is to pre-
suppose the freedom of the governed. [The italics are mine – E.R.]59
 
Is it possible then to use such an approach to governance for understanding the 
Soviet regime, which was notoriously illiberal? I would like to suggest that 
governance defined in opposition to domination is quite applicable to the Soviet 
regime and has important implications for advancing our understanding of it. 
The distinction between “governance” and the state “government” (which refers 
to the central state institutions and key politicians) enables a different, less cen-
tralised approach to the role of techno-science. From Foucault’s perspective of a 
“mentality” or “rationality” of governance, governance has a lot to do with 
meaning-making activities, such as defining, knowing, and describing. In turn, 
the production and use of knowledge, argued Foucault, was perceived as an 
essential condition for conducting modern governance. Thus, meaning-making 
is not something “secondary” or additional to governance. As Rose and Miller 
put it so succinctly, 
 
The mentalities and machinations of government [...] are not merely 
traces, signs, causes or effects of “real” transformations in social rela-
tions. The terrain they constitute has a density and a significance of its 
                                      
57 Paul du Gay, “A Common Power to Keep Them All In Awe: A Comment on Governance,” 
Cultural Values 6, no.1 (2002), 11. Du Gay argued that this notion of governance typical of neo-
liberalism combined both the elements of bureaucracy and action-at-a-distance enabled by net-
works. A more radicalised view according to which network governance eroded traditional gov-
ernment was put forward by R. Rhodes, “The New Governance: Governing Without Govern-
ment,” Political Studies XLIV (1996), 652-67. 
58 See the edited collection by Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., Transna-
tional Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
59 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 4. 
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own. Government is the historically constituted matrix within which are 
articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of au-
thorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired 
directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their envi-
ronment.60
 
Approached from this perspective, Soviet techno-scientific governance could be 
analysed not simply as the repression of many by a few61 but as a complex 
process of knowledge production guided by a wish “to understand what mobi-
lises the domains or entities to be governed”. It could be understood as being 
formed by administrative structures and managerial techniques, which were 
configured through a particular discourse on the cybernetic governance of cul-
ture. In my analysis, I will use the notions of the Soviet discourse on cybernetic 
governance, as well as that of mentality. By mentality I do not mean a phe-
nomenon, transcendent to a discourse. Indeed, the two concepts are used rather 
synonymously, mentality as a way of thinking is inseparable from its materiali-
sation in a discourse, organizations and practices. My choice to use the term 
“mentality” is motivated primarily by a wish to stress the inter-textual, inter-
institutional, enduring character of cybernetic governance. It has to be noted, 
that I use the notion of “techno-scientific governance” in a relatively general 
sense, which only partially refers to historical Taylorism or the Soviet Russian 
term nauchnoe upravlenie. Rather, in line with Beissinger, I treat techno-
scientific governance as “an intellectually complex set of techniques for coordi-
nating human behavior in organizations or for providing organizational mem-
bers with the skills and knowledge to do so”.62
As mentioned earlier, the formation of the Soviet cybernetic discourse of 
governance tended to be regarded as an indicator of the ideologisation of sci-
ence. For instance, Gerovitch argued that cybernetic terminology was reduced 
to a meaningless language or “cyberspeak” and thus degraded from being a 
language of a “serious science” into an official and ideologised language of 
politics and administration.63 It seems that Gerovitch has indirectly built his 
argument on the perspective of the Frankfurt School and in particular that of 
Jürgen Habermas on science and technology. While Habermas was worried that 
science and technology were about to become a prevailing “ideology” in the 
West, Gerovitch argued that cybernetics was subverted by the hegemonic com-
                                      
60 Rose and Miller, 175. 
61 Benjamin J.P. Peters, “Betrothal and Betrayal: The Soviet Translation of Norbert Wiener’s 
Early Cybernetics,” International Journal of Communication 2 (2008), 66-80. 
62 Beissinger, 4. 
63 Gerovitch defined cyberspeak as a Soviet political discourse that operated with concepts of 
homeostasis and reflex (physiology), behaviour and goal (psychology), control and feedback 
(control engineering), entropy and order (thermodynamics) and information, signal and noise 
(communications engineering). Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 2.  
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munist discourse.64 Such a narrative implicates that there once was a “pure” 
cybernetics, clean of political relations, but later it was degraded by the political 
exploitation of its language. Gerovitch’s study of Soviet cybernetics was part of 
a long tradition of Western criticism of Soviet sciences, in which the uses of 
science and technology by the Soviet government have been widely criticised as 
“degrading”, “vulgarising” and “violating the autonomy” of science. As men-
tioned earlier, it has been traditional to conceptually separate science and tech-
nology and politics into two different if not conflicting spheres.65 However, it 
was not always the communist officials who oppressed the scientists. Albert 
Parry, for example, argued that Soviet scientists and engineers managed to es-
tablish a considerable degree of autonomy in their field and even “subjugated” 
politicians with their professional jargon.66 Regardless of who was seen as su-
perior to whom, the spheres of Soviet politics and techno-sciences were pre-
sented as clearly distinguished from and engaged in a struggle with each other. I 
am convinced that such a separation had a very political message because West-
ern scholars were critical of the harsh control exerted by Soviet government 
officials on their scientists and engineers.  
The governmentality approach enabled me to bridge this gap between 
Party ideology and science.67 From a Foucaultian discourse perspective, both 
could be regarded as particular “regimes of truth”, that is, constituted by rules 
according to which a statement could be accepted as a valid one, which defined 
what could be known and done.68 This stance has important consequences for 
my analysis of the relationship between techno-science, governance and culture. 
It makes it possible to capture and describe a non-causal and multi-directional 
relationship between Soviet science and governance. I will study how the two 
were engaged in a relationship of the production of knowledgeability and gov-
ernability and how they ultimately co-constructed each other. I approach cyber-
netics and related sciences and technologies as what Rose and Miller called an 
intellectual but also material machinery of governing.69 This process of con-
struction took place in language and public discourses and will be analysed with 
the help of a concept of translation. 
                                      
64Jürgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society (London: Heinemann, 1971), Gerovitch, how-
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65 This attitude shaped Vucinich’s history of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Paul Joseph-
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versity Press, 1997).  
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York: The Macmillan Company, 1966). 
67 See Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science, 63. 
68 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972), 27. 
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Method  
As described in the Prologue, this study resulted from working backwards, and 
thus my analysis shares some features with the programme of archaeology con-
ceptualised by Foucault. In line with the agenda of the archaeology of discourse 
defined by Foucault, I sought to reconstruct the techno-scientific discourse of 
the governance of culture in Soviet Lithuania out of the remaining fragments. 
Reconstruction is a key word here because this discourse had never been articu-
lated by writing it down as a whole.70 Further, Foucault emphasised that a dis-
course should not be considered as a coherent system, but rather one that was 
shaped by conflicting rules and marked by contradictions. To describe these 
conflicts and contradictions was precisely a task for archaeological analysis. 
Thus, I will show how conflict, incoherence and tension formed important parts 
of the very work of a cybernetic techno-scientific discourse on the governance 
of culture.71
Studying a broad range of texts, I attempted to untangle the public cultural 
policy discourses and trace their techno-scientific components. My definition of 
“discourse” builds on Foucault’s ideas. By discourse I refer to a particular as-
semblage of statements that explicitly concern the object of my interest, namely, 
state cultural policy and cybernetic techno-science. Drawing on Foucault, I con-
ceive of discourse as a broad array of textual and institutional practices: hence I 
did not stop with an analysis of verbal texts but also inquired into institution-
building and other practices as they were described in published texts and inter-
views. I worked from the assumption that discourse on the techno-scientific 
governance of culture could be reconstructed on the basis of several types of 
material: statements that occurred in official documents, public debates and 
retrospective accounts. In other words, the techno-scientific governance of cul-
ture was assembled as a particular discourse. The very point of this archaeologi-
cal analysis is to demonstrate the heterogeneous composition of a Soviet dis-
course on cultural policy and therefore to suggest that it could be treated as part 
of a broader modern mentality of state governance, which would not be limited 
to a particular political regime.  
The contents of utterances made in public were limited by censorship, both 
internal and external; it was held to be particularly difficult to distinguish lip 
service to the official propaganda from an individual’s own views. However, 
my goal was not to check the analysed texts against “reality” (a usual research 
practice in the totalitarian school is to compare what the agents said and what 
“actually happened”). In my case, what had actually happened was an act of 
speaking, that is, the production of a discourse on governance. Thus, the “said” 
or “written” was a reality, a manifestation of Soviet mentality of governance. I 
refused to take the texts as a “distorted”, ideological discourse, which at best 
could give “a lead”, but rarely “a fact”. Instead of looking for representations 
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71 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 151. 
 35 
that would disguise (or reveal) power relations, I searched for “translations” or 
modes of stabilising and activating certain relations.  
a) Translation 
To analyse the formation of the techno-scientific discourse on state cultural 
policy, I will use the concept of translation as defined by Bruno Latour and 
Michel Serres. Translation is a notoriously difficult literary notion, which was 
appropriated by science and technology studies to describe the complex nature 
of transfer (of knowledge, language, materials) from one sphere to another. 
Serres, for instance, defined translation as a broad conceptual process of “mak-
ing connections, of forging a passage between two domains”.72 In this way, 
translation could be seen as a particular act of linking spheres which had tradi-
tionally been constituted as different. The act of linking, however, involved the 
production of difference. Latour, for instance, emphasised that to translate 
meant to forge new associations out of previously existing components and 
therefore suggested that any translation (and innovation) inevitably was a brico-
lage.73 Latour contrasted this act of translation, which bricolages and trans-
forms, with that of “purification”, which not only enabled to coin a notion of a 
“pure fact”, but also to separate the entire domains of science, politics and aes-
thetics. Our thinking that these spheres were separated, argued Latour, was en-
abled only by disregarding that actually politics, science and arts were inter-
linked with multiple networks. 74  
Translation was also important for me because it indicates a post-positivist 
approach. It discards a search for determinist causal models that would test, for 
example, whether politics (or science, or economy) influenced that particular 
configuration of state cultural policy. Latour thus specified that the notion of 
translation referred to a “relation that does not transport causality but induces 
two mediators into coexisting”.75 It is on this basis that I found the concept of 
translation to be especially fit to describe the non-determining role of Soviet 
techno-sciences: the use of the same governing technologies as in the West did 
not directly result in modifications of the Soviet political regime. Instead, trans-
lation guides the researcher’s attention to the act of spotting durabilities, for 
example, expressed in language or materials.76 Thus, my study of the translation 
of techno-sciences into the governance of culture does not mean that I look at 
how “well” the original theories were retold or explained in other discourses. 
Instead, I look at how these theories and technologies – such as names, princi-
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ples, vocabularies, models, machines – appeared in a variety of guises in public 
discourses on the governance of culture and what they did there. Finally, as 
Hayles emphasised, cybernetic steering underwent such a vast number of trans-
lations in various fields that it would be particularly difficult to establish a ge-
nealogical relationship.77 Thus, like Hayles, I will focus on typological similari-
ties and not the genealogical roots of translations; however, my analysis aims to 
be not only a synchronic snapshot, but also an inquiry into a history of the con-
struction of a discursive assemblage of the system-cybernetic steering of cul-
ture.78  
b) Materials and Sources 
Most of my Lithuanian archival and published sources have not been systemati-
cally studied either in Lithuanian or English scholarship; therefore, it may be 
useful to briefly describe them. My major sources consisted of archival docu-
ments, published texts, and fully transcribed semi-structured interviews.  
First and foremost, I had to reconstruct Soviet cultural policy-making as a 
special, calculation-based mode of governance. Thus, I inquired into both the 
institutional history of Soviet cultural policy and its relation to the broader sys-
tem of centrally commanded and administratively directed economic planning. 
In this part, besides secondary literature, I relied heavily on the previously un-
studied documents, which are housed in the archives of the Ministry of Culture 
of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania (1953 to 1990) at the Archives of Lithua-
nian Art and Literature. Documents concerning state security surveillance and 
files on Party officials were found at the Lithuanian Special Archives. I used 
materials from the Lithuanian Communist Party archives for obtaining informa-
tion about the ministers of culture and the State Security Committee (KGB) 
archives for the use of computer technologies in the intelligence services (all of 
them located in Vilnius, Lithuania).  
The study of things Soviet always implies additional issues of data reliabil-
ity. It is a complicated problem primarily because there is no consensus on the 
extent to which one can rely on Soviet data; scholars of the Soviet economy do 
not agree among themselves on how to interpret Soviet statistics. Some argue 
that the data represented in internal reports was generally reliable because it was 
for internal use. Further, after the fall of the Soviet Union, archival research 
proved that the earlier calculations of Soviet economy done by the United States 
                                      
77 Hayles. 
78 My cybernetic keywords are slightly differently defined than the ones used by Gerovitch. In his 
analysis of scientific “cyberspeak” discourse, Gerovitch distinguished information, feedback and 
control as the main components of cybernetic steering. It is not my goal to offer better keywords 
for the analysis of cybernetic discourse; even more options have been already suggested by 
Gerovitch. As he put it, information, feedback and control came to describe “living organisms, 
control and communication devices, and human society”. Based on Wiener, Gerovitch provided 
33 further translations of keywords from man to cybernetic system and machine. Gerovitch, From 
Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 53, 88. 
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Central Intelligence Agency were relatively correct. The public Soviet statistics 
alo proved to be quite adequate.79 However, there is no question that interna-
tionally oriented statistical data was heavily manipulated in order to create more 
positive images of the republic (which itself is an eloquent hint at a particular 
role of numbers).80  
To reconstruct the official discourse on the governance of culture I used 57 
speeches and the manuscripts of articles81 written by Lithuanian ministers and 
vice-ministers82 of culture over a period of approximately 35 years (1955-
1990).83 In Soviet Lithuania, publicly delivered speeches underwent a compli-
cated process of editing. A minister’s speech had to be edited and approved by 
the ideological functionaries at the Central Committee. Only speeches to be 
presented internally, for example, at a meeting of the Collegium of the ministry 
did not have to undergo examination by the highly placed censor.84 This proba-
bly explains the relatively small number of manuscripts found in the archives. 
Because of the editing process, their contents were rather depersonalised and 
thoroughly adjusted to the political climate of the moment. Curiously, the earli-
est archived speeches were dated two years after the foundation of the LSSR 
Ministry of Culture in 1953.85 In addition to the unpublished speeches, the ar-
chival folders included the manuscripts of articles, signed mainly by highly 
placed ministry officials and intended either for the all-union Russian press or 
                                      
79 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR 
after 1945 (Harlow: Longman, 2003), 2-3. 
80 When I asked to what extent the statistical archival data from the Soviet period was reliable, the 
high official of the Institute of the State Planning Committee said that as much as one would 
choose to rely on the contemporary statistics. Paraphrasing the British politician and intellectual 
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), he pointed out that “there are lies and big lies and then there are 
statistics,” meaning that both Soviet and contemporary official statistical data should be taken 
with a grain of salt. Interview with a mathematician, Tomas, Vilnius, December 2005. (When 
only the first name is used it means that the name has been changed). 
81 The archived speeches’ manuscripts were not particularly numerous (5-10 per year, sometimes 
none, as in 1953-1956). The first speech found was dated 1955 and dealt with “cultural construc-
tion”. 
82 It was not always easy to identify authorship or date. The majority of speeches were signed and 
an author, an occasion, a place and a date were indicated. I assumed that unsigned speeches be-
longed to the minister or vice minister, whereas the year could be quite certainly guessed (docu-
ments were chronologically arranged in annual folders). But in such cases I indicated authorship 
and year with question marks. 
83 I chose to analyse only archived speeches and not the published ones. The published speeches 
are in principle more accessible, other researchers may want to look at them and possibly on the 
basis of those findings to correct my argument, whilst the archived speeches present a unique 
source as they exhibited an editorial process that is usually invisible in published material. 
84 Based on a private communication with the Lithuanian historian Kstytis Antanaitis, Kaunas, 
2007. 
85 It took about five months to complete the organisation of the Ministry. Liudvika Lisenkait, 
Aleksandras Gudaitis Guzeviius (Vilnius: Vaga, 1980), 200. Moreover, I was quite taken aback 
that the establishment of the ministry was not commented on either by the key cultural newspaper 
at the time, Literature and Art or Tiesa, the main newspaper (the Lithuanian counterpart of 
Pravda). 
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Lithuanian newspapers in minority languages, such as Russian (Sovetskaia 
Litva) and Polish (Czerwony standar), as well as interviews with the Lithuanian 
press. Some manuscripts were prepared for broadcasting on Lithuanian radio. 
The manuscripts were predominantly written in Lithuanian; only a handful were 
translated into Russian and no texts in Polish were found. The speeches ana-
lysed were delivered on various occasions, such as at the LSSR People’s Depu-
ties sessions, the Central Committee and Supreme Council (LCP), large con-
gresses of cultural workers, openings of important exhibitions, and Komsomol 
congresses.  
In contrast to speeches, I treated the articles published in the Soviet 
Lithuanian press as a public discourse, which could be but was not necessarily 
an official discourse. The Soviet press, as Thomas C. Wolfe had sharply pointed 
out, should not be treated as merely a channel of the Party’s “ideological doc-
trine”. Instead, and drawing on Thomas Lahusen, the Soviet press could be ap-
proached as a “site for consolidation and evolution of cultural imaginary [...] 
that involved the public construction of subjectivities through a whole range of 
organisations, practices and habits”.86 While the texts written by the Party ideo-
logical instructors could also be regarded as an official discourse, other texts 
authored by journalists, intellectuals, artists, and other cultural operators consti-
tute a public discourse. Censored only internally at the editorial boards, they did 
have to comply with some official norms. However, as I will show shortly, even 
the texts approved by editorial censors often failed to comply. Even if an editor 
or an author had to face sanctions from the CC ideological committee, the arti-
cle would remain in print. Therefore, there was a space for some individual 
manoeuvring in the press.  
My analysis relies on a close reading of the LSSR Ministry of Culture’s 
monthly magazine Domains of Culture (1965-) and the weekly newspaper of 
the LSSR Writers’ Union, Literature and Art (Literatra ir menas, 1944-). But 
debates about governance, culture and technology were not limited only to the 
cultural press. Since the late 1950s, various Soviet Lithuanian magazines and 
newspapers featured such discussions.87 For example, a specialised magazine 
Science and Technique (Mokslas ir technika, 1961-) published texts written by 
(predominantly, but not only) natural scientists and engineers, who discussed 
the relevance of their spheres to culture and society. The main agent in this re-
spect was a “public” organization Žinija (the Soviet Lithuanian branch of the 
All-Union association Znanie), which organised an astonishing number of lec-
                                      
86 Thomas C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after 
Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 30. 
87 Indeed, the public press was not particularly numerous in Soviet Lithuania. While for example, 
in 1937 some 157 periodicals were published in Lithuania, the number shrank during the Soviet 
regime, when it amounted to 33. Misiunas and Taagepera, 37; Thomas Lane, “Lithuania: Stepping 
Westward,” in The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, eds. D. J. Smith, A. Pabriks, A. Purs 
and T. Lane (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 18. 
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tures88 and published numerous brochures popularising science as part of atheist 
propaganda.89 Book publishing, daily newspapers, radio and television broad-
casts formed another vast source of information.90  
The reason I chose the Ministry of Culture’s monthly Domains of Culture 
and the Writers’ Union’s weekly Literature and Art was that both represented 
important administrative bodies and were also widely read by the Lithuanian 
cultural intelligentsia.91 They catered to the intellectual communities and edu-
cated public of the capital and larger towns. 92 Further, the texts published the 
positions and concerns voiced by not only the official organs but also those of 
certain groups of intellectuals who gathered around their editorial boards. Limit-
ing my analysis to these two publications also ensured an easily manageable 
corpus, which enabled the detection of both thematic and chronological pat-
terns. A few words are needed about the publications, as they may be rather 
unknown to foreign readers. An earlier source, the weekly newspaper Literature 
and Art,93 covered the period before the establishment of Domains of Culture 
(1965).94 All of the republican Writers’ Unions had their respective newspapers, 
such as Literatra un Mksla in Latvian SSR, for example, or Literaturnaiia 
gazeta in the Russian SFSR. I closely analysed Literature and Art from 1946 to 
approximately 1970; however, its material was only used for contextualising the 
data obtained from the analysis of Domains of Culture. I focused on Domains of 
Culture because of its uniqueness in the context of other Soviet publications.  
                                      
88 For example, the archive materials tells us that in 1979 there were 1,470 lecturers on atheism in 
Lithuanian SSR who read over 13,000 lectures about atheism every year. Lietuva 1940-1990, 576. 
89 For a recent historical study of Znanie, see the doctoral dissertation by Michael Froggatt, Scien-
ce in Propaganda and Popular Culture in the USSR under Khrushchev (1953-1964) (D.Phil diss., 
University of Oxford, 2006). 
 
91 According to a Lithuanian historian, establishing Domains of Culture was a part of the ongoing 
relative liberalization of press. About the same time several popular magazines were established, 
like youth culture magazine Nemunas (1967), popular philosophy magazine Problemos (1968). 
Bronius Genzelis, Imperijai grivant: žmons, vykiai, procesai (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventoj 
genocido ir rezistencijos centras, 2006), 181. 
92 As the former editor of Domains of Culture Aleksas Baltrnas recalled, “we decided that the 
magazine should be dedicated to a man with secondary education and a cultural enlightenment 
worker. Therefore – without academic tone, to be simpler, understandable; better a portrait and 
not a review; to speak about culture as a part of life; to let in philosophy, sociology and so on”. 
Vytautas Jakelaitis, Saulei leidžiantis – toks buvimas drauge. Vol. II (Vilnius: Alka, 2002), 207. It 
has to be added that Domains of Culture published a good deal of reviews, but reviewing was not 
its main purpose.  
93 It was published from 1942 as a weekly supplement to the daily Soviet Lithuania (Taryb Lie-
tuva) and from 1946 as an independent newspaper of the Lithuanian Writers’ Union. 
94 Domains of Culture had a predecessor: the bulletin Amateur Art (Liaudies kryba, 1955–1964). 
The editorial team of Amateur Art, based at the Republican House of People’s Creation (Respub-
likiniai liaudies krybos namai), initiated the founding of Domains of Culture. However, I chose 
not to use Amateur Art because the bulletin focused on club enterprises, was more of a practical 
manual and did not feature more general debates on cultural policy. 
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The establishment of Domains of Culture was a local initiative. It was 
made possible by a decree that granted the republican Central Committees the 
right to found a public press publication. The First Secretary (LCP) Antanas 
Sniekus approved the publication with this warning: “There should not be any 
art for art’s sake, and issues of the village should be addressed; you see, vigi-
lance is needed”.95 The title of the magazine (Kultros barai) recalled an inter-
war publication Domains of Music (Muzikos barai).96 In this way, the title 
communicated a particular perspective from which “culture” was envisioned as 
an area to be worked, acted upon; various areas of life could also be acted upon 
with the aid of “culture”. The first issue of Domains was criticised for its lack of 
a “special profile” or an “ideological-thematic core” by the main Party newspa-
per Tiesa. The editors were advised to “occupy a more precise position in shap-
ing a reader’s ideological-aesthetical principles by reflecting the process of en-
riching our socialist culture”.97 Despite this cold reception at the start, the edito-
rial board and authors sought to create an interesting, professional magazine, 
which would by-pass the Soviet ideological limitations as far as was possible 
under those conditions. In a way, it provided the highly placed Soviet officials 
with some “real” feedback about the population. As the LSSR Minister of Cul-
ture Lionginas Šepetys recalled, Domains was always on his desk.98 Beginning 
in 1985, the magazine was at the forefront in welcoming and promoting the 
ideas of perestroika. Many of the intellectuals from its editorial circles were 
directly involved in founding Sjdis, the national liberation movement. Do-
mains of Culture survived the hard early days of post-Soviet transformation and 
maintained and developed its intellectual capital, and today it remains one of the 
most important popular intellectual magazines in Lithuania and is a member of 
Eurozine. Thus, to read Domains of Culture was to follow the development of 
an important Lithuanian cultural institution that, arguably, generated one of the 
widespread, core public discourses on culture.  
As an organ of the ministry, Domains of Culture was always engaged in 
daily policy issues. However, it should not be regarded as the ministry’s loud-
speaker, which only reported its deeds and views. The magazine’s mission was 
broader than that, it aimed to question the important issues of the day. In its 100 
pages, which also featured many illustrations, Domains of Culture resembled a 
“thick journal” (tolsty zhurnal), a famous Soviet type of cultural publication.99 
                                      
95 Jakelaitis.  
96 The former editor recalled that the title was appreciated by the Minister Banaitis since he was 
the author of music textbooks. Jakelaitis, 204. 
97 “Kauk yra. O veidas?” Tiesa, 17 February 1965, 2. 
98 Lionginas Šepetys, Neprarastoji karta. Siluetai ir spalvos (Vilnius: Lietuvos rašytoj sjungos 
leidykla, 2005). 
99 The “thick journal” was a book-resembling monthly that published polemics, interviews, re-
views, but also original and translated academic and literary texts. Domains of Culture like Rus-
sian “thick journals” was initiated and cultivated by a circle of intellectuals, though the intellec-
tual role of the chief editor was not as important as, for example, Aleksandr Tvardovsky’s at 
Novyi mir. For Russian “thick journals” see Brudny, 31-33. 
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The magazine was initiated by a group of intellectuals and cultural administra-
tors associated with the People’s House of Creation.100 Although, as Baltrnas 
remembered, “nearly every” issue was criticised at the Central Committee ideo-
logical committee, eventually the circulation grew to 24,000. However, by the 
mid-1970s, the circulation had dropped, and by the mid-1980s, it was only 
12,500.101 Domains of Culture was widely read by the Lithuanian cultural intel-
ligentsia and as it was available by subscription from abroad, the magazine indi-
rectly targeted exile Lithuanian communities in the West.  
Other published sources included histories and memoirs. The late 1990s 
and early 2000s saw quite a boom in memoirs from former members of the state 
cultural administration and cultural workers. Numerous memoirs about the post-
World War II period by famous theatre and cinema actors appeared. I used the 
memoirs as sources for “facts” only if it was possible to cross-check them with 
other sources. Otherwise, I looked for hints on cultural events that were politi-
cised, controversial, or in other ways important. As sources, the memoirs of a 
vice-minister (1958-1973) and minister of culture (1964-1974) were much more 
useful.102 These books contained interesting descriptions of everyday ministe-
rial work. Besides being informative about ministerial life, they revealed per-
sonal perceptions on what was important and worth describing for the writer 
himself. The memoirs written by third persons about the former Party leaders 
(LCP) were rich in “popular legends” about the protagonists, which conveyed 
the spirit of the times. I read these memoirs in search of their perceptions in 
relation to Moscow superiors and also in order to get a feel for how the authors 
– usually their contemporaries – made sense of Soviet political power. How-
ever, it was not memoirs but interviews that formed my key source for personal, 
retrospective accounts about the Soviet past. 
Both data collection and analysis were significantly informed by inter-
views with Soviet and post-Soviet agents. During six field trips, I conducted 26 
semi-structured interviews with Lithuanian cultural policy makers, cultural op-
                                      
100 Among whom were Vice Minister of Culture Vytautas Jakelaitis (b.1928), Algimantas 
ižauskas, writer Antanas Vengris (b.1912), editor for art Algis Patašius, philosophers like the 
magazine’s responsible secretary Romualdas Ozolas (b. 1939) and Krescensijus Stoškus (b. 
1938). The editorial board also included important representatives of heritage restoration Jonas 
Glemža and Pranas Gudynas, music critic Vytautas Landzbergis, Raimundas Jakuionis, literary 
critic Vytautas Kubilius, later poet Marcelijus Martinaitis. The first editor was E. Kulakauskien, 
but she was dismissed after the second issue was criticised at the Collegium of the Ministry of 
Culture (9 February 1965). The new editor appointed was a prose writer, Aleksas Baltrnas 
(1925-2001), who in the course of tightening ideological control was dismissed in 1972. The 
other editors were M. Marcalis (1972-1978), V.Vizgirda, A. Zdanaviius and Vilhelmas Chadze-
viius. 
101 Lithuanian Soviet Encyclopaedia indicated that in 1980 Domains of Culture had a circulation 
of 16,000 copies. In 1987 Domains started publishing excerpts of The History of Lithuania by 
Adolfas Šapoka (1936), the circulation grew to 25,000 and reached its maximum at 60,000 in 
1989. Jakelaitis, 201-212. Alfred E. Senn, Lithuania Awakening (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1990), 52-53.  
102 Jakelaitis; Šepetys. 
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erators, intellectuals and scientists (mathematicians, physicists, economists), 
who, to varying degrees, were linked to the development of cybernetics. During 
the interviews I took detailed notes and all but three (due to the failure of re-
cording equipment) of the interviews were fully transcribed. The ones con-
ducted at an early stage were used for developing the research design of my 
study; together with later ones, they informed my analysis of the archives and 
published data.103 Thus, interviews were used as a complementary source. 
Among the most important contributions of the interviews was the acquisition 
of some sense of how the different (political, academic and cultural) communi-
ties distanced themselves from and related to each other. In addition, I found it 
very stimulating to discover the informants’ attitudes towards my subject of 
study, as they retrospectively assessed the influence of techno-science on the 
Soviet governance of culture. 
Trust and credibility were the most important issues in gaining access and 
conducting the interviews. My informants occupied positions which were much 
superior to that of my own. As they were senior natural scientists, often pio-
neers in their fields and leaders of major organisations, leaders of cultural or-
ganisations, holders of high governmental positions under the super-hierarchical 
Soviet regime, or distinguished creators – in other words, the key agents of the 
period of my study – they energetically tested me in all possible ways.104 I was 
interrogated about my working hypothesis in order to establish my credibility as 
a scholar. Those who had never met me before wished to know more about my 
affiliation and educational background in order to determine my “trustworthi-
ness” by seeing if they could detect possible academic-political alliances. Luck-
ily, I was considered “safe” because of my position as a doctoral candidate in a 
university college in Huddinge, Sweden; it became clear that I was not involved 
in local academic struggles. My undergraduate education in art history at the 
Vilnius Academy of Fine Arts also put me somewhat outside of the immediate 
world of academic intrigues in the natural sciences; however, I was also consid-
ered an insider (this was reinforced by my postgraduate studies in Moscow). 
Otherwise, trust was rather easily established when I was introduced by infor-
mants’ colleagues, family friends or “brothers-in-arms” – other intellectuals 
who previously were either dissenters or at least clearly anti-Soviet. 
To some extent, I did not strive to encourage my informants to take an in-
terest in my study because I wanted to find out how they defined the field of 
                                      
103 The pilot fieldwork was on 26 September – 4 October (2004), followed with further fieldwork 
in April 2-12 (2005), 6-25 August (2005), December (2005), 31 March – 20 April (2006), and 30 
October – 13 November (2007). 
104 I interviewed thirteen individuals from both natural and social sciences. The most important 
scholars who were both pioneering scientists and founders of the main academic institutions in 
mathematics, physics and cybernetics were selected. The interviews took place in their offices, 
cafeterias and sometimes homes and usually lasted about two hours, but sometimes longer and 
were recorded on minidisk and later transcribed. My questions were centred both on gaining 
information about the biographies and historical events and finding out their individual attitudes 
to the issues of Soviet governance, culture and cybernetics. See Appendix. 
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cybernetics. I tried to talk as little as possible and not to give definitions; I also 
tried to suggest that I would discuss my attitude at the end of our conversation. 
On the other hand, I doubt whether my hypothesis and reasoning could have had 
a bigger impact on them. I was “me”: a young female (the majority of the in-
formants were males) and, obviously, “not a very scientific” (culture studies!) 
investigator. Nevertheless, by the end of the interviews I tried to provoke their 
reactions by recapitulating certain narratives by leading Soviet historians (par-
ticularly that of Gerovitch). Whilst they either agreed or disagreed with 
Gerovitch, all of them stressed that they had not read him and, moreover, were 
not going to! They explained their lack of interest in reading histories of science 
with a lack of time, as they were busy being scientists (thus, being “true sub-
jects” of such histories).  
I think that they cast me in the role of a “chronicle writer”, which had cer-
tain consequences on my field work. It was a good thing, as I was probably the 
first person in Lithuania to begin looking into Soviet cybernetics; the informants 
were generous with their time, documents, advice, contacts, and even more 
advice. However, what I wrote was not a “chronicle” or a list of facts but an 
interpretative account of the events of the past.105 The problem of names was 
soon to emerge. I told the informants that I would record and fully transcribe the 
interviews and promised to keep the personalities of my informants as anony-
mous as possible. Most of them wanted to have their names included in the 
story because they saw my work as “a history that would recount what really 
happened”. On the other hand, some of them probably did not think that they 
had told me anything that could be used against them or they imagined that they 
were strong enough to cope with any consequences that might arise from their 
interviews with me. 
Indeed, up to now it has been usual to publish the names of interviewed 
individuals in histories of Soviet science and technology. I myself have won-
dered whether the works of Western historians of Soviet science had any impact 
on Soviet scientists.106 However, my study is more sociological in nature; it 
deals even more with interpretation and relies on oral history. My informants, 
however powerful they may be, are not protected from wider audiences by the 
Iron Curtain. Keeping in mind that the relationship between the Soviet past and 
the post-Soviet Lithuanian present is highly problematic, I decided not to use 
                                      
105 Not to mention that a chronicle list is also based on interpretative selection. Hayden White, 
The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
106 I could think only of one example of feedback received by a historian of science from his 
source, which was given by Loren Graham in his memoir, where he described meeting Trofim 
Lysenko, already rejected by the Soviet scientific establishment, who was familiar with Graham’s 
research. Notably, if it is possible to rely on Graham’s account, Lysenko was not too bothered 
with criticisms by his Western historiographers. Loren Graham, Moscow Stories (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2006). Otherwise Graham noted that his books were available for Rus-
sian readers only in specialised libraries. 
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the names of my informants (except when they provided me with specific tech-
nical information).  
c) Periodisation 
The periodisation of Soviet Lithuanian history offered by Romuald Misiunas 
and Rein Taagepera has proven to be largely functional in my case. According 
to their classical study, it does not make much sense to divide Lithuanian his-
tory into Stalinist, Khrushchevian and Brezhnevian periods. With the exception 
of Antanas Sniekus, the change in local first Party secretaries (Petras Griške-
viius, Rimantas Songaila and Algirdas Brazauskas) was not particularly sig-
nificant.107 It is important to remember that de-Stalinisation was launched by the 
20th Party Congress in the Soviet Union in 1956 and entailed the revision of 
both the governmental structure of the Communist Party and the recent past.108 
In Lithuania, this coincided with pacification, as the armed resistance to the 
Soviet occupation was eventually put down. And yet both foreign and Lithua-
nian historians argued that the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 was the begin-
ning rather than the end of the Thaw or cultural liberalisation in the Lithuanian 
SSR. Rather, it is argued by Misiunas and Taagepera that the Thaw withered 
away in relation to the Prague Spring (1968), while Russification intensified 
after the death of Antanas Sniekus in 1974. More broadly, I did not observe the 
periodisation of the Cold War as being significant for LSSR cultural policy, 
except during its early stage in 1946, when Andrei Zhdanov launched an anti-
Western campaign in literature and the theatre. Doubtless, a very important date 
was the beginning of the reformist course of perestroika or restructuring, an-
nounced in 1986. My study also operated with a complementary periodisation 
based on techno-scientific development. Here the crucial dates were the birth 
(1948), prohibition (the early 1950s) and rehabilitation (the late 1950s) of cy-
bernetics, the foundation of its key institutes, the establishment of computer 
industries, translations of Wiener’s works into Russian and the publication of 
influential Soviet books on the subject in the first half of the 1960s. It is in rela-
tion to this history of cybernetic techno-sciences that I will interpret Soviet 
Lithuanian state cultural policy. 
Disposition 
The dissertation consists of six empirical chapters, which unfold the narrative of 
the emergence, development and withering away of the Soviet state’s ambition 
to exercise a calculation-based, techno-scientific governance of culture. As an 
interdisciplinary study, the dissertation deals with the historical development of 
                                      
107 Misiunas and Taagepera, xiii-xiv. 
108 See for example Polly Jones, ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and 
Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Neither Baltic 
countries, not the administration of culture were addressed in this collection. 
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cultural policies in both Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Besides providing 
some background information, Chapter III maps continuities and disruptions in 
the development of Lithuanian cultural policy. Mainly relying on published 
studies, this chapter argues that both the Soviet and independent Lithuanian 
governments saw the organisationalisation of the cultural sector as a positive 
thing. Both governments found themselves as major financers of culture, but for 
different reasons. Yet their views as to the centralised state administration of 
culture differed radically. 
Economic rationales were of the utmost significance in shaping the rela-
tionship between cultural policy and the techno-sciences. Chapter IV shows 
how culture was constituted as a governable sphere by the centrally planned and 
administratively commanded Soviet economic system. The economic rationali-
sation of culture, it argues, created important preconditions for the further trans-
lation of cultural policy in cybernetic terms. On the other hand, the economic 
rationalisation gave culture a low priority because it produced non-material 
values, which obstructed its material supply, especially computerisation. 
The translation of cybernetics into the governance of culture took place as 
part of a very broad post-Stalinist discursive transformation in the Soviet Union. 
This is demonstrated in Chapter V, which shows how the language of govern-
ance (or rather management) was both politically charged and neutralised in the 
Soviet Union and the Lithuanian SSR. This chapter points out the limitations of 
the actual computerisation of Soviet management and an ambivalent relation to 
this by scientists themselves. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the general 
features of Soviet cybernetic governance discourse as it negotiated between 
Party ideology, Western organisation and management theories, cybernetic 
principles, and the costs of technology. 
Chapter VI demonstrates how cybernetics was received by Lithuanian in-
tellectuals and cultural operators. Whilst the analysis of Lithuanian management 
textbooks showed that cybernetics was very smoothly translated into the dis-
course of industrial management, it was met with more resistance in cultural 
discourses. Moreover, the attitudes of Lithuanian intellectuals to cybernetics 
changed from being positive to vaguely negative, as the Party started issuing 
directives to “widely” implement cybernetic methods of governance.  
Cybernetics was perceived as an important part of the modernisation of the 
Soviet Union; its role was to improve the economy by making administration 
effective. Whilst Chapter VI focuses on how cybernetic control principles were 
translated into cultural policy, Chapter VII broadens the view and considers the 
role of “the scientific-technical revolution” (STR) in cultural policy discourses. 
It argues that the discourses on Soviet governance of culture gradually evolved 
from optimistic hopefulness, guided by a belief in techno-sciences, to increasing 
disillusionment, especially because of the growing awareness of the environ-
mental hazards. This chapter explicates the productive nature of the translation 
of techno-science into culture: it shows how STR expanded the notion of culture 
as an object of state governance. 
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Did the modern ambition to centrally and techno-scientifically govern cul-
ture fail in the Soviet Union? The final chapter, Chapter VIII shows that many 
Soviet Lithuanian agents thought so. The chapter discusses in detail how both 
highly placed officials and lowly cultural operators doubted the usefulness of a 
calculation-based governance of culture. Thus, Chapter VIII shows that the 
reliability of Soviet statistical calculations and the economic rationalisation of 
culture were called into question much earlier than political censorship could be 
addressed. The liberalisation at the end of the 1980s saw direct, harsh criticism 
of the Soviet regime not only for its centralisation, censorship and ethnic domi-
nation, but also for its ambition to govern at such a scale and by those methods. 
Nevertheless, the chapter points out that the attitudes of the critics were ambiva-
lent towards the techno-sciences.  
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III. Historical Background 
This chapter discusses the development of the state administrative bodies for 
cultural policy-making and their relation to major cultural organisations in pre-
Soviet and Sovietised Lithuania. Its purpose is to show how the ambition of the 
government to administratively govern “culture” evolved in parallel with a 
young modern nation-state (Lithuania) and the first communist country (Rus-
sia). It highlights differences and similarities between these two trajectories. In 
interwar Lithuania (1918-1940), the government was not particularly eager to 
devise a special administrative apparatus for the cultural sphere. However, to a 
larger or smaller extent, it supported the foundation and maintenance of cultural 
organisations (the fine and performing arts and museums, for example). These 
organisations built upon and disseminated a notion of national culture (tautin 
kultra, predominantly understood as the Lithuanian language and folk art), 
conceived as an important vehicle of national sovereignty. However, I will ar-
gue that nation-building by cultural means, which was widely advocated by 
both the independent Lithuanian government and cultural operators, did not 
automatically entail using the central state administrative apparatus.  
Meanwhile, in Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union, the state cultural 
policy was conceived as a centralised administrative machine almost from its 
inception. The guiding rationale of the early Soviet cultural policy was to build 
a new Soviet society by giving the working class something to which they did 
not have access before: literacy, political enlightenment, civilised leisure. The 
goals of Soviet cultural policy were not only civilising but also political (the 
inculcation of the population’s loyalty to the Communist Party) and economic 
(motivating workers to work harder). I suggest that both the Lithuanian and 
Soviet cases could be understood as a state’s expanding ambition to govern; 
however, they envisioned different means of such governance. 
The chapter begins with a panoramic overview of the development of ma-
jor cultural organisations and their relationship to the state government in 
Lithuania. Inevitably sketchy and simplified, this overview is necessary in order 
to understand how, on the one hand, the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940 
brought about totally new methods of cultural policy-making, but on the other, 
resembled the centuries-old Tsarist repressions. I will then map the main Soviet 
administrative bodies and cultural policy rationales as they were introduced in 
Lithuania. In contrast to previous studies, I concentrate less on the repression of 
individuals and more on the structure of the new, Soviet state cultural policy. 
This choice makes it possible to discern different approaches to the state gov-
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ernance of culture. The occupation brought a shift from a loosely organized, 
barely bureaucratically structured state cultural policy in Lithuania to a highly 
organised, centralised one. The specificity of Soviet state cultural policy is fur-
ther detailed through (1) a discussion of its administrative structure and major 
rationales and (2) a description of its leaders, the ministers of culture. What 
were the main governing bodies for culture and what notion of culture did they 
encapsulate and disseminate? What features characterised a leader of Soviet 
cultural administration, a minister? Thus, the chapter provides the reader with a 
systematised overview of the (Sovietisation of) state cultural policy in Lithua-
nia, one that aims to facilitate the reading of the analysis of cultural policy as 
techno-scientific governance in the chapters that follow.  
Lithuanian State Cultural Policy before the Soviet Occupation 
The following discussion relies heavily on a recent work about Lithuanian art-
ists and the state in the interwar period by Lithuanian historians Giedr Janke-
viit, Jolita Muleviit and Dangiras Maiulis.1 Their studies were published 
in the post-1990 period and deal primarily with the issues of cultural policy 
institution building and national identity (Maiulis, Jankeviit) and the rela-
tionship between Western modernism and Lithuanian traditionalism in art 
(Jankeviit, Muleviit). Maiulis’s study focused explicitly on “Lithuanian 
cultural policy”; however, he did not specify what he meant by “cultural pol-
icy”. Though Maiulis attempted to evaluate the development of a relationship 
between cultural operators and government officials as more or less authoritar-
ian, neither he nor Jankeviit and Muleviit problematised state cultural 
policy as a mode of governance. They did not deal with the impact of manage-
rial and organisational sciences on state policies and non-state cultural organisa-
tions; rather, they described the way “cultural policy” looked from below: 
mainly power struggles among different artists‘ groups and their relations with 
changing governments. Thus, no straightforward comparison between the fol-
lowing reconstruction and my later analysis of Soviet state cultural policy as 
techno-scientific governance can be made at the moment. However, a rather 
solid empirical body produced by the aforementioned historians makes it possi-
ble to discern a typologically different relationship between Lithuanian and 
Soviet state cultural policies prior to World War II.  
However, before I begin my analysis, I must make a brief historical detour 
in order to reveal the complex issues of ethnicity and a state regime in relation 
to our theme. It has to be emphasised that during the last few centuries, the eth-
                                      
1 Giedr Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb. Dails gyvenimas Lietuvos Respublikoje 1918-1940 
(Kaunas: Kultros, filosofijos ir meno institutas, 2003); Dangiras Maiulis, Valstybs kultros 
politika Lietuvoje 1927-1940 metais (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 2005); Jolita Mulevii-
t, Modernizmo link. Dails gyvenimas Lietuvos Respublikoje 1918-1940 (Kaunas: Kultros ir 
meno institutas, 2001). 
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nic Lithuanians only briefly exercised sovereign rule over the country’s terri-
tory. Indeed, Lithuania historically featured a profoundly multicultural society 
and a variety of forms of statehood. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania consisted of 
what are now Lithuanian, Belarusian, Russian, Polish and Ukrainian lands, and 
its official language was Ruthenian, that is, old Belarusian. It had a significant 
population of Jews and Tatars. Beginning in the late 16th century, when the 
Grand Duchy became a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1596-
1795), its governing elites and gentry spoke Polish. The Commonwealth sur-
vived for only two centuries. Despite the fact that, in 1772, the French Republi-
canist Jean Jacque Rousseau produced elaborate suggestions as to how to reju-
venate and consolidate democracy in the Commonwealth (he wrote “Poland”), 
the country grew steadily weaker and eventually split among the Russian Em-
pire, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Prussia. After the third parti-
tion of the Commonwealth in 1795, most of the Grand Duchy’s lands became a 
province of the Russian Empire. Despite repeated revolts, only the dissolution 
of the Russian and German empires during World War I enabled both Poland 
and Lithuania to establish their own nation-states. However, after enjoying only 
about twenty years of independence (1918-1940), Lithuania was forcefully an-
nexed to the Soviet Union.  
Thus, it should come as no surprise that my quest for a “Lithuanian” state 
administration of culture in the past is itself a product of the 20th century and 
rooted in the present reality of the independent Lithuanian nation-state. The use 
of the term “Lithuanian” in relation to cultural organisations prior to the end of 
the 19th century is also problematic because at that time, the idea of Lithuanian-
ness was quite different from that of today. Scholars have argued that in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, the meaning of the term “Lithuanian” signified a local iden-
tity of nobles and gentry (szlachta), who identified with both Polish and Lithua-
nian (gente Lituanus, natione Polonus). On the other hand, the term “Lithua-
nian” referred to a language spoken by peasants. It was the latter meaning of 
“Lithuanian-ness” that was selected as the foundation for establishing a nation 
by a group of Lithuanian nation-builders in the second half of the 19th century. 
The linguistic category was translated into ethnicity and applied to some of the 
inhabitants of a territory roughly similar in size to that of present-day Lithuania 
(notably, the majority of the city dwellers were Jewish).2 Since I am more inter-
ested in the organisation and governance of the cultural sector, I will abstain 
from the ethnic meaning of the terms and use Lithuanian in its (contemporary) 
territorial meaning. 
                                      
2 For more about the community of nobles in the Grand Duchy and the multiple meanings of 
“Polish” and “Lithuanian” in the seventeenth century, see Artras Tereškinas, Imperfect Commu-
nities: Identity, Discourse and Nation in the Seventeenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
(Vilnius: Lietuvi literatros ir tautosakos institutas, 2005), 36-37, 46-51. Ethnic cartography 
produced by the Russian empire was used to negotiate both the territory and ethnicity of Lithuani-
ans. See Vytautas Petronis, Constructing Lithuania: Ethnic Mapping in Tsarist Russia, ca.1800-
1914 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2007). 
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The changing state regimes have proven to exert a great influence on the 
development of Lithuanian cultural organisations. As the Dutch art historian 
Robert W. Scheller argues, beginning in the 17th century, a rather close relation-
ship existed between a mode of governance and the emergence of state art insti-
tutions in Western and Eastern Europe. For example, monarchies featured cen-
tral collections of art, which would become the basis for the country’s first pub-
lic galleries, like the Louvre (1792) or the State Hermitage Museum in St. Pe-
tersburg (1764).3 However, from 1572 onward, the regime of elective monarchy 
in Poland-Lithuania began to entail the vesting of sovereignty into many differ-
ent families and individuals, not just a single monarch. In the 18th century, when 
the Polish-Lithuanian “republic of nobles” gained notoriety for being run in a 
democratic, but infamously anarchic manner,4 it is not surprising, argues Schel-
ler, that the Commonwealth did not see the emergence of centralised arts or-
ganisations.5 In addition, the situation was different in the case of education. 
Indeed, as Ann White has noted, the first Polish-Lithuanian public cultural or-
ganisation was inspired by the ideas of the French Enlightenment. In the 1760s, 
the aristocrat and social reformer Pawe	 K. Brzostowski (1739-1827) founded 
his “peasants’ republic” in the Vilnius region. In order to provide the peasants 
with education, he established a “community house”, which contained a reading 
room and a school.6 In addition, it was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
which had founded the Education Commission, a governmental body that was 
active from 1774 to 1794 and was the first of the kind in Europe. On the other 
hand, a similar development in the fine arts was considerably slower in coming. 
It was only at the very end of the 18th century that the first professional artists’ 
educational centre was established. The Vilnius Arts School was founded in 
1797 as part of the older Vilnius University (1579). The first public museum in 
Lithuania was founded under Imperial Russian rule by the Lithuanian lawyer 
Dionizas Poška (1760-1830) in 1812.7 However, whereas the 19th century saw a 
                                      
3 Robert W. Scheller, “Art of the State: Forms of Government and Their Effect on the Collecting 
of Art 1550-1800,” Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art 24, no.2-3 (1996). See 
also Nick Prior, Museums and Modernity: Art Galleries and the Making of Modern Culture (Ox-
ford: Berg, 2002), 15-20, 31-36. 
4 For a brief overview of the “ethos” of the republic of nobles, see Norman Davies, Heart of 
Europe: The Past in Poland’s Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 290-294. 
5 In this the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth resembled other aristocratic republics like the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the Republic of Venice. However, Scheller noted the attempt of the 
last elected king Stanislas Poniatowski to create a national collection to be named Musaeum 
Polonicum. But the idea was not implemented because of the partition of the Commonwealth. 
Parts of his collection ended up in Dulwich College, London. Scheller, 278-279, 285. For more on 
the collections of Lithuanian magnates, see Nastazija Keršyt, Lietuvos muziejai iki 1940 met: 
Lietuvos muziej raida XVI-XX amžiaus ketvirtajame dešimtmetyje (Vilnius: Lietuvos nacion-
alinis muziejus, 2003), 19-35. 
6 This project was within the spirit of Enlightenment: peasants were granted some rules of self-
governance and access to education. White, De-Stalinization and the House of Culture, 45. 
7 The Baublys Museum, with a small library, ancient artefacts and a print collection, was erected 
in a pavilion in a park. The pavilion itself was rather original in a European context as it was 
 52 
wave of new museums and art academies all over Western Europe,8 the devolu-
tion of these institutions took place in Lithuania. This did not occur because the 
country was too provincial. Indeed, before the commercial rise of Riga, Vilnius9 
was the third largest city in the Russian Empire and home to the oldest univer-
sity in the area. Rather, the Russian authorities saw Lithuania as a province too 
disloyal to be allowed to organise on its own terms. Following the Polish-
Lithuanian resurgence against Tsarist rule in 1830, the possessions of 400 re-
bels’ palaces were confiscated.10 Vilnius University, with its architecture 
(1793), drawing and painting (1797), sculpture (1803) and graphic arts (1805) 
departments, was closed after the uprising in November 1832.11 The Imperial 
Academy of Arts (1764) in Saint Petersburg replaced the Vilnius Art School as 
Lithuania’s arts and education centre.12 True, the first large public museum, the 
Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, was established by the Lithuanian Science So-
ciety in 1855, but its displays were censored.13 The museum stayed open for 
eight years until the Tsarist authorities closed it down after another Polish-
Lithuanian uprising in 1863. Further, the Russian authorities banned Lithuanian 
script in Latin (only Cyrillic characters could be used from 1864 to 1904), 
whilst the official language was Russian (Lithuanian was only taught in primary 
schools). Restrictions imposed on public gatherings and the right of association 
lasted until 1907.14 Thus, Russian Imperial politics heavily suppressed the de-
velopment of public cultural organisations in19th century Lithuania. 
As a result, the tight prohibitions gave rise to resistance and counter- ac-
tions. Informal schools, which taught in Lithuanian, were organised in the coun-
tryside; Lithuanian books published in Latin print were smuggled from Prussia 
(Königsberg). Further, the first ethnographic studies of folk songs, traditions 
and art inspired by Johan Hottfried von Herder’s work in Riga (in the 1760s) 
were carried out, while the ethnic maps of the country were produced by the 
Russian Imperial cartographers.15 The intelligentsia fostered increasingly anti-
                                                                                                                                  
installed in the trunk of an ancient oak tree covered by a roof. Clearly, within the context of neo-
classicist architecture, the Baublys made a statement about local Lithuanian identity. Thus, 
Lithuania’s first public museum was not modelled on the stylistic grounds of a Greek temple, but 
used the natural form of an oak tree, which occupied an important place in pagan mythology. 
Keršyt, 52. 
8 Prior, 38-49. 
9 I use the contemporary Lithuanian name (Vilnius) though historically the city was also known 
under the names of Vil’na and Wilno among others. 
10 Keršyt, 59. 
11 Vilnius University was re-opened in 1919; the Art School was established in Kaunas in 1922. 
12 For more about the role of St. Petersburg in the regional history of art, see Jeremy Howard, 
East European Art, 1650-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
13 In 1865 the Museum was reorganised, transferred to the control of Vilnius Library and Russi-
fied. Later public museums included the Museum of Murav’ev in Vilnius (1898-1914) and Kau-
nas City Museum (1896, renamed the Museum of Industry and Science in 1905); Keršyt, 72, 78, 
87. 
14 Lane, xxxiii. 
15 Petronis, 111-115. 
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Russian and anti-Polish sentiments and eventually formulated the idea of an 
independent Lithuanian nation, which demanded a state separate from Poland 
and the Russian Empire.16 Such a state was established on the basis of Wood-
row Wilson’s national self-determination principle in 1918. However shaky its 
geopolitical grounds had been, it formed the basis for consistent, official 
Lithuanian governmental action on the cultural sphere.  
For the historical reasons noted above, upon its birth, the young Lithuanian 
government did not have a central arts collection, a museum or a higher educa-
tion centre: Vilnius University and the Vilnius Arts School had been closed for 
86 years. On the other hand, during the 19th century, vast new resources were 
actualised: a folk culture and the Lithuanian language. These two were chosen 
as the basis for a “national culture”. The significance of folk art was motivated 
by a political need to establish and argue the historical continuity of ethnic 
Lithuania.17 Eager to transform its citizens into conscious “Lithuanians”, the 
government prioritised the 19th century’s model of folk culture: language, 
handicrafts and music. In line with the famous theoretician of nationalism, 
Ernest Gellner, it has to be emphasised that the Lithuanian folk culture was 
professionally assembled.18 Indeed, some Lithuanian international displays 
were criticised because rather than feature the households of early 20th century 
Lithuania, the “typical examples” were drawn from the 17th and 18th centuries.  
The notion of national culture based on folk art and the Lithuanian lan-
guage was disseminated both within the country and abroad. Following a West-
ern trend to “peacefully” compete in “the progress” of industry and culture (and 
later, thanks to Pierre de Coubertin’s idea, in sports), set by the Great Exhibition 
of London in the Crystal Palace (1851), cultural artefacts were used as part of 
Lithuanian foreign policy and as an argument for sovereignty. Even in 1900, at 
the International Exhibition in Paris, Lithuania participated separately from the 
Russian Empire. The prohibited Lithuanian press examples were exhibited 
alongside folk art. After 1918, Lithuania was represented at several international 
art exhibitions, including the International Exhibition of Decorative Arts in 
Monza, 1925, and in 1927 at the Museum of Applied Arts in Paris. Five art 
exhibitions toured Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) in 1931. Fi-
nally, the country was represented at the World’s Fair in Paris (1937), where 
Lithuania shared a pavilion with Latvia and Estonia, and at the World’s Fair in 
New York (1939). Everywhere, even at the International Exhibition of Hygiene 
                                      
16 Darius Stalinas, “Did the Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and Poles in the Northwest 
Region after the Uprising of 1863–64?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, 
no.2 (Spring 2004), 273–289. 
17 These conceptions reflected the geopolitical situation of the country at that time. But in Vilnius 
both the Polish nobility and representatives of other ethnic groups such as Jews or Tatars ran their 
own cultural organisations, some of which founded collections later to be included in the state 
museums. For more, see Alma Lapinskien, ed., Vilniaus kultrinis gyvenimas 1900-1940 (Vil-
nius: Lietuvi literatrosir tautosakos institutes, 1998). 
18 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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in Dresden (1930) and the World’s Fair in Paris (1937), dedicated to “Art and 
Technology in the Modern World”, Lithuania was represented by folk art arte-
facts (and in the 1930s, by folk art -inspired art deco works by modern artists).19  
The first administrative state body created specifically for “cultural” mat-
ters was formed at a very early stage of Lithuanian statehood. In 1918, the pro-
visional Lithuanian government established the Art Department, which was 
headed by a national-romantic painter Antanas Žmuidzinaviius. However, the 
work of the department was soon disrupted by geopolitical events: in 1919, 
Poland occupied the city of Vilnius and its region, and the Lithuanian govern-
ment moved out to Kaunas (Vilnius changed hands and was finally annexed to 
Poland in 1922). Consequently, the most important organisations were moved to 
the provisional capital (Vilnius University, renamed as Stephan Batory Univer-
sity, remained in Vilnius). The major goals of post-1918 governments were to 
educate the illiterate sector of the population and disseminate the idea of a na-
tional Lithuanian culture, as distinguished from Russian and Polish cultures. As 
to the first goal, about 30 percent of the Lithuanian population was illiterate in 
1923 (illiteracy dropped to 5.9 percent in 1941).20 As to the second one, the 
development of professional national culture both at home and abroad was em-
phasised. The poets Maironis and Antanas Baranauskas (who were also Catho-
lic priests) and the composer and painter Mikalojus K. iurlionis, to mention 
just a few, were promoted as the most important creators of “national culture”.21 
For young creators, a state scholarship scheme enabled young, talented artists to 
study at the famous academies and artists’ studios in Paris.22  
Interwar Lithuania was a new, small and very impoverished country: in the 
1920s, during his visit to Lithuania, the British consul complained about poor 
infrastructure and antiquated agriculture.23 True, the economic situation im-
                                      
19 On the international exhibitions, see Giedr Jankeviit, “Dail kaip politikos kalba. Lietuva 
1918-1940,” Menotyra 2 (2002), 46-55; Dangiras Maiulis, “Kultros paveldo apsauga nepriklau-
somoje Lietuvoje (1918-1940),” Lituanistica 4 (2003), 18-39. 
20 Data from Lietuva 1940-1990, 25. In comparison, according to 1897 census, about 70 percent 
of the Russian population was illiterate (the highest rates of literacy were in Estonia and Latvia 
where they approached 100 percent). 
21 Typically for romantic nationalism, national history was written selectively and seen as being 
materialised in the folklore. As mentioned above, crosses and woven pleats were the objects 
which symbolised the spirit of the nation and dominated the displays in international exhibitions. 
Monuments were erected to Lithuanian medieval dukes as the symbols of sovereignty. Memorial 
sites were constructed for unknown soldiers and liberation fighters. The state was concerned with 
establishing public sites of experience and memory, thus encouraging the creation of rituals of 
memorialisation, collection of folklore and preservation of heritage (although no heritage preser-
vation legislation was passed, see Maiulis, “Kultros paveldo apsauga”; Jankeviit, Dail ir 
valstyb; Giedrius Vilnas, “Vytauto Didžiojo kultas tarpukario Lietuvoje,” Lietuvi atgimimo 
studijos 17 (Lietuva ir Lenkija XIX-XX a.) (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2001). 
22 Giedr Jankeviit, “Dails mokymas Lietuvos Respublikoje 1918-40,” XIX-XX a. Lietuvos 
dail. Edukacinis aspektas (Vilnius: Vilniaus dails akademijos leidykla, 2000). 
23 Lane, 9. 
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proved towards the end of the 1930s (an considerable achievement in the con-
text of the global recession of Western economies at that time) but, in compari-
son with Western Europe, the young republic did not boast a great variety of 
cultural organisations. Whilst an art college was opened in Kaunas, the country 
had only a few art galleries.24 It is true that the M.K.iurlionis’s Gallery (1925) 
hosted major exhibitions, but these were based in a provisional venue with very 
limited space.25 A Lithuanian art historian noted that it was primarily because 
the majority of society was either not rich enough or did not possess the aristo-
cratic habit of collecting that the state emerged as the major collector of art 
works.26  
Whilst theatres were arguably the most thriving cultural sector in the 
interwar period,27 the situation was also better for public museums: quite a few 
opened in the major cities. The first decade of independent statehood saw the 
foundation of the Kaunas Museum of Zoology and the Kaunas City Museum, 
which featured archaeological collections (both opened in 1919). The Museum 
of Pedagogy established in 1922, was devoted to the development of Lithuanian 
national schools. In 1923, the Museum of “Aušra” (The Dawn was a periodical 
published by the national liberation movement in 1883-1887) was established in 
Šiauliai, a small town in western Lithuania. The same year, the Literature 
Museum (Rašliavos muziejus) at the Faculty of Humanities, Vytautas Magnus 
University, dedicated to archiving literary manuscripts, opened. The 1930s saw 
the foundation of memorial museums dedicated to the authors Baranauskas, 
Maironis (1936) and the Catholic priest and writer Juozas Tumas-Vaižgantas. In 
1939, the Religious Art Museum was established under the Arts Institute in 
Vilnius. Smaller museums of regional studies, often administratively linked to 
high schools, were rapidly spreading across the country. Though some museums 
were established under city municipalities, most of them were founded with 
civic initiative. These museums were dedicated to assembling and displaying 
the key ideological components of Lithuanian culture as a basis of sovereign 
statehood. For example, the Museum of Pedagogy was important, since it testi-
fied to Lithuanian resistance to Imperial Russian rule, and a period during 
which Lithuanian was taught in secret from 1864 to 1904.  
                                      
24 There were not very many private artistic organisations. For example, the first private art gal-
lery was opened by a Jewish collector in Kaunas in 1932. 
25 Mikalojus Konstantinas iurlionis (1875-1911) was canonised as the most prominent national 
painter and composer (and also nominated as the founder of professional national music). His 
work was influenced by Symbolism and Romanticism. The gallery, dedicated to his paintings, but 
also a collection of folk art and modern and historic fine art, was established in 1921 and 
converted into the Vytautas the Great Museum of Culture in 1936. Ironically, in the West iurli-
onis was known as a Russian artist. George Kennaway, “Lithuanian Art and Music Abroad: Eng-
lish Reception of the Work of M.K.iurlionis, 1912-39,” Slavonic and East European Review 83, 
no.2 (2005). 
26 Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb, 20. 
27 According to the minister of finance, salaries made up about 83 percent of state subsidies for 
theatre in the 1920s-1930s. Actors were the best paid public servants. Maiulis, Valstybs kult-
ros politika, 56-58.  
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It is worth noting that the Lithuanian public cultural organisations did not 
have a strong association with the aristocracy for two reasons. Just like the state 
itself, the founding of the first independent Lithuanian artistic institutions was 
driven mainly by the local intellectual elite, the nation-builders rooted in the 
thin Polish-Lithuanian middle class.28 Indeed, the first temporary government of 
independent Lithuania included a number of intellectuals and artists, many of 
whom were members of the Lithuanian Science Society (1907).29 Second, aris-
tocratic culture was so closely identified with Polish strata that it did not agree 
with the need for distinctiveness, which was required by the nationalist intellec-
tuals. Poland threatened to incorporate the territories of the newly, nationally 
aware Lithuanians, so it is no wonder, some scholars argue, that the high culture 
propagated by aristocrats was associated with the Polish nobility, and that this 
line of the country heritage was suppressed in the official ideology of national 
culture.30 Ironically, it was the Soviet government that re-discovered and actual-
ised the heritage of estate houses in Lithuania.31
In the scholarship, the 1920s and1930s have generally been considered as 
the time of the birth of modern state cultural policy institutions worldwide.32 
However, more fully-fledged organisations were typical of exceptionally au-
thoritarian states – the Soviet Russia (with Narkompros, a governmental agency 
for education and arts set up by Lunacharsky in 1917) and Mussolini’s Italy and 
Hitler’s Germany, which both developed state administrative bodies that made 
cultural policy.33 Nevertheless, some initiatives, such as the Federal Art Project, 
part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policy of 1935, and private philanthropic 
                                      
28 That the majority of East Central European nation-builders came from the middle class was 
revealed in a detailed biographical study by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. Hroch, however, 
did not problematise the “cultural aspects” of the notion of class which he defined on the basis of 
property and profession. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller Euro-
pean Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
29 The Society was the major force behind the establishment of independence: 18 of the 20 signa-
tories of the Independence Act on 18 February 1918 were members of the Society for Science. 
30 Some historians argue that the anti-Polish sentiments were partially a result of the Russification 
policy in the nineteenth century. After their studies in St. Petersburg, many Lithuanian national-
ists came back with opinions about the evil influence of the Poles. See for example the case of 
Maironis, the Catholic priest and canonised national poet, in Alvydas Nikžentaitis, “Jogailos 

vaizdis lietuvi visuomenje,” Lietuvi atgimimo istorijos studijos (Nacionalizmas ir emocijos 
(Lietuva ir Lenkija XIX-XX a.) (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2001), 61. On the 
other hand the rather poor state of many Lithuanian estate houses and palaces, whose owners fled 
the country during the wars, could also be explained by the government’s low prioritisation of 
fine arts and heritage in general. Muleviit, Modernizmo link, 35-36. 
31 Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 149, 165-170.  
32 Bennett, Culture. A Reformer’s Science. 
33 Goebbels’s Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda was created in 1933. On Italian cultural 
government see Marla Susan Stone, The Patron State: Culture and Policy in Fascist Italy (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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organisations, which had geopolitical aspirations, like the Fulbright and Gug-
genheim Foundations, also took hold in the United States.34 By contrast, in 
France despite lively leftist debate and action, which focused on the idea of 
“culture for the people”, cultural investment was regarded as a predominantly 
private affair and was explicitly opposed in authoritarian regimes.35 In a way, 
like in France in the 1920s and 1930s, though for different reasons, the Lithua-
nian government was not particularly active in establishing a central administra-
tion that would use culture and assist cultural operators.  
Between 1918 and 1940, cultural life in Lithuania was driven mainly by 
various civic societies (draugijos), a type of association rooted in the 19th cen-
tury. These societies became major agents for organising exhibitions and estab-
lishing museums and other cultural organisations. They sought to unite inter-
ested individuals who wanted to develop their private interests but also to en-
gage in public action. Societies arranged discussion clubs, established public 
reading rooms, initiated studies and publications, organised exhibitions and 
other arts events, and established other organisations (often related to the arts 
and education). They also acted as lobbying groups when trying to promote one 
or another idea about cultural organisation to the government. As they were also 
gathering points for informal communication and entertainment, the societies 
facilitated contacts among artists, politicians, businessmen and intellectuals, as 
their members came from different spheres.36 Moreover, the societies also rep-
resented different political and aesthetic ideologies, such as conservative, liberal 
and avant-garde, which often resulted in debates in the press.37  
Among the most prominent were the Lithuanian Science Society (1907), 
the Society of Creators of Lithuanian Art (1920) and the Independent Artists 
Society (1930).38 The Society of Creators was established by the artists repre-
senting different branches of the fine arts. The society founded some key cul-
tural organisations, such as drawing courses, the iurlionis collection (on whose 
basis a gallery was later established), opera, dramatic theatre, drama courses and 
a music school. However, the society was unable to maintain these organisa-
tions financially and thus tried to attract government support in various ways. 
For example, it organised a major exhibition Overview of Lithuanian Art (1 
May 1920), and the president, the prime minister, other members of the gov-
                                      
34 For early US cultural diplomacy see Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. For-
eign Policy and Cultural Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
35 See the formation of L’Association des Écrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires (1932), later 
transformed into l’Association des Maisons de la Culture et des Cercles Culturels in 1935. Vin-
cent Dubois, La politique culturelle: genèse d’une catégorie d’intervention publique (Paris: Belin, 
1999), 114, 119–120. 
36 Muleviit, Modernizmo link. 
37 Especially active were modernist artists group Ars (1932) and an avant-garde writers group, 
influenced by the futurists and the Russian poet Mayakovsky Keturi vjai (Four winds, 1924-28). 
38 The Society for Science founded a public library and an historical museum in Vilnius (1907 
and 1908). It was active both in politics and (particularly philological) scholarship.  
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ernment and prominent representatives of the Catholic Church were invited to 
attend the opening. Despite this attention, the exhibition suffered a financial 
loss. Consequently, closer cooperation with the government was sought.39 How-
ever, there was a discrepancy between heated rhetoric, which affirmed the im-
portance of art for the young nation and the fact that the government did not 
provide any help in the acquisition of permanent facilities for similar exhibi-
tions.40  
It was Lithuania’s cultural creators themselves who demanded a special 
governmental body dedicated exclusively to culture. As early as 1922, ideas 
about bringing civil organisations closer to state authority circulated in the 
press. Artistic and other “cultural” affairs were managed by the Department of 
General Matters at the Ministry of Education. Cultural operators repeatedly 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the work of this department. After four 
years, the Arts Department, under the Ministry of Education, was established 
(1926). The department was headed by Justinas Vienožinskis a painter and head 
of the Kaunas Art School. A special Council of Artists was added to the de-
partment as a result of further demands from artists.41 Ironically, the department 
was short-lived. On 17 December 1926, a coup d’etat brought the Tautininkai 
Party (Nationalists) and the president Antanas Smetona (1874 – 1944) to power. 
This was the beginning of what was known as a “soft authoritarian” regime: the 
parliament was dispersed in 1927, and no elections took place until 1936. The 
1938 Constitution established almost absolute presidential power.42 Cultural 
administration also experienced further changes. The Arts Department and the 
Council were immediately abolished, and cultural matters were transferred back 
to the Department of General Matters; in 1931, this department was abolished.  
Interestingly, this devolution of state administration stimulated civic self-
organisation. The Society of Creators of Lithuanian Art was recreated and be-
came the major agent in supporting cultural life and representing Lithuania 
abroad for the remaining few years of independence. From 1926 to 1928, it 
managed a public cultural centre, with a small library and exhibition space.43 It 
must be noted that the society was also financially supported by the state; yet it 
maintained its non-governmental profile. In 1930, the Independent Artists Soci-
ety was established as an alternative to the more conservative Society of Crea-
tors. The Independent Artists Society cooperated closely with a relatively liberal 
cultural magazine Naujoji Romuva (New Romuva, 1931-1940) edited by Juozas 
Keliuotis, Lithuania’s first professional journalist. Between 1932 and 1933, the 
society organised a Naujoji Romuva discussion club located first on the maga-
                                      
39 Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb, 18. 
40 See Muleviit, Modernizmo link, 19, 24. The government generously supported opera, ballet 
and dramatic theatre.  
41 Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb, 19.
42 Lietuva 1940-1990, 2005, 28-29. For a history of liberal and anti-liberal political movements in 
Lithuania, see Vincentas Lukoševiius, Liberalizmo raida Lietuvoje. XIX a. pab. – 1940 m. (Vil-
nius: Valstybinis leidybos centras, 1995). 
43 Muleviit, Modernizmo link, 49. 
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zine’s premises and later in a movie theatre. The club’s events were attended by 
artists, scholars, and government, church and military representatives. Though it 
was never formally registered, the club was active until 1940. It served as an 
important, informal meeting place for the cultural intelligentsia, politicians and 
businessmen.44
It seems somewhat peculiar that the introduction of an authoritarian regime 
implied the devolution of cultural administration. Just as before, cultural opera-
tors continued demanding that the governmental department for culture be rein-
stated. These demands led to the creation of the Department for Cultural Mat-
ters in 1934, in the context of the imminent opening of the Vytautas Magnus 
Museum. The department had direct authority over a broad range of organisa-
tions, including Vytautas Magnus University, the editorial board of the diction-
ary of the Lithuanian language, the archaeology commission, the central state 
archives, the state drama theatre, the M.K. iurlionis Gallery, the Kaunas Art 
School, religious affairs, the state radio and even the meteorology bureau 
among others.45 As I will shortly demonstrate, initially, the Soviet state admini-
stration of culture also featured a rather eclectic assemblage of sectors. Under 
the department, in 1935, a specialised commission for art under the Ministry of 
Education, chaired by art historian Paulius Galaun, director of the iurlionis 
Gallery, (from 1936, the Vytautas Magnus Culture Museum), was created, but it 
was soon disbanded after the establishment of the Lithuanian Artists Union 
(1935). 
On the one hand, this devolution may be understood as a sign of a positive 
attitude towards a decentralised, public organisation of cultural administration 
in Lithuania. The idea was that the Ministry of Education would use the union 
as an advisory, counselling organ; thus, art matters would be administrated as a 
governmental and public partnership.46 The union membership would be based 
on professional qualifications, not on affiliation to certain social circles or po-
litical views, as was the case of some other societies.47 Yet the income of the 
Artists’ Union was derived primarily from government subsidies and member-
ship fees.48 On the other hand, according to Maiulis, this policy-making role of 
the union remained on paper and in reality did not have any perceivable influ-
ence on the decisions made in the Ministry’s department of culture.49
Alongside the comings and goings of the governmental arts department, 
the idea of a culture fund (a funding body) and culture palace (a planning, pol-
                                      
44 Muleviit, Modernizmo link, 49-50. 
45 Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 34. 
46 The Writers’ Union was founded in 1932. Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 19, 22. 
47 For example, the Naujoji Romuva club attracted those intellectuals who were more liberally 
oriented Westernisers, while the Creators of Art Society united more traditional, conservative 
artists of an older generation. 
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private businesses. Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb, 34.  
49 Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 23-25. 
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icy body) was widely discussed in the press between 1926 and 1939. The public 
culture fund was envisaged as being similar to the ones in Latvia, Estonia and 
Iceland, as a public alternative to governmental and private sponsorship, to be 
funded with an excise tax on alcohol and luxury goods and from revenues from 
the penalties collected for public misconduct.50 A Lithuanian art historian noted 
that the structure envisioned for the culture palace resembled the Kulturkammer 
system of Goebbels’s propaganda ministry because it was thought to combine 
different functions (coordinating display, research, education and creation) and 
different arts and intellectual activities.51 However the foundation was not es-
tablished either. It must be stressed that the influential Lithuanian cultural op-
erators did not sympathise with the authoritarian model of state cultural policy. 
For example, in December 1938, the editor of New Romuva stated that a state 
cultural policy should involve “only a system of material, legislative and public 
affairs, whilst the goals and directions of culture should remain within the com-
petence of cultural creators themselves”. According to the editor, if the state or 
society determine the goals of culture, this would “damage all cultural life and 
halt its progress”, as had been proved by the fascist Italian and Soviet Russian 
experiences.52
Thus, the interwar state administration for culture featured mainly short-
lived organisational bodies. However, from the 1920s to 1930s, a trajectory for 
strengthening the Lithuanian government’s control over cultural organisations 
could be discerned. After the coup in 1926, the government became more ac-
tively engaged in controlling freedom of speech. The calls for the state to en-
gage in popularising high culture intensified in the second half of the 1930s. For 
example, in 1935, Antanas Juška, the director of the Department of General 
Matters (for art and culture) in the Ministry of Education stated: “Some propose 
that the state should require obligatory attendance at theatrical performances, 
concerts and exhibitions… Not everybody wants to study, but the state obliges 
everybody to attend at least primary school. If art is also a good thing, why 
shouldn’t it also be obligatory? Art is very expensive, so broad access to it must 
be organised in order that more people can benefit from it. First, people should 
be compelled to take part in artistic activities and maybe then society will strive 
for cultural process”.53 But it was only later – in 1938 – that the Agency for 
Public Works, dedicated to national culture and propaganda, was established 
under the prime minister. The organisation was headed by professor of philoso-
phy and Catholic priest Izidorius Tamošaitis (1889-1943), an active member of 
the ruling nationalist party. The agency’s primary concern was the censorship of 
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51Jankeviit, Dail ir valstyb, 22, 35.  
52 “Kultros politika,” Naujoji Romuva 1 (1939), 2, cf Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 38. 
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the mass media.54 Further, as Maiulis noted, the late legislation issued by the 
Ministry of Education strengthened state control over certain cultural organisa-
tions. For example, the Theatre Law (1939) stated that both state and private 
theatres could only be established with the permission of the minister; the min-
ister was also entitled to close any theatre.55 However, in the opinion of the 
British historian Lane, as long as “a basic pluralism of social and civic organisa-
tions was permitted”, the Lithuanian nationalist censorship should be regarded 
as qualitatively different from that imposed in Soviet Russia and Nazi Ger-
many.56 The main reason for this view was that the principles of state censor-
ship were applied only to the organisations within the state sector, whereas the 
organisations within the private sector enjoyed relative freedom of speech. For 
example, while state schools were not allowed to purchase some magazines or 
books, such as pro-western Naujoji Romuva, the magazine could be distributed 
elsewhere.  
 
To summarize, in interwar Lithuania, most important cultural organisations and 
cultural initiatives were generated by private individuals and public associations 
and not by the government. Frequently, the government even had to be per-
suaded to support it cultural representation abroad. The fact that the main re-
sponsibility was within society was often articulated: “the role of the govern-
ment in culture is completely insignificant compared with the role of society”; 
its function is to encourage initiatives while “the biggest job should be done by 
society itself”.57 Whilst interwar Lithuanian state cultural policy was organised 
around the idea of establishing, disseminating and maintaining national culture 
as a basis of sovereignty, this task was delegated to public associations and not 
central administrative bodies. As Maiulis observed, the authoritarian Lithua-
nian government did seek to influence public associations, but it did not try to 
replace them with state organisations.58 Moreover, the government looked posi-
tively on civil self-organisation. Arguably, organisation itself was regarded by 
the government as a positive feature of society, as it held that “a unified nation 
is an organised nation”.59 This, argued Maiulis, was part of the broader belief 
in a corporate society. In the late 1930s, in particular, the government increas-
ingly expressed its support of the emergence of larger, integrated organisations 
of cultural operators. The “mildly” authoritarian Lithuanian government, so to 
speak, preferred to govern “culture” as an organisation. More importantly, how-
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ever, the arts were not seen as a sphere that demanded either the control or di-
rect administration of the state. This was to change in June 1940. 
The Soviet Occupation 
The short period of Lithuania’s independent statehood ended between 15 and 17 
June, 1940 when, following the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (signed on 28 
September 1938), the Soviet Army entered the territory of three Baltic states.60 
At the beginning of July, with the help of arranged elections, the minority 
communist parties of occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania “won” by respec-
tively 92.8 percent, 97.19 percent and 99.19 percent of the votes in “spontane-
ous” elections. The provisional People’s governments were formed and imme-
diately applied to join the Soviet Union. Vladimir Dekanozov (deputy chief of 
the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), Andrei Vishinsky (organiser of 
Stalin’s show trials in the 1930s and later the Soviet procurator at the Nurem-
berg trial), and the Leningrad Communist Party leader Andrei Zhdanov (who, in 
the late 1940s, would initiate repressive anti-Western and anti-Semitic purges in 
literature and art) were appointed as the supreme emissaries of Socialist Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Estonia, respectively. Both Russians and leftist Lithuanians 
shared positions in the new government.61 Initially, the Soviet Lithuanian gov-
ernment was not entirely negatively received, as few expected the Soviet coup 
to result in a loss of sovereignty. Tolerance for the regime change was rein-
forced by a negative attitude on the part of many Lithuanians towards the for-
mer authoritarian regime under Smetona.62 But as historian Alfred E. Senn de-
picted in great detail, even the newly installed communist government was 
genuinely surprised by the extent of intervention and control that Moscow be-
gan to exert immediately.63 The non-communist cultural operators were even 
less prepared to face the Soviet methods of governing culture, as they were or-
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dered to explicitly declare political loyalty, while rigid limits were set for both 
the content and form of expression. 
Unlike the interwar government, the Soviet regime operated with a large 
bureaucracy, whose aim was to implement centrally defined rationales of state 
cultural policy. Whilst the nationalisation of cultural organisations64 was proba-
bly not regarded as the worst outcome of the Soviet regime (remember the pre-
viously described interwar artists’ efforts to become more firmly anchored in 
the state apparatus), the sudden centralisation overwhelmed Lithuanian cultural 
operators. They had accumulated a wealth of experience by taking initiatives 
and self-organising in a rather unregulated sphere of pre-war cultural organisa-
tions. Obviously, they would soon clearly understand the new limits and revise 
and adjust their habitual behaviour, a process that was extremely painful and 
demoralising to many.65 For example, the purge of staff took place alongside 
with the purge of museum exhibits and library funds.66 The employees at the 
interwar organisations, especially museums and libraries, were initially retained 
but soon many were gradually replaced with far less qualified individuals who 
“politically deserved” a salaried position. It was often the case that the head of a 
library would be replaced with a nearly illiterate communist.67
It has to be stressed that at the time of the occupation, there was no such 
central agency as a Soviet Ministry of Culture. Instead, several governmental 
agencies took care of various aspects of “culture”. From 1920 to 1953, propa-
ganda affairs in Soviet Russia and its occupied republics were coordinated by 
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Glavpolitprosvet (Head Government for Political-Enlightenment Work). The 
Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavlit), a large or-
ganisational body established in 1922, was in charge of censorship.68 In 1936, 
the All-Union Committee on Artistic Affairs was established at the All-Union 
government. The Soviet Artists’ Union was established in 1939, much later than 
the Artists’ Union in Lithuania (1935). As a reminder, the Soviet Writers’ Un-
ion and the Writers’ Union in Lithuania were established in the same year, 
1932.  
The first act of the Soviet Lithuanian government was to establish the Peo-
ple’s Culture Fund in 1940. This action was rather mysterious. One can specu-
late that, from Moscow’s perspective, the establishment of the fund was per-
fectly rational and was perhaps regarded as an extension of another new All-
Union institution, the Art Fund. However, Lithuanian historians have argued 
that the People’s Culture Fund was promoted locally as a special effort and 
achievement of the otherwise puppet government; thus, it took on the aspect of 
a populist gesture, whose objective was to win the friendship of Lithuanian 
artists (remember the calls for establishing a public culture fund in Lithuania 
during the 1930s, which never materialised). Lithuanian historians were proba-
bly right, because the People’s Culture Fund was quickly disbanded.69 The All-
Union Arts Fund, however, continued to exist and even expanded in 1953 by 
absorbing the Artists’ Cooperatives (established in Russia in 1936).70  
Otherwise, in occupied Lithuania, cultural matters remained under the 
Ministry of Education (replaced with the People’s Commissariat of Enlighten-
ment after 27 August 1940). The centralisation of cultural matters under educa-
tion was explained by both the lack of qualified staff and “the need to ensure the 
political direction of the development of culture”.71 The Ministry hosted the 
Agency for Art Affairs, which, by the end of 1940, was moved to the LSSR 
Council of People’s Commissariats. The Political Education Agency was estab-
lished at the Commissariat of Enlightenment at the beginning of 1941. Further 
Sovietisation of the Lithuanian cultural sector was interrupted by World War II. 
The Nazi Occupation 
The period of Nazi occupation in Lithuania, especially in relation to cultural 
policy, has still not been studied in depth.72 The advance of the Nazis clearly 
revealed the dissatisfaction of Lithuanians with the new Soviet regime. With 
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Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, a Lithuanian revolt 
against the Soviet regime broke out immediately. Within one week, the Soviet 
army was pushed out of Lithuania. The front line moved rapidly through 
Lithuanian territory with the active support of an anti-Soviet uprising, which 
caused some but no devastating casualties or destruction.73 The Lithuanians 
were quick to form a provisional government and army, but it was soon made 
clear that their independence was not part of Germany’s plans. For example, the 
companies nationalised by the Soviets were not restored to their owners but 
taken over by the Nazis instead.74 The provisional Lithuanian government dis-
continued its activities on 5 August 1941. Civil governance was exercised by 
the Reich commissariat, which had a department for culture and science. 
Arguably, the one year of Soviet rule (1940) saw much more vigorous or-
ganisational action in the sphere of culture than during the almost three years of 
German occupation (1941-1943). Generally, the Nazi occupation was more 
repressive than productive. The universities in Kaunas and Vilnius were shut 
down in early 1943. Anti-Russian and anti-Jewish propaganda was actively 
pursued in the press and other public media.75 Lithuanians were exposed to the 
most horrendous experiences of the Holocaust. Further, as current research has 
shown, the Nazi German plans were to cleanse the Lithuanian territories of the 
majority of its population; thus, it could hardly be bothered with cultural policy 
during the course of the ongoing war.76  
If an important part of Sovietisation was the ideological indoctrination of 
Lithuanians, Germanisation meant first and furthermost the settlement of Ger-
mans in the country.77 In 1942, the Germans conducted anthropological studies 
in the Baltic states that, on the basis of physical criteria, aimed to select the 
locals who would be suitable for Germanisation (more were found in Estonia 
than in Lithuania). Further, a directive was issued (17 March 1943), according 
to which Lithuanians could be Germanised only in Germany. Thus, there was 
no need for an active policy of “linguistic and cultural assimilation” in the coun-
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tion: Soviet and Nazi Rule, 1939-1991, ed. A. M. Kõll (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2003). 
76 Two-thirds of the Lithuanian population were to be expelled and the remainder fused with the 
German population. About 520,000 Germans were expected to settle in the area over the 25 years 
following the war. Misiunas and Taagepera, 49, 54. 
77 Lietuva 1940-1990, 199, 200, 201.  
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try.78 The ongoing terrorisation of the population was soon to be continued by 
another regime. 
Soviet Re-occupation79
In early July of 1944, the Red Army re-entered Lithuanian territory. The Soviet 
governmental bodies resumed their activity between August and October 1944. 
Yet the Germans only took the last city, Klaipda, in late January of 1945. Both 
the Red Army and the native population suffered heavy casualties in battle, 
while the major Lithuanian cities were badly damaged by bombings and street 
combat.80 Unlike the situation in 1940, the Lithuanian armed resistance to the 
Soviet occupation was launched immediately.81 Lithuanians entertained hopes 
that the West would help in their fight for independence. These hopes were in 
vain: after World War II, the Soviet Union emerged victorious as a great power 
on the world stage, and although Lithuania’s annexation was never recognised 
by some of the Western states, such as the United States, the country, along 
with the other two Baltic states, was reclaimed by the Soviets. 
The years 1944-1945 saw the greatest terror exerted by the secret police 
(NKVD). The Soviet Union was eager to seek revenge on the Baltic states for 
their “treacherous” cooperation with Hitler’s regime. In addition to purges and 
repression, the work of Sovietisation started practically from scratch. Though 
they had to deal with a heavy shortage of loyal, qualified staff, a collapsed 
economy and the resistance of population, the Soviet authorities quickly rein-
stalled their administrative structures of culture. The Agency for Art Affairs, 
together with the Agency for Cinematography, was already reinstated in Janu-
ary 1944. The agency consisted of the following departments: the republican 
agency for the supply of theatres, the Republican House of People’s Creation, 
agencies for personnel, theatre, music, school, fine arts, and repertory compa-
nies, and departments for purely practical matters (planning and finance, ac-
counting, economical-administrative and construction works). The agency also 
controlled both the Composers’ and the Artists’ Unions.82 The Committee for 
Cultural Enlightenment Enterprises was established under the Supreme Soviet 
(14 September 1945). Culture enlightenment commissions at the regional ex-
                                      
78 Lietuva 1940-1990, 242. Lithuanian historians identified many non-violent forms of anti-Nazi 
resistance, among which was “a peaceful fight for preserving Lithuanian organisations for culture 
and education”. In their view, the main achievement was preventing the formation of a Lithuanian 
SS legion. 
79 I limit my discussion only to the most general features that concerned the sphere of cultural 
policy. For more on Sovietisation under Stalin see Misiunas and Taagepera, 76-130; and Lietuva 
1940-1990. 
80 Lietuva 1940-1990, 263-270, 275. 
81 Lietuva 1940-1990, 316. 
82 LLMA, f. 289, a. 1, b. 2, l. 5. 
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ecutive committee level were also established. The commissions consisted of 
five or six persons and were entitled to advise the executive committees and 
disseminate propaganda. However, Soviet historiography itself puts into doubt 
the effectiveness of their effect on the population.83  
Ironically, the Soviet occupation brought to the Lithuanian cultural opera-
tors something that they had wanted for two decades: governmental bodies spe-
cially dedicated to cultural affairs and a commitment to finance cultural activi-
ties. However, this “package” included something that they had not anticipated: 
many more control instruments of cultural governance. In the remaining part of 
this chapter, I will describe the Soviet administration for culture in greater de-
tail. 
Soviet Cultural Policy 
In the young Soviet Union, the governance of culture and the means by which it 
would be accomplished became an enormous organisational project that, since 
the late 1920s, had been part of the broader logic of central planning and direct-
ing. In the historiography, the descriptions of Soviet cultural policy usually 
begin with the intention of the communist revolution government to transform 
Russian society by erasing class differences. A new Soviet society was envi-
sioned as egalitarian, undivided by class or ethnicity. According to Marxist 
theory, the oppressed working class, the producer of real economic value, was 
especially important.84 The empowerment of the working class was a cultural 
project.85 Deprived workers were to be educated, enlightened about their his-
torical mission and granted access to the standards of life and culture that previ-
ously had ben reserved for the bourgeoisie and the elite. Society would be or-
ganised around secular, ideological principles of communism and effectively 
ruled by one Party.  
Thus, the communist political change was seen as a social and cultural 
revolution. Cultural revolution, first and foremost, did not mean the creation of 
an entirely new culture (this was suggested by some and resisted by Lenin), but 
rather the subverting of an existing one, that is, transforming culture (both as art 
and a way of life) from “an instrument of capitalism into an instrument of so-
                                      
83 Diržinskait, 96. 
84 As opposed to exchange value. Karl Marx, Capital. Volume I (Cambridge: Elecbook, 2001), 
chapter I. 
85 For a brief overview, see Christopher Read, “Krupskaya, Proletkul’t and the Origins of Soviet 
Cultural Policy,” International Journal of Cultural Policy 12, no.3 (2006), 245-255. Moreover, in 
Russia, the workers themselves had to be created. For example, peasants were to be transformed 
into workers of industrialised agriculture. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, 
eds., Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class and Identity (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1995). 
 68 
cialism”.86 This was achieved by replacing “bourgeois ideology” with “socialist 
ideology”.87 Socialist ideology primarily meant the democratisation of culture 
(as arts and education) by expanding access, but also the political loyalty of 
cultural operators. As the Lithuanian Minister of Culture later put it, “it does not 
matter how high the level of culture is, it is not real culture if it is not accessible 
to all”.88 For the purposes of democratisation, extensive organisational networks 
were established, which in turn also ensured the channelling of propaganda.  
Other important objectives of Soviet cultural policy were social, economi-
cal and political: it sought to tackle the overwhelming illiteracy problem, temper 
alcohol consumption and gain the trust of the workers for the Party.89 In many 
ways, it was similar to a Western project aimed at civilising the poor: since the 
18th century similar efforts had been made by enlightened industrialists and land 
owners. Russification, an understated goal of Soviet cultural policy in ethnically 
non-Russian territories, was comparable to colonial projects in the West. Thus, 
the model of Soviet cultural policy combined important features of European 
modernity. What made Soviet cultural policy special was the creation of 
strongly centralised governing bodies, which spanned enormous organisational 
networks to achieve their goals.90
Soviet cultural policy also had a famous artistic mission. Initially, this 
communist project engaged Russian avant-garde artists, whose goal was to 
revolutionise the arts within their own fields. Lenin’s deputy of enlightenment 
and supervisor of the arts, Anatolii Lunacharsky (1918-1929), supported that 
particular artistic experiment and the individual freedom of artists.91 After 
Lenin’s death, the Soviet government instituted stricter measures to control the 
form and content of art. The experimental style of modern art was too similar to 
that of the “enemy” capitalist world. Stalin clearly delineated what had to be 
changed: Socialist realism, based on the formal qualities of 19th century neo-
                                      
86 V.I.Lenin, Polnye sobrannye sochinenie. T.36, p.382, cf M.P.Kim, “O sushchnosti kul’turnoi 
revoliutsii i etapakh ee osushchestbleniia v SSSR,” in Kul’turnaia revoliutsiia v SSSR.1917-1965 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 15. 
87 Kim, 17. 
88 LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b.1604, l. 141. 
89 Major means were introduced to decrease illiteracy and introduce “norms of civilised behav-
iour”: for this purpose the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment (Narkompros, 1917–1929) 
was created. During the time of Narkompros and Lunacharsky, the ideas of cultural enlightenment 
and the ideology of industrialisation in some ways coincided with the modernist ideology of 
Russian constructivists. This artistic and intellectual trend was banned after the New Economic 
Policy (NEP, 1921–1928) failed in the late 1920s. 
90 For a detailed and insightful description of Soviet economic and ideological institutionalisation 
of fine arts before World War II, see Yankovskaya, 769-791. 
91 In the 1970s, Lunacharsky was “often pictured as the artist’s friend in the regime – a talented, 
liberal administrator who advocated artistic freedom and demonstrated that whenever possible he 
preferred to judge a work of art on its own terms rather than on purely political ones.” Howard R. 
Holter, “The Legacy of Lunacharsky and Artistic Freedom in the USSR,” Slavic Review 29, no.2 
(June 1970), 266. 
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classical and academic styles, was to replace modern art.92 The contents were 
purged, and in Lithuania, folk crosses were saved by arguing that they were art 
objects and not related to a religious cult. 
It is important to note that artists were defined as workers of cultural 
enlightenment, employees of the state. In my opinion, this was a clear sign that 
culture was about to be rationalised as a domain governed by economic logic 
and run in accordance with scientific rationality. The state, ruled by the Com-
munist Party, was postulated as the only patron of the arts; it was responsible 
for providing artists and other cultural workers with salaries, workplaces and 
homes, and was eager to engage them in its plans to transform society. Mean-
while, the interwar Lithuanian government just “happened to be” the major 
patron (in terms of art collecting), but this role was not self-consciously as-
sumed; rather, it was a result of the generally weak economic situation. How-
ever, some Lithuanian cultural operators were already demanding a higher pro-
fessional status in society. As one painter put it in 1935, an artist should no 
longer be “a scruffy and hungry individual who lives in an attic, but a clean, 
cultural worker, who has his own rights and responsibilities”.93
However, it would be wrong to think that Soviet cultural policy was an ef-
fective action characterised by a well-defined system of organisations, all of 
which succumbed to central control.94 Indeed, the Soviet governance of culture 
was far from being a well- planned, smoothly executed action. In many ways, it 
resembled both Stalin’s hasty industrialisation project and Khrushchev’s “hair-
brain” schemes. For example, Cocks noted that the Soviet administrative struc-
ture “had, in many ways, been a disorganised and disorganising process. Little 
thought or analysis was given to organisational design and developments. […] 
For the most part, organisations simply ‘evolved’, largely in an unplanned and 
unsystematic fashion”.95 Similarly, a Soviet Lithuanian historian complained 
that very often, Soviet cultural enterprises were “founded without a clear sys-
tem, and were not where they were needed but where there was room”.96 I will 
now describe the making of the most important body of Soviet cultural policy-
making, the Soviet Ministry of Culture. 
                                      
92 For Stalin, language as a form of expression should be transparent and effectively carry the 
sender’s message. Socialist Realism was promoted as the state policy with Stalin’s decree “On the 
Reconstruction of Literary and Art Organisations” (1932) and especially after establishing the 
Soviet Writers’ Union (1934). For socialist realism see Boris Groys, “Stalinism as Aesthetic 
Phenomenon,” in Tekstura. Rusian Essays on Visual Culture, eds. A. Efimova and L. Manovich 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); for socialist realism in different media in the 
Soviet Union and abroad, see Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko, eds., Socialist Realism 
Without Shores (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997). 
93 R. Kalpokas, “Skatinanti atmosfera meniniam veikimui pagyvinti,” Lietuvos aidas, 1 July 1935, 
cf Maiulis, Valstybs kultros politika, 61. 
94For a detailed historical account of the foundational period, see Fitzpatrick, 1970. 
95 Paul Cocks, “Rethinking the Organizational Weapon: The Soviet System in a Systems Age,” 
World Politics 32, no.2 (1980), 232. 
96 Pšibilskis, 206. 
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The Ministry 
The establishment of the Soviet Ministry of Culture coincided with Stalin’s 
death (March 1953).97 Curiously, during the same year, one of the first Soviet 
digital computers, the BESM-I, was built. Thus, the year 1953 saw the emer-
gence of the key aspects of my study: a major, centralised state organisation for 
culture, the materialisation of cybernetic techno-science via a computer, and the 
beginning of the transition from terror to more peaceful, administrative govern-
ance. It was at about this time that the actions of a highly organised guerrilla 
war against the LSSR government were eventually put down. This pacification 
was, in literal terms, extremely important for the cultural sector. According to 
Pšibilskis, in the period 1945-1951, about 100 employees of cultural clubs were 
executed by the partisans as collaborators.98 Indeed, even as late as 1961, the 
First Secretary (LCP) admitted that communist control in Lithuania was rather 
arbitrary and had to rely on force and terror.99
The establishment of the Ministry of Culture was part of a larger ministe-
rial devolution designed to consolidate similar ministries. In his speeches, 
Malenkov stated that this plan had been put into place while Stalin was still in 
power.100 The decision to found the All-Union Ministry of Culture was passed 
on 15 March 1953, and on 17 and 23 March 1953 the LSSR Ministry of Culture 
was established.101 It was created by joining seven cultural agencies (valdybos, 
upravlenie): Art Affairs, Cinefication, Culture-Enlightenment Enterprises, Pub-
lishing Houses and the Printing Industry, Professional Education, Radio Infor-
mation and the Book Trade, and Supply and Realisation.102 In addition, the 
ministry had the following staff training and administrative departments: the 
Agency for General Matters, the Department for Planning-Finance, the Major 
Construction Department, the Schools Staff Department, and Central Account-
                                      
97 In comparison the Arts Council of Great Britain was founded in 1946; the Ministry of Culture 
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ing. The Ministry was responsible for the fine arts, arts education, libraries, 
museums, cultural education, book publishing, television, radio and cinema; 
however, in 1958, public broadcasting was removed from its control. 
The regulations of the republic-Ministry of Culture stated that the ministry 
was under the authority of the LSSR Ministers Council and the All-Union Min-
istry of Culture. Note that the decisive role of the CC was not officially recog-
nised: it was declared that the most important role belonged to the Council of 
Ministers (CM). The CM was entitled to plan the “development of the base of 
culture, organise the preparation and distribution of cadres”, and “sanction and 
control” the work of the ministry and other agencies. The council also estab-
lished work regulations, analysed the execution of plans and identified and 
awarded the winners of socialist competitions. It also “assigned the tasks for 
developing cultural enterprises”, decide on the number of students in higher and 
other educational institutions, determine the amount of printed press and state 
subsidies, and establish plan indicators.103 However, Soviet historiography 
points out that the Ministers’ Council was less significant than the Presidium 
(Political Bureau, Politburo) of the Central Committee. All the main decisions 
were made in the Politburo, to which the ministers of culture were not normally 
admitted (information from the Politburo was not even circulated in the CC). 
The Soviet organisation for governing culture was hierarchical, with the 
special governing organs at the top (which “did not directly create cultural val-
ues”) and specially sanctioned public organisations in the middle (which could 
affect only their members). The lowest rung of this hierarchy consisted of the 
“producers of culture”: creative artists and cultural workers and their organisa-
tions. The term “governing” (valdymas) meant “the actions of all state appara-
tuses (all state organs and organisations) in the culture sphere”.104 According to 
the Soviet Union’s constitution (1977), All-Union organs “establish general 
principles of governing culture”, and union-republics exert operative manage-
ment and solve related problems at the local level.105 The centralisation was 
expected to enable the creation of a “unitary socialist culture”, one that was 
national in form and socialist in content.106  
What was the formal role of the Soviet Ministry of Culture? According to 
its regulations, the ministry was the middle tier in the outlined hierarchy of rule. 
It managed the work of cultural organisations in the territory of the republic. In 
relation to the ministry, the local Soviet councils established the departments of 
culture and education at the councils in six cities and 87 districts. These depart-
ments typically had two officers, a manager and an inspector.107 The ministry 
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“directly governed” republican cultural organisations, “drove the activity” of 
creative unions, and carried out a “repertory policy” in concert organisations, 
making sure that only “full-value” works were produced.108 The actions listed 
for the ministry were those of management, supervision and control. 
What did the ministry actually do? The answer would require a separate 
study. I will only note that during its early stage, the ministry essentially contin-
ued the Stalinist post-war cultural policies, which were concerned in particular 
with the situation in the Lithuanian countryside; the latter was riddled with 
armed resistance and unwilling to accept collectivisation. Indeed, the establish-
ment of the ministry did not entail significant changes in the work of previously 
existing governmental agencies. It seems as if the ministry was expected to 
make the work of separate agencies more efficient and effective. Archival 
documents and the press reveal several major tasks of post-war Soviet cultural 
policy in Lithuania.  
Cultural organisations were ordered to work towards establishing the le-
gitimacy of communist rule; this proved to be difficult task. The Soviet gov-
ernment was arguably perceived as illegitimate by the majority of the Lithua-
nian population, especially its intelligentsia. Soviet reforms, in particular collec-
tivisation, were resisted. The archives contain many documents that demon-
strate how explicitly cultural intelligentsia criticised the Soviet regime and 
forecast its rapid decline.109 First, in order to propagate communist ideas, the 
Soviet government actively engaged in establishing broad organisations and 
their networks of clubs, cinemas, libraries and smaller “cottage reading rooms” 
(pirkia-skaitykla) in the countryside.110 However, the reading rooms were gen-
erally crammed, scarce and poorly equipped; film distribution was often limited 
to films in Russian, a language that the majority of the population did not un-
derstand. Second, the Soviet government repressed collective memory institu-
tions: it denied access to archives, shut down museums and purged libraries of 
material it deemed unsuitable. In the beginning, the Sovietisation of museums 
proceeded slowly, as it took some time to come up with a “correct” version of 
Lithuania’s past. Indeed, by the end of the first decade of Soviet cultural policy 
in Lithuania, the policy was criticised because it was centred around libraries 
and disregarded the need to re-open the main museums. In 1954, Tiesa pub-
lished a suggestion by the Lithuanian historian of architecture for the establish-
ment of “a central national museum of culture”.111 Such a museum was never 
established, but new museums, which constructed and displayed a version of 
                                      
108 For the formal organisation of Soviet creative unions, see Tvorcheskie soiuzy v SSSR. Organi-
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109 Bagušauskas and Streikus. 
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Lithuania’s past and present adjusted to Soviet ideology, were eventually organ-
ised. The work of museums was highly regulated. The archive of the Lithuanian 
Soviet Ministry of Culture contains an abundance of regulations and directives 
for existing and new museums, often translated from Russian “thematic 
plans”.112 In line with Foucault’s ideas of the regimes of truth it can be con-
tended that the primary concern of the Soviet regime was to make cultural or-
ganisations function according to its disciplinary needs. In this regard, the estab-
lishment of its regime of truth through broadcasting, the cinema, libraries and 
museums was especially important.  
Despite all these measures, during the first years of its work, the LSSR 
Ministry was repeatedly criticised for not producing results. Thus, in December 
1953, at the republic meeting of cultural workers, it was stated that the ministry 
“did not sufficiently direct the cultural organisations in locality” (vietose, na 
mestakh); instead it only formally “directed them from the offices” and was not 
“deeply” interested in the actual success of their work. The ministry did not do 
enough to provide its staff with housing, instructions and technical equipment. 
Some complained that the “achievements of the Soviet system” were under-
represented in local museums. Moreover, Tiesa criticised the very meeting for 
an “insufficiently pointed question about the communist upbringing of working 
people and giving an insufficient foundation to the contents of cultural organisa-
tions’ work”.113
A year or so later, the situation was not much better. Following the CPSU 
Plenums in 1954, the Central Committee (LCP) issued a decree for improving 
the “mass-political” and “cultural enlightenment work” in the countryside. The 
Ministry of Culture was criticised for failing to increase “the ideological-
political level” of the libraries, reading cottages, clubs and culture houses in the 
countryside. It was accused of failing to ensure proper “normal financing” and 
of preventing changes in personnel. The criticism was harsh: the ministry was 
accused of failing to distribute films and to provide high-quality, political, and 
especially, anti-religious propaganda lectures. These failures were presented as 
the causes for the economic under-achievement of some districts. To counteract 
the criticism, the CC (LCP) instructed the ministry to improve the book trade 
and amateur arts in the countryside and to commission new plays and songs and 
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send them to amateur collectives.114 The expected results were political loyalty 
and increased output of production. The servicing of villages would persist as 
one of the most problematic areas of the ministry’s work. 
The ministry’s administrative structure, with some minor changes, per-
sisted for about 37 years. For example, the cinema, radio and television, and the 
press were separated from “culture” because “the purpose of these enterprises is 
not only to develop culture, but also to satisfy other needs of the society”. In 
1958, these spheres had their own governing organs reinstated: the State Cine-
matography Committee (Goskino) for film and the All-Union State Committee 
for Television and Radio (Gosteleradio) for the supervision of radio and televi-
sion. As Ganley noted, both the structure and operation of Gosteleradio were 
deeply held secrets until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gosteleradio, with 
the assistance of the KGB, controlled all Soviet broadcasting.115 A separate 
state committee for publishing houses and the print and book trade affairs, as 
well as for the agencies and departments of local councils, were established.116 
There were also other administrative reforms of the cultural sector, such as the 
centralisation of libraries and houses of culture in the 1960s and 1970s and the 
creation of sports and cultural complexes in the 1980s. However, these reforms 
involved merely an administrative regrouping of existing organisations and did 
not change the structures of decision-making. The ministry itself faced more 
extensive reorganisation in 1988, but again, this involved merging several de-
partments, thus reducing their number.117
A look at the administrative structure of the ministry provides insight into 
the wide scope of Soviet cultural policy. As Leokadija Diržinskait put it, “the 
social and cultural” activity of the state could be distinguished in the following 
“branches of governance”: people’s education, science, culture, physical cul-
ture, health care, and social welfare. These branches could be further divided. 
The culture branch was defined either through its “particular elements”, like 
fine arts or literature, or “the entire system of cultural enterprises”. In the latter 
case, “governance of culture” meant acting upon enterprises, such as clubs, 
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museums, theatres, libraries, cinemas, film studios, television and radio studios 
and publishing houses. However, in strictly administrative terms, “governance 
of culture” (kultros valdymas) meant “the influence on only those art and cul-
ture education enterprises that are under the responsibility of the Soviet Union 
and the all-union and republic ministries of culture and their local organs”.118  
The Soviet agents themselves emphasised that their administrative divi-
sions of culture were arbitrary. For example, the all-union classifier of the na-
tional economy distinguished “culture” and “art” as separate branches with their 
own organisations.119 It was acknowledged that the grounds for classifying 
theatres as “art” and exhibitions as “culture” were unclear.  
 
Table 1. “Culture” and “Art” in the Classifier of National Economy 
 
Culture 
 
Libraries, film and audio libraries, museums, exhibitions, club enterprises, 
extra-school education, people’s universities, culture and rehabilitation parks, 
botanical gardens and zoos, television and radio editorials, books’ palaces 
 
Art 
 
Theatres, cinemas, concert agencies and collectives, circuses, art studios, 
organisations for the economic management of art 
 
 
Interestingly, the administrative division was accepted as such; there was no 
perceived need to “motivate” it with social, cultural or economic reasons. Con-
sequently, Diržinskait argued that, on the one hand, the arbitrary classification 
was appropriate because “culture” was “only a relatively autonomous phe-
nomenon in a society”. On the other, she suggested viewing “the sphere of gov-
ernance of culture” as consisting of both “a special purposive action of the 
state” and an indirect, “general action of the state”, which influences culture.120 
In the view of state policy, the line between broader “culture” and narrower 
“art” was particularly blurred in the sphere of education. 
The following “forms of governing culture” were delineated: economic 
(“financing, creating a material base”), social-political (“regulating the state and 
public activities of culture enterprises”), ideological (mass information and 
propaganda), administrative-organisational (which aimed to create a system of 
cultural services for inhabitants and to select and distribute cadres).121 Another 
way to distinguish levels of governing, according to Diržinskait, was to specify 
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119 Diržinskait, 20. 
120 Diržinskait, 21. 
121 This division was based on V. Ostriakov, “Upravlenie dukhovnoi kul’turoi v sotsialis-
ticheskom obshchestve,” in Upravlenie sotsialnymi processami v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve 
(Moscow, 1978), 113, cf Diržinskait, 26. 
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the level of influence: directive orders (nurodymas) and regulatory levers, indi-
rect regulation of cultural processes.122  
The Rationales of Soviet Cultural Policy 
Determining the Soviet rationales of cultural policy is not as straightforward a 
task as it might seem. A rather counterintuitive feature of Soviet cultural policy 
was that despite being an over-regulated sphere, it did not have a special corpus 
of “foundational documents”, namely, regulations, guidelines and long-term 
programmes. This sounds somewhat paradoxical because Soviet juridical and 
other normative acts on culture were numerous.123 The Soviet governance of 
culture featured billions of directives, special decrees and detailed instructions. 
Collected from postulates of Marxism-Leninism,124 cultural policy priorities 
were scattered amongst many documents, since they were announced in the 
State Plan, Party programmes and Party congress materials. It was only in the 
1980s that a suggestion to pass a “Law of Culture” in Lithuanian SSR was 
made, but such a law never came to fruition.125  
Further, published Soviet reflections on cultural policy as a whole were 
also quite rare, especially in its early period; more generalised descriptions usu-
ally dated to the late 1970s and 1980s. This in itself suggests a consolidation of 
an official mentality of governance of culture. A good example is a book by a 
highly placed Soviet Lithuanian official Leokadija Diržinskait-Piliušenko, 
published in Vilnius, 1985. Diržinskait was the deputy secretary for culture on 
the LCP Central Committee (1960-1976) and vice-chairperson of the LSSR 
Presidium (1976-1985). The model of Soviet cultural policy described in her 
book provides a good account of the official version of “mature” or “developed” 
socialist cultural policy. While it expressed the 1980s cultural policy model, I 
suggest that, based on what I gleaned from archival research, it also reflected 
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123 For example, although in 1940 July the LSSR People’s Government has passed the “Law on 
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basic, post-1953 administrative features rather well. Whilst the rationales and 
conditions of Soviet cultural policy-making changed over the years, its adminis-
trative definitions did not change substantially.  
The role of the Communist Party (the Party) was central in both defining 
the goals for the state cultural policy and ensuring their implementation: “the 
Communist Party influences all spheres of state and societal life; culture and its 
governance, in particular, are acted on with intensity and purpose”.126 The Len-
inist-Marxist principle of partiinost’ (party mindedness) meant “servitude to the 
CPSU’s goals” and imposed various strict limitations on cultural practices.127 
This action counted on the “educational” or “enlightening” effect of culture, 
which was held to be “the most important goal of the socialist culture – to edu-
cate a man and to create conditions that would permit him to express his crea-
tive abilities”.128 It is hardly necessary to add that, in reality, this goal of Soviet 
cultural policy was so subsumed to partiinost’ that it defined many “expressions 
of creative abilities” as intolerable, if not punishable. Third, the policy was to 
ensure accessibility for people, which was expressed in the principle of narod-
nost’ (translated roughly as “of the people”). The dimension of ethnicity was 
related to this principle, outlined by Stalin in 1925, according to which Soviet 
culture had to be made “national in form, socialist in content”.129  
After the Bolshevik Revolution, the major concern of Soviet cultural pol-
icy was mass education and propaganda, which remained salient until the 
1990s. The emphasis on education was exemplified in kul’turno-
prosvetitel’naia rabota (cultural enlightenment work), promoted and coordi-
nated by a variety of organisations.130 It is important to note that “cultural 
enlightenment work” was restricted to the use of specifically “cultural means”, 
which, by definition, were located outside of educational organisations.131 Thus, 
in 1945 the Committee for Cultural-Educational Work was created at the Coun-
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127 Michiel Elst, Copyright, Freedom of Speech, and Cultural Policy in the Russian Federation 
(Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 11. 
128 Diržinskait, 33. 
129 To note this was a relative relaxation of Soviet ethnic policies, as the policies of Narkompros 
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131 Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsikopediia (3rd edition, 1975). 
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cil of Ministers and functioned until 1953, when it was integrated into the Min-
istry of Culture. However, in the post-World War II Baltic states the populations 
were already literate. Thus cultural enlightenment in occupied Lithuania was 
mobilised to disseminate political propaganda in order to inculcate the popula-
tion’s loyalty in the new government. For example, the first, more comprehen-
sive decision enlisted the forms of governing culture; it was entitled “About 
Cultural Enlightenment Work in the Republic” and was passed on 26 December 
1951. The decision dealt primarily with propaganda, as it called for “explaining 
the party politics to more people”, “educating people in the spirit of Soviet pa-
triotism and peoples’ friendship” and “fighting bourgeois ideology”.132 How-
ever, Soviet cultural policy was very much oriented towards economic goals via 
the proxy of political ideology, as it was assumed that an ideologically enlight-
ened worker would be motivated to produce the largest possible output.133
Thus, I suggest that from 1945 to the late 1950s another major task in-
volved educating and agitating the worker. As White noted, “The effectiveness 
of cultural enlightenment in the countryside can be measured in tonnes of grain 
and cotton and centners of meat and milk”.134 The agitation was conducted 
mainly through “mobilisation campaigns”, organised by the staff of clubs and 
houses of culture. The word “mobilisation” was often used in cultural policy 
discourses and deserves an additional comment. Mobilisation, a military meta-
phor, first appeared in the Soviet Russian press in 1928 and by the end of the 
1930s, was used primarily to denote a way of solving economic problems.135 In 
culture, “mobilisation” also referred to a kind of Soviet ad hoc or avral man-
agement, which, in my view, had a lasting legacy.136 But entirely campaign-
ridden cultural activities were perceived negatively as early as 1953, while in 
the early 1960s, the “mobilisation campaign” approach would be criticised and 
replaced with the ideal of systematic, coherently planned work.137  
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137 “LTSR Kultros darbuotoj respublikinio pasitarimo (1953 gruodis 10-12) protokolas,” 
LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b. 9, l.26., LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b.1164, l. 13. 
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After Stalin’s death in 1953 and especially during the de-Stalinisation of 
post-1956, Soviet cultural policy in Lithuania came to be gradually reformu-
lated as a means of improving the everyday life of the citizens.138 A biographer 
of Juozas Banaitis, the third Lithuanian Minister of Culture, quoted his speech 
at the 10th congress of Lithuanian Communist Part (LCP) in February 1958:  
 
You know how culture in the countryside is changing. Spectators sit in 
a hall, without coats; it is warm, and everybody is nicely dressed. It is 
not like it was before, when everyone was freezing and wearing coats, 
while smoke kept coming from the entrance hallway. We are already 
moving forward.139  
 
This signified a turn from fighting the class struggle to a more peaceful man-
agement of the population in Soviet governance. In 1966, the 23rd Party Con-
gress coined the slogan: “everything in the name of a man, everything for a 
man’s welfare”.140 Recently, it has been argued that that the Khrushchev Thaw 
entailed a greater concern for the welfare of the people at the expense of mili-
tary economy. This concern led to such an improvement of living standards that 
some scholars heralded the birth of the Soviet consumer society.141 I will return 
to this process, which took place alongside “the scientific-technical revolution”, 
in Chapter VII and show how it influenced the scope of Soviet cultural policy 
rationales and techniques.  
 
In his model of biopolitics, Foucault described a transition to population as the 
means and ends of state governance.142 The post-Stalinist development of cul-
tural policy could well be interpreted as a transformation in line with Foucault’s 
thinking. The foundation and development of the ministry coincided with paci-
fication in Lithuania. As the American Sovietologist Beissinger put it so suc-
cinctly, “terror is based on the assumption that resistance [...] is rooted in the 
character of people, not in the character of organisations”.143 According to 
Misiunas and Taagepera, by 1953, the Baltic people came to realise that the 
Soviet regime was there to stay and that it would be better to accept the imposed 
rules than to constantly challenge them. The end of the mass deportations and 
arbitrary terror of the NKVD also contributed towards an acceptance of harsh 
but predictable rules.144 To paraphrase Beissinger, it was perceived that the 
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“character of the people” had changed. Thus, bureaucratic administration and 
managerial sciences came to the forefront (though they did not entirely replace 
the secret police). The career backgrounds of the first union-republic and all-
union ministers of culture indicate that securitisation was of the utmost impor-
tance when it came to cultural policy-making.  
The Ministers of Culture 
Finally, I will discuss the biographies of LSSR ministers of culture, which will 
illustrate how the Soviet attitude regarding an appropriate leader for governance 
of culture had evolved. The career paths of the Soviet (all-union and LSSR) 
ministers of culture demonstrate that understanding good governance of culture 
required special professional expertise. This section suggests, therefore, that 
state cultural administration underwent a certain degree of autonomisation. To 
describe the LSSR ministers of culture, archived Party (LCP) reference letters 
were used. These provide a unique glimpse of the internal Party evaluations of 
the ministers. 
The first All-Union Minister of Culture was Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko 
(1902-1984). Ponomarenko previously served as the First Secretary of the Bela-
rus CP (1938-47) and the general lieutenant and leader of the Belarusian parti-
san resistance during World War II. It appears that his function was to ensure 
the establishment of the institution: after less than one year – in February 1954 – 
he received a much more significant appointment, that of First Secretary of the 
Kazakhstan Communist Party.145 Keeping in mind Ponomarenko’s background 
and later career, his appointment to consolidate the Ministry of Culture testifies 
to the Soviet view that it takes a very strong leader with a military background 
to create a government apparatus.  
In 1954, Ponomarenko was replaced by Malenkov’s team member Georgii 
F. Aleksandrov (1908-1961), former head of the Propaganda and Agitation De-
partment at the Central Committee. Aleksandrov’s appointment was interpreted 
by historians as a clear symbol of de-Stalinisation, since he had been out of 
favour since 1947 when, in the course of Zhdanov’s campaign, his History of 
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 81 
Western European Philosophy was denounced for “ideological errors”. How-
ever, only a year later he was “dismissed in disgrace”.146  
The minister’s chair was then given to former ambassador to Poland N.A. 
Mikhailov who served, according to Slusser, with “great organising ability and 
energy, combined with uncompromising party orthodoxy”.147 After four years, 
Mikhailov was replaced by the powerful Ekaterina A. Furtseva. The legendary 
Furtseva was often called “Catherine the Third” because of her regal man-
ners.148 Indeed, besides occupying leading posts in the Moscow City executive 
committee, she was the first woman to be admitted to the Politburo. In the con-
text of her successful political career, her appointment as the Minister of Cul-
ture was a punishment because Furtseva was accused of disloyalty to Khru-
shchev and removed from the Politburo in 1960. By then she had already at-
tempted suicide, and after 14 years as the All-Union Minister of Culture, her 
second attempt was successful.149
In 1974, the empty chair was filled by a candidate Politburo member Piotr 
N. Demichev, who had been the secretary of the Moscow Obkom beginning in 
1956 and the first secretary beginning in 1959. In July 1960, he was elected 
First Secretary of the Moscow City Executive Committee, which represented an 
important milestone for this aspiring apparatchik. Among other things, he had 
also been a member of the board of Agitprop and had served as member of the 
Central Committee’s Bureau (RSFSR) since July 1959; he became a member of 
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the Politburo CC in 1964.150 In 1985, while preparing for his restructuring pro-
gramme, Gorbachev replaced the hardliner Demichev with Vasilii G. Zakharov, 
previously the first deputy head of the Department for Agitation and Propa-
ganda (Agitprop) at the Central Committee and, before that, the head of the 
propaganda department at the Leningrad Party committee.151  
This brief overview indicates that the Soviet administration of culture’s 
notion of a minister of culture evolved from an early post-Stalinist militarised 
approach to one that accepted that the position could be appropriated by a po-
litical careerist, especially one from the ideological propaganda sector. Only in 
a later period did the idea emerge that an “insider” or an “expert” cultural prac-
titioner should be in charge of the state administration for culture. 
This trajectory was also visible in the case of Lithuanian SSR, but with 
some important modifications. Ponomarenko’s counterpart was the first LSSR 
minister of culture, Aleksandras Gudaitis-Guzeviius (born in Moscow 1908, 
died in Vilnius 1969), who held the position from 1953 to 1955. Guzeviius was 
appointed as an NKVD major in 1944, but was removed from his post in 1945. 
The archives reveal that the reason for his dismissal was his failure to put down 
the Lithuanian armed resistance to the Soviet occupation.152 His subsequent 
appointment as the head of the Committee of Cultural-Educational Enterprises 
in 1945-1947 was strategic because those enterprises were envisioned as key 
support for local election districts and were utilised for the collectivisation cam-
paign. Thus, a later minister’s speech stated that “in the course of a bloody class 
struggle, when everyone had to choose their own way and make up their own 
mind, a modest, cottage reading room with a small amateurs circle and a narrow 
shelf of books constituted both a field and the means for an ideological strug-
gle”.153 However, in 1947, Guzeviius was once again criticised by Party mem-
bers for not being able to properly organise their work, as “the cultural enlight-
enment work in the Republic remained at a very low level”. Guzeviius, in fact, 
was more inclined to “literary work”.154 Hence, he was made the head of the 
publishing house for belle-lettres (1947-50). The author of several novels, he 
even received the Stalin Prize for his book, The Truth of Blacksmith Ignotas 
(vols. I-II, 1948-49).155 Having resigned from the minister’s post in 1955 due to 
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poor health,156 Guzeviius did not advance in his political career as did Po-
nomarenko, but remained confined to the cultural sector, namely publishing.  
Guzeviius’s successor was a Lithuanian party careerist Jonas Smilge-
viius (b.1924), who occupied the minister’s chair for three years (1955-58). 
Smilgeviius grew up in a village in western Lithuania. After having completed 
six years in secondary school, he was trained as carpenter and worked in Kau-
nas. During World War II, Smilgeviius retreated to Russia, where he worked 
as a komsomol instructor in the Tula oblast. Beginning in 1943, he headed the 
accounting and statistics department at the LSSR komsomol. In 1948 he finished 
attending the Party school and joined the newspaper Komjaunimo tiesa (Lithua-
nian Komsomolskaia pravda) as a literary assistant. From 1949 to 1952, 
Smilgeviius worked with propaganda and agitation matters at CC (LCP), and 
in 1953 he became the head of the department for propaganda and agitation at 
the CC (LCP). For unknown reasons, he was transferred from his post of LSSR 
Minister of Culture and made a deputy secretary of the executive council of 
Vilnius council, where he worked until 1971. According to the last record in his 
Party biography, Smilgeviius had to leave his position because of health prob-
lems; he then accepted a position as an assistant to the director of production of 
chemical goods at Litbytkhim factory in Vilnius.157 Smilgeviius is the only 
LSSR Minister of Culture who does not have an entry in the Lithuanian Soviet 
Encyclopaedia, and I was unable to find out much about his role as the Minister 
of Culture. 
He was succeeded by a more distinguished persona, Juozas Banaitis 
(1908-1967), who became the minister in the period of liberalisation or Thaw 
(1958-1967). Banaitis had been a CPSU member since 1933. When the Soviet 
Union occupied Lithuania, he was appointed the chair of the radio committee, 
and in 1943, he was made the head of the Arts Agency. Initially, his role was 
highly regarded by the government. For example, in 1944, Banaitis was praised 
by the first Party secretary (LCP) Sniekus for persuading “the old intelligent-
sia” to take up institutional positions.158 Yet in 1947, a party reference letter159 
stated that he “had not managed to use the administrative apparatus efficiently”, 
especially when it came to the control of provincial areas.160 In 1953, Banaitis 
was also harshly criticised by Tiesa for a “lack of precise planning” and “sys-
tematised control of implementation” in the work of the agency.161 Banaitis was 
appointed as a vice-minister under both Guzeviius and Smilgeviius (1953-58). 
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In retrospect, these appointments were perceived as being quite unfair by many 
intellectuals as he was regarded to be professionally superior to both minis-
ters.162 Indeed, Banaitis was remembered as a “minister of good taste”,163 
“Lithuania’s Lunacharsky”, who received a sophisticated pre-war education in 
Western Europe and was knowledgeable about and active in culture, especially 
music.164 In November 1957, a Party reference positively declared that Banaitis 
“enjoyed an authority among the Lithuanian cultural intelligentsia”.165 Thus, 
while Banaitis was seen as a failure as regards the implementation of Stalinist 
cultural policy, he was lauded for being more successful in introducing Khru-
shchev’s de-Stalinisation. 
Following Banaitis’s sudden death from a stroke, Lionginas Šepetys was 
given the ministerial appointment.166 Somewhat like Furtseva, but for different 
reasons, he had to step down from the Party hierarchy. He received a degree in 
architecture engineering from Kaunas Polytechnics Institute (1953), where he 
taught and participated in local party activities until 1957. He continued to com-
bine both a Party and an academic career. Šepetys received his PhD in applied 
art from the School of Societal Sciences in Moscow, which prepared “sophisti-
cated Party cadres” (1963). He became the head of the Culture, Science and 
Education Department at CC (LCP) in 1964-1967, and was an associate profes-
sor (docentas) at the Vilnius Fine Arts Institute (1963-1968). In 1967, he be-
came the Minister of Culture and was the only LSSR minister of culture to be a 
member of the Presidium (LCP). From 1976 to 1989 he was the secretary of CC 
(LCP). Author of several books on applied and fine art, Šepetys was a signatory 
of the Independence Act of 1990.  
During the Soviet period, Šepetys had a reputation as a cunning politician 
and influential member of CC (LCP). Not surprisingly, his Party references 
were thoroughly positive and described him as an “efficient”, “principled”, 
“morally consistent” and “thoughtful” leader, who enjoyed authority among 
Komsomol and Party apparatus members. A telling detail: after the death of 
Sniekus, the most influential First Secretary of CC (LCP), Šepetys moved into 
his house (Sniekus’s widow had to move out).167 Just as in this case, many of 
Šepetys’s activities were considered controversial by the Lithuanian cultural 
community. For example, the authorship of one of his books has been openly 
contested since 1990. Yet it was widely acknowledged that Šepetys had “good 
taste” and a tolerance for modern and other “a-Soviet” art forms. His inclination 
to “scientific-research work” was noted in the Party references.168  
                                      
162 See the memoir by Jakelaitis, Saulei leidžiantis. 
163 Šepetys, 2005. 
164 Jakelaitis, Juozas Banaitis, 147. 
165 LYA, f. 1771, ap.227, b. 2047, l. 42. 
166 Lionginas Šepetys was born in Kazliškiai village in East Northern Lithuania, in 1927 and 
currently lives in Vilnius. 
167 Vytautas Tininis, Sniekus. 33 metai valdžioje (Vilnius: Karminas, 2000). 
168 LYA, f. 1771, ap. 274, b. 1899, l. 13 
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Šepetys was succeeded by a somewhat less colourful but no less contro-
versial persona, Jonas Bielinis (b.1933), who was probably the least liked So-
viet Lithuanian minister of culture after 1990. He started his political career as 
the deputy secretary and the secretary of the Party organisation at Vilnius Uni-
versity (1958-59) and actively contributed to the purges of the Lithuanian Phi-
lology Department at Vilnius University in 1958.169 His role in the purge was 
very positively highlighted in his Party references as he was praised for “sig-
nificantly increasing the influence of the Party organisation to all the scientific- 
  
Table 2. The All-Union and Lithuanian SSR Ministers of Culture, 
1953-1990 
 
 
 
 
All-Union
 
 
Lithuanian SSR 
   
1953-54 Panteleimon Pono-
marenko 
1953-55 Aleksandras Gudaitis 
Guzeviius 
1954-55 Georgii Aleksandrov 1955-58 Jonas Smilgeviius 
1955-59 N. A. Mikhailov 1958-67 Juozas Banaitis 
1960-74 Ekaterina Furtseva 1967-76 Lionginas Šepetys 
1974-85 Piotr Demichev 1976-88 Jonas Bielinis 
1985-89* Vasilii Zakharov 1988-90 Dainius Trinknas 
1989 N. N. Gubenko   
    
 
* During most of 1989, the position of All-Union Minister of Culture was vacant 
 
educational work” of the university. As a leader, Bielinis was characterised as 
an “accurate, honest executive”, and later as both “a modest” and “determined 
communist” (nastoichivii).170 In addition to teaching history at Vilnius Univer-
sity (1958-1961), Bielinis was the first secretary at Lenin’s district committee 
(raikom) and the head of the educational department at Vilnius city committee 
(gorkom) in 1961-1964. From 1964 to 1967, he studied at the Academy of So-
cietal Sciences in Moscow and received the degree of Candidate of Philological 
Sciences. Bielinis became a deputy head of the culture department at the CC 
(LCP) (1967-73), then head of the science and education department (1973-
1976), and the minister of culture (1976-1988). 
The last Soviet Lithuanian minister of culture was a composer Dainius 
Trinknas (1931-1996). Previously the director of the Lithuanian Philharmonic 
Society (1970-1973), Trinknas served as a vice-minister under both Šepetys 
and Bielinis (1973-1988) and became a minister in 1988, the year that the col-
lapse of communist system began After the declaration of independence on 11 
March 1990, the Ministry of Culture ended its relationship with the All-Union 
                                      
169 Interview with an historian, Vytautas, Vilnius, December 2005; and a mathematician, Saulius, 
Vilnius, December 2005. Also see Meil Lukšien, Jungtys (Vilnius: Alma Littera, 2000).  
170 LYA, f. 1771, ap. 274, b. 207, l. 11, 12, 32, 33. 
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Ministry and merged with the Ministry of Education. A young literary historian 
Darius Kuolys was appointed as the first minister of culture and education 
(Trinknas was briefly reinstated to the minister’s post, 1992-1994). 
Notably, all LSSR ministers were of Lithuanian ethnicity (though Gu-
daitis-Guzeviius was born into a working-class family in Russia) and all the 
All-Union ministers were Russians. Unlike the All-Union ministers of culture, 
several Lithuanian ministers had received educations in the arts or humani-
ties:Banaitis specialised in music pedagogy, Šepetys had a degree in architec-
ture, Bielinis studied Lithuanian philology and Trinknas was a composer. Gu-
daitis-Guzeviius invested a lot of time and effort into becoming a fiction writer 
(despite the rather harsh criticism that his talents received from other Soviet 
Lithuanian writers, he was awarded the Stalin Prize, and his works were in-
cluded in school reading lists).  
Meanwhile the Russian ministers had predominantly technical educations: 
Ponomarenko graduated from the Moscow Institute for Engineers of Transport 
(1932), and Demichev, who specialised in toxic chemicals, graduated from a 
corresponding department at the Military Academy of Chemical Protection 
(VAKhZ) of the Soviet Army, Moscow Chemical-Technological Institute of 
D.I. Mendeleev (1954).171 Furtseva began her (for a woman) phenomenal career 
path172 as a worker at a textile factory and later graduated from the Institute of 
Chemistry Technology (1941). Only Aleksandrov, who occupied the minister’s 
position for a very brief period, was educated in the humanities, as he graduated 
from the Moscow Institute of History and Philosophy (1932), and later became 
a professor at the Institute and its director.173 The post-perestroika exception 
was the 48-years old actor at the experimental Taganka theatre in Moscow, 
Nikolai N. Gubenko, who was appointed minister in 1990.174 Notably, only two 
of seven All-Union ministers of culture, Demichev and Zakharov, had previ-
ously occupied leading posts in propaganda departments. None had worked at 
the Ministry of Culture before their appointments. Meanwhile, three of the six 
Lithuanian ministers, Smilgeviius, Banaitis, Trinknas, had previously served 
as vice-ministers and thus followed an institutional career track. This suggests 
that there was greater intra-organisational continuity in the work of the LSSR 
Ministry of Culture, which was reflected in its official discourses on governance 
                                      
171 Lev A. Federov, “Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics,” 17 July 1994, 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/jptac008_l94001.htm.> (8 December 2008). 
172 For the limitations of women’s political careers, see Carol Nechemias, “Women and Politics in 
the Soviet Russia,” in Women in the Politics of Post-Communist Eastern Europe. Revised and 
Expanded Edition, ed. Marilyn Rueschemeyer (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1998). 
173 As he was a close friend of Georgii Malenkov (an advisor to Stalin), Aleksandrov’s book 
about Western philosophy was denounced in the course of Zhdanov’s anti-Western and anti-
Jewish campaigns (Aleksandrov lost his position at Agitprop but was reinstated as the minister of 
culture after Malenkov’s return to power). Slusser, 117-123. 
174 Gubenko left the post after coup d’état in August 1991, to return to it only for a very short time 
as the All-Union institutions were abolished in December 1991. Riita H. Pitman, “Writers and 
Politics in the Gorbachev Era,” Soviet Studies 44, no.4 (1992), 665. 
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(of which more will be discussed in later chapters). The contrast between the 
Soviet Lithuanian and All-Union ministers of culture was even greater when 
compared with highly placed cultural officials of the interwar period: they were 
either practicing artists or Catholic priests. Two famous painters, Antanas 
Žmuidzinaviius and Justinas Vienožinskis, and a scientist, the astronomer An-
tanas Juška headed the Arts Department, while a philosopher and priest, Izi-
dorius Tamošaitis, headed the censorship agency. 
Conclusion 
The historical trajectory of public cultural organisations and state administration 
for culture in Lithuania witnessed striking disruptions as well as continuities. 
The disruptions had mainly to do with the ethnic management of the population: 
in the aftermath of World War II, Lithuania had lost about 30 percent of its 
population. Nearly all of its Jewish population was exterminated, while many 
Lithuanians fled to the West or were deported. However, I hope I have demon-
strated that some elements of the organisational mentality of the governance of 
culture were shared by both the Lithuanian “soft” and Soviet “hard” authoritar-
ian regimes. 
Unfortunately, studies of how the statesmen of the independent Lithuania 
regarded their Imperial Russian administrative legacy are lacking at this time. 
However, there was a clear tendency in the interwar period to abstain from a 
special central governmental body for culture. As the Soviet occupation intro-
duced the Soviet model of cultural policy into Lithuania, many of the interwar 
cultural organisations and creative unions were subverted for the purposes of 
Soviet administration. The Sovietisation of Lithuanian cultural organisations, 
therefore, was a combination of continuity and change, both of which were 
marked by a good deal of tension and insecurity. The next chapter analyses 
further this pacification of Soviet governance and focuses on its economic as-
pects. 
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IV. The Economic Configuration of Soviet 
Cultural Policy 
Once the communist regime seized power in Russia, reforming and improving 
the country’s economy were among its most important and difficult tasks. The 
Soviet occupation of Lithuania also entailed major economic restructuring. Both 
Lenin’s Russia and Stalin’s Lithuania were dominated by agricultural produc-
tion. This situation had to change for a number of reasons. While the fact that 
heavy industries generated more profit and ensured the self-sufficiency of the 
Soviet Union, surrounded by “capitalist enemies”, the Party ideology relied on 
the “progressive” proletariat class and not “backward” peasants. Thus, after 
1940 and especially after 1945, Lithuania was drawn into the Soviet project of 
industrialisation, the country’s agricultural sector was collectivised, and new 
industries were established and integrated into the all-Union economy.1  
In addition to massive industrialisation, the Soviet economy was character-
ised by a particular mode of organisation known as central planning. It has often 
been noted that building a Soviet state was a special economic project, which 
entailed the unprecedented centralisation of the state organisations that gov-
erned various spheres of life. Centralisation, it was assumed, would enhance 
efficiency. Material and financial flows were directed top-down with respect to 
future goals. As the Soviet economy was barter-based, the allocation of re-
sources was executed by ministries, which oversaw their enterprises.2 The high-
est decision-making power belonged to the All-Union First Secretary and the 
members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) at the Central Committee of 
CPSU.3 This chapter explores how “culture” came to be rationalised in accor-
dance with this broader Soviet economic system.4
                                      
1 See Lietuva 1940-1990. 
2 The term “administrative command economy” was first used by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
1980s. Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and 
Structure (Boston: Adison Wesley, 2001), 6, 8, 16. On the genealogy of the belief in market 
forces as a regulative mechanism and the historical constitution of the sphere of the economy in 
the West, see Gordon, 14-27. 
3 Urban, 1982. The history of the Politburo is quite complicated. It was established in 1919 and 
consisted of 5 members and from 1930 had 10 members. Initially, it was intended to be the 
Party’s executive body, an additional organ within the CC. Gradually, it took over the legislative 
function that formally belonged to the Party Congresses of people’s deputies, which under Stalin, 
especially after 1934, were convened irregularly and rarely. In 1952 it was renamed the Presidium 
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Up to now, a good deal of the Western scholarship on state cultural policy 
has discerned a particularly normative approach to the economic rationalisation 
of culture. On the one hand, the Soviet ambition to devise a state-wide adminis-
trative network for culture and commit to its financing was more or less openly 
admired.5 On the other, however, some scholars held that any state cultural 
policy, be it authoritarian or democratic, necessarily impoverished cultural prac-
tices because it was guided by “economic reason”.6 It is from this vantage point 
that Soviet cultural policy has been described as the ultimate negative example 
of an “instrumentalised” state cultural policy. While this chapter deals with both 
sides of Soviet cultural policy, I prefer not to abide by either of the normative 
judgments. Instead of juxtaposing the “evil economic” goals against the admit-
ted “good cultural” ones, this chapter attempts to draw an analytical scheme to 
demonstrate how the sphere of culture was assembled under the broader ambi-
tion to define and steer the Soviet Union’s national economy.  
I argue that centralised, calculation-based governance,7 formulated within 
and for the economic sphere, was an important force, which influenced the con-
figuration of Soviet culture as a techno-scientific policy area. I will show how it 
was both productive and counterproductive. Soviet economic logic produced 
culture as a calculable sphere, describable and manageable through an extensive 
system of indicators and statistics. However, Soviet economic logic also consid-
ered culture to be a low priority. Consequently, the cultural sector was prone to 
a high degree of poverty, which was a general feature of the Soviet shortage-
ridden economy. 
It is not my ambition to offer an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of eco-
nomic planning having to do with culture. Nor will I provide a fully-fledged 
historical overview of the development of economic indicators, statistics and 
financing of the cultural sector. Instead, I will use several typical examples to 
highlight the key features of the economic mode of ordering the Soviet cultural 
sector. This analytical scheme will serve as an important explanatory frame-
                                                                                                                                  
and extended to 36 members, but after the death of Stalin returned to 10 members. It functioned 
under the name of the Presidium until 1966, and was again renamed the Politburo. 
4 Rationalisation of policy-making in the Soviet Union has been studied predominantly by eco-
nomic historians, such as Erik P. Hoffmann and Robin F. Laird, The Politics of Economic Mod-
ernization in the Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Erik P. Hoff-
mann and Robin F. Laird, Technocratic Socialism: The Soviet Union as a Post-Industrial State 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1985); Donald R. Kelley, The Politics of Developed Socialism: 
The Soviet Union in the Advanced Industrial Era (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986).  
5 Miller and Yúdice; Elst, 42. This is not to neglect abundant criticisms of Soviet ideological 
control of individual expression by the elites. For a typical example of such criticism, see Leonard 
Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Press, 1971). 
6 Vestheim; McGuigan.  
7 For modern attempts at rational, calculation-based policies, see a wonderful study James Scott, 
Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Failed (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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work for the analysis of the cybernetic language of cultural policy in future 
chapters. It is important to note that the suggested analytical scheme can be 
relevant beyond the Lithuanian case. The scale of Soviet centralisation even led 
some scholars to argue that the entire Soviet Union was de facto run as a giant 
corporation. Though it consisted of fifteen union republics,8 the Soviet Union 
was run as one state, vertically integrated along industry branches (enterprises 
and ministries) and political administration (party and planning organs);9 thus, 
the Union-Republic governments served more of an executive function. As they 
were in charge of some branches of industry, they were legally restricted by 
centrally devised economic plans.10 For these reasons, the chapter’s analytical 
implications could well be applicable to other union republics. 
Some Features of the Soviet Economic System 
To begin with, I would like to briefly point out two important aspects of the 
Soviet economic system – first, the ideological importance of centralised plan-
ning and, second, the significance of formal organisation. Both aspects were 
crucial to the further configuration of Soviet cultural policy. The management 
of the Soviet economy was designed in ideological opposition to capitalist free-
market regulation and was based on central planning and administrative control. 
It was expected that the rational, scientifically grounded planning and distribu-
tion of resources would escape the duplications, mistakes and slack attributed 
by Communists to a market economy.11 As the editor of Pravda put it, in the 
Soviet Union an “elemental force of market, anarchy and competition was re-
placed with governance [upravlenie] that was conscious, scientific and organ-
                                      
8 There were also autonomous socialist republics, the number of which had varied, for example in 
the Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR. 
9 While there are many definitions of state socialism, I agree with Aleksandras Shtromas that they 
“boil down to the institution of public ownership of the means of production and, consequently, to 
central planning”. Aleksandras Shtromas, “The Inevitable Collapse of Socialism,” in Totalitarian-
ism and the Prospects for World Order: Closing the Door on the Twentieth Century, eds. R. 
Faulkner and D. J. Mahoney (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), 100.  
10 For a clear description of the economic functions of the Council of Ministers, Gosplan, Goss-
nab, the State Bank, branch ministries and other bodies see Conyngham, The Modernisation of 
Soviet Industrial Management, 3-11. 
11 To quote an authoritative philosopher of management and editor of Pravda, “the bourgeoisie is 
able effectively, in a model way to manage (rukovodit’) enterprises or their trusts and even sepa-
rate branches of the economy on the scale of a country or a group of countries, yet it is not able to 
govern (upravliat’) purposively, in a planned way, consciously, an industry as a whole, or social 
and economic processes on the scale of an entire society. The reason is the prevailing system of 
private property, elemental forces of the market, laws of anarchy and competition […]. The gov-
erning force of “anarchic capitalist society,” wrote Lenin, “is market expansion by elemental 
force”. Viktor G. Afanas’ev, “O soderzhanii (osnovnykh funkciiakh) upravleniia sotsialistiches-
kim obshchestvom,” in Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom, ed. V. G. Afanas’ev (Moscow: 
Mysl’, 1967), 4. Note that Afanas’ev used rukovodstvo (leadership) and upravlenie (governance) 
as synonims. 
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ised by a plan”. 12 Of course, state economic planning was not a particularly 
Soviet feature. A technique to cope with the uncertainty of the future, it 
emerged in and was shared by a number of modern states in the first half of the 
20th century.13  
The Soviet Union, however, was unique in the degree and scope of its cen-
tralised planning. Beginning in 1928, Soviet economic policy-making was cy-
clic. It was based on five-year plans (further divided into annual and quarterly 
plans), which specified priorities and targets to be achieved.14 The plans, ap-
proved by the First Secretary (CPSU) and, after the death of Stalin, by the Party 
Congresses, had the status of law. Thus, organisations were required to meet the 
set plan indicators, and the centralised, long-term planned economy eventually 
came to be identified with a state socialist system and “Soviet-ness” itself. I will 
shortly describe the consequences of Soviet economic planning on the formula-
tion of Soviet cultural policy. 
In terms of the types of Soviet organisations, Ivan T. Berend noted that the 
Soviet regime’s view of culture implied a ban on any public cultural activities 
that were not sanctioned by the state.15 Therefore, in order to engage in the fine 
arts and other cultural pursuits, individuals had to belong to an organisational 
body approved by the state. For ideological, as well as economic reasons, in the 
Soviet Union, officially defined culture was produced mainly by formal organi-
sations. Two types of organisations prevailed: khozraschetnye and biudzhetnye. 
The former was managed according to the principles of khozraschet, which 
implied that an organisation possessed some autonomy, but it also had to fulfil 
the centrally laid-out plan, and it was economically accountable to the respec-
tive agencies.16 The latter, biudzhetnye or the organisations directly subsidised 
by the state, did not have to either generate profits or balance their expenses 
with income. Cultural organisations belonged primarily to the latter type. This 
implied that should losses incur, they would be compensated from governmen-
tal or municipal budgets. Of course, the intentional misuse or squandering of 
funds was a penal activity, but if a theatre was unable to attract enough audience 
members, its losses would be compensated. Further, the costs of cultural en-
deavours, like most of the prices of consumer goods, were subsidised by the 
                                      
12 Afanas’ev, 5. 
13 See Jenny Andersson, “Choosing Futures: Alva Myrdal and the Construction of Swedish Future 
Studies, 1967-1972,” International Review of Social History 51 (2006), 277-295. 
14 The first five-year plan was launched by Stalin on 1 October 1928. 
15 Berend. 
16 The notion of khozraschet was introduced in the 1920s and meant that the enterprise was a 
distinct entity that “carried out its activities with respect for the following principles: the enter-
prise had to be self-sufficient (samookupaemost’), in other words all expenses had to be covered 
by the enterprise’s income; it had, moreover, to generate surplus, although with little incentive, 
since any profit which appeared in the balance submitted annually to the state treasury had to be 
transferred to the state budget; it had to pay for everything it was given and had to be paid for 
everything it produced,” O.S. Ioffe, “Khozraschet,” in Encyclopaedia of Soviet Law, eds. F.J.M. 
Feedbrugge and G. van den Berg (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 414-417, cf 
Elst, 23. 
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state. In the central planning of culture and ministerial administration of formal 
organisations, a system of economic indicators was of utmost importance. I 
suggest that these components could be seen as the building blocks of the Soviet 
calculation-based governance. 
Economic Indicators of the Cultural Sector 
In order to make plans and issue edicts, the Soviet authorities had to deal with 
an incredible amount of information. It is important to note that price as a in-
formative unit about cost, demand and supply was absent in Soviet economy. 
The prices were set centrally by the State Planning Committee. Thus, in order to 
assist the centralised decision-making process, a vast system of economic indi-
cators was developed. A statistical system of measurement via indicators was a 
Western European invention, not a Russian one,17 and such a system, consisting 
of indicators or categories for statistical calculations, was developed for every 
branch of Soviet industry and eventually put in place in the late 1920s.18  
The problem of acquiring and processing information for centralised deci-
sion-making was as pressing in cultural policy as it was in any other sphere of 
planning. For the Soviet government, the formulation of cultural policy and the 
control of its implementation meant having to deal with a very large sector (no-
toriously, being “big” was a good thing in the minds of the Soviets). As one 
Soviet scholar pointed out, in 1981, the “art” sphere alone (as defined in the 
national economy classifier, see Table 1) consisted of about 275,000 enterprises 
in the Soviet Union. This implied that, in terms of the number of organisations, 
only trade was ahead of culture in the Soviet national economy.19 Of course, in 
“real terms” of profitability, the cultural sector was far less important than trade. 
Yet “culture” featured cash flows, staffs, various materials, accounting forms, 
principles of management, and more, most of which were the concern of plan-
ners. 
Post-World War II Soviet cultural policy-making was a sphere largely de-
fined and guided by various indicators, which provided the information about 
the sector’s performance. Whilst the hierarchies and contents of the indicators in 
strategic branches (raw materials, technologies) were an object of negotiation 
among top managers, the republics’ planners and the CC Planning Committee, 
indicators for culture were mostly channelled top-down.20 The plan indicators 
for the development of culture were formulated, distributed and processed at the 
                                      
17 The concept of an economic indicator was developed in applied statistics. See Ian Hacking, The 
Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
18 The Soviet Union experienced an overflow of indicators that resulted in an unmanageable mass 
of quantitative data. 
19 E. Renov, “Konstitutsionnye principy upravleniia kul’turoi,” in Konstitutsionnye osnovy gosu-
darstvennogo stroitel’stva (Sverdlovsk, 1981), 42, cf Diržinskait, 27. 
20 Interview with an economist, Aleksandras Vasiliauskas, Vilnius, December 2005. 
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State Plan Committee (Gosplan).21 Special guidelines for the classification were 
prepared by the All-Union and Union-Republic State Planning Committees, 
which had small departments for culture.22 These departments communicated 
with the Finance-Planning Departments at the respective Ministries of Culture.  
The archives of the LSSR Ministry of Culture contain a wealth of docu-
ments regarding the “main economic indicators” for culture provided by Gos-
plan. While space is limited for a more in-depth discussion of the production, 
contents and historical development of these indicators, I would like to point out 
their rather limited and apparently arbitrary nature. The main economic indica-
tors for culture did not seek to encapsulate all the diversity of the Ministry’s 
sector. Instead, they either concerned the largest organisational sectors or were 
added in relation to the prioritised economic strategy that prevailed at the time. 
Two excellent examples illustrate this phenomenon. In 1955, the state plan con-
tained the following “main economic indicators” for culture: libraries (number, 
fees for borrowing books, staff education level), club enterprises (the number of 
study circles, absorption of allocated finance, staff education level), cinefication 
(the growth of the network, the number of seats and visitors) and theatres (the 
number of organisations, performances, visitors, income, tours, loss/subsidy).23 
Thus, the indicators did not cover some other types of organisations, for exam-
ple, creative unions and amusement parks. Nor did they include more specific 
types of cultural production, such as art exhibitions and music performances.  
Other lists of indicators from the Ministry of Culture also exhibited rather 
arbitrary logic in making “internal choices”, as well as the invasion of urgent 
“external” economic priorities. While the following example is drawn from 
1983, the structure of the internal ministry’s indicators had not change substan-
tially over the years. The economic indicators used internally concerned 1) the 
maximum number of employees and the salary fund, 2) the library network, 3) 
club enterprises 4) music organisations, 5) culture and recreation parks, 6) cadre 
preparation 7) qualification enhancement courses 8) the introduction of works 
of scientific research and scientific-technological achievements into the national 
economy 9) construction works and 10) the rational utilisation and protection of 
water resources.24 This classification clearly reveals that an economic definition 
of culture closely followed administrative lines. Publishing, recording and 
                                      
21 The Committees were restructured into the republican branches after 1965, Diržinskait, 1985, 
51. In the Lithuanian SSR, the state planning committee and ministries were responsible for about 
60 percent of all industry, while 28 percent were directly supervised from Moscow, Misiunas and 
Taagepera, 188. 
22 When asked about the importance of planning in culture, the head of the Lithuanian State Plan-
ning Committee smiled and said that it was perhaps the least important, very small and insignifi-
cant in relation to other sectors. Interview with an economist, Aleksandras Vasiliauskas, Vilnius, 
December 2005. 
23 LLMA, f. 342, a. 1, b. 264.  
24 Decree no. 504 by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Culture Nr.504 (2 December 1983) “On 
confirming the indicators for the Plan of State and Social Development (1984) for the organisa-
tions of the Ministry of Culture,” LLMA, f. 342, a. 1, b. 3574, l. 15. 
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broadcasting were the responsibility of other governmental agencies and there-
fore not a part of the economic nomenclature of “culture”. However, environ-
mental concerns (“water”) seemed more able to cut across departmental divi-
sions (I will return to the nature-culture rapprochement in Chapter VII). 
The plan indicators had to be fulfilled and, if possible, exceeded. The 
achievement and underachievement of plan indicators were widely and publicly 
disseminated: they were highlighted in the press, especially in public speeches 
by the Ministers of Culture, as well as in numerous brochures and other publica-
tions about cultural policy.25 In the absence of free market competition, the 
public use of statistical figures aimed to encourage competition among districts, 
republics and sectors; they were also used to shame and praise. (It has to be 
noted that the figures were often faked at many different levels; this will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter VIII). The figures were also used to show 
off Soviet cultural progress abroad. The Soviet Union and Lithuanian SSR ac-
tively and systematically used the figures for cultural statistics to represent their 
positive images abroad, especially in relation to the position of culture in their 
bourgeois past.  
Commensurability: Calculable Culture on Display 
That the Soviet Union used cultural statistics to communicate its progress 
abroad and to mark its efforts to “catch up and surpass the West” was not a new 
thing in itself. As noted by Hacking, the issue of international commensurability 
was contemporaneous with the emergence of national statistics and played an 
important role beginning in the 19th century.26 In this respect, Soviet cultural 
statistics were no exemption; they were meant to communicate to the West the 
full-fledged progress that Soviet society was reportedly making. Drawing 
mainly on the first Soviet cultural policy report, I will briefly consider the repre-
sentation of Soviet cultural policy abroad. This should not be confused with 
“cultural” representation of the Soviet Union abroad. The former aimed at rep-
resenting the state cultural policy, its means and achievements. The latter aimed 
at representing the state by “cultural means”, such as the visual or performing 
arts, for example. Whilst the latter has already been addressed in numerous 
studies, such as those by Caute, Saunders and Richmond, to mention just a few, 
the representative power of the former has thus far been ignored.27  
                                      
25 This is especially valid for the numerous overviews of the culture of the Lithuanian SSR con-
cocted by LCP ideological secretaries. See, for example, Antanas Barkauskas, Kaimas, kultra, 
buitis (Vilnius: Mintis, 1967); Antanas Barkauskas Kultra ir visuomen (Vilnius: Mokslas, 
1975); Diržinskait. 
26 Hacking. It is important to note that the first public economic statistics was published during 
de-Stalinisation, in 1956. Hanson, 67. 
27 Caute; Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western 
Europe 1945-1960 (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2003); Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., 
Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2004); 
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After World War II, one of the most important arenas for pulling “a num-
bers’ tug of war” was a new international body for cultural policy-making, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). 
Founded in 1945, UNESCO became an agency of the United Nations (UN) in 
1946 and was entitled to implement the UN’s cultural policy on a global level 
and promote multilateral relations. This was done primarily by issuing conven-
tions (often criticised for their vague formulations) and sponsoring various in-
ternational studies, conferences and projects.28 The Soviet Union joined 
UNESCO in 1954.29 Eventually, the organisation came to function as an impor-
tant tool in the Soviet Union’s efforts to flex its statistical muscle, both in re-
ports and votes.30 For my purposes, the series of Studies and Documents on 
Cultural Policies, commissioned by UNESCO in 1969, are particularly impor-
tant in this regard. The resulting reports were published in the series, which 
enabled one to imagine “state cultural policy” as a simultaneous process, going 
on all over the world. One could shelve the reports together and compare the 
cultural policy of Ukraine with that of Togo. Yet structurally, the reports varied 
– they ranged in style from loose essayistic accounts to highly structured, statis-
tically saturated panoramas.31
In 1970, the UNESCO series published a report about the Soviet Union’s 
cultural policy, written by A. A. Zvorykin, professor at the Institute for Applied 
Social Studies (the Soviet Academy of Sciences) with the help of N. I. 
Golubtsova and E. I. Rabinovich.32 The 68-page report described the major 
organisations in the educational, scientific and cultural sectors (the sectors were 
chosen according to the budget structure and the system of classification of the 
state plan). That the Soviets used statistical prediction methods in cultural pol-
icy-making was especially evident in this report: a separate chapter was dedi-
                                                                                                                                  
also Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(New York: The New Press, 2000). Studies of Cold War “cultural” representations and exchanges 
were also guided by scholars’ own ideas as to what constituted “culture”. Some, for example, 
approached science and higher education as such an exchange. See Yale Richmond, Cultural 
Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003). 
28 Miller and Yúdice, 169-172. 
29 Socialist East European countries joined UNESCO earlier: Czechoslovakia (founding member 
state, 1946), Poland (1946), Hungary (1948) and Yugoslavia (1950). The Soviet Union was fol-
lowed by Romania and Bulgaria (1956). 
30 In this the Soviet Union was backed by the Third World countries which “outnumbered” the 
Western capitalist members on the UNESCO board. Because of these reasons, the US left 
UNESCO in 1984, to be followed by the UK in 1985 (the UK rejoined in 1997 and the US in 
2003). S.E. Graham, “The (Real)politics of Culture: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in UNESCO, 1946–
1954,” Diplomatic History 30, no.2 (2006), 231–251. 
31 Since then international cultural policy comparison has become highly evolved: for example, 
the EricArts Compendium enables comparisons between European countries online. See their 
website, <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/index.php>. 
32 A.A. Zvorykin, Cultural Policy in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Paris: UNESCO, 
1970). 
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cated to “Evaluation of Cultural Needs and the Forecasting of Cultural Devel-
opment”. As Zvorykin thought it necessary to describe the statistical process in 
detail, his account deserves a longer quote:  
 
For the purpose of forecasting the development of culture and working out 
a long-term cultural policy, increasing use is now being made of the meth-
ods of structural and system analysis. By these means, it is possible to 
make forecasts by smoothing the statistical curve obtained by the observa-
tion of recent processes, expressing it in analytical terms and then extrapo-
lating to the future. […] The first question of interest […] was how the ra-
tio between scientific and artistic culture in the U.S.S.R. is changing. We 
compared the numbers of scientists – doctors and masters [kandidaty] of 
science – with the number of members in the main unions of creative art-
ists… We took the statistical data for the period 1950-1967, worked out the 
extrapolation formulae by smoothing the statistical curve obtained and 
then, using these formulae, calculated the number of scientific workers and 
creative artists for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. As a check, the 
corresponding figures for 1950 and 1960 were also calculated by the same 
method. Comparison of the actual and calculated figures for 1950 and 1960 
indicated that our method of forecasting was sufficiently accurate.33
 
Thus, on the basis of statistical time series, Zvorykin forecasted that the mem-
bership of unions of creative artists would increase by ca. 400 percent and by 
2000 would reach a total of 128,600. Meanwhile, the number of scientists 
would increase by about 600 percent to 383,100. In terms of percentages, the 
number of artists in relation to the number of scientists would decrease from 
30.4 percent in 1950 to 25.1 percent in 2000. Hence, the proportion of scientists 
would continue to grow.34 The subsequent pages provided further optimistic 
estimates of increases in various artistic and cultural sub-professions; oddly 
enough, there were no figures to indicate possible future decreases in any of 
these professions. The only anticipated decrease, according to the forecasting of 
Soviet cultural statistics, concerned cinema-goers, who were assumed to be 
watching television at home. However, despite the general increase of all the 
numbers, Zvorykin was worried that, proportionally, the artistic sector would 
diminish. He considered this a “warning, since the first result of spiritual im-
poverishment is to upset the harmonious development of man”.35 Apparently, 
he was suggesting that the harmoniousness of the “human spirit” was statisti-
cally describable. 
In a somewhat similar way, the transformation of quantitative growth into 
a qualitative one was forecast to take place in the cultural sphere. Zvorykin de-
                                      
33 Zvorykin, 32. 
34 Zvorykin, 32. 
35 Zvorykin, 35. 
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scribed Soviet cultural development in economic terms of “intensive” and “ex-
tensive” development:  
 
[…] for there is, in addition to the intensive aspect of cultural development 
(creation of cultural values) also the extensive aspect, i.e., the extension of 
culture and cultural activities to the broad masses. This “extensive” devel-
opment of culture is of decisive significance for progress, since it is in 
these conditions that culture becomes a powerful instrument of human ac-
tivity. At the same time, the “extensive” development of culture lays the 
foundations for more rapid “intensive”, i.e., qualitative development.36  
 
As of the 1960s, the “intensive” development, which increased production by 
demanding less material investments, was a guiding strategic objective of na-
tional and republican economies.37 Zvorykin’s report, of course, is but one ex-
ample of many. However, it provided a concentrated sample of the discourse, 
which used economics to rationalise culture along several lines: administrative 
(the Ministry of Culture and Education), economic (the state plan) and techno-
scientific (statistical calculations). This rationalisation of culture was seen as an 
appropriate thing to do, both internally in the Soviet Union and externally, in its 
representations abroad. Thus, I suggest that these rationalisations are the mani-
festation of a broader Soviet mentality of governance of culture by calculation.  
 
Thus far I have argued that Soviet cultural policy was quantitatively constituted 
by an economic indicator system and statistical prediction, as it had to match the 
economic logic of centralised planning and accounting. The very existence of 
the extensive administration of the cultural sector, with its appropriate govern-
mental agencies, testified to the fact that culture was important for the Soviet 
state. Nevertheless, many people have pointed out that the Soviet state encoun-
tered enormous difficulties in its efforts to provide its citizens with even life’s 
most basic needs.38 Thus, how was the cultural sector positioned in the structure 
of priorities of the Soviet economic system? In later chapters I will show that 
the translation of quantitative development of culture into qualitative develop-
ment increasingly posed a problem for Soviet cultural policy-makers and opera-
tors. The following sub-chapter clarifies the position that cultural organisations 
                                      
36 Zvorykin, 11. 
37 As J. Wilzcynski pointed out, “extensive growth is based on the quantitative extension of la-
bour, capital and land engaged in production”. Meanwhile intensive growth “consists in overall 
increases of productivity, and consequently it depends on technological progress in its broadest 
sense”. J. Wilzcynski, Technology in Comecon: Acceleration of Technological Progress through 
Economic Planning and the Market (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974), 9. The Lithua-
nian SSR, for example, achieved intensive production of dairy products and agriculture (generat-
ing high productivity from smaller land plots). 
38 János Kornai, The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000). 
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and thus cultural policy occupied in the “priority landscapes” of Soviet plan-
ning.39
Culture as a Service Sector 
As the distinguished Hungarian economist János Kornai has persuasively sug-
gested, the Soviet economy could be characterised by endemic shortages at all 
levels;40 however, shortages were greater in some areas than in others. The se-
verity of constraints depended on both official political priorities and unofficial 
procedural rules. I will go on to show that despite its ideological significance, 
culture was given a low economic priority, which resulted in under-financing 
and, in particular, a paucity of sophisticated tools to assist administration.41
It has been argued that the needs of the military complex underpinned the 
structure of Soviet industries.42 The Cold War followed World War II, and mili-
tary defence remained the top priority.43 In turn, the military-industrial complex 
was first and foremost serviced by heavy industries (“the production of the 
means of production”), and scientific research, especially the natural sciences, 
tapped into these top-priority spheres. This type of industry was classified as 
“Group A”, while the goods for consumer use was known as “Group B”.44 The 
Twentieth Party Congress stressed the welfare of the people, but it did not chal-
lenge the existing priority system: “Without the prioritised growth of the heavy 
industry, we cannot assure extensive reproduction in all branches of the national 
                                      
39 I was inspired by the analyses of urban planning from the perspective of the priority system in 
the Soviet shortage economy, see Michael Gentile and Örjan Sjöberg, “Intra-urban Landscapes of 
Priority: The Soviet Legacy,” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no.5 (July 2006), 701-729.  
40 I refer to shortage economy as defined in János Kornai, Economics of Shortage, Vol. A-B. 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980), 25-29.  
41 On how the Soviet shortage economy contributed towards the ideologisation of the arts, see W. 
D. Kay, “Toward a Theory of Cultural Policy in Non-Market, Ideological Societies,” Journal of 
Cultural Economics 7, no.2 (December 1983), 1-24, 4. As Kay noted, “faced with the task of 
balancing off the several high-priority items on their policy agendas, socialist decision-makers are 
now required to state precisely the nature of the social good that their cultural policy seeks to 
maximize,” Kay, 1983, 5. A similar argument has been advanced more recently by Yankovskaya, 
769-791. 
42 David Holloway, “War, Militarism and the Soviet State,” in The Soviet Polity in the Modern 
Era, eds. E. P. Hoffmann and R. Laird (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984). 
43 Hanson, 30-31. The military production priority, according to Holloway, was embedded in 
central decisions, the structure of industry and even the attitudes of workers and managers. Thus 
the same enterprise would be producing much higher quality machinery dedicated to the military 
alongside its usual rather low-quality production. See Holloway, “War, Militarism and…,” 373; 
David Holloway, “State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev,” International Security 14, 
no.3 (Winter 1989-1990), 8-13. My Lithuanian scientist-informants, however, argued that it was 
easy to establish high-tech industry plants in Lithuania because the work ethic was perceived to 
be greater than in Russia. Interviews with mathematicians, Tomas and Pranas, December 2005, 
Vilnius. 
44 See Hanson, 27. 
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economy; without continuous technical progress, the upward line of the devel-
opment of productive forces and unswerving growth and labour efficacy, we 
cannot ensure the invincible productive power of our country and cannot in-
crease the welfare of the people”.45 As the fields of mathematics, physics (and 
later cybernetics) became famous for developing technologies that contributed 
to making the Soviet Union a global superpower,46 other disciplines sought to 
affiliate with them. Among the most important reasons for this rapprochement 
were the relative freedom from ideology and softer resource constraints.47 A 
relevant – and witty – point was made by the American scholar Parry, who 
pointed out that the reason why Soviet physicians were paid much less than 
engineers was that machines were more valuable than men; hence, the care of 
machines was better financed.48
It must be pointed out that there has never been any officially declared 
pyramid of Soviet priorities. Therefore, the priority system should be seen as a 
matter of reconstruction, expressed in terms of financial flows and the percep-
tions of the agents. In this regard, it was claimed that military defence influ-
enced both Soviet policy language and other systems of representation. The 
rhetorical militarisation of Soviet public discourses has been studied quite ex-
tensively.49 In Chapter III, I addressed the rhetoric of mobilisation that pervaded 
the post-World War II Stalinist cultural policy. Here, I would like to point out 
that military metaphors survived in culture, since they were reinforced by the 
Cold War. For example, in October 1970, an internal discussion between the 
LSSR Artists’ Union and the Collegium (Kolegija) of the Ministry of Culture 
about the all-union exhibition “On Leninist Way” took place. In following up 
critical reviews in the Russian press about the Lithuanian exhibition in Moscow, 
the LSSR Minister of Culture emphasised the importance of painting, as it was 
“heavy artillery and determines the level of both national art and each exhibi-
tion”.50 Heavy artillery or not, I argue that, economically, the arts could not be 
any further away from the military complex because they were economically 
classified as “service”. 
In both Soviet policy discourses and economic structure, “culture” was 
formulated as “service”. “Culture” was directed to the service of industrial pro-
                                      
45 See “Apie XX Partijos suvažiavimo išvadas” (1956), LLMA, f. 342, a. 1, b. 6, l. 292. Kazimie-
ras Meškauskas, Lietuvos kis 1940-1990 (Vilnius: 1994), 90.  
46 On Soviet “cult of science” see Paul R. Josephson, “Rockets, Reactors, and Soviet Culture,” in 
Science and the Soviet Social Order, ed. L. R. Graham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990). 
47 It must be added that after World War II there was nothing comparable with Stalin’s “scientific 
prisons” under NKVD control. 
48 Parry, 104. 
49 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-
1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  
50 “Lietuvos TSR Dailinink sjungos valdybos ir Lietuvos TSR Kultros ministerijos kolegijos 
jungtinio posdžio, 
vykusio 1970 m. spalio 6 d. protokolas Nr. 12,” LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1984, 
l. 31. 
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gress, the ideological advancement of communism and the welfare of the peo-
ple.51 The historian Kay argued that the service-oriented notion of culture was 
rooted in the Leninist interpretation of Marx. According to her, Lunacharsky 
drew upon Marx’s vague idea that artistic production was a part of the general 
“means of production” and therefore rightly belonged to the “masses”. This 
right of the masses had to be ensured by the state by supporting diverse arts and 
providing broad access to them, whereas, Kay argued that, according to Social-
ist Realism, the artwork itself “was the ‘property’ of the proletariat. Under this 
scheme, the social responsibility of the artist lies in ‘satisfying the owners’, that 
is, producing works that can be immediately accepted by the masses”.52 Here 
“one of the main factors that contributes to the advancement of artistic creation 
in a socialist society is a will to meet the growing needs of society in the field of 
art; this is what artists often call the ‘feeling of being useful’.”53 Furthermore, to 
serve an existing need was not a matter of choice but the duty of a Soviet artist. 
As a Russian art critic noted in 1979, “Soviet society takes upon itself to care 
for the material side of artists’ lives. In return, artists feel a dual responsibility 
for the quality of their work: to themselves and to their society”.54
While the cultural policy discourse of need and service was formulated in 
Soviet Russia in the 1920s and 1930s, in Lithuania it was introduced together 
with Stalinist cultural policies and further reinforced by de-Stalinisation in the 
late 1950s. For example, in the Republic meeting of cultural workers (19-21 
August 1954), the cultural workers in the countryside were instructed to “estab-
lish close relations with the heads of MTS [machine-tractor stations], find out 
about the cultural needs and demands of MTS workers and employ all possible 
means to satisfy them”.55 In 1955, the Lithuanian Minister of Culture referred to 
the republic’s cinema theatres as “improved cultural servicing of working peo-
ple” since “during the second five-year period, they … had 3,000 more screen-
ings than they did during the 1946-1950 period and serviced over 4 million 
spectators”.56 The definition of a village house of culture was that of a service 
provider: “it is a state enterprise of social purpose, which is entitled to execute 
the cultural servicing of people who live within the boundaries of a given col-
lective farm” [The italics are mine – E.R.].57 Following the Twentieth Party 
                                      
51 Apparently, nothing that was “good” could be left unemployed in service of the Soviet Union. 
For example, one of the earliest books propagating cybernetics stressed in its title that it was “at 
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54 M. Lazarev, “The Organization of Artists’ Work in the U.S.S.R.,” Leonardo 12 (1979), 107-
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56 “ naujus laimjimus kultrinje statyboje” (1955), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 38.  
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Congress in 1956, it was officially declared that the basis of the legitimacy of 
the socialist state was to satisfy the needs of the people: “As Comrade Khru-
shchev emphasised in his report, we have to guide ourselves not only by com-
parisons with the last year, but and most importantly, by the continuously grow-
ing material and cultural needs”.58 In the 1970s, a Lithuanian philosopher ar-
gued that:  
 
For example, if aesthetic, artistic creativity demands exist in society, it is 
self- evident that the state has to satisfy them. And not like some kind of a 
client, but as a mouthpiece of society’s interests. Both the socialist state 
and the artist are subjects of art politics [politika]. Therefore, the artist has 
to feel like an owner, like a conscious mouthpiece of society’s interests, 
and foster its goals and expectations.59
 
Thus, the state cultural policy was officially formulated neither as an egoistic 
caprice of the state (not the state but the population was “a client”) nor as an 
enterprise that would unselectively satisfy any folly. The Soviet government 
claimed that it had a very clear idea about the good and the bad needs of its 
population. Stimulating “good cultural needs”, such as socialising with work 
collectives and folk dancing (but not drinking) or attending the theatre during 
leisure time, was a way of governing the behaviour of the population.  
However, it would be erroneous to think that the Soviet discourse of “cul-
ture that satisfies needs” was inflexible. The growth of cultural needs was per-
ceived as an inevitable side effect of better standards of living. It was thus ac-
knowledged that as needs changed, cultural policy had to change too. Not eve-
rything was instilled from the top of the cultural administration down to the 
cultural consumer. Soviet cultural policy makers slowly, but surely responded to 
some of the changing cultural preferences of the population (to be sure, there 
were also negative responses). A good example of how difficult it was for So-
viet policy-makers to incorporate new, widespread cultural practices into the 
official discourse of “needs” were the debates about “light music” (pop, jazz, 
and disco as opposed to other genres, which included among others, “serious” 
contemporary music or patriotic and folk songs). In his speech at the First Re-
public’s Congress of Cultural Workers in 1969, the Lithuanian Minister of Cul-
ture Šepetys observed that 
 
Light music is not someone’s folly (though this happens sometimes), but 
first and foremost a need of our times; we will not escape it and should not 
be trying to do so. The time has come to essentially regulate and satisfy 
this need – we must create our own pop music, educate new pop singers 
and help existing ones. In this respect, the competition Towers of Vilnius is 
positive. Just before the congress, together with the Ministry of Industry 
                                      
58 “Apie XX Partijos suvažiavimo išvadas” (1956), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 298. 
59 E. Meškauskas, “Menininkas ir valstyb,” Literatra ir menas, 7 October 1978, 4. 
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and the Union of Lithuanian Consumer Cooperatives [Lietkoopsjunga], 
which is responsible for many pop and jazz orchestras, we began to search 
for ways of establishing an organisational economic unit, which would take 
care of the ideological-artistic level of those collectives.60 [The italics are 
mine – E.R.] 
 
This quotation is an excellent illustration of Soviet governmental logic: first, an 
existing “good need” was identified in the society, in this case “light music”. 
Then an administrative body that was formally accountable to the existing eco-
nomic system (“an organisational economic unit”) was to be established. This 
body would translate “need” into a formal organisation and control it according 
to predefined artistic and ideological criteria. The cultural process – creating 
light music – could not be left unsupervised. There was a risk that existing 
“good” cultural needs, especially those of “light music”, would become “bad” 
and get out of the hands of the administrators. About twenty years later, another 
Minister of Culture, Jonas Bielinis, complained: 
 
In recent years, the activity of amateur rock and pop groups has become 
much more vigorous. [...] We have to soberly and self-critically evaluate 
this controversial phenomenon. First of all, we must bravely and in a prin-
cipled way, as is proper for Communists, acknowledge that we have never 
experienced such a tragically heavy and long-term spiritual loss. It is a re-
sult of a neglected aesthetic education. [...] At first glance, it seems that 
everything is going well: only Lithuanian music is played at rock and pop 
concerts. Thousands of young people solve the problem of leisure time by 
learning to play the guitar, keyboard or percussion instruments. Thus, the 
tens of thousands of teenagers who listen to them are occupied in the eve-
ning – hence, no problems. And yet the limiting adoration and interest to 
only this music genre impoverishes the spiritual world of young people, 
and eventually they become alienated from real cultural values.61
 
This notion of culture as a service to the population was indelibly inscribed in 
the Soviet economic priority system. In the Soviet economic model, culture was 
attributed to a “non-productive” sphere of economics and thus perceived as a 
sphere for “expenditure” and not “investment”.62 Despite the declared on-going 
scientific-technical revolution (which I will address in more detail later) and, 
with computerisation, a Soviet post-industrialisation,63 Soviet economists rec-
                                      
60 Lionginas Šepetys, report at the First Congress of Republic’s Cultural Workers (2 June 1969) 
“Už tolimesn
 lietuvi tarybins kultros suklestjim!” LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b. 1856, l. 43. 
61 Jonas Bielinis, “Saviveiklin meno kryba” (1988), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3826, l. 22,23.  
62 Zvorykin. 
63 See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New 
York: Basic Books, 1973), on the service economy, Peter F. Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society 
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ognised only material goods as a result of production and subsequently, as an 
investment.64  
Thus, culture, attributed to the non-productive sector of service, was a low 
priority.65 Quite a few scholars noted signs of this attitude. For example, the 
issues of culture were rarely addressed in plenums of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee. As Mawdsley and White put it, Konstantin Chernenko’s 1983 speech 
about culture and ideology was the first to address these subjects on such a high 
level in twenty years. The inferiority of culture as “consumption” in relation to 
industries of “production”, as noticed by Thomas F. Remington, was also re-
flected in the hierarchical valuations of news in Soviet broadcasting and the 
press.66
If culture belonged to a low priority sphere then, according to Kornai, it 
could not help but face the rather severe restraints of shortage economy.67 And 
indeed, I found some evidence to suggest that the economic situation of culture 
was stable but not particularly good in the Soviet Union. Figure 1 demonstrates 
that the financing of “cultural and social undertakings” was relatively stable 
after World War II. Dedicated budget expenditures grew by 10 percent from 
1940 to 1960 and then remained at that level. Yet because economic growth in 
the Soviet Union was steadily declining from 1960 to the late 1980s, in real 
terms the financing of culture and the social sector was decreasing as well.68 
Only in 1984 was The Program of Development of Paid Services passed; this 
introduced the monetarisation of transactions. For the first time, the returns of 
the cultural sector to the national budget were studied; the study found that the 
culture sphere largely paid for itself.69 These results, however, should be taken 
with a grain of salt for a number of reasons: because such returns are generally 
difficult to count, Soviet cultural statistics were far from reliable; this was fur-
ther complicated by Soviet prices that were generally uninformative, as they 
were still centrally set by the government in 1984.70
Despite the existence of many cultural organisations, the “non-productive” 
cultural sector did not employ a large share of Lithuania’s population. Again, 
the numbers should be viewed with some scepticism. It is difficult to make 
more exact estimates because the published statistical data typically pooled 
together the health sector, social welfare, education and culture. However, it can 
                                                                                                                                  
(Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1994). Notably, Drucker debated the definitions of technical 
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64 Meškauskas, Lietuvos kis, 260. 
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66 Thomas Remington, The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union 
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67 Kornai, Economics of Shortage. 
68 Lietuvos kultros politika. Apžvalga (Vilnius, 1997). For economic decline, see Gregory and 
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69 Lietuvos kultros politika. Apžvalga. 
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be noted that although employment in the cultural sector had grown since 1960, 
it still made up a rather small part of the national economy (See Figure 2). Many 
 
Figure 1.The Budget of the Soviet Union: Expenditures 71
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cultural organisations were fairly small: it was not uncommon for a village club 
or house of culture to have only two employees. The cultural sector was not a 
particularly attractive sphere for persons seeking employment. In 1989, the av-
erage salary of a cultural worker was 111 to 113 roubles.72 According to the 
Lithuanian historian Kstytis Antanaitis, the salary of those employed in cul-
tural administration and education were 25 to 30 percent lower than the average 
salary in the country.73 It must be remembered that the average standard of liv-
ing in the Soviet Union was quite modest, to put it mildly. Is it any wonder that 
the LSSR ministers of culture often complained that the students sought em-
ployment elsewhere after receiving their degrees in cultural work.74 In 1985, for 
example, about 60 percent of the employees in provincial culture houses were 
under 30 years of age, while almost half of all the employees (43.7 percent) had 
worked in their workplaces for only three years. The cultural workers often left 
                                      
71 The source Gregory and Stuart, 104. The graph represents official data and thus expenditure on 
defence is grossly misrepresented, see also alternative calculations by Hanson, 32-34. Note that 
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cultural centres to work in trade union clubs (which reportedly involved fewer 
responsibilities) and industrial enterprises.75
Of course, the Soviet cultural operators had their own elite, who enjoyed 
better working and living conditions. Top artists and most members of creative 
unions based in cities enjoyed comparatively high standards of living. The stan-
dards differed depending on the individual’s occupation, position in the Party 
hierarchy, and profession. On the one hand, the leaders of major cultural  
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organisations and creative unions were included in Party nomenklatura, the 
privileged political class in the Soviet Union, which enjoyed superior standards 
of living.77 On the other, the top Party nomenklatura included very few acade-
micians or cultural operators.78 To achieve the rank of a “professional” cultural 
intellectual or artist, a person had to be investigated on many levels.79 However, 
                                      
75 A speech (1985), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3645, l. 79-80. 
76 The percent refers to the total of the population. “Non-productive sphere” includes the health 
sector, social welfare, education and culture. Source: Meškauskas, Lietuvos kis, 260. 
77 For the Lithuanian nomenclature, see Antanaitis, 63-65; for the Russian nomenclature see 
Mawdsley and White, 256-258, 262-264. Among other facilities, the nomenclature members had 
their own cemeteries. In Vilnius one such was Antakalnis cemetery, where many distinguished 
artists and intellectuals were buried.  
78 The media, science and arts representatives at the CC CPSU made 4 percent in 1939, 11 percent 
in 1952, 9 percent in 1956, 4 percent in 1966, 7 percent in 1976 and 6 percent in 1986, increasing 
up to 14 percent in 1990 after Gorbachev’s reforms in the Central Committee. Mawdsley and 
White, 98-99, 171, 205. 
79 As Miller and Yúdice noted, Soviet cultural policy intensively worked towards encouraging 
professionalism, which became a kind of hegemony. Miller and Yúdice, 110. 
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even ordinary members of creative unions had a job guaranteed by the state, and 
were provided facilities for work and leisure and given state commissions.80
The situation was different for more “mundane” cultural workers, who 
were employed in the administration of cultural organisations, especially librar-
ies and houses of culture. There was little chance that ordinary cultural workers 
would get on the list of the top nomenklatura (membership in the local nomenk-
latura was easier to attain but it brought fewer benefits). While they would be 
excluded from the privileged ranks, the nature of their jobs (the administration 
of poorly funded organisations) would also prevent them from making more 
money (whereas artists could earn extra income by selling their works privately, 
a musician could give part-time private tutorials and so on).81 For example, in 
1989 a choreographer complained that he was promised a dormitory room near 
his workplace. However, he had to live with his parents, because the room was 
never allocated. A music teacher from a village school painfully observed that 
“a cultural worker is a second-rate man, a piece of rubbish that would be kicked 
and even spat on by passers-by. I expected that I would raise the level of culture 
in the district and help it grow. I invested a great deal of effort in it, until I un-
derstood that in this sphere the quality of your work has no relationship whatso-
ever to social prestige. An agronomist receives everything once he completes 
his education: a house, a good salary, a car, everyone’s respect”. According to 
the musician, poor working and living conditions even lead to alcoholism or 
suicide among the cultural workers in the province.82  
The shortages and centralised barter economy gave rise to widespread in-
formality in the Soviet Union.83 However, the issues related to an informal 
economy in the Soviet cultural sector have still not become the subject of very 
much research. To mention just one example, the private collecting, buying and 
selling of works of art and antiques was quite widespread. The phenomenon 
was judged in the harshest terms by the Soviet officials, not only because of the 
financial profit from this illegal trade, but also of the “privatisation” of culture, 
which went against the ideological principle of narodnost’ or “access to the 
people”. For instance, in 1987, the LSSR Minister of Culture complained that 
many of the “works of art were hidden from society in ‘home museums’ and, 
unfortunately, often turned into objects of commerce, sources of income that 
were not derived from work”.84
                                      
80 For a detailed account about the formation of artists’ employment in pre-World War II Soviet 
Russia, see Yankovskaya, 769-791. 
81 I base my interpretation of the position of cultural workers in Soviet party nomenclature on the 
only Lithuanian study of LCP nomenclature on Antanaitis. 
82 Asta Andrikonyt, “Nieko naujo,” KB 9 (1989), 44.  
83 Kornai, The Socialist System, 85-86; Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The In-
formal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
84 Jonas Bielinis (3 April 1978), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 15. 
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The Material Base of Culture 
Finally, I would like to consider another important indicator of culture’s posi-
tion in the economic priority scheme, namely, the contents of the widely used 
notion known as “a material base of culture”. Throughout my study of this pe-
riod, I have encountered endless calls for “improving a material base of culture” 
in the ministers’ speeches and articles in the press. Now, in Soviet policy termi-
nology, “material base” could mean virtually anything that had to be “exter-
nally” provided for cultural operators (except for financing). Thus, a material 
base of culture was the primary concern of Gosplan’s planning. The archived 
documents of the LSSR Ministry of Culture provide a wealth of material about 
the codifications of the “material base” of culture from the 1960s to the 1980s.  
Significantly, I discovered that the contents of such codifications did not 
change much during that period. A typical project, submitted to the All-Union 
Council of Ministers in 1965, states that the notion of a “material base” in-
cluded, first and foremost, buildings. The construction of buildings was grouped 
in accounting forms under “capital investment” and was one of the most press-
ing tasks of the Ministry. Staff positions were also part of the material base and 
were codified as “cadres”. Curiously, “organisation” itself was conceptualised 
as material: the base included “a network of organisations”; its “denseness and 
evenness” was particularly important. Consequently, other issues were also 
associated with the material base: in the case of buildings – “maintenance and 
renovation”; in the case of cadres – “the welfare of staff”, particularly housing, 
while organisations were to be provided with “technical equipment”, such as 
libraries on the wheels, furniture, machines for amusement parks, equipment for 
performances, and music instruments.85  
Thus, the notion of “a material base” also included non-material objects, 
such as administration (“the network of organisations”) and work positions 
(“cadres”). While many of the cultural organisations’ buildings lacked adequate 
furniture, administration was even more neglected when it came to the latest 
technology. Even in the plans, computer or general information technology 
never made their way to the notion of “a material base of culture”. I believe that 
this can be regarded as another eloquent indication of the low priority given to 
cultural policy, as well as of the general limitations of Soviet post-
industrialisation. Only in the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
did the public libraries see the materialisation of “informatisation”, “cyberneti-
sation” and “computerisation” campaigns. (However, it is important to note that 
the scientific libraries, with restricted access, were better equipped.)  
                                      
85 The All-Union Ministers Council (project) “On the means of assistance for widening and 
strengthening the material-technical basis of culture’s enterprises,” LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1432, 
l. 90-93. Notably, communication and computer technologies were not included in the list. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter argued that Soviet culture was economically rationalised as a cal-
culable sphere of services. It was seen as consisting of organisations, objects 
and practices, all of which could be counted and had to be accounted for. The 
central planning organs needed a lot of information, which was codified with 
economic indicators of culture. Cultural policy was intended to serve the needs 
of the population, but the needs to be serviced were selectively chosen and often 
insufficiently addressed. It is true that the Soviet government established a very 
extensive administrative network of cultural organisations, but they could 
hardly be seen as thriving in the context of the shortage-ridden economy and the 
low priority given to the cultural sector. Though the work of cultural organisa-
tions was officially appraised, statistically codified and internationally displayed 
as proof of Soviet progress, in reality, cultural workers had to cope with their 
lower than average salaries and chronically insufficient provisions with a mate-
rial base.  
Many scholars have noted that the Soviet ambition to centrally plan and 
administer the entire economy posed nearly insurmountable problems. One of 
the major problems had to do with information about the demand, in market 
economies, obtained from prices. Soviet economic planning has been much 
criticised as crude and insufficient, unassisted by the latest technology, executed 
with little regard for local conditions, and ultimately jeopardised by the lack of 
incentives.86 The economic decline that began in the late 1960s and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 were presented as the ultimate proof of the fallacies 
in this approach.87 Soviet agents themselves acknowledged the problems and 
attempted to solve them with the help of new science and technology, as well as 
new modes of management. Yet to limit the ambition of governing at that scale, 
including culture, to leave, as one minister of culture put it, cultural develop-
ment to “elemental, self-driving” forces,88 was nearly unthinkable. 
Better governance and better machines were considered important ele-
ments in the Soviet Union’s quest for progress. With de-Stalinisation, good 
management, assisted by new technology, came to be perceived as the tools for 
rejuvenating the Soviet economy. As Brezhnev put it in 1970, “the science of 
victory [in building socialism] is, in essence, the science of management”.89 
This language of economic rationalisation of the cultural sector facilitated, and 
                                      
86 It was argued that “Gosplan officials” could not “make 1% of the calculations needed to bal-
ance the plan,” Michael Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971), 68 cf Conyngham, The Modernisation of Soviet Industrial Management, 26; see also John 
P. Hardt, Marvin Hoffenberg, Norman Kaplan, Herbert S. Levine, eds., Mathematics and Com-
puters in Soviet Economic Planning (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967); 
Hanson; Misiunas and Taagepera, 188. 
87 Stephen Kotkin, Armagedon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2001), Andres Aslund, Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); Hanson; Rosefielde. 
88 The speech of LSSR minister of culture (1969), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1856, l. 49. 
89 Pravda, 13 June 1970, cf Cocks, 229. 
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moreover called for, its translation into the new cybernetic terms of techno-
scientifically assisted governance. In 1967, the LSSR State Plan stated that “a 
more perfect system of norms, mathematical methods and electronic computing 
technology should be introduced into the management and planning of produc-
tion as quickly as possible”.90 The next chapter examines how this process of 
calculation and circulation became an object of management theories, under-
pinned by a “system-cybernetic approach” and assisted by computer technol-
ogy.  
 
 
                                      
90 LTSR MT nutarimas N. 433 (5 October 1967), LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b. 1736, l. 4.  
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V. Cybernetic Management: Setting the 
Preconditions for the Scientific Governance of 
Culture 
In January 1990, the first officially declared intention to establish an automated 
management system (AMS) for LSSR Ministry of Culture appeared in the Min-
istry’s internal plan. Ironically, the suggestion for the ministry occurred barely 
three months before Lithuania’s government declared the country’s independ-
ence from the Soviet Union.1 The late date of the suggestion testifies to the low 
priority given to the cultural sector in the Soviet hierarchy of distributing “the 
material base”. As I showed in the previous chapter, culture was not highly 
prioritised by the Soviet economic planners. Sophisticated computer technol-
ogy, not to mention computers, was expensive and reserved only for the most 
prioritised spheres. The Ministry of Culture did not even have appropriate copy-
ing technology.2
The plan approved in 1990, however, does not provide sufficient grounds 
for speculating about the purpose of the ministry’s AMS. However, it gives us a 
significant hint that the ministry wanted to have an AMS. On the one hand, this 
suggestion for an AMS was clearly a part of a chain of decisions to computerise 
the cultural sector with an automated system for cultural monuments and auto-
mated workplaces).3 On the other, the suggested AMS indicated a broader men-
tality of governance. I will now show how this mentality was formulated in 
relation to industrial management and then later extended to the governance of 
society and culture. 
This chapter reconstructs the way in which Soviet cybernetic management 
was assembled as intellectual and material machinery of governance. I have 
                                      
1 An appendix to the decision N.3 by the Collegium of the LSSR Ministry of Culture, “Lietuvos 
TSR kultros ministerijos 1990 met pagrindini darb planas” (4 January 1990), LLMA, f. 342, 
ap. 1, b. 3915, l. 13. 
2 One archive employee recalled that in order to make a copy for an archive it was necessary to 
travel to the National Library, which was located a couple of kilometres from the Ministry’s 
building. Unrecorded conversation, Vilnius, December 2007. 
3 The archive contained documents which revealed another suggestion to design “automated 
systems for cultural monuments” (Decree 29, 26 January 1989). In September of the same year 
introducing computer technology into governmental organisations was for the first time included 
as in the state plan. The plan indicators contained “automated systems” and “automated work-
places”. LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b. 3882, l. 41; LSSR State Plan Committee, “Raštas su pridtais 
rodikliais Nr. 1/9-3105” (8 September 1989), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3891, l. 5. 
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already shown how the occupational regime introduced an extensive, centralised 
state administration of culture in Lithuania. Further, in the previous chapter, I 
demonstrated that, in the eyes of the Soviet state, “culture” was formulated as 
an economic sphere. Subsumed to the logic of economy (and chronic economis-
ing), Soviet cultural policy-making was an inherent part of calculation-based 
governance. In this chapter, I will explicate in greater detail how calculation-
based governance was upgraded with the new cybernetic machinery, both as a 
thought and as a technique. 
The process of techno-scientific innovation in governance will be concep-
tualised as translation: the chapter explores how the principles of cybernetic 
control were translated in management theory in Soviet Lithuania. The concept 
of translation is used to emphasise that neither cybernetic principles nor vocabu-
lary was taken in a straightforward manner from the context of origin and trans-
ported to other discourses and organisational practices. The transfer of cyber-
netic theory and technologies (predominantly computers) featured multiple and 
mutual adjustments, during the course of which new meanings were produced. 
This is precisely why I use the term “translation” and not simply “influence” or 
“transfer” to capture the complexity of this process.  
This chapter also addresses the consequences of this translation to the So-
viet political regime, while other chapters will consider its cultural conse-
quences. Consideration of the influence of cybernetics and systems theory on 
management in the context of transforming Soviet authoritarianism is already 
part of tradition. Since the 1970s, the influence of systems theory and cybernet-
ics on Soviet managerial thought has been investigated by quite a few Western 
scholars, including Conyngham, Holloway, Hoffmann, Beissinger and Vidmer.4 
Acknowledging that an enormous discursive shift towards cybernetics and sys-
tems theory took place in Soviet managerial thought in the early 1960s, these 
researchers wondered whether this new techno-scientific development would 
entail a deeper transformation of the Soviet administration and even politics. 
The expected transformations ranged from improved economic performance 
and military strength, achieved by better and faster calculations, to the de-
ideologisation of the very process of governance, as the information would cir-
culate back and forth more freely and on a horizontal level. Yet it was con-
                                      
4 Cocks; David Holloway, “The Political Use of Scientific Models: The Cybernetic Model of 
Government in Soviet Social Science,” in The Use of Models in the Social Sciences, ed. Lynd-
hurst Collins (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976); Erik P. Hoffmann, “The ‘Scientific Management’ 
of Soviet Society,” Problems of Communism (May-June 1977); William J. Conyngham, “Tech-
nology and Decision Making: Some Aspects of the Development of OGAS,” Slavic Review 39, 
no.3 (1980); Richard F. Vidmer, “Soviet Studies of Organization and Management: A ‘Jungle’ of 
Competing Views,” Slavic Review 40, no.3 (1981); Erik P. Hoffmann, “Soviet Perspectives on 
Leadership and Administration,” in The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era, eds. E. P. Hoffmann and 
R. F. Laird (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984); Hoffmann and Laird, Technocratic 
Socialism; Beissinger; Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak. See also Graham, Science, 
Philosophy, and …; D.A. Pospelov and Ya.I. Fet, eds., Ocherki istorii informatiki v Rossii (No-
vosibirsk: Nauchno-izdatelskii tsentr OIGGM SO RAN, 1998). 
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cluded that the concrete applications of a system-cybernetic approach were only 
successful in the Soviet military sector. In practice, they largely failed to recon-
figure the economic and political spheres.5  
This chapter contributes to this argument by specifying how the system-
cybernetic approach adjusted to both theory and practice of management in 
Lithuanian SSR. I will show that the Soviet translations of management into the 
terms of systems theory and cybernetics featured securitisation with regard to 
the external environment. Cybernetic emphasis on self-regulation was combined 
with an authoritarian emphasis on coercion. I found that the process of translat-
ing a system-cybernetic approach into Soviet management theory went rather 
smoothly. The potential “liberalising” qualities of techno-science were neutral-
ised and adjusted to the needs of the centralised authoritarian Soviet govern-
ment. However, I will also show that, in practice, the technical cybernetic appli-
cations (AMS) worked as critical devices, since they exposed the officially sup-
pressed informality of the Soviet economy. 
I will begin with a brief outline of the main ideas of Wiener’s cybernetics. 
I will then present an overview of the institutionalisation of cybernetics and 
management science in Soviet Lithuania. This will be followed by a discussion 
of how cybernetic control and computers came to figure in management theory, 
which also revealed a strong Russian legacy in the Lithuanian context. The 
analysis will be complemented with examples of concrete projects, which in-
volved the installation of automated control or management systems (AMS). 
This will allow me to evaluate the practical implementation of the principles of 
cybernetic control. This discussion is necessary in order to appreciate the com-
plexity of the cultural debates that will be addressed in the following chapters. 
Cybernetics 
This section briefly outlines the principles of cybernetics and presents its intro-
duction into the Soviet Union and Lithuanian SSR. My thesis is less concerned 
with the development of cybernetics as a scientific discipline than with the ways 
in which cybernetic ideas and machinery contributed to formulating an under-
standing of knowability and governability. Therefore, this sub-chapter is limited 
to some background historical data about the pioneering scholars and the first 
institutions that engaged in cybernetics and related disciplines; unfortunately, it 
cannot do justice to the complexity of the history of Lithuanian cybernetics.  
                                      
5 But not only the Soviet political regime was expected react to the techno-scientific innovations. 
Fischer has argued that similar expectations were also posed towards system-cybernetic steering 
in Western democracies. Technical rationality and especially its emphasis on self-regulation was 
contrasted to irrational personal violence, arbitrary coercion of the state, and the uncontrollability 
of war. Fischer. 
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a) A Note on “upravlenie” and “valdymas” 
Before I proceed any further, I must clarify the linguistic translation of some 
key terms. This chapter deals with a subject area that usually operates with Eng-
lish terms, such as management, governance and control. My sources featured 
many linguistic translations: from one scientific domain to another, from Eng-
lish to Russian and Lithuanian. In turn, my own writing involves translating 
back to English. In Soviet scholarly and public discourses, Wiener’s “control” 
was translated as upravlenie (Russian) or valdymas (Lithuanian).6 To translate 
these words back into English is a complicated task because in their original 
languages, both upravlenie and valdymas mean management or governance. In 
fact, a more precise translation of “control” in both languages would be kontrol’ 
(Russian) and kontrol (Lithuanian), but this did not occur. As Gerovitch con-
vincingly argued, the choice to translate “control” into upravlenie already ex-
pressed a particular interpretation of the science of cybernetics itself: as broadly 
defined governance.7
Notably, there was consistency between the Russian word upravlenie, 
which could be quite adequately translated into the Lithuanian word valdymas, 
even though the etymology of the words is different. The root of upravlenie 
refers to prav,o which means both “a right” and “a law”. Pravo is also related to 
pravil’no or “correct” or “truthful”. The words pravit or upravliat suggest an act 
of correction, which brings us back to truthfulness. The meaning of the Russian 
upravlenie does imply a regulation that aims at correction on the basis of preset 
“truth measures”. This is why it is a rather good translation of Wiener’s concept 
of feedback-based control, whilst it transgresses the more narrow meaning of 
the English word “control”. Unlike upravlenie, the Lithuanian valdymas does 
not imply an act of correction or control by supervision.8 Moreover, in the So-
viet Union, both upravlenie and valdymas were used to translate the Western 
term “management”. However, in the Lithuania of the 1920s and 1930s, an 
American-Lithuanian theoretician Graicunas suggested the Lithuanian word 
vadyba as a translation of “management”. The word vadyba was derived from 
the word vadas or a leader and meant “leadership”. Thus, Graicunas’s term 
reflected his own understanding of management: he specialised in human rela-
tions and leadership in organisations. Vadyba was not used during the Soviet 
period, but was revived after 1990. At the same time, in Russia, “management” 
                                      
6 Wiener’s Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine was 
translated in Russian as Kibernetika, ili upravlenie i sviaz’ v zhivotnom i mashine (Moscow, 
Nauka, 1983). 
7 Slava Gerovitch, “Striving for ‘Optimal Control’: Soviet Cybernetics as a ‘Science of Govern-
ment’,” in Cultures of Control, ed. M. R. Levin (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000). 
8 In the respective languages, both words differently relate to the word “a state”. The Lithuanian 
word for “governance” (valdymas) is directly related to “a state” (valstyb) and “a government” 
(valdžia). In other words, in Lithuanian “a state” is something which is “governed”, when both 
are related to “a will”. Whilst in the Russian language “governance” (upravlenie) is related to “a 
government” (pravitel’stvo), but not “a state” (gosudarstvo). 
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came to be transcribed as menedzhment, whereas upravlenie remained in use 
and denoted the governance of larger sectors or policy-making. A similar dis-
tinction could be traced in Lithuanian (vadyba as management and valdymas as 
governance). 
To conclude, there is no straightforward way to translate either the Soviet 
Russian word upravlenie or the Lithuanian word valdymas into English. These 
words were translated as “control” in technical texts, especially those related to 
computers, but as “management” or “governance” in texts that dealt with poli-
tics and economics.9 Therefore, I will use control, management and governance 
depending on the contexts. In order to make my choice more visible, I will indi-
cate the original word in brackets. 
b) From American to Soviet Cybernetics 
Founded in the American military sector during World War II and dedicated to 
the improvement of machines for extermination, cybernetics, the science of 
communication and control, was extended to civil applications, attributed with 
liberal humanist values, and used by various academic disciplines. The term 
“cybernetics” was coined by the American mathematician Norbert Wiener 
(1894-1964) in his Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal 
and the Machine (1948).10 The term was derived from the Greek word kuber-
n	t	s or “steersman”. The choice of the word was not accidental.11 It referred to 
the control of an object that was self-regulating and whose behaviour was not 
limited to causal determination.  
Cybernetics as a science of control developed out of efforts to improve the 
servo-mechanisms12 of anti-aircraft defence. The task was to calculate and pre-
dict the future position of a plane, target it and launch a missile. The speed of a 
                                      
9 For example, in an official translation done in Moscow, 1974, as it stated that: “Cybernetics 
affords a striking example of links between many sciences. It deals with the theory of manage-
ment in various fields [...] science is penetrating every field of government and economic man-
agement. The Communist Party, the leading force in the state and society, puts the management 
of social processes on a sound scientific foundation” [The italics are mine – E.R.]. USSR. Scien-
tific and Technical Revolution (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973), 10. 
10 The life and work of Wiener had been depicted in two main biographies. See a more journalis-
tic account Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman, Dark Hero of the Information Age: In Search of 
Norbert Wiener, The Father of Cybernetics (New York: Basic Books, 2005); and the more aca-
demically focused Rustom P. Masani, Norbert Wiener 1894-1964 (Basel, Boston, Berlin: Birk-
häuser Verlag, 1990). 
11 French cybernetician George Guilbaud pointed out that the term kybern	tik	, the art of steers-
manship was used by Plato in the Gorgias and André-Marie Ampère who, in the Essay on the 
Philosophy of the Sciences (1834) translated kybern	tik	 into cybernétique, designating the means 
of civil government. The term was recognised by Larousse but not used until Wiener’s publica-
tion in French (1948). George T.Guilbaud, What Is Cybernetics? (New York: Grove Press Inc., 
1960), 2. 
12 A servomechanism is “an electric or hydraulic motor that, with the addition of a feedback loop, 
is able to precisely hold and control its position”. Mindell, Segal, Gerovitch, 69.  
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plane and the range of its manoeuvres implied that these actions could not be 
performed by a human being. These technological challenges were met by cre-
ating servo-mechanisms, which were complex automatic electromechanical 
machines that interacted with the environment. The trajectories were predicted 
by rapid calculations and the action was steered by transmitting electronic sig-
nals. These were automatic, self-steering machines, which guided their actions 
on the basis of information feedback loops. In order to take in the information, 
these “cybernetic machines” were equipped with sensors (radar).13  
The design and construction of war machines led to a rethinking of the na-
ture of control on other systems besides electronic ones. At the Josiah Macy 
Foundation’s interdisciplinary conferences in New York in the 1940s,14 the 
influence of cybernetics theory expanded beyond military engineering.15 In the 
Macy meetings, cybernetics was discussed among leading American social and 
natural scientists, such as W. Ross Ashby, Roman Jacobsson, Charles Morris, 
Gregory Bateson, Paul Lazersfeld, Talcott Parsons and Margaret Mead. It had 
important ramifications in the social, economic and political sciences,16 since 
the principles of the theory made sense even if the mathematical expression was 
bypassed.17 Along with information theory (Claude Shannon) and General Sys-
tems Theory (Ludwig von Bertalanffy), cybernetics provided important concep-
tual tools for social science, for example, feedback, information, codes and 
                                      
13 Wiener listed the following sensors: photoelectric cells and other receptors for light, radar 
systems receiving Hertzian waves, hydrogenion-potential recorders (for “tasting”), thermometers, 
pressure gauges and microphones. The sensors send the information to receptors, which further 
issue a command to effectors. The received information may be delayed for a time; such delayed 
information constitutes memory. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in 
the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965), 42, 43. 
14 Steve Joshua Heims, The Cybernetics Group (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1991); 
Steve Joshua Heims, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the Tech-
nologies of Life and Death (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1980); Conway and Siegelman. 
15 Hayles; Mindell, Segal, Gerovitch, 67. 
16 Most famously, Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communica-
tion and Control (New York: Free Press, 1966). Speaking of art, the culmination was a large 
exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity at the Institute for Contemporary Art, London, 1968. The exhi-
bition involved 325 participants and attracted about 60,000 visitors. Focused on art and creativity 
as cybernetically defined processes, it laid the ground for the concept of an interactive museum. 
Jasia Reichardt, “Cybernetics, Art and Ideas,” in Cybernetic Serendipity, ed. J. Reichardt (Lon-
don: Studio Vista, 1971); Barry, 136-137. 
17 Mainly in the 1960s, many popular introductions to cybernetics were published, though most 
often by specialist presses. See, for example, Ross W. Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1956); F. H. George, Automation, Cybernetics and Society (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1959); George T. Guilbaud, What Is Cybernetics? (New York: 
Grove Press Inc., 1960); Gordon Pask, An Approach to Cybernetics (London: A Radius 
Book/Hatchinson, 1961); D.A. Bell, Intelligent Machines. An Introduction to Cybernetics (Lon-
don: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd., 1962); Ralph Parkman, The Cybernetic Society (New York: 
Pergamon Press Inc., 1972); A. F.G. Hanken, Cybernetics and Society: An Analysis of Social 
Systems (Kent: Abacus Press, 1981); even translated from Russian, Viktor M. Glushkov, Intro-
duction to Cybernetics (New York and London: Academic Press, 1966). 
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communication.18 It is important to note that cybernetics was not alone in de-
veloping these concepts. As Mindell pointed out, beginning in the 1950s, sev-
eral disciplines (cybernetics, operations research, general systems theory, sys-
tems analysis and systems dynamics) shared the world view of flows, feedback 
and interactions.19
Wiener worked closely with biologists (Arturo Rosenblueth) and physi-
cists (Julian Bigelow). They produced a theory of the workings of the brain as a 
circular process and coined the concept of purposeful or “teleological behav-
iour”. Teleological behaviour was defined as feedback-controlled, goal-seeking 
behaviour. It must be emphasised that causal determinism is largely irrelevant 
for constructing or understanding such behaviour: it was seen as being less de-
termined by causes and more guided by predictions.20 Wiener also advanced the 
development of statistics by introducing calculations to smooth the time series, 
which made it possible to predict future behaviour on the basis of statistical 
accounts of its past. Though Wiener himself was quite sceptical about the qual-
ity of social statistics, his discovery was instrumental for the forecasting of so-
cial and political trends, as well as risk management.21 In this way the calcula-
tions made possible by electronic engineering made feedback applicable to 
wider governance or policy-making.22
Even more influential were the conceptual principles of cybernetics, which 
concerned the notions of order and the transmission of information. Wiener 
defined information as a “content” of exchanged messages, the goal of which 
was to increase order. He argued that “the amount of information in a system is 
the measure of its degree of organisation”.23 In Wiener’s cybernetics informa-
                                      
18 Charles R. Dechert, “The Development of Cybernetics,” in The Social Impact of Cybernetics, 
ed. Ch. R. Dechert (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 34; Rose, 
1974, 78; Armand Mattelart and Michèle Mattelart, Theories of Communication. A Short Intro-
duction (London: Sage, 1998). Lash, however, defined cybernetic information systems as external 
to humans, or “forms of life at a distance”. Scott Lash, Critique of Information (London: Sage, 
2002), 15-16. 
19 David A. Mindell, “Bodies, Ideas, and Dynamics: Historical Perspectives on Systems Thinking 
in Engineering.” In MIT Working Paper Series, ESD-WP-2003-01.23, 23 January 2003, < 
http://esd.mit.edu/wps/2003.htm> (5 May 2008), 17. 
20 Arturo N. Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleol-
ogy,” Philosophy of Science 10 (1943), 23, 24. 
21 He argued that for a “good statistics of society” long runs were needed “under essentially con-
stant conditions,” which is hard to achieve. On the other hand comparing the statistics of society 
with that of gas, he insisted on the need to know “the main elements of the dynamics of the situa-
tion” in order to define a smaller sample. Wiener, Cybernetics, 25. 
22 As Wiener put it, “such a policy-feedback may … appear to be what we know under one aspect 
as a conditioned reflex, and under another as learning,” Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Hu-
man Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York: Da Capo Press, 1954), 33, 38. This idea was 
more developed by Ashby who conceptualised a random formation of order and its stabilisation 
on the ground of learning. This influenced development of the ideas of “learning organisation” 
and entire societies. 
23 Wiener, Cybernetics, 11. 
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tion was the opposite of noise. Further, cybernetics would acquire a nearly phi-
losophical status and mission, since Wiener saw it as  
 
[The] theory of the message among men, machines, and in society as a se-
quence of events in time, which […] strives to hold back nature’s tendency 
towards disorder by adjusting its parts to various purposive needs.24
 
The control processes based on the transmission of information, Wiener argued, 
were featured in machines, organisms and human beings, as long as they were 
seen as purposively behaving systems.25 Together with the centrality of feed-
back, Wiener’s theory contributed to seeing control as dialogue or the exchange 
between the external environment and several levels of feedback mechanisms. 
Openness, free flows of information were necessary for the proper functioning 
of such machines (or systems). Drawing on that, Wiener argued that cybernetic 
technology is particularly suited to a “liberal humanist subject”.26 Whilst Wie-
ner acknowledged that large, complex communities, for example, ants and hu-
man beings, had the potential for self-regulation through feedback, he warned 
that social self-regulation did not necessarily result in homeostasis or a state of 
equilibrium. Quite the opposite – he argued that societal self-regulation tended 
to result in non-desired states, which essentially lack equilibrium, such as the 
tendency to shape monopolies in the market. However, this is the case of large-
scale societies. Wiener held that very small communities were more likely to 
have “a very considerable measure of homeostasis”.27
Thus, according to Wiener, scale had an important effect on a type of con-
trol. As he argued, in astronomy the observer is rather alienated from the ob-
served, because human beings and their instruments have very little energy to 
influence the planets. Meanwhile, physics has to deal with very small particles, 
and there the observer’s influence on the observed is unavoidable. The biggest 
problem for this type of influence emerges in the social sciences, when an ob-
server and an observed are of a very similar scale. Ultimately, Wiener believed 
more in the value of “the narrative method of the professional historian” than in 
                                      
24 Wiener, The Human Use…, 27. 
25 It has to be noted that Wiener did not identify language with the transmission of information. 
Wiener understood language as a field of order confronted with nature defined in Einsteinian 
terms, but also as a game in public debate: “language may strive simply against nature’s tendency 
to confuse it or against wilful human attempts to subvert its meaning. Normal communicative 
discourse, whose major opponent is the entropic tendency of nature itself, is not confronted by an 
active enemy, conscious of its own purposes. Forensic discourse… encounters a much more 
formidable opposition, whose conscious aim is to qualify and even to destroy its meaning”. Wie-
ner, The Human Use…, 93.  
26 Wiener was reserved about using cybernetic control for governing society. See Wiener The 
Human Use…, 15-16. For Wiener’s “reconciling cybernetics with a liberal humanist subject” see 
Hayles, 92. 
27 Wiener, Cybernetics, 158-160.  
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predictive social science based on “short statistical runs”.28 It is simply curious 
that the history of Soviet cybernetics featured such a dramatic narrative.  
Whilst cybernetics was greeted as a scientific breakthrough in both the 
United States and Western Europe in the early 1950s, in the Soviet Union, cy-
bernetics was criticised and prohibited as a “reactionary bourgeois” “pseudo-
science”.29 Why did the Soviet authorities refuse to appreciate the new science 
of communication and control? Many reasons lie behind this lack of apprecia-
tion; some were ideological, since Wiener defined “information” neither as 
matter nor energy, which contradicted Marxism-Leninism, whilst other were 
geopolitical, as the Cold War intensified since 1948.30 Revisionist historiogra-
phy convincingly pointed out that the banishment of cybernetics was a result not 
only of central organs, but also of internal institutional competition among So-
viet scientists.31 Particularly damaging to cybernetics was its intellectual affilia-
tion with genetics. In the Soviet Union, genetics was attacked as “unscientific, 
idealistic, metaphysical, reactionary, scholastic, feeble and sterile” by Trofim 
Lysenko, with the editorial support of Stalin (July 1948). Similarly, relativity 
theory, quantum mechanics and other theories from Western social and natural 
science, for example, structuralism and comparative historical linguistics, were 
declared to be erroneous and not to be applied in Soviet scholarship.32  
It took a good deal of effort on the part of Soviet Russian mathematicians 
and physicists, mainly those employed in the military sector, to reinstate the 
scientific status of cybernetics.33 The Western debates about the political impli-
cations of a “system cybernetic approach” were of little help here. For example, 
in spite of its assumed neutrality, the systems theory was hailed in the West as a 
harbinger of “the death of ideology”.34 However, this is why it was initially 
received with scepticism in the Soviet Russia.35 The rehabilitation of cybernet-
                                      
28 Wiener, Cybernetics, 162-164. 
29 The first public criticism of Wiener appeared in the Soviet press in May 1950. In 1953 an arti-
cle by Materialist in Issues of Philosophy (Voprosy filosofii) criticised cybernetics on theoretical 
Marxist-Leninist grounds. In 1954 cybernetics was called a “reactionary pseudo-science” in the 
Short Philosophical Dictionary, an important ideological reference book. See Materialist, “Komu 
sluzhit kibernetika” (1953), in Ocherki istorii informatiki v Rossii, eds. D.A. Pospelov and Ya.I. 
Fet (Novosibirsk: Nauchno-izdatel’skii tsentr OIGGM SO RAN, 1998). Gerovitch related the 
flow of the attacks to Soviet foreign policy in response to the formation of NATO in 1949. 
Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 118-119, 125. 
30 Wiener stated that “information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which 
does not admit this can survive at the present day”. Wiener, Cybernetics, 132. 
31 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak. 
32 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 17, 19, 40. Even sociology was considered to be 
dangerous. Elizabeth Weinberg, The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union (London and 
Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). 
33 This process started in 1954-1955. The main initiators were mathematician Aleksei Liapunov 
(1911-1933), the chief mathematician of the Soviet atomic project Sergei Sobolev (1908-1989) 
and the deputy head of Computation Centre 1 of the Ministry of Defence Anatolii Kitov. 
Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 167, 174, 175, 176. 
34 Fischer; also Holmqvist. 
35 Susiluoto. 
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ics began well after Stalin’s death in 1955 and was reinforced by the construc-
tion of the first computer in the Soviet Union.36 The year 1958 saw the appear-
ance of the term “cybernetics” in Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia, as well as 
of the Russian translation of Norbert Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Be-
ings.37 It was almost symbolic that the rehabilitation of cybernetics, a science of 
communication and control, coincided with de-Stalinisation. Moreover, it 
seemed that the Soviets invested much more hope in this new science of com-
munication and control than did their Western counterparts.38 It came to be seen 
as a panacea for the economic and social problems of governance. 
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels wrote that a “bourgeois 
culture” did nothing but mould working people to “act as a machine”, a cog in 
industrial production.39 Wiener’s cybernetics made it possible to create both a 
new type of machine and to re-think a relationship between human beings and 
culture as a nexus of control and communication in a new way.40 The rehabilita-
tion of cybernetics in the Soviet Union was a step towards a more complex ap-
proach to the relationship among state governance, human beings, machines 
and, in my case, culture. I will now briefly present the development of cybernet-
ics in Lithuania. 
c) From Moscow to Vilnius: The Beginnings of Soviet Lithuanian Cybernetics 
The route that cybernetics took into Lithuania was rooted in the Soviet aca-
demic centres in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. With its notorious prohibition in 
1948 and its enthusiastic rehabilitation in 1955, reinforced with condemnation 
                                      
36 During the “anti-cybernetic” period 1951-52, the Russian scientist Sergei A. Lebedev (1902-
1974) constructed the first digital computer MESM (malaiia elektronnaia schetnaia mashina or 
“Small Electronic Calculating Machine”) in Kiev, Ukraine. His next computer BESM (bol’shaia 
elektronnaia schetnaia mashina or “Big Electronic Calculating Machine”), very powerful for that 
time, was designed in 1953. The serial production of the computer (under the name of BESM-2) 
started in Kazan’, Russia in 1959. Gregory D. Crowe and Seymour E. Goodman, “S.A. Lebedev 
and the Birth of Soviet Computing,” Annals of the History of Computing IEEE 16, no.1 (1994), 5-
6. 
37 The translation was published under the title Cybernetics and Society, Norbert Wiener, Kiber-
netika i obshchestvo (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo inostrannoii literatury, 1958). Wiener’s Cybernetics 
was translated into Russian only a decade later. See Norbert Wiener, Kibernetika ili upravlenie i 
sviaz’ v zhivotnom i mashine (Moscow: Sovetskoe radio, 1968, the 2nd edition was published by 
Nauka, 1983). 
38 Aksel’ I. Berg, “Nauka velichaishchikh vozmozhnostei (1962),” in Ocherki istorii informatiki v 
Rossii, eds. D.A. Pospelov and Ya.I. Fet (Novosibirsk: Nauchno-izdatel’skii tsentr OIGGM SO 
RAN, 1998). 
39 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, <http://www.marxists.org> (3 
March 2008).  
40 Wiener anticipated the human costs of technological progress as computers would devalue the 
“simple work of the brain” and cause lay offs of less skilled workers, which would not be eman-
cipation, but personal economic disaster. Similarly to Marx and Engels, he argued thus that the 
society possessing the new advanced technology should organise itself around values other than 
economics, to be based on “human values other than buying or selling,” Wiener, Cybernetics, 28. 
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by the Stalinist terror in 1956, Soviet cybernetics captured many young minds 
as a science that was new and different, with a strong, lasting anti-soviet after-
taste. Spectacular scientific inventions of that era, such as the nuclear and hy-
drogen bombs (1949 and 1953), the launch of the first unmanned space flight 
(1957) and the first manned ones (1961) promised an exciting field for a future 
scholar in physics, mathematics and other sciences.  
However, against this backdrop, early post-war academic conditions in 
Lithuania were more miserable than exciting. As discussed earlier, the years 
1944-1953 saw the height of Stalinist terror in the Baltic states and other newly 
occupied territories. Like their Russian colleagues in the late 1920s and 1930s, 
many Lithuanian academics and engineers disappeared from the country, as 
they fled to the West or were killed or deported to Siberia.41 The post-war situa-
tion regarding education in the natural sciences was very bad. Not only was 
there an enormous shortage of academics qualified to teach mathematics, phys-
ics and related disciplines because they fled after the war,42 but schooling dra-
matically declined: in 1955-1956, only 18.3 percent of mathematics teachers in 
schools had received a higher education and 43.5 percent did not even have 
degrees in mathematics.43 Thus, the disciplines that should have formed the 
environment necessary for the new science of cybernetics were in a very sad 
state.44 It should not come as any surprise that the introduction of cybernetics 
and computer technologies into Lithuania was associated with only a few 
names. In the second half of the 1950s, several individuals came to occupy im-
portant positions in academic institutes, university faculties, advisory commit-
tees and computer industries. Among those talented scholars were Jonas Kubil-
ius (number and probability theory), Laimutis Telksnys (identification of sto-
chastic processes), Antanas Nemeikšis (automatics and telemechanics), Vytau-
                                      
41 As, for example, in the cases of culture historian Levas Karsavinas, philosopher Vosylius 
Sezemanas, mathematician Antanas Žvironas or the pioneer management theoretician Vytautas 
Andrius Graiinas, who were deported to Siberia and died in the 1950s. See Rudokas; Povilas 
Zakareviius, Vadyba. Genez, dabartis, tendencijos (Kaunas: VDU leidykla, 1998); Lietuva 
1940-1990, 291) or survived, as economists D.Ceseviius and P. Šalius, and an architect S. 
Stulginskis. Nearly half of those holding a higher education degree left from the occupied Baltic 
states. Tininis, Sovietin Lietuva…, 66; Misiunas and Taagepera, 113.  
42 The Physics, Mathematics and Astronomy sub-section in the Institute of Physics and Technol-
ogy (LAS) consisted of the director, physicist Adolfas Jucys, several other physicists and only 
one mathematician Jonas Kubilius. Vilius Staknas, Lietuviški metai. Profesoriaus Jono Kubiliaus 
gyvenimo trajektorija (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2001), 186.  
43 Staknas, 193. The demographic problem of the lack of an educated strata, especially youth, 
was faced by the entire Soviet Union, as Jeremy Smith noted, Smith. 
44 Vytautas Statuleviius (The Institute of Mathematics and Cybernetics) and Antanas Nemeikšis 
(The Vilnius Computer Factory), or leading scholars in the field who occupied very high and 
influential positions as in the cases of Laimutis Telksnys (The Special Computer Design Bureau) 
and Vytautas Kubilius (rector of the Vilnius University). Certainly, a tight connection between a 
person and a leading post was a typical Soviet feature. But most important is that those leaders 
belonged to the same generation. Generational proximity and similar educational background 
facilitated not only communication between their institutions, but also with Moscow or Lenin-
grad.  
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tas Statuleviius (probability theory and stochastic processes), and later, Mifodi-
jus Sapagovas (non-linear equations), Henrikas Vaitkeviius (biocybernetics) in 
Vilnius, Jonas Mockus (optimisation) and Antanas Nemura (system modelling) 
in Kaunas. 
As I pointed out earlier, cybernetics was used and associated with the de-
velopment of electronic technology, particularly servo-mechanisms and later, 
computer industries. In Lithuania, the establishment of the Institute of Physics 
and Mathematics at the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (IPM LAS) in 1956 
represented an important step.45 A few years later, in 1959, the Vilnius Com-
puter Plant46 and the Special Computer Design Bureau47 were established in 
Vilnius.48 It took several years for the first computer to be installed in Lithua-
nia: LAS acquired their first BESM-2M in 1961 and it was put into operation in 
196249 – three years later than in Moscow.50 In 1962, the scientific council Cy-
bernetics and Computing Technology was established at the Lithuanian Repub-
lican Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research and headed by the 
mathematician Kubilius.51 In 1966, the 23rd Party Congress declared that the 
five-year plan would make considerable use of the methods of scientific organi-
sation of labour.52 In 1967, the Centre of Computation opened at the IPM LAS, 
                                      
45 In 1977, the Institute was divided into separate Physics and Mathematics and Cybernetics 
institutes. In 1990, the Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute was renamed the Mathematics and 
Informatics Institute. 
46 The computer factory was established on the basis of the cash register manufacturing facility 
(built in 1957). As Telksnys and Žilinskas noted, “the Lithuanian computer industry passed all 
typical stages of design, technology and production: from electromechanical card punchers and 
computers based on vacuum tubes to LSI technology and distributed systems of data processing,” 
Laimutis Telksnys and Antanas Zilinskas, “Computers in Lithuania,” IEE Annals of the History of 
Computing 21, no.3 (1999), 33. 
47 The Bureau was established on the initiative of Antanas Nemeikšis, who headed it until 1988. It 
is noteworthy that the Bureau started to function only when Nemeikšis came back after comple-
ting his dissertation in automatics and telemechanics in Moscow. Rudokas, 260-1.  
48 In comparison, the Moscow Plant of Calculating-Analytical Machines was founded on the basis 
of a workshop that repaired foreign-made calculators (1923) and after World War II started pro-
ducing mechanical arithmometers Felix (1946) and typing machines. As of 1959, the plant seri-
ally produced computers M-20. Crowe and Goodman, 20. While the Lithuanian Vilnius Computer 
Plant went bankrupt and was dismantled, the Moscow plant is currently working in partnership 
with Siemens. 
49 The date of the acquisition is based on an interview with a mathematician, Mifodijus Sapa-
govas, Vilnius, December 2005. BESM-2M was followed with a more powerful and reliable 
BESM-4 in 1968, while Vilnius University received a less powerful computer Minsk-14 (which 
was mostly used for economic calculations) in 1963. Lithuania lagged behind Russia: LAS ac-
quired BESM-6 only in 1972, despite the machine being designed in the early 1960s. Telksnys 
and Zilinskas, 31; Crowe and Goodman, 20.  
50 The first BESM-2 at the All Union Academy of Sciences was installed in spring 1959 but was 
not operating at least since June of the same year. It took more than one year for the Moldavian 
Academy of Sciences just to unpack a delivered computer. Crowe and Goodman, 19; Parry, 62. 
51 Rudokas, 260. 
52 Afanas’ev, “O soderzhanii…,” 27. 
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with Mifodijus Sapagovas, the twenty-seven year old graduate in mathematics 
(a student of Viktor Glushkov), as director and deputy director.  
By the end of the 1960s, computer-related research was already quite well-
developed in Lithuania. The professional community grew: in 1967, the scien-
tific council Cybernetics and Computing Technology had 40 members, and the 
Special Computer Design Bureau had 653 employees.53 The productivity of the 
Computer Factory and Design Bureau was quite high, at least in the 1960s. Dur-
ing that period, Lithuania created and produced several computers of its own, 
starting with the EASP-S in 1962, the EVT 80-2 Rta in 1963 and the Rta 110 
in 1969. The bureau, under the leadership of Laimutis Telksnys, initiated sev-
eral important innovations, such as an optical character reading device Rta 701 
in the early 1960s (the first in Europe) and a removable disk drive R401 (the 
first in the Soviet Union). Another significant contribution was the creation and 
development of devices for the identification of stochastic processes, which 
were used to detect the first nuclear tests in China.54 However, between 1968 
and 1969, a decision was made at higher levels to stop developing Soviet origi-
nal computers and to copy the IBM S/360 series instead.55
It can thus be argued that Lithuanian scientists and engineers made good 
use of the possibilities offered by the creative period in the Soviet computer 
industry. Between 1955 and 1969, Lithuania built a fully-fledged infrastructure 
almost from scratch: academic institutes for computer and cybernetic research, 
councils in governmental structures, academic forums, and higher education 
programmes at universities, design bureaus and factories.56 The development of 
the cybernetic sector was a part of the general recovery of the sciences. 57 The 
number of researchers grew from 2,700 in 1960 to 10,800 in 1973. The funding 
                                      
53 Kubilius, “Kibernetikos pradžia Lietuvoje,” 5; Rudokas, 261. 
54 Telksnys and Zilinskas, 33-4; Interview with a physicist, Laimutis Telksnys, Vilnius, 2005. As 
Telksnys and Žilinskas note, the increase of computer production motivated the creation of large 
and complex organisational solutions, such as the organisation Sigma, established in 1965. 
Telksnys and Zilinskas, 34. Sigma (“a sum” in Latin) was one of the largest factories in Lithuania 
that came to employ over 18,000 workers, among which were 6,000 engineers by the end of the 
1980s. Rudokas, 105. 
55 William K. McHenry and Seymour E. Goodman, “MIS in Soviet Industrial Enterprises: The 
Limits of Reform from Above,” Communication of the ACM 29, no.11 (November 1986), 1036.  
56 Much computer related technical research was also done in the bureaus attached to so-called 
“post-code” factories, such as Venta (Vilnius Bureau of Construction, that manufactured integral 
schemes), Vilma (that produced magnetic records), Nuklonas (microscheme factory in Šiauliai) 
and some others. See Rudokas.  
57 The beginning of the 1960s saw the opening of numerous technical institutes in Lithuania: 
faculties of Radioelectronics, Automatics and Engineered Economics were founded at the An-
tanas Sniekus Polytechnic Institute in Kaunas. Branches were established in other towns, like 
Vilnius and Klaipda. In addition, institutes in probability theory, galvanotechnics, biochemistry, 
semiconductor physics, precision vibrotechnics, ultrasound; also the Laser Research Centre at 
Vilnius State University and others were created.  
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for science in the Republic’s budget also grew more than twofold, from 6 mil-
lion roubles in 1960 to 16 million in 1972.58
The recovering Lithuania experienced not only material but also intellec-
tual ramifications of cybernetics and new computing technologies. In the 1960s, 
the computer was eventually conceived as both a model and an instrument of 
governance. In all likelihood, the first public lecture on cybernetics in Lithuania 
was given by the distinguished mathematician, and later the rector of Vilnius 
University, Jonas Kubilius.59 The lecture, entitled What is Cybernetics? About 
Machines Which Substitute Some Work of the Brain (1957), was published by 
the Association for the Distribution of Political and Scientific Knowledge and 
circulated in six hundred copies.60 Significantly, the lecture appeared a year 
before Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics was translated into Russian (1958).61 As 
this was the first address on cybernetics by a leading Lithuanian scholar to a 
larger sector of society, it deserves a closer look.  
I would like to distinguish two major ideas in Kubilius’s speech. First, he 
emphasised that the major innovation and use of an electronic calculating ma-
chine was the ability to speed up calculations, a type of work that was particular 
to the human brain. For Kubilius, a computer was essentially a machine that 
could perform very fast calculations. Faster calculations resulted in economic 
benefits and thus were directly relevant to the Soviet economy. Hence, the com-
puter was able to facilitate the management of this economy. Second, computer 
enabled a new type of control. Kubilius discussed the use of the computer for 
modelling processes and argued that the computer could “control and govern 
other machines”.62 Thus, a computer could emancipate workers, transforming 
them from “cogs” into “controllers of controls”: 
 
A machine performs the same work as the staff, which services a process. 
Some of the members of the staff observe the process that takes place in 
different domains of production and work performed by different aggre-
gates. The staff analyses and compares the results of observations. If the 
process deviates from a norm, the staff regulates it.63
 
                                      
58 Barkauskas, Kultra ir visuomen, 210-11. 
59 The distinguished Lithuanian mathematician Jonas Kubilius returned from his postgraduate 
studies in Moscow and became actively involved in propagating both mathematics and computer 
science in Lithuania. According to himself, Kubilius found out about computers from the Russian 
mathematician Boris Delauny in Moscow, 1951. 
60 Kubilius, “Kibernetikos pradžia Lietuvoje,” 3.  
61 Norbert Wiener has not been translated into either Lithuanian or Latvian. However, his Cyber-
netics and The Human Use of Human Beings have been translated into Estonian respectively in 
1961 and 1969.  
62Jonas Kubilius, Kas yra kibernetika? Apie mašinas, kurios pavaduoja kai kur smegen darb 
(Vilnius: Draugija, 1957), 20. 
63 Kubilius, Kas yra kibernetika?…, 22. 
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Note that Kubilius explained the work of the computer-enabled cybernetic con-
trol with an example of management in an organisation. He was well tuned into 
his time; by the late 1950s, organisation management had been translated into 
computer metaphors and cybernetic models, most famously by Stafford Beer 
and Herbert Simon.64 Just as Marshall McLuhan would later write about “cy-
bernation” (1966),65 Kubilius argued that computers could replace not only 
workers, but also managers and hence liberate human beings from performing 
dull, repetitive tasks. At the very end of the lecture, Kubilius discussed the defi-
nition and etymological origin of cybernetics. He defined cybernetics as a “sci-
ence of processes of governance” (valdymas), whereas governance was based 
on information flows.66 Here he used the broader term of “governance” (in Rus-
sian upravlenie) and not “control”.  
The young mathematician’s efforts to demonstrate the role of mathematics 
in computer-making and to draw attention to diverse and interesting applica-
tions of computers represented a real novelty in those days. His lecture could be 
treated as quite symptomatic of a prevailing attitude in Soviet Lithuanian scien-
tific circles: “first mathematics, second computers, then call it cybernetics if you 
like”. From this perspective and typically for Soviets, a computer was under-
stood primarily as a “fast calculator”, and other functions, especially communi-
cation, were seen as secondary. Further, there was also a tendency to label com-
puter technology as “cybernetic”, identifying cybernetics with computer sci-
ence. As Conyngham noted, beginning in the mid-1960s the competition for 
scarce computing equipment dramatically increased.67 Thus, academics who 
wanted to receive new computers and other advanced technology from Gosplan 
had to claim that they were doing “cybernetic research”. However, “cybernet-
ics” also provided a home for anything new, non-mainstream, unusual. As the 
director of the Institute of Mathematics and Cybernetics (LAS) noted, cybernet-
ics was used as a wide umbrella for very diverse scientific problems, which 
were not easily accommodated in traditional scientific disciplines.68 Thus, not 
only intellectual but also pragmatic reasons escalated the hybridity of Soviet 
cybernetics in even its early stages. 
From Scientific Management to Cybernetic Management 
Like cybernetics, management science was borrowed from the West, later 
banned and then rehabilitated in post-Stalinist Soviet Union and, just like cy-
bernetics, scientific management was looked on with favour and turned into 
official dogma by the Soviet authorities. According to Vidmer, in the developed 
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socialism of the 1960s and 1970s, management (upravlenie) was viewed “not 
only as an instrument for improving organisational performance, but as a gen-
eral philosophy of social life”. The Soviet theorist Afanas’ev, for example, re-
garded management as a “binding, cementing link” which ensured the function-
ing of society.69  
While the pioneering systematic attempts to use science in governing the 
state emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries,70 the very notion of “scientific man-
agement” was coined by the American consultant Frederik Winslow Taylor in 
1911. Like Henry Ford, who invented the division of labour along an assembly 
line, Taylor was concerned about improving manual work and held that govern-
ance of a worker or management could be based on “its own science”, known as 
“time-and-motion study”. Taylor formulated a particular type of management, 
which was based on a behaviourist science and aimed at increasing the effi-
ciency of all work processes by splitting them into small functions and optimis-
ing each of them. In the 1930s, Taylor’s scientific management was confronted 
by the human relations approach first promoted by Elton Mayo. The human 
relations approach emphasised the psychological and social factors in work and 
in turn, made use of psychology and sociology. Taylor’s notion of scientific 
management referred predominantly to a private industrial firm. However, the 
application of its principles was broad and soon included state governance.71  
Taylorism reached Europe in 1914, and Lenin welcomed its adoption in 
the Soviet Union immediately after the revolution, in 1918. The intellectual 
elaboration and industrial implementation of the scientific governance of labour 
was advanced primarily by the efforts of Aleksei Gastev (1882-1939), the foun-
der of the movement NOT (nauchnoe upravlenie trudom) in 1920.72 The first 
conference dedicated to these issues was convened by Trotsky before the end of 
the Russian civil war in 1921.73 While there is not enough space to expand on 
the activities of NOT, it should be noted that Gastev’s followers emerged all 
over the Soviet Union. However, when Stalin acceded to power, NOT was 
eventually eliminated altogether, along with many other movements in favour 
of the rationalisation of governance. Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan, which was 
announced in 1928, had little to do with NOT, Taylorism or Elton Mayo’s hu-
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man relations. As Beissinger noted, in the 1930s, rationalisation was replaced 
by coercion and with the achievement of goals at any human costs as the guid-
ing principle of Soviet industrial governance. The decade marked the apex of 
terror, the eventual extinction of NOT, and the repression and even execution of 
many engineers, scientists and cultural intellectuals.74 In 1935 Stalin replaced 
the famous Party slogan “technology decides everything” with “cadres decide 
everything”. From a Stalinist point of view, it was not rational calculations, but 
the character and political loyalty of the people that counted when it came to 
making progress. 
Scientific management as a discipline was revived in the early 1960s, a 
few years later than cybernetics. Just as in the case of cybernetics, the second 
wave of Soviet scientific management was largely shaped by an intellectual 
import from the West. The first translation of Sir Stafford Beer’s book on cy-
bernetic management was published in 1963 and reprinted in 1965 (Kibernetika 
i upravlenie proizvodstvom).75 This transfer, as well as Western development, 
has been addressed in a number of studies on various aspects of how the Gen-
eral Systems Theory, operational research and especially cybernetics influenced 
the notions of management and governance after World War II. 76 The rehabili-
tation also featured attempts to reconnect to the recent Soviet Russian past, es-
pecially the 1920s and 1930s. The parallels between cybernetics and systems 
theory and Bogdanov’s tectology were drawn. The work of Aleksei Gastev and 
the achievements of the NOT movement were revived in the discussions about 
new, cybernetic management.77 In cultural policy, the ideas of Lunacharsky 
were revived, and a thoroughly planned, scientifically grounded administration 
was opposed to the short-sighted campaigns (vajai), rooted in the Stalinist 
methods of pre-war and war-time mobilisation campaigns in production.  
It is important to note that the rehabilitation of cybernetics and manage-
ment was strongly influenced by the polarisation of the Cold War. Both systems 
theory and cybernetics were originally formulated in the United States, which 
put the Soviet Union in a rather embarrassing position. It had either to accept 
being at the receiving end of a transfer from the West or to rehabilitate its own 
thinkers, who were condemned and executed by Stalin.78 As Susiluoto noted, an 
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embarrassing borrower’s status stimulated some efforts to rehabilitate tectology, 
a “general theory of organisations” of Aleksandr Bogdanov (1873-1928).79 The 
problem was Bogdanov’s dissidence within the Party: his book Empiriomonism 
was criticised by Lenin for “subjective idealism” in 1909. Furthermore, Bogda-
nov was politically allied with Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938), whose name was 
still taboo at the time of the rehabilitation of cybernetics and the NOT.80 Since 
there was little chance that Bukharin would be rehabilitated, the 1960s and 
1970s witnessed only a few unsuccessful attempts at reintroducing Bogdanov’s 
tectology.81 However, the writings of Gastev were published in 1966. It can 
thus be argued that beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet man-
agement was reinstated and institutionalised as a scientific discipline by recon-
necting with the recent past and selectively adopting Western thought.  
However, only the intellectual tradition of the titular Soviet nation, Russia, 
was allowed. No reconnection with the interwar Lithuanian managerial thought 
was permitted. One must remember that in 1928, the Lithuanian Scientific 
Management Society was founded in Kaunas and its first chairman and the in-
ventor of the word vadyba was Vytautas Andrius Graicunas (Graiinas). 
Graicunas worked as a consultant at a number of large industrial enterprises in 
Lithuania, the United States, France, Switzerland, Germany and the Nether-
lands. In today’s Lithuanian textbooks on management, Graicunas is heralded as 
the pioneer of managerial thought in Lithuania. His essay on leadership “Rela-
tionship in Organization” (1933) has been called a “classic”. There is almost no 
information available on what Graicunas did during World War II (he held the 
rank of Major in the United States Air Force), but he perished in the Soviet 
NKVD prison after being captured in 1947 in Moscow.82  
One cannot overstate the importance of the connection between the reha-
bilitation of management and cybernetics. The first civil applications of cyber-
netics in the Soviet Union occurred in economic planning and industrial man-
agement. After experiencing growth in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet 
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economy came to a halt and began to decline.83 As Wiener put it, “to live effec-
tively is to live with adequate information”.84 In the spirit of Wiener, Soviet 
economists and computer scientists acknowledged that inadequate information 
was a grave problem in Soviet economic planning. The hope that the mathema-
tisation and computerisation of economic planning and management would give 
new impetus to Soviet economy drove the establishment of new institutions. 
The first institution of this kind was a laboratory for “economic-mathematic” 
research, established by V. Nemchinov at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 
1958-1959. The laboratory served as a basis for creating the Central Institute of 
Economics and Mathematics (1963), which was developing automated systems 
of plan calculations for the All-Union State Plan Committee as early as 1967. 
Alongside with the plan calculation systems, prognostic models were launched, 
and systems for classifying and coding various enterprises were developed. 
Lithuanian SSR soon responded to Nemchinov’s initiative. In 1960, Jonas 
Kubilius, with the Russian mathematician Efrem Maiminas, established the 
Central Scientific Laboratory for Economic Research at Vilnius University 
(VU).85 Headed by Maiminas, it was initially attached to the National Economy 
Council (sovnarkhoz), still located at VU.86 It is rather telling that after the abol-
ishment of the sovnarkhoz system, the laboratory was moved to the Bureau of 
Designing and Constructing Automated Management Systems at the Sigma 
industrial association (1965). VU developed a specialised department and began 
educating specialists in economic cybernetics in 1966.87 The first group of stu-
dents graduated in 1971, and about 25 to 50 graduated every year thereafter.88 
In the second half of the 1960s, the Department for Applied Economic-
Mathematic Methods and Electronic Calculation Technology at the Soviet 
Lithuanian State Plan Commission was established (1967). The department 
formed the basis for the Institute of Planning of National Economy and Scien-
tific Economic Research.89  
According to Thrift, throughout the 20th century, higher education and 
practical training in management had been a major vehicle for distributing new 
global modes of thinking about governability.90 Whilst in the 1960s, capitalist 
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countries saw a boom in business schools, the Soviet Union was creating its 
own educational networks for distributing new ideas about management.91 In 
line with the revisionists of totalitarian accounts of the Soviet Union, I would 
like to stress that as of the 1960s there was no unified stream of managerial 
thought; as Conyngham noted, Soviet theory of management was quite hetero-
geneous.92 Soviet management was however, predominantly oriented towards 
industrial production. In Lithuanian SSR, higher education in management was 
provided by the faculties of Industrial Economics (VU) of Engineer Economics 
at Kaunas Polytechnics Institute (KPI). In 1969, the KPI’s branch in Vilnius 
also established the Laboratory of Research of Management Systems, under the 
direction of K. Antanaviius. The laboratory specialised in decision-making and 
long-term planning. Among other important institutions were the Department of 
Management and Planning of National Economy at the Institute of Economics 
(LAS), the Department of Sociological Problems of Management at the Institute 
of Philosophy, Sociology and Law (LAS), and the Department of Management 
at the Lithuanian Institute of Scientific-Technical Information.93 Management 
of organisations was included in the research agenda of the Institute of Econom-
ics (LAS), which was later headed by one of the first graduates in the field of 
economic cybernetics Eduardas Vilkas. Related applied research was also car-
ried out at the Institute of State Planning Committee, headed by Aleksandras 
Vasiliauskas. Even the Institute of Mathematics and Cybernetics (LAS) was 
engaged in applied research, as its scholars were commissioned to develop theo-
retical and technical applications of computer systems for the economic plan-
ning of the republic’s economy and individual organisations.94 In this way, the 
1960s saw the growth of both research and education institutions of manage-
ment in Soviet Lithuania. I will now go into greater detail about how the trans-
lation of cybernetics into Soviet management took place as an intellectual and 
material project. 
a) Writing Cybernetic Management 
As discussed in the previous chapter, officially, the main objective of Soviet 
enterprises was to implement the state plan. However, many management theo-
reticians sought to distance themselves from planning by formulating different 
interest agenda and relying on different techniques and ideas. Eventually, as 
Vidmer observed, “governance” (upravlenie) came to be perceived as a wider 
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notion than “planning” (planirovanie).95 If cybernetisation of planning meant 
speeding up calculations with the help of computer, cybernetisation of govern-
ance implied a redefinition of a governor, an act of steering, and an object of 
governance. Let us look at how the Soviet “system-cybernetic approach” to 
management produced both its subjects and its objects.  
It has been widely acknowledged that the most distinguished Soviet public 
thinkers and propagators of the system-cybernetic approach were the Russians 
Dzhermen Gvishiani and Viktor G. Afanas’ev.96 Gvishiani (1928-2003), a KGB 
officer of Georgian origin, married Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin’s daughter. 
From 1965 to 1985, he served as the deputy director of the State Committee of 
Science and Technology under the Council of Ministers (CPSU).97 A Doctor of 
Science (he defended a doctoral dissertation entitled “About American Theories 
of the Governance of Organisations” in 1969), and, since 1970 a member of the 
All-Union Academy of Sciences and a family member of the highest-ranking 
Soviet economic elite, Gvishiani was well positioned to advocate the wide use 
of systems analysis and computer technologies. Concerned with the long-term 
planning of both industries, along with the environment, he was unusual for his 
time and, in spite of the fact that he was a Soviet official, he was aware of 
global interdependence: it has recently been argued that one cannot overesti-
mate his role in opening up Soviet foreign policy to global responsibility.98 
Perhaps his most important achievement was the launch of an international pro-
ject (1967), which paved the way for the International Institute of Applied Sys-
tems Analysis in Vienna, Austria.99 Among other things, the institute was an 
important channel, which facilitated the introduction of systems theory to Soviet 
organisational analysis. A decade later, the All-Union Scientific Research Insti-
tute of Systems Analysis was established under the All-Union Academy of Sci-
ences and the State Committee of Science and Technology (1976). As one of 
the initiators of the Club of Rome, Gvishiani had been praised for investing a 
substantial effort in steering Soviet foreign policy to address the issues of the 
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environment (I will return to environmental issues later).100 In management 
theory, his most visible legacy was probably the notion of “complex approach” 
(kompleksnyi podkhod). The term was coined in 1966 and became one of the 
key elements of Soviet policy discourse.101 Basically, it referred to a relational 
approach to solving a specific task. A complex approach was embedded in “sys-
tems thinking”, defined by Mindell as a way of “treating technologies as aggre-
gates of interconnected components as opposed to focusing on individual ma-
chines”. Those components, according to Mindell, also involved organisations 
and human beings.102 Gvishiani’s books and articles on management were stan-
dard references and course materials in Soviet Lithuania. 
Another important figure, the social theorist Afanas’ev (1922-1994) was 
less visible on the international scene but very significant Union-wide as the 
editor-in-chief of Pravda (1976-1989). Pravda, founded by Lenin and edited by 
him from 1912 to 1914, was the organ of the CC (CPSU). Thus, Afanas’ev was 
both the public and official voice that promoted cybernetics and computer tech-
nologies. He had been widely disseminating cybernetic ideas about scientific 
governance of society since the mid-1960s. It seems that Afanas’ev sought to 
popularise cybernetics as a source of innovative ideas in most spheres of human 
life, none the least of which was the regulation of society. This even led the 
American scholar Schwartz to argue that Afanas’ev’s cybernetic take on gov-
ernance (upravlenie) was unusually democratic, since it resembled Karl 
Deutsch’s ideas of “self-steering politics” and Amitai Etzioni’s “active soci-
ety.”103
Afanas’ev drew on Wiener to argue that cybernetic control could be used 
to conceptualise social order. According to Wiener, “in control and communica-
tion we are always fighting nature’s tendency to degrade the organised and de-
stroy the meaningful; the tendency… for entropy to increase”.104 Drawing on 
Aksel’ Berg’s introduction to the Russian translation of Stafford Beer’s Cyber-
netics and Management, Afanas’ev maintained that “cybernetics, and partially 
computing technology and automatics, are powerful means for regulating socie-
tal systems and ‘diminishing entropy’.”105 According to Afanas’ev, the princi-
pal object and objective of governance (ob”ekt upravleniia) was an orderly 
Soviet society, “a complex social organism, which consists of many different 
components”. Among its components were “economy”, “people”, united into 
classes and social groups, work and other collectives; economic, class and ethi-
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cal relations among people, and finally “a spiritual life of society in all of its 
manifestations”.106 For Afanas’ev, a governing subject was “a system of state 
and non-state organisations and organisations, led by the Communist Party”. 
Essentially, “scientific governance” consisted of “conscious, purposive actions 
upon a societal system and its transformation in order to ensure an optimal flow 
of societal processes”.107 Conscious, purpose-directed cybernetic governance 
coincided well with a historical mission of communists – to transform society in 
accordance with predefined goals. In line with Foucault, Afanas’ev’s cybernetic 
model of the governance of society could be interpreted as a typical example of 
the modern governance of a population, which constructs its governed object 
with the help of aggregate notions. Statistical accounting, especially when it 
was assisted by cybernetic technologies, was seen as essential to governance: 
 
Without statistical data, without processing it scientifically, it is impossible 
to have reliable information about the state of both a controlling and con-
trolled system [upravlenie] and, consequently, to organise effective gov-
ernance.108
 
Even though Wiener’s calculations were embedded in relativity theory, statisti-
cal calculation-based governance was reconciled with Soviet tradition to define 
science essentially in positivist terms. Thus, the cybernetic regulation of society 
was conceived as based on “objective laws”, seeking to match “subjective ac-
tions of people with objective laws”.109 In his discussion of “social planning”, 
Afanas’ev argued that mathematical methods were not sufficiently used in gov-
erning “social relations” and “spiritual life”. This is where cybernetics would 
compensate the straightforwardness of economic, mathematical methods: 
 
The language of contemporary mathematics, partially of deductive math-
ematic theories, is not able to reflect the most complicated processes of the 
accumulation, processing and transmission of information related to the 
governance [upravlenie] of societal processes. This limitation of mathemat-
ics in the study and organisation of processes of governance may be trans-
gressed by the methods of heuristic programming, which are becoming 
more prevalent in cybernetics.110
 
In addition to positivism, cybernetic management had to be adjusted to chang-
ing Soviet political realities. Afanas’ev invested a good deal of effort in ensur-
ing that cybernetic steering could be consolidated with Brezhnev’s idea of “ma-
ture socialism”: “since cybernetics assumes an already organised and ordered 
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system, a function of governance is reduced to such an action upon a system 
that ensures the maintenance of order and resists disorganising forces, which 
appear from within and without”.111 However, Afanas’ev acknowledged that 
even a Brezhnevite society should be seen not as a completed, but ever trans-
forming and evolving system. It should be noted that Wiener’s cybernetics did 
not emphasise the historicity of systems; a self-generated change of a system 
was conceptualised by scientists who came later. In turn, the Soviet system-
cybernetic discourse in the late 1970s and 1980s used the notions of self-
generating and self-transforming systems to describe society. Afanas’ev re-
ferred to Lenin’s statement, which asserted that the main task of control (kon-
trol’) was not to “catch” or “denounce”, but to “correct”.112 According to him, 
control as Russian kontrol’ acquired very specific political tones: 
 
To check the actual state of affairs in all the parts of a societal system, to 
check deeply, scrupulously, seeking to achieve an implementation of deci-
sions made, carrying on the merciless fight against the theft of socialist 
property, bureaucratism, attaining slazhennost’ of the governing apparatus 
– these are the most important tasks of control.113
 
All of these examples demonstrate that Afanas’ev’s model of the cyber-socialist 
steering of society combined the Leninist principles of the supremacy of the 
Party, the Stalinist emphasis on planning, and the ambition to control all aspects 
of life and production. The control was embedded in the active organisational 
transformation and maintenance of the achieved workers’ society. It is impor-
tant to note the word slazhennost’, which indicated special ideological qualities 
of governmental work. As a noun it is a rough derivative of “smooth” and “co-
hesive”, but in the Soviet discourse, slazhennost’ was closely related to “collec-
tive work”. Thus, it denoted the smooth, cohesive work of a collective towards 
an agreed-upon purpose, comparable with that of a machine.114
It is obvious that Afanas’ev carefully tailored his cybernetic approach to fit 
the Marxist-Leninist conceptualisation of society as consisting of “classes”, 
defined by the modes of production and ownership. And yet its innovativeness 
should not be underestimated. The system-cybernetic approach equipped schol-
ars, policy-makers and managers with a completely new vocabulary, which they 
could use to talk about the objects of their concern and about themselves. In-
creasingly, the new Soviet man of the 1960s was attaining the role of an expert, 
a controller of controls, who legitimised his own actions with the authority of 
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scientific, calculation-based governance. In future chapters, I will demonstrate 
how this had important consequences on cultural policy. 
 
The Lithuanian SSR could not boast of public management theorists such as 
Gvishiani and Afanas’ev. Notably, the most distinguished Lithuanian econo-
mists, such as Raimundas Rajeckas (1937-1997)115 and Eduardas Vilkas (1935-
2008),116 were committed to strictly scientific and high-level consulting activi-
ties. Unlike Gvishiani and Afanas’ev, neither of them wrote any textbooks or 
popular texts about management. In general, writings which would seek to 
communicate management theory to a wider public were scarce in Lithuania. As 
a rule, the authors of such works were neither leading scientists nor eminent 
public figures, but pedagogues or various specialists in the methods of teaching, 
who often gave public lectures at Žinija (Znanie in Russian).117 My further 
analysis, grounded on this type of publications, revealed that whilst Russian 
publications on cybernetic management appeared in the 1960s, the Lithuanian 
versions only appeared a decade later, in the 1970s.  
Lithuanian writing on management drew heavily on the Russian theorists 
described above and exhibited a strong adjustment of cybernetic translations to 
the official ideology of the Party rule. Probably because the authors were not as 
famous, they had less freedom to rewrite the Soviet regime in cybernetic terms. 
Rather, Lithuanian writers did the opposite: they wrote Soviet ideology over 
cybernetic management. One of the earliest Lithuanian books on the subject, 
written by the management pedagogue Algimantas Indrinas, was entitled 
Technique of Leadership (1971) and relied strongly on Afanas’ev’s ideas.  
Indrinas’s text testified to two important aspects of the Soviet translation 
of cybernetics to management: the justification of centralisation and coercion 
and the securitisation of the external environment. Keeping in mind how eagerly 
                                      
115 Rajeckas graduated from Kaunas Institute of Technology in 1959 to later study at Harvard 
University (1967-1968). All my informants referred to him as a foremost proponent of “economic 
cybernetics”. Economic cybernetics, according to Conyngham, “dominated management research, 
education and rationalisation” Conyngham, The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management, 
48. Attributed by Vidmer to the “planning” school of management, he followed in the footsteps of 
Leonid Kantorovich and was preoccupied first and foremost with linear programming and optimal 
planning. For this Kantorovich received the Nobel prize in 1975, which he shared with Tjalling 
Koopmans, which was considered by some as “an indirect avowal” that cybernetics had helped to 
shape similar approaches to the economy in the East and West. Philip Mirowski, “Review of 
Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: The History of Soviet Cybernetics,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 42, no.1 (2004), 215. 
116 Vilkas was educated as a mathematician and particularly active in developing game theory. 
Retrospectively Vilkas was rather sceptical about the universalist claims of the cybernetic ap-
proach. In interview, he stated that each managerial problem should seek its own solution instead 
of relying on one general theory. Interview with an economist, Eduardas Vilkas, Vilnius, Novem-
ber 2007. It has to be added that both Rajeckas and Vilkas played a central role in designing 
reforms for the transition to a market economy in Lithuania. 
117 In the Soviet Union scientific research was notoriously separated from teaching. On Znanie in 
Russia, see Froggatt. 
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both Soviet and Western theoreticians praised and criticised the “neutrality” of 
the systems approach, I found it quite striking that coercion was rather smoothly 
translated into the terms of systems thinking. Much more than Afanas’ev, Indri-
nas insisted that even a violent political change, such as, for example, a revolu-
tion, could easily be described in system-cybernetic terms. A relational system 
approach was, according to Indrinas, exceptionally suited to describe the Party 
political administration. As complex systems were seen as hierarchically organ-
ised, the systems approach could not contradict “democratic centralism”, which 
allowed lower levels of governance to interpret and enact locally the decisions 
that were made centrally:118  
 
[…] the most effective is that system, all of whose components are directed 
towards implementing its main function […] which is seeking its centrally 
established goal. Centralisation is understood as taking certain parts away 
from freedom and subjugating them to the general goals of the system.119
 
Thus, systems theory in Indrinas interpretation was something that legitimised 
the coercive discipline imposed by “democratic centralism”. He also argued that 
“system’s components resist the loss of freedom”, thus implying that not only 
coercion, but also resistance was a built-in capacity of the system. To counteract 
this resistance, some “external forces” were necessary to make the unruly “com-
ponents” submissive. From this point of view, a social system, with its self-
organisation, was only a relative exception compared with any other system: 
 
[…] exceptions are some social systems in which people gather and create 
an organisation or a collective themselves. But even in those cases, not eve-
ryone submits to the majority’s opinion, and therefore coercion [prievarta] 
is required.120  
 
Later on, Soviet theorists put a lot of effort into reconciling system-cybernetic 
management theory with the polarising logic of the Cold War. Cold War secu-
ritisation and containment discourses marked the Soviet translation of system-
cybernetic theory into management. The distinguished Cold War historian John 
Lewis Gaddis has convincingly suggested that the post-World War II Soviet 
regime had no choice but to treat the surrounding world as hostile. As George 
Kennan’s “long telegram” stated, the construction of external hostility was an 
important excuse “for the dictatorship without which they [Soviets] did not 
know how to rule”.121 Thus understood, securitisation refers to a discursive 
                                      
118 Allowing no legitimate opposition, “democratic centralism” was adopted as their organisa-
tional principle by the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1906. Mawdsley and White, 
242. 
119 Algimantas Indrinas, Vadovavimo technika (Vilnius: Mintis, 1971), 57. 
120 Indrinas, 60. 
121 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 29. 
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construction of objects as hostile and threatening. This securitisation took place 
as rewriting or rethinking scientific theories and electronic technologies in rela-
tion to inside and outside, subject and object of governance. For example, Indri-
nas wrote that “systems that are able to survive and protect themselves from 
outside influences are characterised by governance. Such systems are called 
self-governing (in Lithuanian)”.122 As this example illustrates, the system vo-
cabulary came in very handy for establishing a discourse of governance oriented 
against external threats. That Indrinas saw control as an essential condition for 
system’s survival in a threatening environment was less an outcome of the sys-
tems theory and more a result of the viable Stalin metaphor of the Soviet Union 
encircled by “hostile aliens”. 
In Lithuanian writing on management of the late 1970s, the notion of nega-
tive feedback transmitted by a signal became synonymous with the control of an 
organisation or the general economy. It is quite striking that the management of 
economy has been described in exceptionally cybernetic terms. In his The Issues 
of Management of Republics’ National Economy (1979) Algirdas Maniušis 
claimed that 
 
A task of control [valdymas] is to discover deviations on the basis of com-
paring received factual data with specified criteria and to give signals of 
de-alignment. [...] Control is a basis that enables a managing system to ana-
lyse and prepare managing influences, which would return a managed sys-
tem’s parameters to the sphere of allowed meanings.123  
 
It seems that by the late 1970s, cybernetic control became a prevailing metaphor 
for managerial action.124 This hegemony was noted and criticised. In the same 
year (1979), another textbook insisted on the need to expand the meaning of 
management beyond that of cybernetic control. The author argued that it was 
“impossible to perfectly govern production by relying only on the laws of cy-
bernetics. Today, a leader has to understand all methods of governance”.125 
However, he pointed out that the most important task was to “automate govern-
ance”.  
The 1980s saw the adoption of post-Wiener cybernetics (or second-order 
and third-order cybernetics) in Lithuanian managerial thought.126 A good exam-
ple of this was a book about “the features of cybernetic systems”, written by the 
                                      
122 Indrinas, 61. 
123 Algirdas Maniušis, Respublikos liaudies kio valdymo problemos (Vilnius: Mintis, 1979), 76-
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124 Juozas Zujus, Vadovas ir informacija (Vilnius: Mintis), 1976. 
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Lithuanian engineer, Romualdas Pladis. In 1984, Pladis used the notion of feed-
back-based control to describe the essence of management. Indeed, he saw in-
formation and control as identical: “information is data used for governance 
[valdymas]. [...] Governance – informational influences on a system when its 
behaviour is desired to be kept or changed [...] Regulation – eliminating devia-
tions from the regulating norm”.127 Cybernetic control as an informational loop 
brought the idea that a governor was inseparable from a governed into manage-
ment discourses. Pladis acknowledged that “cybernetic systems can be projected 
(elicited from the surrounding world) by the subject of governance (ob-
server)”.128 Logically then, if cybernetic systems were defined as a result of 
active creation they could not possibly be seen as part of a positivist objectively 
existing reality. That this cybernetic contention was at odds with Soviet positiv-
ism was probably the reason why the approach was not pursued more deeply, 
especially when applied to society and economy. The communist ideology 
could not possibly view classes as an observer’s projection; such a view was 
criticised by Lenin in his classic Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Classes 
defined according to types of labour and ownership were understood as being 
part of objective reality, rooted in “objective” relations of production.  
The task of cybernetic control was to optimise a system. Optimisation was 
a term related to Paretto’s equilibrium and Ashby’s mechanism of homeostasis. 
Take Pladis’s application of this technical term to social-planning, for example. 
For him, the purpose of governance was “to decrease diversity, shape states of a 
system in only an optimal way in relation to an established goal”.129 Unlike 
Wiener, Pladis did not regard “difference” as an essential condition of ordering. 
To briefly recapitulate his argument, Wiener held that difference was a basis of 
order, while entropy was a chaos of sameness.130 In turn, Pladis emphasised that 
a structure (a basis of system) was “a whole of those stable relations of object or 
system, which ensure coherence and identity”.131 This definition of structure 
could, in principle, be regarded in Saussure’s terms, according to which both 
“coherence” and “identity” were essentially produced by relational difference. 
However, Pladis did not emphasise this quality of differentiation. I suggest that 
Pladis’s position could be explained by the ideological implausibility of admit-
ting that governance of a socialist society aimed to produce an internal differ-
ence.  
It was precisely this type of selective translation of cybernetics to man-
agement that attracted criticism from Sovietologists. On the other hand, the 
American political scientist Hoffmann argued that systems theory (systems 
analysis) was attractive to CPSU leaders because of its neutrality, a “lack of 
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emphasis on purposes and motivations other than those prescribed by the central 
political authorities”. According to Hoffmann, Soviet officials understood the 
system approach as first and foremost “a useful means of increasing the consis-
tency and clarity of central directives and/or promoting national support for 
their policy preferences”.132 It seems that Hoffmann, like the Soviet policy-
makers before him, considered the system-cybernetic machinery to be neutral 
and devoid of meaning. In this way, another fundamental principle of cybernet-
ics was ignored, namely, that of the non-neutrality of the instrument of observa-
tion in relation to the process observed. As Wiener pointed out, information 
always comes at a certain cost of energy. However, my purpose is not to check 
whether Wiener’s cybernetic principles were “correctly translated” into the 
Soviet language of management. Instead, I would like to stress that in order to 
translate cybernetics into the Soviet ideological language of politics and society, 
some conditions had to be met. It seemed that Lithuanian writers on manage-
ment were much more restricted translators of cybernetics than were their Rus-
sian colleagues.  
Cybernetic control was a constitutive part of a particular discourse and 
technology of governance that, in the scholarship, was often attributed to “de-
veloped” socialism.133 Thus far I have charted the key features of the method 
for introducing cybernetic control into Soviet management discourses. Now, it 
is time to explore how cybernetic technologies, or computers and computer 
systems, were introduced into management practices. Odd Arne Westad, for 
example, insisted that the most significant outcome of the Cold War was the 
development of electronic communication technologies, particularly the com-
puter, which assisted rather than hindered information transmission.134 In the 
next section, I will show that machinery and the philosophy of cybernetic steer-
ing was not neutral with regard to its object, society and organisations (and in 
the next chapter, culture). 
b) Cybernetic Machines of Management 
In 2003, Agar metaphorically called the computer a “government machine”.135 
Intriguingly, in the 1970s, a computer as a “government machine” was not a 
metaphor but a fixed technical term for a Soviet management theoretician. Take 
as an example the slim volume entitled Theory and Use of Government Ma-
                                      
132 Hoffmann, “Soviet Perspectives…,” 123. 
133 On leadership under “developed socialism” see Jeremi Suri, “The Promise and Failure of 
‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972,” 
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chines, published in Kaunas, Lithuania in 1976. According to the author of the 
technical manual, a “machine of governance” was any “digital device in a cen-
tralised governance and control system”.136 It is important to note that the So-
viet Lithuanian engineer determined that a “digital machine of governance” 
could work only as part of a centralised system of governance and control 
(valdymo ir kontrols).137
As was argued in the previous section, governance of both organisations 
and entire sectors was translated into cybernetic steering of systems in manage-
rial theory. Similarly, the administrative actions of accounting and calculation 
had to be translated and entered into “machines of governance”. Cybernetic 
control was technically embodied in computers and embedded in other techno-
logical and social networks.138 In the Soviet Union, such networks were usually 
called automated management systems (AMS). As Vidmer noted, AMS was 
“the most significant practical thrust of the cybernetic school” in Soviet man-
agement.139 Indeed, these systems were sometimes called “cybernetic manage-
ment systems”.140
In Soviet texts, automated management systems were defined in both 
broad and narrow terms. A broad definition was offered in a monograph about 
AMS published in Lithuanian SSR (1980). It defined an “automated manage-
ment system” as both material and intellectual machinery, which involved  
 
A whole series of economic-mathematical methods, computing technolo-
gies, automatics and means of communications of governance, which en-
ables the governing apparatus of an organisation (an enterprise, a ministry, 
an agency) to more efficiently govern an object.141  
 
A more narrow definition designated AMS as a computer-based set of pro-
grammes for accounting and other data processing to be used for governing 
purposes. However, as Conyngham noted, the Soviet AMS was formulated as 
“a man-machine decision-making system, in which some previously human 
decisions are transferred to the machine and in which all planning and opera-
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tional management processes are optimised”.142 That such a definition was 
rooted in military control engineering had been pointed out quite early.143 Since 
the texts I analysed dealt primarily with the management of larger sectors, be-
yond the management of industrial enterprises, the broad definition was usually 
assumed. 
As outlined in the previous section, management was redefined as a prac-
tice that, to a large extent, had to deal with increasing flows of information. In 
his influential Introduction to AMS (1972), the Russian computer scientist and 
mathematician Viktor M. Glushkov argued that the contemporary economy 
faced a problem of an “informational barrier” that obstructed the decision-
making process. Overcoming the “informational barrier” involved improving a 
wide range of actions, such as methods of gathering and processing information, 
procedures for regulating supply and demand, and ways of preparing and mak-
ing decisions.144 It was the task of AMS to assist heterogeneous management by 
facilitating information flows.  
In a way, Glushkov saw computer systems as viable substitutes for a regu-
latory market mechanism and, hence, the best fit, politically, for a state socialist 
system.145 Therefore, for Glushkov the computer was a political machine, a life-
support system for the Soviet economy. There were, of course, limits. Accord-
ing to Glushkov, “even if one had a powerful electronic computing machine 
(EVM), it would be meaningless to pack the entire economy into it”. Instead, he 
argued, “an effective man-machine system should be created in which the crea-
tive potential of people would be most fully used and which would become an 
organic part of an entire complex mechanism of regulation, which is the process 
of governing economy”.146 As noted by Vidmer, Glushkov did not foresee a 
greater transformative power for cybernetic technologies in Soviet governance. 
The very definition of cybernetics in the Kyiv school was limited to the transfer 
of information without transforming existing organisations. For example, the 
Kyiv edition of the encyclopaedia of cybernetics claimed that “cybernetics is a 
science about general laws of receiving, storing, transmitting and transforming 
information in complex systems of governance. … Here the systems of govern-
ance refer not only to technical, but also biological, administrative and social 
systems. The examples of very complex systems of governance are the systems 
of live organisms, especially the human organism, and also the apparatuses for 
governing human society”.147 Thus, like Kubilius Glushkov saw computers as a 
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tool that would ensure faster and more efficient processing of information in 
existing administrative structures.148
According to McHenry and Goodman, the pilot project of designing such 
computer applications attached to the State Network of Computer Centres dated 
to 1963. Transport was the first sphere to see civic applications of AMS, as they 
were designed for scheduling truck routes (by the way, NOT’s first applications 
were for the railroads in 1920).149 In Lithuania, the first AMS were put in use in 
1969.150 In the Soviet Union, from 1965 to 1985, about 7,500 automated man-
agement systems for enterprises, accompanied by several hundred ministry-
level systems, were created. These approximate numbers implied that only 7.5 
percent of organisations had such automated management systems.151 Data pub-
lished later show further increases. 
 
Table 3. New AMS in the Soviet Union, 1966-89 152
 
 1966-70 1971-75 1976-78 1981-89 
AMS-enterprises 151 838 210 2,474 
AMS-technological 
processes 
170 564 590 3,548 
AMS-territorial organs 61 631 180 1,081 
AMS-ministries and 
departments 
19 168 45 545 
ASOI (Information 
processing systems) 
13 108 55 2,165 
TOTAL AMS 414 2,309 1,080 
 
15, 580 
 
 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that the number of newly created AMS increased from 
1978 to 1989. After a decline in the second half of the 1970s, AMS experienced 
a kind of boom in the 1980s, especially in the ministries. However, the useful-
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Goskomstat SSSR, 1991), 186. Please note that the total number of AMS includes more types of 
AMS than represented in Table 3. 
 142
ness of AMS was already being contested by their contemporaries. An analysis 
by a Lithuanian economist revealed that from 1970 to1980, about 57 percent of 
AMS in Lithuanian enterprises did not cut down on expenses as had been ex-
pected.153
AMS was superimposed onto the Soviet politico-administrative system. 
Five hierarchical levels were distinguished. First, directive organs of govern-
ance (CC (LCP), LSSR SS Presidium, LSSR CM) were to use automated sys-
tems for information processing. Second, AMS were to be used by inter-branch 
governing organs (State Planniing Committee, Central Statistical Agency, the 
Ministry of Finance, State and Construction Bank, State Work Committee 
among others). Further, separate AMS were to be devised for branch ministries 
and agencies, territorial organs of governance, enterprises and trusts. By the late 
1970s, AMS were used for calculating statistics in the planning sector; these 
statistics would cover culture and science as well. Culture and education were 
included in “the complex of branch governing”; this is why, in 1990, AMS 
would be designed for the Ministry of Culture.154 An integrated data basis was 
perceived as being a pressing necessity; yet the author noted that by the late 
1970s it was still only a theoretical experiment.  
 
In summary, this section argued that AMS were the most visible materialisation 
but also the discursive embodiment of cybernetic governance. In the next sec-
tion, I will show that, in reality, economic relations in the Soviet Union were 
not entirely structured according to the centralised system of control. Amazing 
as it might seem, this lack of centralisation and ordering of the Soviet economy 
was revealed by concrete applications of AMS. Though intended to assist the 
assumed centralisation and slazhennost’, the real outcome of the application of 
cybernetic technology was the unmasking of informal Soviet organisational 
practices.  
c) Limitations of Industrial AMS 
Calls for the wide application of “cybernetic management” mushroomed in 
official discourses. By the 1970s, special design bureaus were established and 
AMS proliferated. The technical possibilities of AMS induced a new way of 
thinking about governability. This, for example, was clearly expressed by the 
LCP Central Committee secretary for ideology: 
 
Contemporary enterprises often resemble laboratories of scientific re-
search; production processes are “scientificised”, partially liberated from 
previously hard physical labour. There is a new type of worker, one who is 
more educated, professionally trained, and better qualified. This is why it is 
said that science, which has always played quite an important role in soci-
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ety, is now becoming a real productive force […] Scientific and technical 
revolutions demand an all-encompassing perfection of governance [valdy-
mas]. Governance becomes science. This means that it is vital to create and 
widely apply automated planning and control systems first and foremost in 
separate departments, territorial organisations, industrial associations, and 
enterprises, so that in the future, a general automated system of information 
processing and collecting can be made, one that would serve the account-
ing, planning and governing of the national economy, and would be based 
on the state computing centres and automated connections… [The italics 
are mine – E.R.].155
 
It can be argued that designing and installing AMS was the new form of Soviet 
scientific management. But did the possibility become a material reality? Both 
Soviet and Western scholars noted that AMS largely failed to restructure exist-
ing organisational forms. Hoffmann and Conyngham pointed out that although 
some projects of AMS did strive to restructure management and organisations, 
most of them were superimposed on existing routine practices and hierarchical 
relations.156 One of the reasons for this was that the foremost goal of AMS was 
to improve centralised control.157 On the other hand, as Hoffmann argued else-
where, scientific and technological resources were in no way the most important 
resources that enabled the Soviet leaders to maintain their control.158 Retrospec-
tively, a Lithuanian mathematician considered that the AMS boom should be 
taken with a grain of salt: 
 
[...] Hundreds of thousands of AMS were created in the Soviet Union, and 
in Lithuania, at least forty. Thus, our joke, perhaps not without a sound ba-
sis, was that they were “absolutely not automatic, they did not control and 
they were not systems at all”.159  
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However, in historiography, AMS were described as a source of Baltic pride. 
For example, the historians Taagepera and Misiunas pointed out that AMS were 
“actively” developed in the Baltic republics and in Estonia, in particular, served 
as “laboratories” for the Soviet Union.160 Indeed, as of the mid-1960s, auto-
mated management systems were being designed in Akademgorodok, Novisi-
birsk, Russia,161 the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (1967) and the Estonian 
Academy of Sciences (1969).162 In both Lithuania and Estonia, the first AMS 
sought to rationalise cargo transport routes, which were considered to be par-
ticularly ineffective. However, the scientists interviewed recalled that particular 
project with a good deal of irony. In an interview, the Lithuanian mathematician 
told me about the first AMS, which was designed in cooperation with the 
Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute and the LSSR Ministry of Transport. It 
was the “first attempt to use computers, not for calculation, but for solving con-
trol problems in Lithuania”: 
 
But I will tell you the solution! [...] There were no computers that were 
suitable for transmitting information. Available options were to use the 
telephone or take the information to another location by car. There was also 
a more rational version: to manually put down the information, print it on 
punch-tapes and transmit them via the telephone network. This way was 
rather unreliable, but worked with some duplication. So the data was sent 
to the Computation Centre [at the Academy of Sciences]; we would enter 
the data from the punch-tape into a BESM II computer and then do our cal-
culations with a specially created programme, transfer the calculations back 
onto the punch-tape and then send them to the respective offices so that 
they could print out the routes. 
There you go. One would not call this an automated control system. 
“Automated” – perhaps when the participation of a man is less important, 
but here everything is done by a man.163
 
This quote reveals that technical reasons prevented putting automated manage-
ment systems into practice. Like Castells, my informants pointed out that the 
biggest problem was a lack of communication technology. In the first half of the 
1980s, the Soviet Union had nearly six times fewer telephones than the United 
States, while the density of Soviet telephone lines made up only a quarter of the 
average in Western Europe.164 Further, in line with Western science historians, 
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161 Josephson, New Atlantis Revisited, 150-153.  
162 Akademgorodok date is based on Josephson, New Atlantis Revisited, Estonian date on Misi-
unas and Taagepera, 234; and Lithuanian date on the author’s communication with Sapagovas. 
163 Interview with a mathematician, Tomas, Vilnius, December 2005. 
164 Ganley, 17-18. 
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the Soviet Lithuanian scientists who were my interviewees for this study noted 
an important problem, namely, that the computer was treated first and foremost 
as a “super-calculator” and not as a communication device.165  
Centralisation of the centres of calculation was also a serious problem. For 
instance, in order to obtain the necessary calculations, an enterprise had to turn 
to the Academy of Sciences or a few other institutions. In 1968, there were only 
nine electronic calculating machines in Lithuania, the most powerful of which, 
the BESM-4M was about 40 times slower than the newest Soviet computer, the 
BESM-6M, and probably a hundred times slower than the most advanced West-
ern computers at that time.166 Beginning in the 1970s, the situation improved. 
For example, in 1972, 18 computation centres and 29 other agencies that had 
computers (mainly BESM, Minsk and Rta-110) were operating in the republic. 
The services of the centres were used by more than 400 enterprises, and they 
employed about 1,800 technical staff. However, the computers were underused: 
in the second half of 1971, the machines were used, on average, 6.9 hours per 
day despite their capacity to operate for no fewer than 18 hours. Various reasons 
were cited to explain this situation: the computers were incompatible (in 1972 
there were 11 types of ESM operating in Lithuania), the information transmis-
sion and storing technology was undersupplied, and maintenance was bad.167  
A lack of incentives from the users’ side also played an important role. 
Many Soviet managers, as the historians of Soviet economy have pointed out, 
did not always need efficient solutions. In their own different ways, planners, 
administrators and managers were focused on surviving under the conditions of 
a permanent deficit.168 For example, take an illustrative story about testing 
AMS at the enterprise management level, created by the Bureau for Design and 
Construction of Automated Control Systems:  
 
Once, the Bureau created a programme for managing trade flows for the 
Vilnius Department Store. Well, it turned out that they had to test it some-
where. But to have precise accounting would have been idiotic in those 
                                      
165 See Graham, Science in Russia…; Manuel Castells and Emma Kiselyova, The Collapse of 
Soviet Communism: A View from the Information Society (Berkley: University of California, 
1995). Rudokas described an attempt to create “an electronic computing complex for governance 
of a middle size firm.” The device was called Rta-110 and included a central processor that was 
connected to the terminals for information transfer from individual work-places as well as an 
optical reading device R-701, earlier created by Laimutis Telksnys. However, production and 
realisation of the machine were slow, and subsequently the focus returned to smaller devices 
(M5000, M5010, M5100), dedicated to statistical calculations of mostly economic data. Rudokas, 
109. 
166 Mifodijus Sapagovas, “ESM ir mokslas,” Mokslas ir technika 10 (1968), 11. 
167 Jonas ernikovas, “Efektyviau naudoti ESM,” Mokslas ir technika 4 (1972), 2, 3.  
168 As V. Girdzijauskas, the historian of the Computer Factory wrote about the first production of 
cash registers in 1957, “there are so many problems with the new production. No one wants to 
buy”. The complaint was commented on by Rudokas: the reason was that “wooden abacus calcu-
lators were more convenient for salesmen in many ways,” Rudokas, 162. 
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times! Because one had to trade everything unofficially [šmugeliuoti], to 
bribe, beginning with the smallest store in the hierarchy and continuing to 
the top level; you know, everything was acquired through blat.169 And 
when they had to test the programme for accounting for flows of goods, 
they chose a warehouse in which unsellable goods were stored. And to eve-
ryone’s surprise, it appeared that there were a large number of unsold 
sheepskin coats. In those days, to get such a coat was a privilege reserved 
for only very highly placed ladies. No one could believe this was possible. 
And it appeared that the programme worked very well indeed because the 
coats received never reached the store. Instead they were put aside with the 
unsellable goods… There were lots of similar examples.170
 
The success of the AMS applications for planning at the level of union-
republics and ministerial branches was bounded by the arbitrary nature of the 
all-Union resource distribution: 
 
For example, Latvians created a system that was based on the number of 
cars and depreciation norms, and then with its help, they ordered a certain 
number of tires from the centre. In Moscow, they looked at the order and 
simply halved the requested amount and that was that. Meanwhile, Lithua-
nians travelled to Moscow with approximate numbers in mind, intuitively 
guessing how much they would be cut down and then received the needed 
amount. Precise accounting made no sense!171
 
In this chapter I argued that cybernetic control provided Soviet managerial 
thought with both a vocabulary and a model of governance. These were dis-
seminated through educational institutions and materialised in techno-scientific 
administrative machinery, namely, automated management systems. However, 
the distribution of cybernetic steering under the name of AMS was limited, both 
materially and intellectually. For example, in 1984, some complained that no 
one had written a doctoral dissertation on AMS. The training of AMS special-
ists was also criticised as being insufficient.172 Thus, the Soviet translation of 
cybernetics to governance was complex. In order to provide the reader with a 
more nuanced picture, I will conclude with an analysis of the retrospective ac-
counts of the Lithuanian scientists I interviewed. 
d) “Viskas buvo visai kitaip” 
As mentioned in the introduction, I was quite struck to have recognised a cyber-
netic model in the cultural policy discourses. My interest was further reinforced 
                                      
169 For more about blat as an alternative, informal economy in Russia, see Ledeneva. 
170 Interview with a physicist, Pranas, Vilnius, December 2005. 
171 Interview with a physicist, Pranas, Vilnius, December 2005. 
172 Baskas, 22. 
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by existing Western scholarship on the subject, which emphasised the over-
whelming significance and span of influence of cybernetics in the Soviet Union. 
However, the Soviet Lithuanian scientists I interviewed appeared to be rather 
sceptical about my intention to search for cybernetics under Soviet rule. As one 
informant put it (after I had explained my interest in the role of cybernetics in 
formulating Soviet governance), “everything was completely different” (viskas 
buvo visai kitaip).173 He may have been the most straightforward, but he was 
not alone in his attitude. Quite a few scholars stressed that, “in reality”, cyber-
netic theory and technologies were rather marginal in Soviet governance, 
mainly because, as they put it, “everything was much more primitive”, “brutal” 
or “personal”. I believe this deserves more thought. In the language of my in-
formants, “technology” was constructed as something “non-primitive”, sophis-
ticated, requiring explanation and expertise. It was “the social” which was seen 
as “primitive” and “brutal”. In other words, Soviet governance was seen as an 
exceptionally “social” sphere by the Soviet scientists: a brutal world populated 
only by human beings, their groups and struggles of these groups. According to 
my informants, in this world, even bureaucratic hierarchies were perceived as 
secondary to particular individuals and their groups. Even more telling, they 
doubted the quest for a cybernetic cultural policy (mainly for the economic rea-
sons outlined in the previous chapter). Their scepticism also boiled down to 
doubts as to the “rationality” of the Soviet regime: they rendered Soviet politics 
and governance as largely absurd, faulty, laughable or frightening.  
They looked back on Soviet governance as anything but rational. There-
fore, the informants insisted, the Soviet regime was not capable of being ration-
alised, and this is why scientific technologies did not play a bigger role in gov-
ernance. One of them classified my interest in the extra-scientific role of “cy-
bernetics” as “purely academic”.174 On the basis that the Soviet attempts at “cy-
bernetic governance” failed due to the lack of rationality and science in 
executing governance, the informants stated that “scientific governance” was 
carried out in a way that was not “scientific/cybernetic”, and therefore, govern-
ance was not “scientific/cybernetic either”.  
All of these distinctions, which my informants pointed out in their 
speeches, were indeed very important and productive in the development of a 
Soviet cybernetic discourse of governance. The following chapters will show 
how both hybridisation and purification strategies were mobilised in describing 
culture, techno-science and governance. Latour noted that no science was car-
ried out in a purely “scientific” way, but rather was conducted via very hetero-
geneous practices.175 The same can be said about “scientific governance”: as I 
have demonstrated, its scientific components were a subject of translation, 
which involved many adjustments.  
                                      
173 Interview with a cultural operator, Viktoras, Vilnius, April 2006. 
174 Interview with a cultural operator, Viktoras, Vilnius, April 2006. 
175 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
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Conclusion 
Despite being retrospectively devalued by the Soviet Lithuanian scientists, the 
principles of systems and cybernetic control arguably became important com-
ponents of Soviet managerial discourse.176 In the Soviet management texts, the 
system-cybernetic theories were rewritten in accordance with the administrative 
structures (hierarchical centralised administration) and along political lines (an 
emphasis on the necessity of coercion and defence from the outside). Most im-
portantly, cybernetic governance discourse significantly reformulated the old 
discourse of planning. As of the 1960s, in the Soviet mentality of governance, 
“planning” simply became part of broader, more advanced cybernetic govern-
ance (valdymas, upravlienie).  
During de-Stalinisation, and especially in the post-Khrushchev period, sci-
entifically grounded and technically empowered administration, in keeping with 
the objectives set by the Party, was officially presented as the key instrument in 
ensuring social order (Afanas’ev). Thus, the Soviet discourses of management 
by default were not confined to the management of organisations, but were ex-
tended and applied to society and culture. Systems theory and cybernetic control 
was translated into a language of societal management with certain modifica-
tions. From an ideological standpoint, it was necessary to omit the projected, 
constructed nature of the systems because this idea clashed with the Marxist-
Leninist notion of “objective” natural law, such as class divisions, which were 
based on production. Second, an important cybernetic postulate, which states 
that no technology of measurement and control is neutral towards its object and 
subject and is indeed productive towards both of them, was disregarded. The 
idea of the neutrality of science and technology was officially escalated, as it 
was used to justify the techno-scientific transfer from the West to the Soviet 
Union.  
As the analysis of the management textbooks has shown, cybernetic steer-
ing became an integral part in theorising the management of organisations. My 
impression is that the translation from cybernetic science to management theory 
transpired rather smoothly, facing little resistance. Cybernetic theory and tech-
nologies were rather easily accommodated into the broader Soviet socialist 
mindset, which was concerned with large-scale planning and territorial integra-
tion through a centralised hierarchy. This mindset required an operation with 
extremely large quantities of data, to which computers were immediately appli-
cable (Glushkov). Yet it is striking that the applications of cybernetic technolo-
gies to economic management were counter-productive, since they disagreed 
with the pervasive informality of the economic sector.  
                                      
176 A proof is that the contemporary Lithuanian management textbooks still refer to cybernetics 
and GST as “the science of governance”. See Fabijonas Saulius Butkus, Organizacijos ir vadyba 
(Vilnius: Alma littera, 1996); Povilas Zakareviius, Vadybos arimuose (Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo 
universitetas, 2005); Zakareviius, Vadyba. 
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Yet historically, culture, especially the arts and humanities, have had their 
own rationales. The Soviet government and the Communist Party were self-
proclaimed patrons of the arts and the (economic and ideological) providers of 
cultural operators. Once at work, the cybernetic mentality of large-scale control 
could not help but enter the sphere of cultural administration and policy. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, material cybernetic machinery exposed a discrep-
ancy between official ideal management and actual practices. But what were the 
consequences of cybernetic governance as intellectual machinery? The follow-
ing chapter discusses the discursive aspects of Soviet cultural policy and dem-
onstrates that the translation from cybernetic theory and technology to govern-
ance/management of culture was not a smooth undertaking. I will now proceed 
to elucidate the way in which the postulate of a neutral, universal system-
cybernetic approach was adopted, but also contested and criticised by Lithua-
nian intellectuals and cultural operators. 
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VI. Cybernetic Rationalisation of Culture: From 
Knowledge to Steering 
In 1962, Pravda announced that “modern cybernetics – the science of the ra-
tional, optimal control of complex processes and operations – could be looked 
upon in the USSR as the successor and heir to the scientific organisation of 
labour”.1 This quote said several things. First, it revealed that both previously 
banned disciplines – cybernetics and NOT (the “scientific organisation of la-
bour”) of the 1920s – were proclaimed to be fully legitimate sciences. Second, it 
redefined the traditional object of Party control, the basis of society (“labour”), 
as consisting of “complex processes and operations”. In the Soviet Union, the 
changing notion of labour could not leave the notion of culture unaffected: in 
Marxism-Leninism, culture, defined as a “superstructure”, depended on produc-
tion relations. If cybernetics was the science of labour management, it was also 
the science of “culture” and its governance. In the previous chapter I demon-
strated that cybernetics and systems theory provided the Soviet governor with 
tools for knowing and controlling an object and process of governance. How 
were cybernetic knowledgability and the governability of culture formulated by 
Lithuanian cultural intellectuals and policy makers?  
This chapter, which deals mainly with the Lithuania of the 1960s and 
1970s, analyses how cybernetic control was translated in the public Soviet 
Lithuanian cultural policy discourses – in the cultural press and speeches made 
by highly placed officials. It must be remembered that de-Stalinisation in 
Lithuanian SSR coincided with the internal pacification achieved by the suc-
cessful repression of the armed resistance. The cultural sector recovered during 
this period. In 1956, the classicist 18th century Vilnius Cathedral was reopened 
as a picture gallery under the State Vilnius Art Museum. By the 1960s, the col-
lectivisation of the countryside was largely completed, and the ambitious pro-
jects of industrialisation were under way. The urban population grew rapidly.2 
At the same time that the Vilnius Computer Factory was built and operational 
and the Institute of Physics and Mathematics was developing automated man-
agement systems, architectural heritage had been restored or reconstructed, as in 
the case of the Vilnius Castle Museum, which opened in 1960. Despite Khru-
shchev’s criticism in 1961, the insular, medieval Trakai Castle was eventually 
                                      
1 Pravda, 24 October 1962, cf Samuel Lieberstein, “Technology, Work, and Sociology in the 
USSR: The NOT Movement,” Technology and Culture 16, no.1 (1975), 62. 
2 Lietuva 1940-1990. 
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rebuilt (1962), whilst the folk culture heritage was institutionalised in the 
Rumšišks Open-Air Museum (1966).3 Various museums were consolidated 
into the Lithuanian Art Museum in 1966. Further, the Museum of Lithuanian 
History and Ethnography was established in 1960 and opened in 1968; the 
Palanga Museum of Amber (1963) and the Art Exhibition Hall in Vilnius 
(1968) also opened. At that time, a new, less restricted cultural press emerged, 
with the appearance of the LSSR Ministry of Culture’s magazine, Domains of 
Culture (1965, and the publication of the LSSR Writers’ Union Nemunas 
(1967), which was dedicated to youth culture. Thus, the 1960s appear to have 
been a time of consolidation of the republic-wide institutional network of or-
ganisations for heritage, folk and professional high culture. After 1990, all of 
them would become “national” organisations, symbols of the sovereign Lithua-
nian nation. It seemed that the harsh experience of 15 post-war years receded 
into the background: the Lithuanian past was thoroughly Sovietised in history 
textbooks and museum displays. The 1960s could best be described as a period 
of organisational explosion in the cultural sphere in Lithuanian SSR.  
As described earlier, the early 1960s were also the period of Soviet eco-
nomic upheaval and achievements in space technologies. It is against this back-
drop of enthusiasm and belief in the power of science and technologies that the 
ambition to scientifically (cybernetically) govern the organisationally consoli-
dated sector of culture must be understood. The text of the 1963 speech, “What 
Is and Will Be New in Cultural Construction?”, which was broadcast on 
Lithuanian radio, includes the following statement: 
 
If, only recently we used to talk about communism as a theoretically 
grounded idea about the future of humanity, then last year the people of our 
country started to put the programme of building communism on the basis 
of concrete plans and scientifically grounded calculations into practice.4
 
The scientific-technical progress of the 1960s was publicly framed as proof of 
the success of the Soviet regime in Lithuania. Eager to demean the period of 
independence, in 1965, Tiesa claimed: 
 
If the bourgeois Lithuanian industries could only provide such “very com-
plicated” production, such as locks and axes, then today the republic’s sci-
entists and designers could create electronic computing machines, radio 
                                      
3 As he put it, “The Lithuanian government started to reconstruct from ruins the palaces and cas-
tles of feudal rulers, many of which did not have historical value. Whereas there is not enough 
finance allocated for some other essential needs of the workers”. For similar “wasting of national 
funds” Khrushchev criticised the construction of stadiums in Tbilisi and Kiyv. “Rech tovarishcha 
Khrushcheva,” Pravda, 22 January 1961, 4. 
4 M.Požarskas speech on radio “Kas yra ir bus naujo kultrinje statyboje?” (17 January 1963), 
LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b.1164, l. 10.  
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and television equipment, and high-precision and other welding machines, 
which would raise their standing on the world market.5  
 
In a way, the 1960s in Lithuanian SSR could be seen as an entirely new histori-
cal period, which eagerly sought to distance itself from both the interwar state 
and the recent Stalinist past.  
This chapter is organised both chronologically and thematically. Based on 
an analysis of articles published in a monthly magazine Domains of Culture, it 
opens with an overview of a discussion between two exceptionally bright young 
Lithuanian intellectuals, which took place in the mid-1960s at the time of the 
Thaw in Lithuania. I argue that their debate concerned the purposefulness of 
translation from cybernetic science to cultural discourses. Why translate cyber-
netics to culture? Was it even possible to do so? After the events in Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968, Lithuania saw the hardening of political control. At the same 
time, however, I will show that the cybernetic discourse spread and became a 
hegemonic language of cultural policy. I will then outline how the cybernetic 
model of the governance of culture manifested itself in the texts published by 
Soviet officials. Thus, this chapter delves into how the cybernetic mentality or 
way of thinking about governance was assembled in Soviet economic rational-
ity-driven, calculation-based, cultural policy-making. 
Why Bring Together Cybernetics and Culture? (1965-68)  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the intellectual agenda of cybernetics 
quickly expanded beyond electronic engineering. In the Soviet Union, the newly 
rehabilitated science attracted interest from individuals trained in various aca-
demic disciplines. Writers, linguists and philosophers delved into systems the-
ory and cybernetics, seeing them as resources for new tools, which could make 
sense of their traditional spheres of inquiry.6 However, combining culture and 
cybernetics did not turn out to be a straightforward task. In the Soviet policy 
discourses, culture and techno-science were mobilised to shape a Soviet society, 
but the roles and means envisaged for them were quite different. Thus, transla-
tion from sciences and technologies to culture was not a self-evident undertak-
ing. Let me illustrate this with an example taken from the weekly Literature and 
Art (1958), published by the LSSR Writers’ Union. The article, which was pub-
lished the same year as Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Beings, was trans-
lated into Russian. It described the special role of a writer in the context of in-
dustrialisation and scientific progress:  
 
                                      
5 “Nuo spynos iki elektronins skaiiavimo mašinos,” Tiesa, 4 June 1965, 3. 
6 See L.B. Pereverzev, Iskusstvo i kibernetika (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1966); Yurii Lotman and V. 
Petrov, eds., Semiotics and Art-metrics: Contemporary Foreign Research (Moscow, 1972); B. V. 
Biriukov, E.S. Geller, Kibernetika v gumanitarnykh naukakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1973). 
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[…] along with automatons, management of complex machines 
assisted by television technologies, computing machines do not 
only analyse and generalise elements of the production process, 
but also directly lead production…And here, more is needed than 
only a scientist’s inventiveness or the shrewdness of an engineer or 
a worker; what is also required is a writer’s passion, which would 
help to wipe away everything that is backward off the road.7
 
This quote implied that creativeness in science was of great importance because 
it produced the advanced “computing machines”, which “lead the production 
process”. Whereas the arts were associated with “passion” because they affected 
the emotions, the arts had to exercise a critical power in channelling innovation 
(“to wipe away everything that is backward”). The author, an economist, sug-
gests that in the course of scientific-technological progress (STP), literature’s 
role was to cultivate emotions rather than intellect. As I will demonstrate in 
greater detail, in the Soviet mentality regarding governance, creativity was iden-
tified with intellect and expressed, first and foremost, in the natural sciences. 
Indeed, this suggests that by 1958, creativity, associated with the natural sci-
ences, was positioned beyond ideology. Because culture, especially the fine arts, 
was always seen by communists as an important tool for disseminating ideol-
ogy,8 literature in STP was supposed to perform a supportive, auxiliary role, not 
a leading one. As one Lithuanian instructor of ideology put it, “an intensive 
integration of material and spiritual culture takes place, an active process, in 
which science increasingly becomes a basis of production and politics, morality 
– a factor that cements all of society and art – an organiser of man’s joy, an 
especially important precondition for his meaningful life and happiness”.9 At 
about the same time, a Russian literary scholar argued that “the artistic process 
is first of all, a progressive development of man’s emotional-spiritual sphere, 
whereas art improves all spiritual capabilities through sensation”.10  
I think that it is precisely this approach to the role of the arts (and culture 
in general) in Soviet progress that, on the one hand, facilitated, but on the other, 
complicated translations of cybernetic principles into cultural policy. The theory 
of cybernetic control and its terms originated in spheres that were far removed 
from those of Soviet cultural policy (the arts, education, everyday culture). 
There was a strong perception that both the theory and the terms were alien to 
culture. The first protagonists in the culture/cybernetics debate were literary 
                                      
7 J. Mairnas, “Ekonomisto pastabos. Skaiiai, žmons, ateitis,” Literatra ir menas 50 (1958), 1. 
8 As it was put by one Lithuanian philosopher, “ideology is impossible without knowledge, in-
formation, the means of influencing people’s mind and feelings,” Jonas Minkeviius, Mokslo ir 
technikos revoliucija: procesas ir problemos (Vilnius: Žinija, 1979), 65. 
9 Justinas Lazauskas, “Socialistins kultros samprata,” KB 9 (1976), 19. 
10 A.G.Egorov, “Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i iskusstvo,” in Kontekst. Literaturno-
teoreticheskie issledovaniia. 1973 (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 77. 
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scholar Tomas Venclova and linguist Jonas Trinknas. Interestingly, their life 
stories were interwoven with the history of cybernetics.  
Venclova was born in Klaipda in 1937, the son of the writer and first So-
viet Minister of Education Antanas Venclova. Brought up in a privileged no-
menklatura family in Vilnius, Venclova studied Lithuanian philology at Vilnius 
University (VU). After graduation, he received a lecturer’s position at VU, 
where he wrote his doctoral dissertation (kandidat nauk) under the supervision 
of the famous Russian semiotician Yurii Lotman, who was based at Tartu Uni-
versity, Estonia. Venclova was closely associated with the leading non-
mainstream Russian poets and writers, especially Joseph Brodsky, and was later 
involved with Moscow dissidents, such as Alexander Ginsburg and others. 
The other debater, Trinknas, was also born in Klaipda (in 1939), but he 
grew up in Kaunas. As his talent for exact sciences already revealed itself in 
secondary school, he was admitted to the prestigious telemechanics faculty of 
the Moscow Energetics Institute in 1957. However, after 18 months in Moscow, 
young Trinknas decided that the technical sciences did not suit him, and he 
returned to Lithuania. After working for a year in the radio plant, he entered VU 
in 1960 to study the same subject as Venclova, Lithuanian philology. However, 
their paths did not cross for a few years.11 Whilst studying Lithuanian, 
Trinknas chose a natural-scientific stream. Under the supervision of Zakarian, 
a scholar of Armenian origin, he specialised in machine translation. Zakarian’s 
group maintained close contact with individuals who were conducting similar 
research at Leningrad University.  
After receiving a degree in mathematical linguistics in 1965, Trinknas ac-
cepted a position at the Institute of Physics and Mathematics (LAS). He recalled 
that he did not foresee immediate success in machine translation, especially 
voice recognition, as it was not conceptually and technologically advanced at 
that stage (indeed, better results were achieved only about forty years later in 
Japan). Moreover, there were no positions available for this kind of research in 
Lithuania. Instead, he worked as a receptionist at the institute’s computing cen-
tre.12 Meanwhile, Venclova received a degree in Lithuanian literature and be-
came a lecturer and research associate in VU’s Lithuanian philology depart-
ment. To jump ahead, Trinknas’s debate with Venclova attracted the attention 
of the head of the philosophy department, the unorthodox Marxist Eugenijus 
Meškauskas, who hired Trinknas as a philosophy lecturer at VU in 1970. 
Thus, the discussion that took place in 1965-66 between Venclova and 
Trinknas was a debate between two young, ambitious graduates: Trinknas 
and Venclova were 27 and 29 years old, respectively. It was also an interdisci-
plinary debate: both were trained in philology but interested in exact sciences. 
Venclova was arguably the first Lithuanian representative of humanities to pub-
licly promote cybernetics. With a stronger background in cybernetic sciences, 
Trinknas took the opposite stance and harshly criticised the cybernetic vogue. 
                                      
11 Interview with Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. 
12 Interview with Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. 
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He was sceptical about a belief in the omnipotent powers of artificial intelli-
gence and computers and later got involved in reviving ethnic culture and pagan 
religion. I will now analyse the debate, as it was, in my view, largely about the 
very possibility of translating cybernetic control to culture and its management. 
I will show that, unlike Soviet management theorists, both Venclova and 
Trinknas understood and questioned cybernetics as an instrument for produc-
ing knowledge about culture and not the instruments of its control. Thus, a dis-
sociation took place in their debate: they attempted to locate knowledge produc-
tion outside of political control. 
a) Venclova versus Trinknas 
Up until now, the significance of Venclova’s contribution to Lithuanian cultural 
discourses on techno-sciences has gone unnoticed, and quite unfairly so. It is 
important to note that Wiener’s writings have never been translated into Lithua-
nian. To my knowledge, except for the translations into Russian (1958 and 
1968), Wiener appeared only in Estonian (Cybernetics in 1961, The Human Use 
of Human Beings in 1969) in the Soviet Union. Venclova was one of the few 
humanistic intellectuals who popularised Wiener’s ideas in Lithuanian. Fur-
thermore, Venclova’s book, Golem or an Artificial Man: Conversations about 
Cybernetics (Vilnius: Vaga, 1965), was probably the first non-specialist intro-
duction, in Lithuanian, of cybernetics targeted at wider, particularly cultured 
audiences. True, there were other Lithuanian books that dealt with new techno-
sciences and especially computers. Yet, The Machines of Today and Future 
(1964), for example, a book written by the Lithuanian theoretician of manage-
ment and circulated in 8,000 copies, did not stir a wider intellectual debate.13
In both the Soviet Union and Lithuanian contexts, Venclova’s books were 
timely.14 The first, Rockets, Planets and Us (published in Vilnius by the State 
Publishing House of Belle-Lettres, 1962) dealt with the space sciences and was 
intended for younger audiences. It was warmly received.15 But more impor-
                                      
13 See Algimantas Indrinas, Dabarties ir ateities mašinos (Vilnius: Valstybin politins ir moks-
lins literatros leidykla, 1964). 
14 Around that time were published such books as Mikhail I. Levin, Kibernetika vkhodit v zhizn’: 
beseda o knigakh (Leningrad, 1962), eds. V.A. Il’in, V.N. Kolbanovskii, E. Kol’man Filosofskie 
voprosy kibernetiki (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1961). Besides 
Venclova’s Golem, popular publications in Lithuanian about cybernetics were mostly translations 
from Russian, such as Levas Teplovas, Kibernetika ir žmonija (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), Viktoras 
Pekelis, 
vairenybs apie kibernetik (Vilnius, 1973). It is important to note, that unlike in the 
West, the Soviet books popularising cybernetics were published by major printing houses. 
15A positive review by astronomer A. Juška was published in the LSSR Writers’ Union’s weekly 
newspaper Literature and Art. The reviewer congratulated Venclova’s ability to describe scien-
tific matters in language easily understandable “for anyone with eight years education”. Though 
sceptical about the book’s modernist design by Antanas Tarabilda which “would not be appreci-
ated by natural scientists,” Juška humorously noted that the book was of interest to all “kids up to 
seventy-years old”. A. Juška, “Raketos, planetos ir mes…,” Literatra ir menas 4 (1963), 5. The 
reviewer emphasised that Lithuanian rocket science streched back to the nineteenth century, when 
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tantly, it was his next book, Golem or an Artificial Man, which addressed a 
more mature readership, as it connected cybernetic control and computer tech-
nologies with biology, linguistics and literary theory, for example. Venclova 
acknowledges that he was, to use his own words, “modestly motivated” to write 
the books for financial reasons. In retrospect, Venclova did not consider those 
publications to be a distinctive professional achievement. In particular, he re-
gretted his unsuccessful attempts to avoid mandatory quotes by Marx and Lenin 
in both books, but he had no choice but to insert them in the final stage of edit-
ing.16 However, the books were professionally written, and their arguments 
contained very sophisticated reasoning regarding the influence of new science 
and technology on society, the arts and social and humanities scholarship. Go-
lem or an Artificial Man, which stirred a public debate in the cultural press and 
inspired a special edition of Domains of Culture, was particularly popular. 
Why did a young literary scholar become interested in cybernetics? When 
interviewed, Venclova attributed his interest in cybernetics to general curiosity 
about something “new” and “non-communist”, something that cut across tradi-
tional disciplinary boundaries.17 His close relationship with his childhood 
friend, Ramnas Katilius, who later became one of Lithuania’s leading semi-
conductor physicists, may well have had an important influence on him.18 Dur-
ing his literary studies at VU, Venclova attended courses on logics and prob-
ability theory.19  
In Golem, Venclova described cybernetics as a “science, maybe even an 
art of brave analogies” or a “style of thinking”.20 In line with official Soviet 
discourse, Venclova translated Wiener’s “control” into valdymas, which he 
defined as the “transformation of knowledge received into signals, which steer 
[vairuoja] a machine (body). According to Venclova, to “regulate” means to 
receive and use information about the outcomes of one’s work”.21 It is notable 
that Venclova translated “communication” into the Lithuanian ryšys, which in 
turn translates into the Russian sviaz’. Both sviaz’ and ryšys have rather techni-
cal and material connotations, like the English “connection” (“communication” 
in a more general sense, just as in “mass communication” or “interaction” 
would be translated into the Lithuanian komunikacija). In turn, “feedback” was 
translated as gržtamasis ryšys or obratnaia sviaz’. 
Like Wiener, Venclova saw cybernetics as a science able to connect (and 
probably control) most diverse disciplines, including language. He argued that, 
                                                                                                                                  
the noble K. Semenaviius wrote a theoretical treatise on rockets that was translated into English, 
German and French. 
16 Unrecorded interview with Tomas Venclova, Vilnius, August 2005. 
17 Unrecorded interview with Tomas Venclova, Vilnius, August 2005. 
18 Interview with a physicist, Ramnas Katilius, Vilnius, August 2005. 
19 According to contemporaries, though Kubilius was actively involved in popularising hard 
sciences among the humanities, the university study programme was never especially targeted at 
multi- or inter-disciplinarity. Interview with a cultural operator, Viktoras, Vilnius, April 2006. 
20 Tomas Venclova, Golemas arba dirbtinis žmogus (Vilnius: Vaga, 1965), 14, 124. 
21 Venclova, 14. 
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were we to understand communication (ryšys) as a process of receiving, storing 
and transmitting information, then the notion of societal communication would 
include languages and “artistic communication”. Venclova viewed his fascina-
tion with cybernetics as a “style of thinking”, and he saw computer technologies 
as a rich resource for humanities scholars and artists. Drawing on the famous 
Russian mathematician Andrei Kolmogorov, Venclova promoted “art-metrics” 
(menometrija), a new science that “measured the amount of information in art”. 
He argued that: 
 
In general, cybernetic terms could be applied to art history and theory 
[menotyra]: there is an author-reader communication [ryšys] over several 
centuries and there is governance [valdymas] because a book educates us, 
and feedback because in a process of creation, images influence one an-
other.22
 
Art-metrics was presented as an indisputably progressive development in the 
humanities. According to Venclova, mathematical methods would perform a 
controlling role if applied to cultural production: 
 
Art-metrics wipes away a lot of garbage that has accumulated in art theory; 
criticism is no longer that uncertain and shaky deck on which only a great 
talent could remain on their feet. Mathematics regulates deceptive personal 
taste and preferences. Terms are made more precise.23
 
Thus, Venclova wanted to bring the natural sciences, particularly cybernetics, 
and the humanities closer together. However, the book was not only about 
bringing scholarly disciplines together. It proposed the redefinition of an entire 
world view, which embraced human beings, machines, texts and societies as 
flows, codes and feedbacks. Unlike Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Be-
ings, it did not contain philosophical thrusts and social critique. Whilst the 
book’s title was most probably inspired by Norbert Wiener’s God and Golem 
(1963), Venclova did not engage more deeply in a discussion of the implica-
tions of cybernetics and religion, which was the focus of Wiener’s book. Under 
the conditions of Soviet censorship, public consideration of religion instantly 
implied paying lip service to the official ideology. This was especially true, 
since communists used science as the major foundation of atheism.24 For exam-
ple, the widespread museums of atheism actually displayed the history of mod-
ern science. In Vilnius, quite a few of these museums were located in churches, 
including the Vilnius University Museum of Science, located in the university 
chapel, and the Museum of Atheism in the Church of St.Kasimir – these are 
                                      
22 Venclova, 102. 
23 Venclova, 102. 
24 Michael Froggatt, “Putting Science into Scientific Atheism,” a paper presented at BASEES 
conference, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, 31 March – 2 April, 2007. 
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perfect illustrations of Latour’s argument that modern science is as equally 
grounded on a belief as is religion. 
Venclova’s second book was welcomed as being particularly timely by its 
reviewers, the Lithuanian physicist V. Lujanas and the literary scholar Algis 
Samulionis, as they noted a growing general interest in new sciences: 
 
Today, people who were never interested in technology [technika] have be-
come interested in what is going on in scientific laboratories, and they wish 
to orientate themselves in a flow of amazing new technical inventions and 
to understand their essence. There is no shortage of examples. Nowadays, 
it is more difficult to obtain tickets to lectures – even about the above-
mentioned cybernetics – at the Moscow Museum of Polytechnics than to 
performances at the best theatres in the capital. In Kharkiv, a lecture about 
“thinking machines” was moved to a larger hall because the club that was 
hosting the event could not accommodate several hundred visitors. In Vil-
nius, the Actors’ House opened a new season with a story about the princi-
ples of electronic machines.25
 
As mentioned earlier, Venclova was enthusiastic about cybernetics and mathe-
matical methods in general, as he saw them as an instrument capable of making 
more precise cultural analyses and critical judgments. Ironically, his reviewers 
complained about the lack of precision in Venclova’s use of cybernetic terms. 
Although they evaluated Venclova’s book as “sufficiently qualified and reason-
able”, they were especially sceptical about Venclova’s “metaphoric use of some 
terms”.26 This, I suggest, demonstrates that a precise transfer was expected 
when translating from hard science. Yet Golem received more praise for its 
balanced critical scholarly considerations and the popularisation of science than 
did Rockets, Planets and Us.  
However, elsewhere the very attempt to translate from cybernetics to hu-
manities and culture was criticised. In 1966, shortly after the publication of 
Golem, Jonas Trinknas published an article entitled “The Era of Robots or 
People?” in the “thick” literary journal, Victory (Pergal).27 It has to be noted 
that in the 1960s, Victory published quite a few articles on science, particularly 
genetics, and thus Trinknas’s article was quite at home in that otherwise liter-
ary journal.28 Just like Venclova, Trinknas acknowledged the all-pervasive 
                                      
25 V. Lujanas, A. Samulionis, “Pasakojimai apie kibernetik,” Literatra ir menas 16 (1966), 7. 
26 Lujanas, Samulionis, 7. 
27 The thick literary magazine Victory had been published since 1944, but its roots can be traced 
to two issues of a literary supplement of the Lithuanian Unit of the Soviet Army newspaper Mo-
therland Calls (Tvyn šaukia), published in 1942. “Taip krsi Taryb Lietuvos periodika,” KB 
11 (1970), 63-64. In 1991, Victory was reorganised and renamed into Years (Metai). 
28 A critique of Trofim Lysenko and a detailed presentation of Gregor Mendel’s theory was pub-
lished in 1966 under the rubric “Publicistika,” Jonas Rubikas, “Genetika vakar ir šiandien,” Pe-
rgal 3 (1966), 110-127. The author noted that Lithuanian scholars did not suffer from Lysenko’s 
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influence of cybernetics: “it is a creation of our days that defines us. To an in-
creasing extent, everything that surprises and promises speaks in the language 
of this science”.29 The translation from a scientific domain of cybernetics to 
humanities and arts, Trinknas admitted, was already happening. It was per-
ceived as a fact of life in the mid-1960s. 
Trinknas operated with a more narrow definition of “cybernetics” than 
did Venclova. He postulated that cybernetics consisted of “mathematics, logics 
and electronic calculation machines”.30 Unlike Venclova, Trinknas did not 
elevate cybernetics to a “style of thinking”. Because of his more in-depth educa-
tion in the technical sciences, Trinknas saw cybernetics as a cross-over be-
tween fundamental science and technical applications. His article was not very 
enthusiastic about translating cybernetics into other spheres. Trinknas was 
concerned about “a threatening, creeping plant of scientific reality, possibility 
and fantasy”, which was about to strangle culture.31 True, he also acknowledged 
the fresh, innovative contribution of the new science to traditional disciplines, 
which it “invaded” because it was “convinced of its own universality”. None-
theless, this conviction in its own universality was wrong. Trinknas argued that 
cybernetics was simply unable to admit that it was just another historically 
bounded science: 
 
We often forget that we are children of a certain epoch and inclined to un-
derstand everything from our point of view. The history of science can 
provide us with many pedagogical examples in which certain features of 
studied phenomena were overrated and treated as being absolutely essen-
tial. In the 17th and 18th centuries, mechanical science flourished. When 
Harvey discovered blood circulation, he looked for mechanical features in 
it. The science of our times is most definitely inclined towards formalism. 
The power of exact, mathematical methods is well-acknowledged. A search 
for mathematical structures and processes is launched everywhere, even 
where it is not needed [...] Most often, old truths are expressed with new 
signs. It cannot be otherwise. Every century gives us a new weapon, and 
each time it seems that the ultimate knowledge of nature is close at hand.32
 
The translation of cybernetics into human beings was considered to be particu-
larly limited. This critical position of Trinknas was inspired by the American 
librarian and critic of new technologies, Mortimer Taube (1910-1965), whose 
Computers and Common Sense: The Myth of Thinking Machines was translated 
                                                                                                                                  
policies merely because there were no “geneticians” at that time. However, quite a few Lithuanian 
biologists sufferred from the “anti-mendelists-morganists” campaign. Lietuva 1940-1990, 369. 
29 Jonas Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” Pergal 5 (1966), 108. 
30 Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” 109. 
31 Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” 109. 
32 Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” 115-7. 
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into Russian in 1964 (only three years after it was first published in English).33 
In line with Taube, Trinknas disapproved of describing a man in computer 
terms. On the other hand, Trinknas admitted that a partial translation was pos-
sible. He agreed that, from a strictly control point of view, machines and human 
beings could indeed be treated alike: “No one would deny that in relation to 
some processes of information or management, machines and living organisms 
can be similarly evaluated. The same features can be found in both”.34 How-
ever, this, he argued, should not lead to the identification of brain processes 
exclusively with computers.  
No less contested was a translation among different branches of academia. 
Translating hard science into humanities was seen as problematic, especially in 
the case of machine translation and mathematical linguistics. Being trained in 
machine translation, Trinknas was highly sceptical about its prospects. Ac-
cording to him, the major obstacle to developing machine translation was its 
underlying assumption of language as information or code. Trinknas’s gradu-
ate thesis dealt with the mathematisation of the phonology of Lithuanian. In an 
interview, he revealed that discovering that phonemes themselves are only con-
ditional codes, arbitrarily marked by letters and inherently unstable, made him 
doubt the possibilities of machine translation. Thus, he contended, if such a 
relatively well-defined element of language as a phoneme could not be precisely 
coded in such a way that a computer would recognise it, then the coding of 
meaning would be even more complicated.35 He saw meaning as essentially 
evasive and contextual and therefore too amorphous to be expressed in a digital 
way.  
In addition, translation from cybernetics to arts was criticised as a hierar-
chical interaction of fields in which cybernetics occupied a superior position in 
relation to culture. Trinknas was worried about the trend of identifying creativ-
ity with science and technology and even reserving it to the machines them-
selves. This, in his opinion, “painfully” damaged the status of the arts: 
 
Finally, we degraded this to the point that our artists became accustomed to 
beginning their discourses with: “Despite the fact that we live in an age of 
technology, art is also...”. Sadly, such speeches frequently sought to prove 
the necessity and utility of art.36
 
In another article entitled “Humanities – Technical or Integrated Culture?” 
Trinknas expressed a concern that the prestigious hard sciences as a predomi-
nant mode of knowledge production undermined and threatened the role of cul-
ture and arts as another mode of knowledge production:  
                                      
33 Mortimer Taube, Vychislitel’nye mashiny i zdravyi smysl. Mif o dumaiushikh mashin (Moscow: 
Progress, 1964). For more on Taube’s criticism of cognitivism Holmqvist, 116-120.  
34 Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” 117. 
35 Interview with Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. 
36 Trinknas, “Robot ar žmoni era?” 118. 
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For example, in the post-war UNESCO bulletins about public sciences, 
there is no place for art. Spiritual human culture, in which the core is re-
served for art, is pushed into an auxiliary position in the educational sys-
tem”.37  
 
The perception of inferiority was increasingly pressing: “Today’s scholars of 
the humanities are jealous about the growth of the natural sciences and their 
increasing role in society, and they attempt to apply their methods and means 
not only, for example, to literary scholarship, but also to creation”.38 For 
Trinknas, art is not just for entertainment, a regulator of “changing moods”, 
but a true “instrument of knowledge”, a provider with values, whilst science is 
an instrument of “action and production”.39  
b) To Translate or Not? 
However, there was no debate about whether to translate or not, but rather how 
and for what reasons. The ongoing translation was driven by many reasons, 
intellectual as well as political ones. Among the political reasons was Khru-
shchev’s call to “catch up and surpass” the West. As was argued in Chapter IV, 
economically, culture was rationalised as a service and thus was rather low in 
the hierarchy of economic priorities. Yet improving the social welfare of the 
Soviet population was another Khrushchevian policy line. Aimed at improving 
services to the population, state cultural policy as intellectual and material ma-
chinery had to be modernised. Thus, it reacted to the call “to widely apply” 
cybernetics to many Soviet policy areas (in which comparisons with similar 
applications in the United States, were drawn and vice versa).40 In a larger con-
text, cybernetics translation was a part of Western modernisation, which largely 
consisted of translations from the natural sciences to the humanities, culture and 
governance.41  
Nevertheless, Trinknas and Venclova admitted that cybernetics had suc-
ceeded in acquiring a hegemonic position as a science of governance and was 
soon to be experienced in everyday life. Indeed, they thought that the greatest 
problem was that the Soviet Lithuanian intellectual climate reacted rather 
slowly and insufficiently to this ongoing translation. In his article “About Art 
                                      
37 Jonas Trinknas, “Humanitarin, technin ar integruota kultra?” KB 8 (1966), 15-16. 
38 Jonas Trinknas, “S. Lemo ‘atsitiktinumo filosofija’,”Literatra ir menas 35, 1969, 14. 
39 Trinknas, “S. Lemo...,” 14. Indeed, this stance first advocated by Trinknas will later be de-
fended by Krescencijus Stoškus. That this position was not popular among professional Lithua-
nian philosophers was revealed in the All-Union conference “Art and Knowledge” (Menas ir 
pažinimas) arranged in late 1977-8(?) in Vilnius. See a report in KB 1 (1978), 72-73. 
40 See Aksel’ I. Berg, “Cybernetics at the Service of Communism,” Cybernetics at the Service of 
Communism.USSR.Vol.1. (Washington D.C., 1962). 
41 This has been explored by many historical studies. Translation from science was famously 
theorised in Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
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and Machine”, published in Domains of Culture (1966), Venclova replied to 
Trinknas and further defended the need for translating from cybernetics to 
culture.42 In the spirit of Thomas Kuhn’s description of “normal science”, Ven-
clova wrote, in defence of cybernetics, that: 
 
The destiny of cybernetics is quite special today; its lexicon, even the most 
superficial one, is considered to be fashionable in any scientific discipline. 
[…] recently it [cybernetics] one may say, settled down, normalised, 
ceased to be a bold and suspicious innovation and became an ordinary, un-
questionable discipline or direction of thought. “Anti-cybernetic poems” 
are met with a grin, since no one writes anti-physical, anti-biological po-
ems or poems against a multiplication table, a “cruel plot” against human-
ity. However, recently a new wave of “disclosing” or demythologising cy-
bernetics, dealing mostly with mathematical linguistics and mathematical 
art history, has arisen.43
 
Venclova engaged in a debate with Trinknas for several reasons. First, it was 
not improbable that the anti-cybernetic attacks of the mid-1960s were perceived 
in light of criticism, which took place in the early 1950s and motivated the pro-
hibition of cybernetics.44 From this point of view, as several of my informants 
noted, to defend cybernetics was to defend intellectual freedom.45 From the 
very beginning, Soviet cybernetics was branded as “a bourgeois pseudo-
science” (burzhuaznaia lzhenauka). For a scientist to engage in something that 
was recognised in the West but, for political reasons, prohibited in the Soviet 
Union, was an assertion of his or her immunity to a political regime. Similarly, I 
believed that the desire to stay away from things political influenced the in-
creasingly negative attitudes of Soviet natural scientists to cybernetics, even as 
it became widely praised by the Party officials. Gerovitch argued that as of the 
1970s, “cyberspeak” came to prevail in official discourses. This meant that a 
previously “pure” language of science became a hybrid language of politics. 
Consequently, many scientists wanted to dissociate from it. 
Second, in retrospect, Venclova argued that he was highly motivated to 
debate “for the sake of the debate” and was looking for a constructive confron-
tation with the public, which was a very rare occurrence in conformist Soviet 
reality.46 True, the issues of techno-science and culture were addressed in loose 
debates, which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in the Soviet Russian and 
Lithuanian literary press and were labelled by contemporaries as a debate be-
                                      
42 Tomas Venclova, “Apie men ir mašin,” KB 8 (1966), 17-19. 
43 Venclova, “Apie men ir mašin,” 17. On normal science, see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). 
44 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 113-131. 
45 This point was also argued by an informant, a Lithuanian mathematician and economist. Inter-
view with Eduardas Vilkas, Vilnius, December 2007. 
46 Unrecorded interview with Tomas Venclova, Vilnius, August 2005. 
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tween “physicists and lyricists”. Notably, here a “physicist” referred to anyone 
who was optimistic about techno-sciences and a “lyricist” to a more sceptical 
proponent. This debate, however, deserves a book of its own and cannot be 
addressed in this chapter. 
Indeed, the criticism of the 1960s did not address the issues of ideological 
correctness, but rather the excessively high ambitions declared by many admir-
ers of cybernetics. Trinknas was particularly sceptical and concerned about 
aspirations to model social reality with the help of cybernetic models, invent 
“thinking machines” and construct “mechanic translators” – in his opinion, they 
were, if not impossible, then clearly unnecessary.47 Venclova agreed that cyber-
netic applications did not always succeed in practice, especially since expecta-
tions tended to be exceedingly high. He criticised exaggerated expectations that 
mathematic methods and technical mediation could, by themselves, solve any 
social or economic problems. In this regard, both Venclova and Trinknas 
agreed that the new intellectual and material machinery had strong limitations. 
However, as I will demonstrate shortly, this contention was not a feature of 
ideological pronunciations. The official Party ideologues disseminated a belief 
in the virtually limitless power of science and technology, which would be lim-
ited only by the Communist Party. 
Trinknas feared that cybernetic translation would produce a “de-
humanising” effect in the spheres that were previously regarded as untouched 
by the new techno-sciences. To this, Venclova replied that the cause of “dehu-
manisation” was not a techno-science per se: 
 
Today’s human situation is not really easier than it was in previous centu-
ries, but we should not blame technology and the soullessness it inflicted 
for that, but rather the soulless people who got an opportunity to use tech-
nology. There are a sufficient number of bureaucratic, military and similar 
“machines” that oppress and humiliate people, and it is hardly meaningful 
to passionately blame “overly arrogant cyberneticians”, “mythical engi-
neers” or “physicists”, ostensibly enemies of lyricists. Believe me, lyricists 
(and also physicists) have much more serious enemies than these…48
 
According to Venclova, only human beings caused the vices of rapidly advanc-
ing sciences and technologies. On the one hand, for Venclova, cybernetic trans-
lation was value-neutral. On the other, however, he saw cybernetic translation 
as productive, able to give a birth to something new. According to Venclova, 
cybernetics contributed to culture by making it knowable in new ways: “renam-
ing phenomena in cybernetic terms (only if we do not blindly follow fashion) 
                                      
47 It is important to note that cybernetic modelling of art was later conceptualised by many Soviet 
scholars. See for instance I. V. Gutchin, “Kiberneticheskoe modelirovanie proizvedenii 
iskusstva,” in Iskusstvo i nauchno-technicheskii progress (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1973). 
 
48 Venclova, “Apie men ir mašin,” 18. 
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overcomes mundane habits; automation makes a phenomenon “odd” and there-
fore enables us to look into it in greater depth.. This is very similar to a method 
used in art”.49 Venclova did not explicitly refer to the Russian formalist literary 
theoretician Viktor Shklovsky in that text. Yet I think that he was clearly influ-
enced by Shklovsky’s theory of artistic estrangement50 in seeing cybernetics as 
a special heuristic tool. 
Finally, automatic self-regulation was translated as a general act of order-
ing in thermodynamic terms. Venclova’s input consisted of a rather open criti-
cism of the Soviet regime. Holding that the “conflict between art and science 
was clearly exaggerated”,51 he indicated the real problems to be “obscurant-
ism”, “ignorance”, “bureaucratic thinking”. Both art and science were partners 
in fighting these problems. Nevertheless, Venclova also rejected the notion of 
art as primarily concerned with emotion. Instead, he argued that the value of art 
was its capacity to generate order because, first and foremost, it was:  
 
[…] a challenge to death, temporality, that what is called entropy. Art plugs 
us into the world, explains it in its own way and models it (first, it models 
the parts that science missed).52
 
Venclova and Trinknas were not alone in this discussion. For example, more 
opinions about cybernetics were brought together in a special edition of Do-
mains of Culture, which published roundtable proceedings dedicated to art, 
science and technology in 1966. During the roundtable proceedings, cybernetics 
was addressed by another important Lithuanian intellectual, Aleksandras 
Shtromas.53 Shtromas would later become a famous political exile, but at the 
time he was the head of the Court Expertise Department and familiar with cy-
bernetics, which was expected to modernise criminology: 
 
There is no need to fear cybernetics. It is a powerful instrument for knowl-
edge for the representatives of all the creative professions. There are no 
such spheres of behaviour that could not be modelled and through model-
ling – explored and improved. Cybernetics will have to play the core role 
                                      
49 Venclova, “Apie men ir mašin,” 19. 
50 Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader, ed. D. 
Lodge (London: Longmans, 1988). 
51 Tomas Venclova, Roundtable “Menas, mokslas, technika,” KB 8 (1966), 3. This was emphasi-
sed in several interviews with a mathematician, Saulius, and physicists Simas and Paulius, Vil-
nius, December 2005. 
52 Venclova, “Menas...,” 3. 
53 As a child, Aleksandras Shtromas survived the holocaust by miraculously escaping from Kau-
nas ghetto and grew up in the family of the First Secretary (LCP) Antanas Sniekus, who was 
indebted to Shtromas’s family (Shtromas family helped Sniekus to hide when he was prosecuted 
as a communist by the Lithuanian government in the 1930s). See Leonidas Donskis, Identity and 
Freedom: Mapping Nationalism and Social Criticism in Twentieth-Century Lithuania (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), 74. 
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in fighting alienation and professional dissociation; it will unite all the rep-
resentatives of the creative professions in turning every sphere of human 
activity into something both intellectual and creative. Essentially, cybernet-
ics has to help human beings make use of new possibilities. Just as a 
sledgehammer is more perfect than a fist, so an electronic computational 
machine is more perfect than an abacus. [...] Everyone wants to know eve-
rything, but is limited. This limitation will be defied by the machine.54
 
In this quote, Shtromas makes a strong case for relating creativity to cybernetics 
and progress.55 Trinknas strongly disagreed with this. For him, it was wrong to 
embed creativity in cybernetic methods. The cybernetic methods would produce 
knowledge only at the cost of leaving out too many other important things. 
Trinknas defended his position in a later article, a review of the book, The 
Philosophy of Contingency (1968, Literature and Art), by the world-famous 
Polish mathematician and science fiction writer, Stanislaw Lem. Backing his 
own position with that of Lem, Trinknas argued against “cybernetic structural-
ists”, who were “trying to achieve only one thing in the humanities: the evasion 
of meaning. They never describe events or phenomena themselves, but their 
generators”. He further insisted that cybernetics did not “suit literary theory, 
first and foremost, because it specialises in transmitting and receiving informa-
tion, whereas in art the most important element is artistic reception – experi-
ence. Artistic experience is not the same thing as understanding”.56  
For Trinknas, “technology” was meaningless. For example, he argued 
that “it is not engineering that gives meaning to life, science, machines. Cinema, 
radio, press, television are the pride of our epoch. This is a merit of scientists 
and technicians. They created those devices and mechanisms – but note – only 
mechanisms. Content is another matter”.57 Thus, he contended that meaning or 
“content” was produced only in extra-technological spheres. From this point of 
view, technologies were only mechanisms, as they possessed no “content”. It 
could certainly be reasoned that, were the “content” to be defined in cognitive 
terms, then computers would be capable of producing meaning. However, 
Trinknas was against an exclusively cognitive definition of meaning. For him, 
meaning was primarily sensual, embedded in experience.  
By drawing strict lines between meaning and cognitivism, Trinknas did 
not seek to develop his own philosophy or coherent thought. Indeed, in an inter-
view, he confessed that he preferred acting to writing.58 By writing anti-
cybernetic articles, he signalled the fact that he belonged to a group of under-
                                      
54 Aleksandras Shtromas, Roundtable “Menas, mokslas, technika,” KB 8 (1966), 3. 
55 In Soviet Russia, modelling with the help of arts was in turn criticised together with sturctural-
ism and Lotman’s semiotics. See M.V. Khrapchenko, “Literatura i modelirovaniie deistvi-
tel’nosti,” in Kontekst. Literaturno-teoreticheskie issledovaniia. 1973 (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 
15, 16-17. 
56 Trinknas, “S. Lemo...,” 14. 
57 Trinknas, “Humanitarin,…,” 16. 
58 Interview with Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. 
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financed humanistic intellectuals. In his rather tedious job as a receptionist at 
the computer centre in the Institute of Physics and Mathematics, he was sensi-
tive to the dethroning of humanistic intellectuals and artists, whose status as 
knowledge producers was evaporating in the wake of advancing engineering 
and the natural sciences. On the other hand, it was an expression of his adher-
ence to Occidentalism, that is, disenchantment with Western civilisation as a 
whole. In retrospect, Trinknas explained that he was already an adherent of a 
religious world view, something which was impossible to admit in a public 
intellectual debate at that time.  
Unlike Venclova, Trinknas did not advocate translations from the natural 
sciences and engineering to humanities, but rather the internal cultivation of 
one’s own field by building on traditional methods and ideas. Indeed, Trinknas 
was negative towards the very term “cybernetics”, as it was too heterogeneous 
and did not imply “a normal scientific discipline”. For example, when I asked 
him for his opinion about Gvishiani, Trinknas argued that he was an example 
of someone pursuing an academic career by becoming an adherent of “cybernet-
ics and systems theory” whilst lacking “real scientific abilities”.59 Therefore, in 
a Latourian way, Trinknas could be called a purist, whilst Venclova could be 
called a hybrid thinker.60
From a purist perspective, culture was regarded as a field with its own, 
autonomous criteria of progress.61 Trinknas repeatedly warned against the 
trend of identifying “progress” exclusively with the natural sciences and tech-
nology.62 Moreover, one form of progress should not be translated into another 
because such a translation would inevitably inflict a hegemonic relationship. 
Subsequently, he argued, “most people” would no longer be able “to look at art 
and spiritual activity through anything other than a technical lens. It seems that 
people do not know what is to be done with art anymore. For some it is enter-
tainment, for others, a trinket, for others, a way of passing the time, and for 
others, an illustration of scientific or political truths”.63  
 
To summarize, the translation of cybernetics to culture in the Venclova- 
Trinknas debate exhibited some similarities, but also important differences 
from the point of view of the translation of cybernetics into management. First, 
the cultural debate stressed cybernetics’ contribution to the knowledgeability of 
                                      
59 Interview with Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. 
60 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
61 This resembles Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of hierarchically organised cultural fields, where the 
stronger ones can afford “internally developed” rules. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: 
Genesis and Structure in the Literary Field (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
62 Despite Trinknas receiving some education in hard sciences, some of his ideas were simply 
wrong, as noticed by Venclova. For example, Trinknas was convinced that “most of today’s 
inventions were planned” and thus maintained that scientific research had little to do with indivi-
dual curiosity. Meanwhile, he held that “art and societal ideas cannot be planned – only the condi-
tions for their development can be secured”. Trinknas, “Humanitarin,...,” 16. 
63 Trinknas, “Humanitarin,...,” 16. 
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culture. However, Venclova and Trinknas had different perceptions of the role 
of new knowledge produced with the help of cybernetic theory and technology. 
For Venclova, the new knowledge would escalate the internal development of 
culture, especially the arts. It would shift human reason to the next, higher level. 
Trinknas, on the other hand, resisted the imposition of the cybernetic rationali-
sation of traditional methods and objects of art and culture in general. It was the 
dimension of governability that distinguished the cultural discourses on cyber-
netics from the managerial ones. Neither Venclova nor Trinknas believed that 
cybernetic technologies should be used for the more effective administration of 
culture.  
What was behind this indifference to cybernetics’ potential to reform cul-
tural administration? Hypothetically, the techno-scientific rationalisation of the 
governance of culture would ameliorate its ideological restrictions. For exam-
ple, in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, the natural sciences enjoyed a consider-
able degree of intellectual freedom. The professional autonomy of the “produc-
ers of knowledge”, natural scientists, was rather respected by the Party officials. 
This autonomy, of course, was much more restricted to scientists as individuals 
– for example, their right to free movement abroad was strictly limited accord-
ing to their political loyalty. Since de-Stalinisation, Soviet scientists themselves 
had been cultivating a mythology of their field as an “isle of freedom”. Com-
pared with the natural sciences, neither artists nor cultural workers enjoyed a 
similar degree of independence from ideology. As described in Chapter III, the 
ideological restrictions in the culture sphere were abundant: from entry into the 
professional ranks (creative unions) to the content of production (a novel, a 
painting, an amateur art circle). For a Soviet ideologue, culture filled up leisure 
time and trained emotions (through representations both at home and abroad); it 
stimulated sociality and a spirit of collectivism (amateur art collectives); it did 
not create new knowledge. Thus, in this world view, emotion did not require 
autonomy from politics, but knowledge did. Moreover, unlike in economics and 
management, the principles of cybernetic governance were introduced into cul-
tural policy, not from below by pioneering, daring cultural operators, but from 
above, by Soviet officials. 
Cybernetic Control Appropriated 
At the first glance, it may seem as if culture and its scientific governance 
[kontrol] are incompatible. However, culture is not an impalpable, amor-
phous phenomenon – it is the product of human activity, values and ac-
cepted ways of behaviour, which are created in certain communities and 
transmitted to other communities and generations. Therefore, culture is a 
regulable thing. […] culture is “regulated” not only by the social condi-
tions of human existence, but also by human beings themselves. In social-
ism (though the preconditions emerged significantly earlier), a man be-
comes a real subject of historical process and can purposefully regulate so-
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cial relations. Socialism opened up real ways to regulate not only separate 
elements of culture, their complexes, systems and examples, but also to 
purposively, scientifically act upon culture in general.64 [The italics are 
mine – E. R.] 
 
This quote, taken from a roundtable discussion that took place at Domains of 
Culture in 1970, encapsulates the key features of the post-Stalinist notion of the 
governability of culture. First, its opening sentence admits that it was still not 
self-evident that culture could and should be governed scientifically. This im-
portant hint indicates that, as late as 1970, the necessity of scientific governance 
of culture was not yet a hegemonic feature of public discourse. It had to be as-
serted, explained and defended. Second, it emphasises that culture was man-
made and thus governable (the next chapter argues that, in later discourses, non-
manmade systems were also perceived as governable). Third, the quote empha-
sises the holistic approach, as it claims that it was “culture in general” and not 
its isolated parts that should be acted upon. Finally, the quote uses the fancy 
Soviet management words of the 1960s, such as “complexes” and “systems”, 
but implies that “culture in general” transcends even the term “system”. Thus, 
the vocabulary of systems theory was mobilised as an instrument that was to 
help manage culture, but it did not thoroughly describe its essence. Or, as the 
Russian cyberneticians Biriukov and Geller noted, the very purpose of applying 
a system-cybernetic approach to culture and society was their governance.65
Here, it is important to note that the quote cited above belonged to the 
ideological secretary at the CC (LCP). Thus, it was a highly placed Party offi-
cial who initiated a roundtable discussion (“The Scientific Basis of Cultural 
Development”). Representatives from various backgrounds, including the direc-
tor of the Vilnius Factory of Electronic Calculators, took part in the discussion. 
The very selection of speakers clearly acknowledged that the scientific govern-
ance of culture was regarded as a multidisciplinary matter. Compared with the 
previously analysed roundtables, which took place in the mid-1960s, the role of 
the ideological secretary was more pronounced. It was not a science professor 
who opened the debate and set its tone, but a Party official. Cybernetic language 
was no longer the original suggestion of a scientist or daring cultural intellec-
tual, but the official speech of the government. 
The times were also different. In Lithuania, as in Latvia and Estonia, the 
post-1968 period was characterised as a time of political stabilisation and eco-
nomic stagnation (which was to last for about 20 years, until the late 1980s).66 
From the beginning of the 1960s, anti-Western ideological control of cultural 
production, mainly film, arts and literature, intensified. Stricter measures for 
controlling the expressions of Lithuanian cultural elites were enforced in 1972; 
                                      
64 Justinas Lazauskas, A roundtable “Moksliniai kultros ugdymo pagrindai,” KB 11 (1970), 10. 
65 B.V. Biriukov and E.S. Geller, Kibernetika v gumanitarnych naukakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1973). 
66 Misiunas and Taagepera, 208-211. 
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for example, the chief editors of the most liberal magazines, Domains of Culture 
and Nemunas, were dismissed.67  
However, and this is one of my dissertation’s most salient points, in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s, the Soviet cultural policy in Lithuania was not limited 
to prohibitions and the management of the expression of cultural elites. The 
cultural policy-makers were not only engaged in controlling individual voices 
and internal power struggles. They also faced the difficult task of keeping cul-
tural policy appropriately integrated in Soviet social and economic planning, 
which was continuously challenged by the ongoing changes, driven by scien-
tific-technological progress. Rapid industrialisation (large chemistry and cement 
plants, an oil refinery and a nuclear plant were built) and urbanisation, and a 
growing influx of Western youth cultures, along with the need to support and 
expand the network of culture houses in the provinces, as a large part of the 
population still lived in the countryside and their leisure time had to be managed 
– all of these were massive tasks, which had to be addressed. And, as ever, the 
bureaucratic apparatus was notoriously late, slow and backward.  
Thus, this slow pace only increased the significance of the texts from that 
period, which revealed an overwhelming awareness on the part of contemporar-
ies of the ongoing changes. For example, in Domains of Culture, “culture” was 
increasingly described as ambivalent. Changes in culture were described as 
indeterminate. It was feared that culture continuously risked changing in an 
unwanted direction, for example, “good culture” could degrade into “mass cul-
ture”, “genuine” socialist culture into “perverted” capitalist culture, and so on. 68 
Science and technologies, especially cybernetics and the systems approach, 
were looked on with hope, regarded as a tool box for governance that would 
help to cope with these changes. In this section, I will demonstrate how system-
cybernetic terms were incorporated into Soviet Lithuanian cultural policy dis-
courses. 
As outlined in Chapter IV, cybernetic control was incorporated into man-
agement discourse both as a conceptual system and electronic machinery. I 
showed how the computer was translated into an organisation and control-based 
feedback in the regulation of the economy and society. Here, I will further focus 
on translation, with a particular emphasis on language. Thus, in the texts I ana-
lysed, I looked for those terms and their combinations, as they referred to key 
aspects of cybernetic steering: 1) system, 2) feedback and prediction, 3) auto-
mation. 
                                      
67 As Lithuanian historians noted, in 1964 the CC (LCP) passed the decree to intensify counter-
propaganda, which aimed to demean the new cultural developments in the West. Bagušauskas and 
Streikus, 19-22. 
68 From the mid-1970s, one of the most salient issues was a growing “cult of things”. This was 
posed as a risk and associated by public writers with “mediocracy” and “technocracy” and descri-
bed as a “de-humanising activity”. References to such risks were utilised for backing calls for 
“perfecting the theory and practice of the governance of cultural processes”. Zigmantas Viktoras 
Morknas, “Kultros valdymo ypatybs,” KB 2 (1977), 22. 
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1) System  
As I demonstrated in Chapter IV, in Soviet state policy, “culture” was economi-
cally rationalised as consisting of material objects (a material base), organisa-
tions, people and “services” (art and other cultural works). For the purpose of 
planning, these components of “culture” were described by “indicators”. Such a 
rationalisation of “culture” was already present in Leninist and Stalinist cultural 
policies. In this section I will show that beginning in the 1960s, this rationalisa-
tion came to be reframed in terms of systems theory. From this viewpoint, “cul-
ture” was perceived not as “a sum” of objects, organisations, people and ser-
vices, but as a system, in which these components were dynamically interlinked 
and controlled by feedback via the flows of information. Moreover, understand-
ing “culture” as a system made it possible to link both its components and the 
sector as a whole with other systems, most importantly, the “social” one.  
The translation of General Systems Theory (GST) to culture took place in 
both Soviet and democratic regimes.69 While there is not enough space to do 
justice to the rich history of the term “system”, fortunately, it has already been 
covered quite well elsewhere.70 Suffice it to state that the notion of “system” 
should be differentiated from “structure”, which is used in structuralist ap-
proaches to culture and society. Whilst the combination of structure and change 
had been an ongoing problem of structuralism, “system” itself was defined 
through relations of ongoing processes. Openness, flow, change – these and 
other qualities have been conceptualised as key features constituting a system. 
von Bertalanffy defined “system” as a sustained relationship among compo-
nents. Both conceptually and materially, cybernetic steering was embedded in 
complex systems. Outside of electronic engineering, systems were used for for-
mulating environmental, econometric, culture-metric, art-metric and other mod-
els.71 In governance models, systematic features were attributed to objects of 
control and often seen as embedded in larger systems. Such a concept of “sys-
tem” was believed to fit with culture, a very heterogeneous sphere.  
Just as in the case of Soviet management thought, culture was predomi-
nantly conceptualised as a system in the texts of Russian scholars, such as B. 
Biriukov and E. Geller, Nikolai Kriukovsky and Moisei Kagan, to name just a 
few.72 In 1971, G. Povarov described culture, particularly the arts, as constitut-
                                      
69 Holmqvist, 47-62. The Western translation of GST and cybernetics to culture and especially its 
sciences remains to be addressed.  
70 Susiluoto; Mindell, “Bodies, Ideas, and Dynamics…”. 
71 See Lotman and Petrov; Viachislav V. Ivanov, “The Role of Semiotics in the Cybernetic Study 
of Man and Collective,” in Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology, ed. D. P. Lucid (Baltimore and Lon-
don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). 
 
72 Biriukov and Geller; Nikolai I. Kriukovsky, Kibernetika i zakony krasoty. Filosofskii ocherk 
(Minsk: Izdatel’sstvo Belaruskogo gos.universiteta imeni V.I.Lenina, 1977); Moisei S. Kagan, 
“Iskusstvo kak fenomen kul’tury,” in Isskustvo v sisteme kul’tury, ed. by M. S. Kagan (Leningrad: 
Nauka, 1987). It is significant that this line of Russian thought persisted into the 1990s. V.M. 
Petrov, “Sistemnost’ sotsiokulturnoi sfery: mekhanizmy, obespechivaiushchie dinamiku,” in 
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ing “a complex system” characterised by a large number of components, which 
were “becoming” and connected by stochastic interactions.73 The changes 
within and outside the cultural sector were seen as a flow of “processes”, which 
could be known and steered with the help of feedback control, which I will dis-
cuss later in greater depth.74 This conceptual grid made it possible to conceptu-
alise culture, on the whole, as governable. It is curious that this description of 
culture as a system related by flows with other systems (economic and techni-
cal) was at odds with the Marxist theory of culture as a superstructure deter-
mined by the base or production relations. In a system-cybernetic model of cul-
ture, there is little room for determination, and culture would be seen as inter-
acting with the base. 
Thus, by the early 1970s, culture was officially postulated to be thinkable 
and governable as a system. But how was the term “system”, charged with po-
tentially political values such as openness and internal change, adapted to a 
cultural policy discourse? Chapter V showed that Soviet management dis-
courses combined a systems approach with a need for internal coercion and 
external defence. The fundamental postulate of a system-cybernetic theory, 
namely that the degree of order depends on the degree of difference, was disre-
garded, as the ideologically Soviet social “system” aimed at escalating equality. 
How could art, with its modernist need for originality and uniqueness, be con-
ceptualised as a “system”? I will argue that in cultural policy discourses the 
conceptualisation took place on the level of economic rationalisation. Art as a 
service could be conceptualised as an equalising system as long as it could be 
accessed by the people and understood by them. 
In the analysed texts, taken from Domains of Culture, several conse-
quences of translations of “system” into culture could be distinguished. First, 
the concept of system was superimposed on administrative categories. Thus, a 
“system of the Ministry of Culture” was a phrase that simply referred to the 
organisations under the ministry.75 In this sense, the term “system” did not fully 
transfer the qualities of GST to the bureaucratic structure of cultural organisa-
tions. However, as I will show, in some aspects the bureaucratic structure came 
to be described in GST terms. For example, this is how an instructor in ideology 
described rational decision-making in relation to culture as a system: 
                                                                                                                                  
Kul’turologicheskie zapiski. Vol. 5. Khudozhestvennaia zhizn’ Rossii ot 1970-kh k 1990-m. (Mos-
cow: 1999). 
73 G. N. Povarov, “Novoe puteshestvie na Gelikon, ili istoriia kul’tury v svete obshcheii teorii 
sistem,” Tochnye metody v issledovaniiakh kul’tury i iskusstva (material k simpoziumu)Vol.I. 
(Moscow, 1971), 58. 
74 Semiotics was also to contribute to the governance of culture as a system of signs. L. T. Kuzin, 
“Metody strukturnoi lingvistiki v upravlenii,” in Semioticheskie metody upravlenia v bol’shikh 
sistemakh (Moscow: Moskovskii dom nauchno-tekhnicheskoi propagandy imeni F.E. Dzerzhins-
kogo, 1971); L.T. Kuzin and D.A. Pospelov, “Problemy semioticheskogo upravleniia,” in Semio-
ticheskiie metody.... 
 
75 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 16, l. 1.  
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One of the main things in governance [valdymas] is decision. Decision, as 
a method of influence that aims at a particular goal, is described in litera-
ture as a process that has several components: when we need to decide, 
what we have to know about a current situation (state of exit), the pur-
posive goal, criteria by which we are guided, obstacles (hindrances) that 
obstruct. ... In order for the system to reorganise itself from the state of exit 
into the one for which we strive, many decisions are needed. [...] Control of 
the implementation of the programme and regulation are needed. [...] what 
does it mean to scientifically govern culture as a process? We have to look 
at culture as a system and therefore its modelling should be important to 
us.76 [The italics are mine – E.R.] 
 
Administrative command and large-scale centralised economic planning were 
strong incentives for conceptualising culture as a system. Another way to use 
systems theory was to conceptualise culture as a feature of human population: 
“humanity is the only self-regulating system […] that combines knowledge, 
purposive and creative activity, will and reason, freedom and responsibility”.77 
Third, systems theory “smuggled in” the non-human agents in Soviet cultural 
policy discourses. Systems were multiple; culture as a system was not isolated 
from other systems. Take, for example, this quote from the chairman of the 
Republican Committee for the Scientific Organisation of Labour: 
 
When governing an activity [veikla], whether it is a small brigade or a large 
factory or even such a complicated process as culture – a man encounters a 
system, and here his relations are defined by three systems: technical, or-
ganisational and psychological.78 [The italics are mine– E.R.] 
 
In this quote, “culture” is described as a process that involves non-human agents 
(“technical, organisational”). The fourth way to use the term “system” was to 
describe human individuals. Such use of the term, which was mobilised in the 
loftiest discourses, persisted into the 1980s. For example, in 1985, the First Sec-
retary (LCP) described a man not as “a product of circumstances” but “a system 
that has to perfect itself by its own means”.79 Thus, from this perspective the 
communist enlightenment of a man did not have a mechanical cause and effect 
                                      
76 Lazauskas, 10-11. 
77 Minkeviius, Mokslo ir technikos revoliucija, 112. The growing academic discipline of ethics 
also stressed the importance of self-regulation. L. I. Timofeeva, “Osnovnye mekhanizmy vnut-
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impact. On the contrary, it was conceptualised as a dynamic, relational process, 
one that took place inside and on its own energy.  
In summary, as of the late 1960s, the definitions of culture as a system in 
Domains of Culture emphasised its artificiality (a result of human construction), 
as well as its internal energy and its ability to internally sustain and produce 
order. Culture as a system was linked to technical systems. In this system-driven 
world, a new type of control was needed. 
2) Feedback and Prediction 
As argued in Chapter V, cybernetic feedback became synonymous with man-
agement and was incorporated into Soviet management theory as the circulation 
of information transmitted by signals. Better feedback was expected to improve 
the work of particular organisations and ultimately to lift up the entire national 
economy. Not surprisingly, the term “feedback” was seen as crucial in cultural 
policy-making.80 Here I would like to contrast two approaches – a scholarly 
semiotic one and an administrative one – in relation to feedback in culture. The 
a-Soviet intellectuals, adherents to semiotic discipline, emphasised the auton-
omy-building or internal self-regulative aspects of feedback. However, the offi-
cials saw feedback as a tool to improve the accounting system and facilitate 
centralised control. In the first case, feedback was seen as important for the 
appropriate development of the cultural sector across time. It was considered 
crucial for viable cultural (re)production, an internal generation of order. In the 
second case, feedback was considered important for controlling the administra-
tive sector of culture both across time and space, where prediction was very 
important. From this point of view, timely feedback would enable the central 
organs to manage remote, wide-spread cultural organisations. In the first case, 
cybernetic feedback was translated as a memory process, which transmitted 
(national) tradition. In the second case, cybernetic feedback was translated into 
reporting back through accounting and forecasting. 
The notion of feedback across longer periods of time (as cultural tradition) 
was formulated by cultural intellectual Venclova in 1970. Notably, such an 
approach to cultural tradition, as well as to the theory of culture as a system of 
signs, which essentially works as described in GST, was formulated in both 
Soviet and Western semiotics, especially by Yurii Lotman and Umberto Eco.81 
In the Soviet Union, however, semiotics was marginalised somewhat in relation 
to the mainstream literary sciences. Lotman, one of its most famous Russian 
proponents, even had to leave Moscow for Tartu University in Estonia. In 
                                      
80 See, for example an article by a Russian theorist on methodology of studying feedback between 
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Lithuania, with the exception o Venclova, very few scholars were interested in 
semiotics.82  
The cybernetic feedback model was described in Venclova’s last article, 
published in Domains of Culture (“Culture and Its Backdrop”, April 1970). In 
it, he conceptualised feedback in culture as cutting across time and geographical 
space. Indirectly confronting the official anti-Western line that had been in 
place since the mid-1960s, Venclova argued for the necessity to translate West-
ern writers into Lithuanian. He insisted that the “national Lithuanian culture” 
would vanish or at least recede into deep provinciality if it was not interlinked 
dialogically with the international “backdrop” (first and foremost Western).83 
Wiener had already noticed that since cybernetic feedback implied an exchange 
of information, it resembled an older notion of dialogue. Similarly, dialogical 
governance was one of many synonyms for cybernetic steering. Thus, as early 
as the 1960s, in Soviet semiotics, the uses of “dialogue” were shaped by the 
intellectual and technical cybernetic legacy. Thus, Venclova described Soviet 
Lithuania’s culture, with its spatial (foreign) and chronological (past) borders, 
as related by a cybernetic analogy: 
 
Lithuanian national tradition consists not only of folk sculpture, songs and 
lamentations, but also of Vilnius University, Vilnius’s architecture, old and 
modern Kaunas and Klaipda and, for example, literature and music of the 
16th and 17th centuries. Here, a biological and cybernetic comparison can 
be made: folk creation is like a reserve of culture, the second line (culture 
resembles the human brain – when certain parts become damaged, the re-
serve ones switch on). In crisis situations, for example, from the end of the 
19th century onward, that reserve performed its role by saving culture from 
stagnation and collapse. But one must always remembered that there is the 
first line, namely, that Lithuania was a country with considerable traditions 
of professional culture, open to influences from various epochs and 
styles.84
 
In this quote, Venclova defined folk creation as a “reserve” and professional 
creation as the “major” part of “culture”, governed like a brain. It could be un-
derstood that he claimed that an important professional culture (high culture, 
such as fine arts and literature) was created in Lithuania even before the Soviet 
regime. Most importantly, he implied that this pre-Soviet professional culture 
                                      
82 Interview with a semiotician, Saulius Žukas, Vilnius, December 2005; see also an interview 
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“Kultra ir jos fonas,” KB 4 (1970), 47. 
84 Venclova, “Kultra ir jos fonas,” 47. 
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could and should serve as a resource for “national culture”.85 I will come back 
to the rationales of techno-scientifically assisted feedback on culture for govern-
ing bodies in later chapters, which will analyse its failures. I will now consider 
what is probably the most important function of cybernetic feedback, namely, 
prediction. In the cybernetic model of steering, feedback was intended to not 
only provide information about the actual performance, but also, on the basis of 
extrapolation, to enable the prediction and control of the future. Cultural policy-
making was reformulated precisely in relation to this aspect of cybernetic feed-
back. 
The function of feedback in a cybernetic system is to provide a controlling 
mechanism with the information needed for the regulation of the actual behav-
iour of the system. The regulatory action is always based on the actual informa-
tion (what is really going on as opposed to what is expected to go on). The regu-
lation of complex and dynamic (learning and changing) systems means having 
to deal with changes, described as “uncertain” processes. The behaviour of a 
system is corrected by the calculated prognosis of its future behaviour. In cul-
tural policy, this method of cybernetic control was expressed as statistical repre-
sentation and forecasting.86 “Prognosis” provided by statistical forecasting was 
essential once the changes were conceptualised as “uncertain”.87
As of the late 1950s, Soviet “scientific prognosis” meant statistical fore-
casting. Statistical forecasting based on time series was an important spill-over 
of the World War II scientific and technological development and of course, 
was just as much a Soviet as a Western a phenomenon.88 However, in the So-
viet context, the introduction of statistical forecasting acquired special political 
significance. Statistical prediction was seen as a necessary instrument to prevent 
governance (also of culture) from “voluntarism”. Voluntarism, a notorious qual-
ity attributed to Khrushchev, was represented as particularly negative in 
Brezhnevian discourses. From a semantic standpoint as well, “voluntarism” 
seriously clashed with “governance”, as one of governance’s official definitions 
was “an execution of the plan”.89 Thus, the promotion of statistical forecasting 
in policy-making was a part of a plan to do away with strong individual leader-
ship in the Soviet Union. To recap, the principle of strong leadership had its 
roots in Stalinist management and a stress on edinonachalie or concentrating 
                                      
85 From 1966 to 1971 Venclova worked on his candidate dissertation in Semiotics and Russian 
Literature under the supervision of Yurii Lotman at Tartu University, Estonian SSR. At the same 
time he also taught at Vilnius University (in which the famous Lithuanian-French semiotician 
Algirdas Julius Greimas later delivered two lectures about the semiotics of Lithuanian mythology 
in 1972).  
86 For a history of statistical term of “state” in state governance, see Hacking, 160-169. 
87 Grounding his approach in Wiener, Gerovitch attributed the term “uncertainty” to the human 
domain and translated it into “entropy” and “noise”. Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 
88. 
88 As Andersson has pointed out in her study of forecasting in Sweden in a similar period, see 
Andersson, 277-295. 
89 Afanas’ev, “O soderzhanii…,” 23. 
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responsibility and command in a single person, such as the director of industrial 
enterprise.90 Whilst edinonachalie persisted in enterprises after de-Stalinisation, 
it lost its legitimacy at higher political levels. 
Why statistical prediction when the Party had already established the ulti-
mate goal of communism? As pointed out earlier, the Soviets regarded culture 
and society as changing. First and foremost, they were supposed to change and 
head towards communism. However, the “actual” behaviour of Soviet “culture 
as a system” varied; it was seen as changing in more than one way and not only 
heading towards a communist future. Soviet “culture as a system” was develop-
ing in an uncertain way. In the cybernetic imagination, it could have been con-
jectured as a fleet of enemy planes guided by many pilots, determined techni-
cally, physiologically and intellectually. All these trajectories, good or bad, 
were to be mapped, their future predicted; wrong ones would be extinguished or 
modified. Zygmunt Bauman described the ambition of the authoritarian modern 
state as one of “weeding out” undesirable practices.91 I suggest that, as of the 
1960s, detecting an undesirable practice was less a matter of the visual observa-
tion of a gardener and more a matter of sophisticated mathematical calculations. 
Thus, the cybernetic model conceptualised “culture” in a macro way, as consist-
ing of “trends”, which were to be influenced. In contrast, a gardener’s “weeding 
out” was a micro- strategy for detecting an individual divergence, which was to 
be removed.  
In order to be susceptible to statistical forecasting or a “scientific progno-
sis”, culture had to be translated into a mathematical language. In order to be 
expressed mathematically, culture had to be divided into categories or coded. In 
the Soviet cybernetic model of steering culture, the objective Marxist-Leninist 
historical laws had to be combined with Wiener’s statistical time-series analy-
sis. Although the combination was a contradiction in terms, it worked in public 
discourses. Soviet statistical models made it particularly clear that “culture” and 
its policy were a part of larger social and economic planning. It was not “art for 
art’s sake” for only ideological aesthetics, but also for social statistical reasons. 
As Jakelaitis, the LSSR Vice-Minister of Culture, put it in 1983, “Culture, just 
as every other sphere of society, needs the scientific organisation of labour, 
insightfulness, purposefulness”. According to him, this implied the need for 
conducting “sociological research on the basis of well-studied, generalised ex-
perience in an attempt to fashion a prognosis of the future”.92 According to an 
instructor at the Central Committee, modelling and the prognosis of culture had 
                                      
90 Sil. 
91 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992). 
92 Dainius Trinknas, “Kultros užmojams – tvirtus pamatus,” KB 5 (1983), 4. This, by the way, 
was to be achieved by a somewhat mythical “scientific centre,” the foundation of which never 
took place, despite voices describing it as a pressing need since the 1970s. The Institute of Culture 
(LAS) was nominated for that function, while the Republican Scientific-Methodological Centre of 
Culture was excluded for being “too methodological” (indeed, it dealt with amateur culture and 
cultural-enlightenment). 
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to rely on the purposeful analysis of culture’s development trends “in the past 
and the present”.93  
Ideally, statistical information was to be processed by computers and en-
tered into automated management systems. Chapter V demonstrated the limited 
use of computers and AMS in both industry and culture. Here I will show that 
“coding” was addressed in the cultural policy discourses as a translation of het-
erogeneous reality into a computer language. Remember how disappointed 
Trinknas was by the prospects of coding for the purposes of computing a 
seemingly articulated and stabilised system, a language. How then to code such 
a broad and heterogeneous thing as “culture”? Indeed, broadness and heteroge-
neity of culture was immediately acknowledged by the Soviet officials. Thus, 
the coding of culture for policy predictions was perceived as a challenging, 
multidisciplinary undertaking. For example, Jakelaitis insisted on the need for a 
“scientific theory of cultural labour”. According to him, such a theory could be 
developed through the joint efforts of cultural workers, art historians, philoso-
phers and sociologists (Note that he did not mention economists!). While point-
ing out the one-sided, fragmented nature of current cultural statistics, Jakelaitis 
also acknowledged the need for them in the “scientific governance of culture”.94 
At this important point in time, the ambition to code “culture” was perceived 
not as utopian, but as necessary and comparable to the mathematical rationalisa-
tion of processes in any production plant (“labour of culture”). Cultural “ser-
vices” were provided by a centralised organisational network of the Ministry of 
Culture. The ministry, therefore, embraced the new methods of organisation to 
rationalise this network by making it visible, accountable, traceable, predictable.  
The old Stalinist system of economic indicators was held to be insufficient 
for governance by “advanced” system-cybernetic methods. It was generally 
accepted that the existing practices of quantitative statistics of cultural con-
sumption were insufficient for more advanced policy-making. Most cultural 
statistics contained only those figures that dealt with production and consump-
tion. Therefore, with regard to the population, they only demonstrated “access” 
and said nothing about the “effect” of culture. Yes, a large number of workers 
were taken to the theatre in groups, but did they become better Soviet citizens 
because they had been exposed to a play for a few hours? The existing Soviet 
statistics did not provide any answers. (And the Soviet state wanted to know in 
order to be sure that they had become better citizens.) However, despite the 
often recurring statements about the need to thoroughly code and calculate the 
present, past and future of the cultural sector, the coding of culture remained an 
academically, administratively and technically underdeveloped sphere from the 
late 1960s to the 1980s. It was in the 1980s that the significance of computers, 
or material cybernetic technologies, for solving the problems of the governance 
of culture was addressed in a straightforward manner: 
 
                                      
93 Lazauskas, 10-11. 
94 Vytautas Jakelaitis, A roundtable “Moksliniai kultros ugdymo pagrindai,” KB 11 (1970), 13. 
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Scientific and technological progress is related to cybernetisation, the com-
puterisation of processes of governance, the growing influence of informat-
ics. In the country, republic-automated management systems and subsys-
tems for certain branches of culture have already been created (the press, 
radio and television, education, cinema, cultural enlightenment work). But 
they usually involve only statistical, bureaucratic information. The use of 
cybernetics in the sphere of culture is under-explored. There has been much 
written about computers that write poetry and music and are used for in-
formation searches in large databases [saugyklos] of cultural values, but an 
information supply to the governing organs remains as it was before the 
Deluge [prieštvaninio lygio]. 95
 
According to one sociologist, the fact that cultural policy lagged behind was 
intolerable in the view of general technological development in the Soviet Un-
ion.96 In this process, the intersecting knowledge skills were to play a crucial 
role in assisting formalisation: 
 
For example, a vocabulary of special terms for the automated processing of 
information necessary for governing and planning is needed. However, the 
object of scientific terminology in all its aspects is part of philosophy, lan-
guage sciences, logics, informatics, science studies [mokslotyra], and some 
areas of cultural theories. Additionally, the terms have to be aligned with 
the notions of general and partial sciences that study spiritual culture in or-
der to align with the notions that were taken from foreign literature, to 
align terminology in the various languages of the Soviet Union used by the 
our country’s and international organisations. For that, a united, state, inter-
branch, interdisciplinary programme of ordering terminology is needed. 
The special programmes of complex terminology, standardisation, classifi-
cation and preparation of norms for the cultural sphere would assist in cre-
ating a united automated system for gathering empirical data.97
 
This quote reveals that 1) in the late 1980s, the coding of the cultural sector was 
still a work in progress; and 2) the coding would require cross-disciplinary co-
operation, which would be very much in the universalist spirit of cybernetics. 
Such a formalisation of a language needed for cultural policy-making would 
                                      
95 Laima Kastanauskait, “Svarbiausia neatsilikti,” KB 7 (1987), 52. 
96 “Meanwhile in the country super systems of managing the ESM [electronic calculating ma-
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society’s development”. Kastanauskait, 52. 
97 Kastanauskait, 53. 
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have entailed an enormous cooperative venture on the part of formal organisa-
tions; ironically, this would be a barely achievable task in “collectivist” Soviet 
society. Thus, it is seems that almost 20 years ago, Trinknas may have been 
right in doubting that any language could be treated as a code and successfully 
formalised. It was even more difficult to code culture. And yet Krescencijus 
Stoškus pointed out that governmental intervention assisted by social science 
was needed: 
 
If we had sufficient data from sociological research about the real state of 
our culture, we could more objectively and operatively evaluate the rela-
tionship between our cultural traditions and new (often only indicted by 
fashion) cultural phenomena. The cultural upbringing of a person is related 
to many factors that are difficult to control, and sometimes even the con-
trolled factors cross each other in such a way that a consumer does not re-
ceive the most valuable products. [...] The scientific analysis of the current 
cultural situation would reveal the “geography” of societal interests and en-
able decision-making on options for improving the situation.98
 
The head of the Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute (LAS) supported both 
Stoškus and Venclova, as he agreed for the need for longitudinal sociological 
studies and stressed that it was “unrealistic to talk about the danger of technici-
sation of culture”.99 He compared sociological studies with meteorology and, 
based on this model, encouraged the study of the past at different sites in order 
to enable better predictions of the future. In all likelihood, it was no accident 
that meteorology was utilised for comparison. As Wiener noted, meteorology is 
concerned with short-term predictions that study quasi-objects (for example, 
clouds), which are in a permanent transitory state, the initial state of which is 
unknown. In this respect, the metaphor of meteorology might be seen as fitting 
for “culture”. However, one obviously does not have a policy on weather: mete-
orology concerns the forecasting of irreversible processes, a task that is nearly 
impossible from a statistical standpoint.100 On the other hand, the Marxist-
Leninist view was built on deterministic relations among production, class and 
culture as a representation. All of these relationships would potentially be de-
stabilised if the meteorological model was applied to them. Thus, I argue that 
this example, like similar ones, was used in a metaphorical sense. Rather, the 
writers indicated their general affiliation with techno-scientific governance, 
guided by statistical prediction, and did not reflect on its deeper implications. 
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The uncertain nature of cultural processes and the need for a hard-science 
approach was repeatedly argued by the LSSR Ministers of Culture. The empha-
sis on the “professionalism of leading creative processes” was regularly 
voiced.101 However, the limitation of available cultural statistics, provided 
mainly by sociological research, was explicitly and officially acknowledged. 
For example, in his speech at the plenum of the CC (LCP), the Minister of Cul-
ture admitted that 
 
But [knowing] the great number of visitors provides only a quantitative 
characteristic of the activity of cultural enterprises, which do not ade-
quately address the essential issue – what is the “utility coefficient” [naud-
ingumo koeficientas] of the functioning of cultural values among the 
masses. Here, full-fledged and in-depth scientific research is needed be-
cause we have reached such a stage of cultural development that we are in-
terested not only in knowing how many people socialised [bendravo] with 
artistic values, but also what was the influence [of their artistic values]. The 
time has come to establish a scientific research centre at the Ministry of 
Culture, which would study the effectiveness of the functioning of spiritual 
values. Objective scientific knowledge about the influence of art on man’s 
spiritual world is just as necessary to us as a compass and other means of 
navigation for a boat sailing in the ocean. We can no longer be guided by 
only intuition and general reflections.102
 
This passage suggests a pressing need for scientific research regarding steering-
orienting governance. Individual opinion, based on experience (“intuition”) and 
ideological postulates (“general reflections”) were seen as limiting and prevent-
ing more effective cultural policy-making. Since speeches at the Plenum were 
always edited by the ideological department at the CC, this means that it was 
officially possible to admit serious shortcomings regarding the implementation 
of scientific governance. More important, however, is the metaphoric model of 
steering used by the minister. Perhaps it would not be too far fetched to indicate 
the parallel between Bielinis’s metaphor of cultural policy-making as sailing 
with the assistance of navigation instruments with Wiener’s inspiration to for-
malise stochastic processes, which he received by observing oscillating waves 
on a beach. It is interesting to note that one Western scholar criticised Soviet 
governance by saying that it was more about rowing rather than about steering. 
Thus, by the late 1960s, the statistical representation and forecasting of 
culture was translated into “geography” and “meteorology”. Governance came 
to be conceptualised as “steering”, which would rely on responsiveness to feed-
back. To jump forward, the 1990s saw an explosion of “cultural policy observa-
tories” or institutes concerned with monitoring both policies and cultural proc-
                                      
101 Jonas Bielinis speech at the CC (LCP) plenum, “Ministro kalba plenume (LKP CK) dorovinio 
aukljimo klausimais,” (September 1976), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 2856, l. 129. 
102 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 2856, l. 131-132. 
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esses in Western Europe. Back in Soviet Lithuania, society and culture were 
imagined by the debaters as territorial and characterised by flows. They were 
seen as systematic, representable and predictable with the help of models and 
maps. Hence, culture was constructed as a knowable, governable sphere with 
the help of the social sciences, which imported models from the natural sci-
ences. In the words of James Scott, statistical representation and prediction were 
meant to make culture’s past and presence but also its future visible in the eyes 
of the state.103
3) Automation  
The idea of automation was crucial for cybernetic steering. The key problem in 
designing air-missile defence was that the amount of information to be proc-
essed and the speed and precision of the commands to be issued were beyond 
the capacity of human operators – they were far too slow and imprecise. Indeed, 
it took a good deal of effort to create adequate electronic machinery that would 
work rapidly and with a high degree of precision.104 After World War II, the 
idea of planning national economy and society (to a different extent) was popu-
lar in both the West and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, large-scale steering was 
also described in terms of automation: 
  
We want super-planning on a large scale rather than in bits in order to 
avoid blatant inconsistencies and wasteful duplication, not for its own sake, 
but so that human beings can be free to apply themselves to human pur-
suits, the arts and crafts. What we have to avoid are inhuman, dull routines, 
crude and ugly standardisation, and the dullness of which science is capa-
ble. […] Automation, though, is far more than the rather questionable ideal 
of producing a completely automatic factory, but is a part of the tremen-
dous influence of science on our social evolution. … This whole movement 
affects every aspect of modern life, and in particular has implications for 
education, economics, and the wider planning of our whole society.105  
 
It is not paradoxical that it would be difficult to find a better description of the 
goals of Soviet planners in the 1960s than this vision, presented by the head of 
the American Cybernetics Society. System-cybernetic language influenced the 
discourses of governance irrespective of the political system. Thus, for such 
large-scale planning, a human being was to be replaced or at least assisted by a 
computer, connected into an automated management system. The idea was per-
ceived as a particularly viable one because the principle of automatic self-
regulation was seen as an already existing part of naturally occurring phenom-
                                      
103 Scott. 
104 For a detailed account, see Mindell, Between Human and Machine. 
105 F. G. George, Automation, Cybernetics and Society (Leonard Hill, 1959), 40, 42. 
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ena, such as organisms, populations and markets. How was the idea of automa-
tion translated into Soviet cultural policy? 
First, direct references to the contemporaneous history of science and 
technology were made in connection with culture. For example, in the late 
1970s, the Lithuanian philosopher Zigmantas Morknas emphasised that a piv-
otal event in the history of the governance of culture was the invention of the 
servomechanism. The automated technology of the servomechanism not only 
transformed the governance of the economy and society, but even influenced 
the internal definitions of culture: automation, according to Morknas, contrib-
uted towards making labour an intellectual and creative activity. Such advanced 
labour, emancipated by technology, itself became culture. With the help of ad-
vanced cybernetic technology, labour was de-classified.106  
Second, automatic metaphors of cultural processes and human subjects 
were used. Not only in liberal but also in Soviet discourses, the idea of automa-
tion was useful for dealing with very complex processes and relying on self-
governance.107 According to Morknas, in a future society, the object of the 
governance of culture will be “an entirely artistic and scientific activity – the 
humanisation of the natural and social world”. Here, the subject of governance 
would be “a man (society) that conducts that humanising activity”. The goal of 
governance would be “the unlimited development of human spiritual richness as 
a goal in itself”. As Morknas concluded: 
 
Since a subject of governance hereby governs causes of its own development 
[tapsmas] which is free, full-fledged activity, then a governance [valdymas] of 
culture is already self-governance.108
 
This quotation recalls Foucaultian accounts of liberal governmentality, accord-
ing to which both society and the individual are produced by discerning and 
stimulating their self-regulating powers.109 It is important to note that this type 
of control takes place at a distance and is mediated by a signal (in a Foucaultian 
framework, this has often been framed as knowledge distribution). Similarly, 
self-regulation was conceived in Soviet cultural policy. For example, in 1967, a 
letter to the editors of Domains of Culture, the official journal of the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Culture, described the following cultural experience: 
 
                                      
106 But Morknas immediately argued against the theories of such a de-classifying effect (“con-
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A book for me is like the spark in an engine. When I read it, flocks of 
thoughts surround me and I get inspired; plans are aligned; self-reflection 
takes place. The better the book – the brighter this process, and the more 
bulbs light up in my brain (V. Motiejnas, teacher). 110
 
This quote was selected by the journal’s editors to give a normative example of 
a “well-cultured” individual. A cultural product, a book, was described as a 
signal to the brain. The brain was stimulated to act (inspiration), producing an 
organised activity (plans) and heading towards self-regulation (self-reflection). 
Here, “a teacher reading a book” was framed as a self-regulating system. A 
book, being part of “culture”, was described as a controlling system that, 
through giving signals, optimised the functioning of “man and system.” In this 
model, a man was a controlled system and culture was a controlling system.  
It should be noted that techno-scientific metaphors were even used by the 
Ministers of Culture to describe cultural judgments. For example, one minister 
described taste as a tool of precision measurement (1979): “an aesthetic taste 
serves a man in the same way as a slide rule, which he always picks up in order 
to check his intention”.111 Remember, that in 1966 Venclova suggested that 
mathematised cultural sciences would help make taste more precise. The entire 
text, dedicated to considerations of the notion of taste, contained an abundance 
of similar phraseology related to technology and calculability: 
 
A man is not a mechanical calculator that calculates how many individual-
ising and socialising processes should be contained in individual taste. A 
human personality is like an electric arc, which melts all external impres-
sions into a completely new alloy in which it is impossible to separate so-
cial taste from individual taste.112 [The italics are mine – E.R.] 
 
In Soviet translations of cybernetic control, freedom was translated as a regula-
tive mechanism of action. Yet this model of control was underpinned with the 
notions of collective and self, which, as Oleg Kharkhordin argued in his exhaus-
tive study, were rather different from their Western counterparts.113 As demon-
strated in the above quote, the individual and social ideally had to merge into 
one another in the Soviet imagination. Thus, Soviet parallels between freedom 
as self-regulation and automation typically emphasised unity, not differentia-
tion: 
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The beginning of automated production coincides with the beginning of the 
development of a unitary [vientisa] human culture. In socialism, a process 
of automation accelerates and undoubtedly becomes a typical phenome-
non.114  
 
In this process, amateur art was attributed a special role in enabling self-
regulation. One philosopher described the Lithuanian factory workers who, 
according to a survey, were increasingly educated and involved in learning 
more and expressed a great wish to participate in amateur art collectives.  
Doubtless, this argument of self-governance, which is implicit in amateur 
art, was not intended to inject some liberalism into communist rule. Quite the 
opposite, and this was clearly explicated: “This, of course, cannot be understood 
in such a way that, under current conditions, the leading role of the working 
class and its avant-garde – the Communist Party and the socialist state - in gov-
erning culture, would diminish”.115 Several reasons were put forth. First, despite 
the de-classifying effect of technology, labour was still differentiated into exe-
cution and creation. Second, in order for “scientific-artistic creativity” to be-
come the “spiritual culture of a person”, it had to first be interpreted and under-
stood in the “right way”. Similarly, many rules of discourse had to be met in 
order to publicly translate cybernetics into culture. In the following section I 
will reflect on some of those rules. 
Silenced Voices  
As I have detailed so far, the translations of cybernetic steering into cultural 
policy were performed by various voices in Soviet Lithuania. At its early stage, 
the translation was carried out by young, controversial intellectuals. Later, cy-
bernetic control occurred in different shapes in the discourses on cultural policy. 
It was mainly propagated by the communist officials, such as instructors in ide-
ology at the Central Committee (LCP), philosophers and administrators. How-
ever, in both instances, the translation of cybernetic techno-science into culture 
cut across disciplinary boundaries, and the question of the governance of culture 
emerged beyond the issues of loyalty and effective Party control. Governance 
was framed not only via communist loyalty, but via more complicated issues of 
relation between techno-sciences and culture. Hence, the translation of cyber-
netic steering into cultural policy made a discourse more pluralistic. Bakhtin’s 
heteroglosia may be a good concept to describe the analysis of the discussion 
about techno-science and the governance of culture.116 However, whilst in the 
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late 1950s the voices of techno-science eventually entered the cultural policy 
discourse, in the late 1960s, quite a few voices were silenced and eventually 
expelled beyond discursive and physical boundaries.  
The year 1968 saw the first Lithuanian samizdat or self-published under-
ground publications, which consisted of petitions of Catholic religious dissent. 
In 1972 the first systematic Lithuanian underground press was born: Lithuanian 
Catholic Church Chronicles (1972), Aušra (1975), Laisvs šauklys (1976) and 
the theoretical Perspektyvos (1978), among others.117 Indeed, Venclova ceased 
being explicitly interested in cybernetics as he became engaged in the problems 
of poetics.118 However, he was fired from Vilnius University in 1973 for his 
divergent views.119 His texts were repeatedly refused by publishers and his in-
tellectual isolation grew, although he was relatively fortunate in that he held a 
position of junior researcher at the Institute of History (LAS).120 Being closely 
linked to the Russian dissidents who gathered around Alexander Ginsburg, 
Venclova joined the Lithuanian Helsinki Group in 1976.121 On the grounds of 
his alienation from communist ideology and with the help of the Minister of 
Culture Lionginas Šepetys, he was given permission to emigrate from the Soviet 
Union to the United States in 1977. In his letter to the Central Committee 
(LCP), Venclova wrote “The Communist ideology is alien to me and, in my 
opinion, is largely false. Its absolute reign has brought much misfortune to our 
land … I take a serious view of Communist ideology, and therefore refuse to 
repeat its formulas in a mechanical or hypocritical manner”.122 That same year, 
Venclova’s books (Rockets, Planets and Us (1962) and or an Artificial Man 
(1965), along with a poetry collection, The Signs of Language (1972), were 
banned and removed from bookstores and public libraries. Venclova pursued 
his academic career in the United States and become Professor of Slavic Lan-
guages and Literatures at Yale University in 1993.123 The 1970s saw an exodus 
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history. For Venclova’s take on Lithuanian nationalism, see and Donskis; Egle Rindzeviciute, 
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of more individuals who were featured in the early debates about cybernetics. 
Aleksandras Shtromas left for the United Kingdom in 1973. He later become a 
renowned Sovietologist and held lecturer positions at the Universities of Brad-
ford and Salford in the UK.  
Another strong voice that could not be directly expressed in writing was a 
religious world view, especially that of “orientalism”, which was in sharp con-
trast to the technological civilisation of the West. In retrospect, Trinknas dated 
his disappointment with natural sciences to 1966, when his article that decried 
Venclova was published. At that time, influenced by Romas Kolonaitis, he was 
attracted by an idea of the declining West. At the end of 1966 and into 1967, the 
two founded the Lithuania-India Association for the study of Indian history, 
religion and philosophy. However, soon after, Trinknas got the idea that one 
does not have to look as far as India for an alternative to Western civilisation. 
After about six months, he joined an increasingly popular folklore and local 
history movement. Following the celebration of a pagan festival Rasa in the old 
Lithuanian capital Kernav, Trinknas helped establish a student club Ramuva, 
based at Vilnius University.124 In 1970, while teaching and conducting research 
in VU’s philosophy department, Trinknas began working on a doctoral disser-
tation about the ancient Lithuanian religion. However, he actively engaged in 
the Ramuva movement, often neglected his research and teaching duties, and 
clashed with his superiors. 
In his own words, it was Trinknas’s relationship to an unofficial national-
ist local history group (kraštotyra) that aroused the KGB’s interest in him. The 
group was based in Kaunas and distributed anti-communist leaflets that, for 
example, promoted Lithuania’s National Day, 16 February. Because of his con-
tact with members of the group, Trinknas was expelled from Vilnius Univer-
sity in 1973. As he could not be employed in an “intellectual profession”, he did 
various odd jobs, often in the countryside, and continued to gather folklore ma-
terial until 1988. After 1988, he was given a research position at the Institute of 
Culture, Philosophy and Art (LAS) and participated in establishing a club (as 
Romuva). He also became active internationally and served as the president of 
the World Congress of Ethnic Religions. At present, he is the main krivis of 
Lithuania (a pagan priest).  
Some voices were expelled, but others never even managed to enter the 
techno-science discourse of culture. In the publications analysed I encountered 
                                                                                                                                  
“‘Nation’ and ‘Europe’: Re-approaching the Debates about Lithuanian National Identity,” Journal 
of Baltic Studies 34, no.1 (2003), 74-91. 
124 Ramuva started its activities in 1967, was formally registered in 1969, closed down in 1971 
and was recreated as Romuva in 1988. In the interview, Trinknas especially emphasised that club 
tours of Lithuanian countryside enabled them to touch upon the “nineteenth-century’s Lithua-
nians”. By this he meant the authentic folklore, particularly language and songs. Interview with 
Jonas Trinknas, Vilnius, November 2007. See also Arnas Vaicekauskas, “The Academic Youth 
Movement Ramuva. From Passive Resistance to the Community of the Old Faith of the Balts,” in 
The Baltic Countries under Occupation. Soviet and Nazi Rule 1939-1991, ed. A. M. Kõll (Stock-
holm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2003). 
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few articles about techno-scientific governance written by women. For example, 
the 1966 special issue of Domains of Culture published the proceedings of a 
roundtable entitled “Art, Science, Technology” (Menas, mokslas, technika). The 
roundtable hosted a number of Lithuanian professionals and intellectuals: S. 
Butkus (an engineer and head of cechas, the Computation Machines Factory); 
the famous public debator and professor of chemistry Kazys Daukšas; the poet 
Vytautas P. Blož; Jonas Trinknas and Tomas Venclova; the head of the Law 
Expertise Institute Aleksandras Shtromas; and the head of the philosophy de-
partment at Vilnius University, Eugenijus Meškauskas (who was one of Lithua-
nia’s unorthodox Marxists). The participants represented three generations: 
Daukšas and Meškauskas were in their late 50s and early 60s, Blož and Shtro-
mas were in their mid-30s, and Trinknas and Venclova were in their late 20s.  
All were men.125 However, the first generation of Lithuanian programmers 
in the late 1950s was predominantly female126. As Jeremy Smith pointed out, 
official school curricula listed “women’s work”, which involved “instruments 
radio-technical, electro-technical, textile, sewing and knitting industries”.127 
Despite this, I found only one article about techno-science and culture written 
by a woman in the press I studied (Domains of Culture, 1987). I found this in-
teresting, because a woman tractor driver was such an important a part of the 
iconographical canon of Soviet visual ideology. While it is true that women 
could operate simple (at the time) mechanical machines, they were not linked to 
advanced electronic technologies to any great extent. Promoting a woman as a 
creative natural scientist or an inventive electronic engineer was not a salient 
feature in the Lithuanian cultural press. Notably, in photographs, women often 
figure in the background as operators of the machines, but not as scientists. Of 
course, Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman to fly in space (1963) was the 
quintessential Soviet space heroine and of vital importance to the iconography 
of Soviet progress. However, strictly speaking, Tereshkova was the user rather 
than the creator of a machine during her flight, although she later received a 
doctorate in space engineering. Together with the All-Union Minister of Culture 
                                      
125 Take another example. Two years later Venclova participated in a roundtable discussion “Per-
sonality, Society, Culture” published in Domains of Culture, January 1968. The discussion may 
have taken place in late 1967 as its publication coincided with the Prague Spring, as Alexander 
Dubek came to power on 5 January 1968. The roundtable discussion involved many young and 
senior scholars, writers and engineers, among whom were the engineer J. Binkis, Krescencijus 
Stoškus a doctoral student of philosophy at Vilnius University, Edmundas Meškauskas mentioned 
above as the head of VU philosophy department, writer Jonas Mikelinskas, Tomas Venclova at 
that time lecturer in foreign literature at VU, Bronius Genzelis, lecturer in philosophy (VU) and 
Vytautas Statuleviius the head of the Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute (LAS). The purpose 
of the roundtable was to introduce a series of articles on the cultural preferences of students and 
the leisure activities of the population. 
126 Information based on the interview with a physicist, Jonas Grigas, Vilnius, December 2005; 
which unfortunately at the moment of writing could not be compared with hard data. 
127 Jeremy Smith, “Khrushchev and the Path to Modernisation through Education,” in Modernisa-
tion in Russia since 1900, eds. M. Kangaspuro and J. Smith (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 
2006), 235. 
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Furtseva, Tereshkova was one of a handful of women who were admitted as 
members to the Presidium of the Central Committee (CPSU).128 However, there 
were no “Tereshkovas” in Lithuanian SSR, nor did I encounter her as a role 
model in the texts I analysed (although such models may exist elsewhere).  
Conclusion 
 
“I think that in our profession before starting to fantasise, before mounting 
Pegasus, one has to keep in mind that theatre directors are organisers par 
excellence. If we are organisers, engineers of production, then we have to 
arm ourselves with knowledge about organisations and to know what kind 
of ‘entity’ an organisation is”. These words were pronounced when cyber-
netics or systems theory or other “entities”, which were needed so much for 
contemporary management systems, including for the theatre, were still 
unknown.129
 
The above quotation, taken from a Lithuanian economist’s article about the 
implications of Kosygin’s reform of theatres, illustrates that, by the mid-1970s, 
the techno-scientific, calculation-based approach to the governance of culture 
sought to legitimise itself by referring back to pre-war traditions. It quoted Vse-
volod E. Meyerhold, the famous Russian avant-garde theatre director, who was 
executed during Stalin’s Great Purges in the 1930s. On the other hand, it reveals 
that, at that time, cybernetics and systems theory were already seen as being 
self-evident, normal parts of the intellectual machinery of contemporary man-
agement. In this chapter I have shown that the idea of cybernetic steering, cou-
pled with scientific knowledge production, gradually entered Soviet discourses 
on the governance of culture. Like all of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian SSR 
faced the translation of techno-sciences into governance and an adjustment to 
the specific needs of culture. The translation was sanctioned and performed by 
high-ranking Party officials, such as ideological secretaries, but also by cultural 
operators.  
                                      
128 There were more women outside of the Politburo in the Central Committee. Yet the late Stalin-
ist elite (Central Committee) included only 11 women (3.4 percent). The post-Stalinist period saw 
a slightly larger but still very small number of women, 41, or 4.3 percent. The number grew only 
as a result of Gorbachev’s reforms to 8 percent in 1990, still a small number if compared with 
their general party membership (30 percent). Mawdsley and White, 2006, 109, 206. In Lithuania, 
however, the percentage of women was higher. See Antanaitis.  
129 Saulius Razma, “Teatras ir ekonomika. Polemins pastabos,” Literatra ir menas, 27 July 
1974, 11. The author graduated in economics from Vilnius University in 1960 and since then was 
engaged in management studies. His interest in culture and particularly theatre could probably be 
explained by the occupation of his spouse who was prima ballerina at the Vilnius Opera and 
Ballet Theatre. 
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This chapter has argued that the translation of cybernetic steering into cul-
tural policy discourses had several consequences. In its early stage – the mid-
1960s – cybernetics was seen, on the one hand, as a source of heuristic methods 
for culture sciences (Venclova). Cybernetic theory, it was held, would make 
culture knowable in a new and better way. On the other hand, others perceived 
this cybernetic knowledgeability as a humiliating invasion of hierarchically 
superior hard sciences into the cultural field (Trinknas). The former view iden-
tified cybernetics with academic freedom and welcomed the opportunity to ex-
periment with it in culture. The latter view pronounced disappointment with the 
reductive effects of cybernetics and saw it as another proof of the failure of 
Western modernisation. However, both views did not focus in particular on 
cybernetic control as a resource for steering, but rather as a tool for rethinking 
culture. 
Indeed, it would be hard to find a better example of the Foucaultian con-
nection of knowledge to state power than in the case of translating cybernetics 
to culture. I have demonstrated that in the post-1968 discourse, cybernetics 
emerged as a provider of the intellectual models of governing culture. The 
model of cybernetic steering, I argued, was manifested in the use of terms such 
as system and process, feedback-based control, prediction and automation. 
Taken together, these terms helped to rationalise and integrate a heterogeneous 
sphere of culture as governable by one administrative structure using one 
method. They were used to describe culture at various levels, for example, bu-
reaucratic organisational structures and accounting, the transmission of tradition 
and individual consumption of cultural products. Thus, cybernetic terms were 
mobilised and constructed a distinct cultural policy world, with its own lan-
guage, subjects and objects.  
The chapter opened with an analysis of the debate between Venclova and 
Trinknas. I suggest interpreting this debate in relation to the later cybernetic 
discourses on culture as typological and not genealogical. It should come as no 
surprise that their discussion was never brought up again, as in the mid-1960s, 
both Venclova and Trinknas were already quite controversial. Since they were 
officially condemned in the mid-1970s, no references to them could be made in 
the press. The actual translation of cybernetics that took place in Lithuanian 
discourses was quite different from that advocated by Venclova. The transla-
tions of cybernetic steering into culture and especially its state policy were not 
backed up with deeper, more scholarly considerations.  
Thus far, I have demonstrated the development of the state’s ambition to 
administer culture from the centre and to use cybernetic control in these matters. 
However, the introduction of cybernetic control was perceived as part of a lar-
ger process – Western techno-scientific modernisation, especially its post-
World War II stage known as the scientific-technical revolution. The next chap-
ter looks more closely at the role of techno-sciences in cultural policy dis-
courses in relation to ongoing, uncertain changes.  
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VII. From Hope to Discontent: Soviet Cultural 
Policy in the Grip of the Scientific-Technical 
Revolution 
Scientific-technical revolution has evolved into the most significant phe-
nomenon and engine of culture since the middle of the 20th century; it ac-
celerated progress and raised new contradictions and problems. … For cul-
ture and, first and foremost, man, STR created a new ecological, anthropo-
logical and social situation: it increased the possibility for transgressing ra-
tional boundaries of culture and nature and their interaction, increased the 
danger of one-sided scientism and technocracy, negatively influenced the 
relationship between material and spiritual culture. […] STR made it espe-
cially clear that it was necessary to rationally govern [valdyti] the processes 
of culture for human purposes.1
 
As of the 1960s, scientific-technical revolution (STR) was a core concept in 
Soviet cultural policy discourses. Soviet cultural policy-making was publicly 
described as being embedded in a formative context of change, which was 
driven by techno-science. In 1980, STR was incorporated into an encyclopaedic 
definition of “culture”, as revealed in the above entry on “culture” from the 
Lithuanian Soviet Encyclopaedia. Taking this quote as an eloquent hint, this 
chapter explores more deeply the extent to which STR became a nexus of the 
discourse of steering or governing culture.  
So far, I have argued that cybernetics and systems theory were expected to 
help the Soviet government improve economic planning and the administration 
of organisations. But although it was often named as a driving force of STR, 
Soviet cybernetics was not its only one. For example, it was held that the “con-
temporary revolution in the natural sciences and technology” was initiated by 
physics, accompanied by other “leaders”, such as mathematics and cybernetics.2 
Chapters V and VI demonstrated how the system-cybernetic approach was used 
to formulate a general notion of governance in management and cultural policy 
discourses. As noted by Hoffmann and Laird, in many ways, techno-science 
was a source of hope for a better future for the Soviet economy and society.3 
                                      
1 Lietuviškoji tarybin enciklopedija Vol. 6 (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1980), 244. 
2 Minkeviius, 24. 
3 Erik P. Hoffmann and Robin F. Laird, The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet 
Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982).  
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However, there also was another side to this hope. STR not only provided So-
viet governance with new ideas and techniques; it further complicated the ambi-
tion of governance by introducing the idea of complexity. STR should become a 
part of social planning: the “traditional branch planning of the national economy 
and culture should become a complex programme of social development other-
wise STR would be disconnected from the advantages of socialism”. STR im-
posed “a necessity to forecast, plan, programme, govern [valdyti] on the bio-
techno-socio-cosmo-noosphere scale”.4  
With a focus on discontent, this chapter further elaborates the main thesis’s 
idea, which states that techno-sciences were translated into Soviet policy lan-
guage and powerfully shaped the mentality of the governance of culture5 by 
arguing that techno-sciences did more than simply empower the central organs 
of the government. Indeed, STR discourse was used by Soviet cultural operators 
both to define themselves as “modern” and to criticise Soviet conditions. With 
or without an explicit connection to cybernetics, the term “scientific-technical 
revolution” frequently occurred in the analysed texts. In these texts, I treated 
STR as an idiom in the language of policy. Idiom in linguistics is defined by its 
use as a cliché: being a word or a phrase with a fixed meaning, it features quali-
ties of a sign. Irrespective of context, it maintains its meaning, which usually is 
shared by a large discursive community.6 In other words, a valid idiom does not 
need an explanation within its community of speakers. In turn, such a commu-
nity itself could be understood as constructed and maintained through the circu-
lation of idioms.7 I suggest that the use of STR in cultural policy discourses 
could be understood as an example of the performative role of idiomatic lan-
guage, which constructs the speaker’s belonging to the discourse community 
and modernity in general.  
Before proceeding further, I would like to expand on the term STR. The 
origin of the term is unclear although, since the early 1960s, many attempts to 
define and conceptualise it have been made. Because a separate study would be 
needed to properly address these attempts, I shall limit myself to a brief over-
view. Western scholars attributed the authorship of the concept to the British 
analytic philosopher Bertrand Russell, who used it in the 1950s. In line with 
Russell’s view, “scientific-technical revolution” was seen as progress in ad-
vanced societies, which was born out of techno-scientific development during 
World War II.8 However, during de-Stalinisation, Soviet theoreticians sought to 
locate the roots of Soviet STR in the efforts of Russian scientists imprisoned in 
                                      
4 Minkeviius, 104. 
5 For a recent study of modernisation in Russia, see the excellent collection, Kangaspuro and 
Smith. 
6 In a different context, a similar definition of sign is used by Judith Butler, Excitable Speech. A 
Politics of the Performative (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 147-148. 
7 Irina Sandomirskaja, Kniga o rodine. Opyt analiza diskursivnykh praktik (Wien: Wiener Slawis-
tischer Almanach, 2001), 22-25. 
8 Wilczynski, 6. Wilczynski though did not give a reference to Russell’s definition (and I did not 
manage to find it myself). 
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the Gulags during the 1930s.9 As it integrated fundamental research, technology 
and production on an unprecedented scale, STR was distinguished from the 19th 
century’s Industrial Revolution.10 Further distinctions were made on the basis of 
technology type: whilst the Industrial Revolution was largely mechanical, STR 
relied on electronic technologies, which were increasingly automated and intel-
ligent.11 Just like the Industrial Revolution, STR was about a new perception of 
the surrounding world. As the Russian physicist Evgenii L. Feinberg put it, “We 
live in a world which is becoming more and more formalised, mathematicised 
and ‘cyberneticised’.”12
STR was used alongside the notion of “scientific technical progress” 
(STP). STR was conceived as a “wider social process”, whilst STP was seen as 
a narrower “scientific technical progress”, which did not automatically imply 
social transformation.13 STR designated a revolution, an abrupt change, whilst, 
to quote the Soviet economist Abel G. Aganbegian, STP referred to an “evolu-
tionary” development. However, the two terms and their abbreviations, STR 
and STP, were often used interchangeably as late as the end of the 1980s.14 
Their lifetime coincided with the Soviet regime: both terms disappeared from 
public Lithuanian discourses after the collapse of the Soviet Union (an interest-
ing case of the relation between discourse and political structures). In turn, the 
system-cybernetic vocabulary, a successfully neutralised toolbox, persisted into 
the post-Soviet Lithuanian (and Russian) discourses on (the management of) 
culture.15
Politically, STR was a hotly contested issue in Soviet discourses because it 
was seen as a global process, the next stage of modernisation, which was going 
on in both the communist East and the capitalist West.16 The “ongoing STR” 
                                      
9 N.V. Markov, Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia: analiz, perspektivy, posledstviia (Moscow, 
1973), 40, cf Minkeviius 1979, 13. I.G. Marchuk, Abel G. Aganbegian et al., Nauchno-
tekhnicheskii progress. Ekonomika i upravlenie (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1988), 26. For Soviet 
scientists in Gulags, see Krementsov, 34. 
10 Wilczynski, 6. 
11 Wilczynski listed the following “elements” of STR: “a more effective utilization of traditional 
and superior sources of power, nuclear energy, computers and electronic data processing, automa-
tion, cybernetics, lasers and ultrasonics, synthetics with desired characteristics, new chemical and 
biological sources of food” and so on. Wilczynski, 6-7. In the West, it was even called a “cyber-
netic revolution”. John Rose, The Cybernetic Revolution (London: Elek Science, 1974). 
12 Evgenii L. Feinberg, Art in the Science Dominated World: Science, Logic and Art (New York: 
Gordon and Breach, 1987), xiii. 
13 See, for example, material about STR for a lecturer, prepared by the Lithuanian philosopher 
Minkeviius, 3. 
14 For example, Agenbegian saw the post-Khrushchev period as evolutionary or STP and pere-
stroika as revolutionary or STR. Marchuk, Aganbegian, 19, 20. 
15 For an example of the post-Soviet use of the system-cybernetic approach see a recent Lithua-
nian textbook on arts management, Elona Lubyt and Borisas Melnikas, Šiuolaikins dails si-
stema ir jos vadyba (Vilnius: Baltijos kopija, 2001). This was also an argument of Gerovitch, 
From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 300-303. 
16 For example, in 1979 the Lithuanian philosopher stated that STR was “a world phenomenon, its 
essence and significance, social outcomes and problems are also global”. Minkeviius, 5. 
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was mobilised in the Khrushchevian ideological discourse of “catching up and 
surpassing”.17 However, STR was also important terrain for Cold War polarisa-
tion.18 In 1973, for example, a decision of the 24th Party Congress stated that: 
 
With scientific and technical revolution now at a very important stage, the 
world socialist system is required not only to hold its own in this biggest 
ever competition with capitalism but also to win this battle for progress and 
prosperity of nations. [...] the scientific and technical revolution is [...] a fo-
cal point in the struggle between two world systems, socialism and capital-
ism.19
 
Thus, the Soviet STR discourse was organised around the ideas of both catch-
ing-up with and confronting the West. However, the two ideas were accommo-
dated by what was described by Latour as a strategy of purification.20 A line 
was drawn between the socio-political and techno-scientific sides of STR. From 
an ideological standpoint, the techno-scientific STR, even as developed in the 
West, could be safely transferred to the Soviet Union. Such Soviet techno-
scientific definitions of STR involved, first and foremost, information and 
automation technologies. The social side of STR was more complicated. From 
the West, the Soviet Union accepted only the natural sciences and technologies, 
not the social sciences. If, in the West the post-World War II techno-scientific 
developments inspired a theorist to describe social change as an emergence of 
“information”, “post-industrial” or “technotronic” society, then the Soviets re-
jected these theorisations as wrongly guided by “technological determinism”.21 
The Soviets believed that Western attempts at “post-industrial” theories disre-
garded the role of the mode of ownership of production and hence conflicted 
with “historical materialism and scientific communism”. It was held that these 
new notions merely sought to mask the fact that Western societies were essen-
tially capitalist.22 Soviet scholars conceptualised the ongoing social change 
under the umbrella of the notion of STR.  
STR was seen as a powerful change. In 1973, an official description of the 
positive effects of Soviet STR was articulated as follows: “The scientific and 
                                      
17 Notably, “catching up” technologically was not only Soviet a problem, but a feature of Western 
techno-scientific development. See the discussion in relation to contemporary information tech-
nologies in Japan, the USA and Western Europe, see McGuigan, 20. 
18 The “confrontation of two developed world systems, the development of the “third world” is a 
global driving force of STR,” Minkeviius 1979, 13. For more see Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin 
F. Laird, “The Scientific-Technical Revolution” and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1982). 
19 USSR. Scientific and Technical Revolution (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 
1973), 6, 13. 
20 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
21 For “information society” and the related “network society,” see Manuel Castells, The Informa-
tion Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996). For an 
attempt to apply Castells’s approach to cultural policy see McGuigan. 
22 Minkeviius, 73. 
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technical revolution is destroying everything that is old and conservative in the 
way of life of classes and nations. Their ideas, psychologies and cultures are 
changing dramatically”.23 However, my analysis of discourses on STR in cul-
ture revealed that the perception of the absence of changes was just as salient. 
Moreover, evaluations of STR evolved from those of a positive ally of cultural 
policy to a source of deep ambiguity and even anxiety.  
 
I will now proceed to demonstrate how STR empowered criticism of Soviet 
realities of the cultural sector’s daily existence by revealing the shortcomings of 
existing modes of governance; several distinctive cases will be discussed. First, 
I will consider the STR effects on labour because labour, restructured by STR, 
was seen by the Soviets as a very important source of challenges for cultural 
policy-making. Second, it was expected that STR would spill over into the civil 
sector and dramatically increase the welfare of the population and yet, I will 
show that the claims of on-going STR only made the actual poverty of the cul-
tural sector more visible. Indeed, the discourse of ongoing STR enabled the 
cultural operators to openly complain about their grave material situation. That 
STR discourse was useful in legitimising criticisms and complaints was espe-
cially salient in the case of the natural environment. In the third section, I will 
demonstrate how the negative effects of STR made culture include nature and 
eventually exposed the limits of techno-scientific governance. Finally, I will 
consider the textual role of STR as an idiom and a source of self-identification 
of a new critical subject, modern Soviet man.  
STR and Labour 
Beginning at the time of Narkompros, Soviet cultural policy was mobilised to 
improve the productivity of labour: it was geared to industrialisation and, after 
1928, to collectivisation in Russia. As of the 1950s, Soviet cultural policy in 
Lithuania was largely organised around the ongoing collectivisation campaigns. 
As quoted earlier, the success of Soviet cultural policy was measured “by litres 
of milk”. As of the early 1960s, however, the economic rationale of Soviet cul-
tural policy was modified: now its role was to facilitate STR. Post-Stalinist cul-
tural policy had to facilitate not only material production but also “non-material 
processes”, in particular, in order to assist STR by ensuring “information 
flows”. For example, in 1965 the publishing industries and the library network, 
which were improving, were described by the Minister of Culture as contribu-
tions to the “rapid development of the national economy, an aid in the imple-
                                      
23USSR. Scientific and Technical Revolution, 18.  
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mentation of innovations in the fields of science and technology”.24 In the early 
1980s, the minister quoted the CPSU programme:  
 
“The cultural growth of inhabitants greatly depends on the rise of produc-
tive forces, technological progress and the organisation of production, an 
increase in the public activity of working people...”. Therefore, along with 
an ideological and aesthetical upbringing, amateur art is called upon to 
carry out a no less significant social task.25
 
As noted previously in quotes from Afanas’ev and Kubilius, cybernetic tech-
nologies transformed the character of human labour. In the course of STR, work 
became more sophisticated because it required greater intelligence and more 
education. Sometimes it was even re-defined as a part of new “culture”.26 STR 
also produced a “new type of worker” and demanded “a new organisation of 
governance” – both were seen as “typical of the new technology”.27 Such a new 
worker would be engaged in the branches of “nuclear power engineering, cy-
bernetic equipment, computers, automatic equipment for recording and informa-
tion processing [...] and the use of automation as an aid to engineering and ad-
ministrative personnel”.28  
It is significant that despite an increase in the education rates, the discipli-
nary task of cultural policy continued to be a relevant and rather pressing issue. 
I found it quite peculiar that in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet cultural 
policy discourses still featured the rhetoric of a civilising mission towards in-
dustrial and collective farm workers, something which signified a considerable 
lack of trust in the people’s ability to self-educate in an age of universal literacy 
and broadcasting. A corrective and cumulative function of culture was repeat-
edly emphasised in the ministers’ speeches. Participation in amateur arts was 
seen as a powerful disciplinary tool, one meant to socialise individuals in col-
lectives and to eliminate deviance and drunkenness.29 The culture minister’s 
speech at the first session of LSSR Supreme Council in 1963 focused on the 
significance of the corrective social effects of cultural policy for constructing 
such a technical base of communism. A later minister stated that “drinking and 
                                      
24 Speech by Juozas Banaitis at the Republican Jubilee Conference dedicated for the 25th anniver-
sary of Soviet Lithuania, “Taryb Lietuvos kultros klestjimas” (1965), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 
1371, l. 153. 
25 Jonas Bielinis, “Meno saviveiklos vaidmuo komunistinio žmogaus aukljimui” (1981), LLMA, 
f. 342, ap. 1, b.3386, l. 52. 
26 “The intellectualisation of work,” it was held, “brings the working class closer to the inteligent-
sia, the social boundaries between them eventually wither away, physical and intellectual labour 
get closer to each other,” Minkeviius, 37; Juhan Kahk, “Culture and the Scientific and Techno-
logical Revolution,” in Social Sciences in the Soviet Baltic Republics (Moscow: “Social Sciences 
Today” Editorial Board, 1988). 
27 Marchuk, Aganbegian et al., 19, 20, 21. 
28 USSR. Scientific and Technical Revolution, 42. 
29 For a Foucaultian account of Soviet techniques of individuation and collective-building see 
Kharkhordin, 1999. 
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cursing, negligence and filthiness are the ultimate extremes of anti-culture, and 
an audacious fight against those phenomena is also a fight for a socialist cul-
ture”.30  
Further, the growing class of engineers and improved standards of living 
was seen as a cause of the increasing needs of the population, which became 
another challenge to cultural policy. The number of engineers had increased 
dramatically: the Soviet Union boasted that it had educated the greatest number 
of engineers in the world.31 Engineers earned higher incomes and were suspi-
ciously attracted to “material values”. Their cultural consumption diverged from 
the ideologically correct one, as they were fascinated by kitsch and other kinds 
of “vulgar culture”.32 Thus, the traditional task of communist cultural policy – 
to educate the worker – was re-actualised by the advances of techno-sciences 
and complemented with the supervision of engineers’ tastes. This posed a new 
problem for cultural policy-makers: because they were better educated and had 
more leisure time at their disposal, “the new type of worker” did not want to use 
the cultural services provided by clubs. This phenomenon was particularly acute 
in the cultural-enlightenment sector. For example, in 1970 the Minister of Cul-
ture observed that “many social groups” were, “in general, not satisfied with 
any kind of lecture, book or mass event”. He stressed that cultural-educational 
work had “to compete” with television and the cinema.33 Consequently, it was 
feared that cultural work was becoming increasingly outdated, incapable of 
capturing the changing tastes and habits of the population. For example, in his 
speech in 1970, the LSSR Minister of Culture observed that: 
 
The societal-production conditions are obviously improving the cultural 
level of people, which is continuously changing and growing. Village 
populations are declining and will continue to decline in the future, and the 
social conditions of those individuals who remain in the villages are chang-
ing daily. The mass media, including the press, radio, television and cin-
ema, are relegating many cultural-educational forms of work, which have 
been used up to now, to the past.34
 
Lithuanian television broadcasting was launched from Vilnius in 1957, whilst 
radio was established in the 1920s.35 However, as was mentioned earlier, nei-
                                      
30 Speech by Juozas Banaitis at the First session of LSSR Supreme Council (18-19 April 1963). 
LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1164, l. 101-109. Speech “Už tolimesn
 lietuvi tarybins kultros sukles-
tjim!” by Lionginas Šepetys at the First Republican Congress of Cultural Workers (2 June 
1969), LLMA, f.342, ap. 1, b. 1856, l. 59. 
31 Beissinger. 
32 See for example a discussion about the petty-bourgeois taste of the engineers in the Writers’ 
Union’s weekly Literature and Art in 1970. 
33 (1970), LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b.1983, l. 6. 
34 (1970), LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b.1983, l. 4. 
35 In 1936, there were 86 shops selling portable radios in Kaunas, the provisional capital. Howe-
ver, in the 1930s Lithuania lagged way behind radio consumption in Latvia and Estonia. 
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ther television nor radio was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture. 
Supervised by the Radio and Television Committee (since 1958, Gosteleradio), 
broadcasting, for some strange reason, was not conceptualised as a part of the 
“cultural sector”. Thus, it was not considered as a potential source of “new 
forms of work” in the eyes of the Ministry of Culture. In the sphere of cultural 
enlightenment, as explicated in a later document, the major “forms of work” 
were “lectures”, “presentations” and “visual agitation”.36 Thus, in cultural pol-
icy the notion of “forms of work” referred to a very traditional medium of So-
viet ideological communication, probably because the ministry did not have 
direct financial or administrative power over them, and in the Soviet Union, 
cross-branch cooperation was particularly inefficient. 
I would suggest that STR did not radically change, but rather stimulated 
the re-actualisation of older labour-related rationales of Soviet cultural policy. 
In the context of STR, cultural policy continued to be a part of economic ration-
alisation, a service aimed at improving working conditions. Its object, however, 
became more complicated – not an illiterate worker or peasant, but an intelli-
gent worker or engineer who operated intelligent machines. The new nature of 
labour inevitably led to the idea that cultural administration should also be some 
form of a sophisticated, technically equipped process. Despite its higher level of 
education, this object of cultural policy still needed to be disciplined. This, I 
suggest, indicates that despite the declaration of “mature socialism”, the con-
struction of a communist society was an open, ongoing project with no end in 
sight.  
Poverty and STR  
Cultural operators hoped that STR in culture would help to overcome the stag-
gering poverty that existed in many provincial, as well as town cultural clubs 
and houses of culture. The first speech by a LSSR Minister of Culture that I 
found referred to the Twentieth Congress (1956) and emphasised the general 
need for developing technology and science, especially for the purposes of 
economy; but it did not specify the uses of technology for cultural administra-
tion.37 Soon, however, hints at the realisation of technical progress began to 
appear to an increasing extent in cultural policy discourses. It was expected that 
STR would drive material progress in the culture sector by contributing more 
financing and, in particularly, more electronic equipment. Yet the paradigmatic 
attributes of STR, such as automated management systems, were more or less 
absent from the everyday life of the cultural operator. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
                                      
36 The Agency of Cultural-Educational Enterprises (1965), LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b.1374, l. 39. 
37 “Apie XX Partijos suvažiavimo išvadas”(1956). LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b. 6, l. 288-300; manusc-
ript by minister J. Smilgeviius for Sovetskaia Litva, “ naujus laimjimus kultrinje statyboje” 
(14 July 1955), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 38-52. Both a radio program and a newspaper existed 
under the name Sovetskaia Litva and it is unclear for which one the text was intended. 
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to estimate just how acutely the lack of computer technology was perceived. As 
I argued in Chapter V, its usefulness was severely limited by informal and arbi-
trary rules of the Soviet economy game (I will return to specific cases in the 
next chapter).  
Indeed, descriptions of the anticipated progress revealed only the over-
whelming poverty of the cultural sector. The positive STR effects on culture, as 
discussed in the Soviet Lithuanian press, concerned rather basic provisions. It is 
interesting to note that from the 1960s onwards, the notion of a technical base of 
culture included “organisation” itself and, in turn, the resources needed by or-
ganisations.38 Thus, as noted by the Minister of Culture in 1966, the key prob-
lems of a “material base” were the lack of heating, furniture and musical in-
struments; dilapidated buildings; and uneducated directors (40 percent still did 
not have a secondary education); low density; and little or no means of transpor-
tation (it was not uncommon for people to walk 6 to 8 kilometres or more to 
reach a village house of culture).39 Thus, STR in culture was seen as any im-
provement of the basic standards of living as, for example, housing: 
 
[...] how our technical weaponry significantly increased; thousands of fami-
lies are meeting the New Year in great apartments, and two leisure days a 
week became a simple phenomenon of everyday life.40  
 
The discourse of STR was teleological, with a clearly expressed axis of time. It 
was assumed that STR would shortly arrive at the cultural sector; accordingly, 
the pressing need to “prepare” for this arrival was repeatedly expressed. Thus a 
minister’s speech entitled “For a Further Flourishing of Lithuanian Soviet cul-
ture!”, prepared for the First Republican Congress of Cultural Workers (Vilnius, 
June 1969), enthusiastically proclaimed: 
 
Culture has entered an age of technology, which opened up many opportu-
nities, but also raised many demands. Immediately – now we have to rap-
idly improve a material-technical base of professional culture and also a 
base of cultural mass work [...]. Otherwise we will lag behind and not be 
able to justify the higher calling of socialist culture.41 [The italics are mine 
– E.R.] 
 
The issue of “lagging behind” appeared to be unavoidable. The frustration – that 
STR was not reaching the cultural sector, especially in the countryside – accu-
mulated with time. Bureaucratic demands for reports, calculations and papers 
                                      
38 In 1980 Jonas Bielinis referred to the number of organisations in the LSSR to illustrate the 
“widening of the material-technical base”. Jonas Bielinis, “Su socialistinio humanizmo vliava,” 
LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3323, l. 18. 
39 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1494. 
40 (1970), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1983, l. 2. 
41 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1856, l. 40. 
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were suffocating the administrative work of the ministry and cultural organisa-
tions. In the next chapter, I will analyse how this discontent grew and was gen-
eralised towards scientific, calculation-based governance in general and was 
finally turned against the political organisation, the Party and the ethnic group, 
Russians. 
 
To summarise, the advance of STR required cultural policy to “shape up”, at 
least discursively. As discussed in Chapters V and VI, the development of 
techno-science changed the Soviet understanding of both administration and 
labour. These changes led to a re-evaluation of the existing modes of the gov-
ernance (valdymas) of culture and its purpose. As of the late 1960s, the pres-
sures of STR intensified: the growing complexity of industry and, in Lithuania, 
industrialisation itself, brought with them new, serious problems. STR was in-
creasingly framed as a process that generated risks. It was both securitised and 
used as a tool of securitisation, but not only in Kennan’s sense. As the Soviet 
Union found itself in the grip of a scientific-technical revolution, the enemy was 
no longer “internal” (exploiting class) or “external” (capitalist system). It was 
“global”, transcending the boundaries of political regimes. STR, like bourgeois 
culture and capitalist industries, had to be subverted for socialist goals. How-
ever, now STR threatened to get out of hand in both capitalist and socialist sys-
tems. It became a source of global problems. 
From Limits of Growth to Limits of Governance: Culture and Nature 
The positive teleological discourse of STR increasingly featured discontent and 
even warnings about the potential dangers for culture. As early as the mid-
1960s, the scientific-technical revolution was addressed as a source of risks in a 
special issue of Domains of Culture, the official magazine of the Ministry of 
Culture (October 1966). The editorial, subtitled “An Olive Branch in Space”, 
asked: “What is the destiny of art, of a humanities culture in general? Are they 
not condemned to decease in view of scientific progress and ‘thinking’ ma-
chines? What does the contemporary interrelation between art and science and 
technology mean?”42 The previously quoted Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopaedia 
(1980) also described STR as a force that threatened culture. This special issue 
of Domains of Culture included the debate between Venclova and Trinknas, 
which was analysed in Chapter VI. Nevertheless, it is also important to discuss 
its broader agenda because it presents a very concentrated, intentional account 
of the view of the Lithuanian cultural intelligentsia of the 1960s regarding 
techno-sciences and governance.  
First and foremost, it was quite striking that in those times of overwhelm-
ing optimism, the “Space Age”, the editors articulated their fear of an imminent, 
uncontrollable disaster. The subtitle referred to the biblical deluge (the phrase 
                                      
42 KB 8 (1966), 1. 
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“an olive branch” referred to the story of Noah’s Ark). In all likelihood, Cold 
War-related anxiety could be detected between the lines, though at the begin-
ning of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was still leading the space race, with its 
sputniks (1957 and later) and first cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin (1961). Americans 
would not land on the moon until 1969. Explicit critical references to the Cold 
War-driven, techno-scientific development would not emerge in the Lithuanian 
cultural press until the late 1980s, probably in relation to Reagan’s Star Wars 
programme. Did the editors see arts or culture in general as an “olive branch” or 
a sign of salvation in a dystopian context of techno-scientific progress? To what 
extent was it legitimate to express doubts about techno-scientific progress in 
Soviet public discourses? Were cultural discourses a special place in which to 
express such doubts?  
The answers to these questions should be seen in the context of Soviet in-
dustrialisation, which traditionally had been characterised by hasty decisions, a 
lack of regard for local conditions, especially the natural environment, and 
large-scale construction.43 If the late 1940s saw collectivisation in the country-
side, then the late 1950s and 1960s could be characterised by major growth in 
heavy and light industries in Lithuania, traditionally an agricultural country. 
Electronics factories were joined by large concrete and chemistry plants and 
later an oil refinery (Mažeikiai) and a nuclear plant (formerly Sniekus, now 
Visaginas). Sterile, computer-controlled laboratories were housed behind the 
walls of secret institutes. What cultural intellectuals saw were smoking chim-
neys and the ugly sprawl of factories on the outskirts of towns; polluted rivers; 
and megalomaniac agricultural complexes.  
I found it curious that the official magazine of the LSSR Ministry of Cul-
ture increasingly featured articles about environmental concerns. Indeed, these 
environmental concerns, interestingly enough, dealt with the issues of cultural 
policy. Of course, the environment eventually became a matter of public discus-
sion all over the Soviet Union. In Latvia, the first concerns about polluted rivers 
were voiced in 1959. According to Brudny, the Soviet Russian intelligentsia 
expressed its environmental concerns as early as 1961 in relation to the plans 
for building a cellulose plant on the banks of Lake Baikal.44 Whilst Rachel Car-
son’s Silent Spring, published in 1962, caused a wave of anxiety about the envi-
ronment in the United States, in the mid-1960s, Latvia and Estonia were the 
only Soviet republics to ban the use of DDT, hexachlorone and several other 
chlorine and phosphorus preparations. However, by the late 1960s, the situation 
was rapidly deteriorating in the Soviet Baltic area. In 1969, the Panevžys 
Chemical Plant released a pollutant into the Nevžis, one main rivers, which 
killed the entire fish population. The Klaipda Cellulose and Paper Plant regu-
larly discharged massive amounts of waste into shallow waters, and ships 
dumped oil into Klaipda harbour at the same time that the construction of puri-
                                      
43 For more on the Soviet industrialisation of Lithuania, see Misiunas and Taagepera 2006; Lie-
tuva. 1940-1990. 
44 Brudny, 46. 
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fication facilities, initiated in 1974, was pending for years.45 The Lithuanian 
Nature Protection Association was founded in 1971, just a year after the United 
States’s Environmental Protection Agency (1970). All of this was outside the 
responsibility of the Soviet Ministry of Culture. However, I will show that it 
was easier for “nature” than “television” to become a part of official definition 
of “culture”. 
Among the first Lithuanian thinkers to bring culture and nature together 
from the perspective of governance was the influential philosopher Jokbas 
Minkeviius.46 Minkeviius could be called a career party intellectual. He began 
his career path as the head of the department of Marxism-Leninism at the Kau-
nas Medical Institute; later he occupied high positions in the philosophy de-
partments at the Vilnius Party School and the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. 
Thus, his views could be taken as representative of an official ideological line 
on science, technology and culture. On the other hand, he was concerned about 
the fate of his country’s “nature and culture” and in that he represented an 
emerging Soviet intellectual academic culture that did not blindly follow the 
official line. In describing the “contemporary backdrop of human existence and 
its cultural progress”, Minkeviius located STR at the centre of the Soviet trans-
formation: 
 
[...] the contemporary epoch is especially dynamic. This dynamism is first 
of all marked by the progress in knowledge of the forces of nature and en-
gineering their governance, known as the scientific technical revolution. 
Today’s industrial and scientific technical potential manifests itself in 
nearly all spheres of human existence and activity. Urbanisation, universal 
technicisation, the flow of information, the powerful means of communica-
tion and information, specialisation, the increase of leisure time – all of 
these factors significantly change the human situation in the contemporary 
world. To this can be added the newly emerging problems regarding ecol-
ogy [...].47
 
                                      
45 Misiunas and Taagepera, 240-241. For pre-1980s environmental movements in the Baltic 
countries see Katrina Z.S. Schwartz, Nature and National Identity after Communism: Globalizing 
the Ethnoscape (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 60-1. The association grew 
from 20,000 members in 1971 to 320,000 in 1983. Misiunas and Taagepera, 2006, 293.  
46 Jokbas Minkeviius (1921-1996) was born in Ufa, Bashkirstan and served in the Soviet Army 
during World War II. He started as a committed communist, but later revised his views. Educated 
in Moscow, at the Party College at the Central Committee (CPSU) in 1953 and the Academy of 
Societal Sciences in 1959, he later became the head of Philosophy department in Vilnius Party 
College (1963-1971) and the head of the Philosophy Department at the Lithuanian Academy of 
Sciences (1971-1990). In 1988 he participated in the foundation of Sjdis and was a signatory of 
the Independence Act (1990). He has been generally positively regarded by his contemporary 
colleagues, especially as he attempted to enlighten and teach “technicised partocrats” the values 
of nature and cultural heritage. See Genzelis, 26. 
47 Jokbas Minkeviius, “Kultros prieštaravimai,” KB 2 (1974), 16-17. 
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Dated 1974, this article was the first to introduce ecological issues under the 
theme of culture and progress in Domains of Culture. Although the inclusion of 
environmental concerns in the key platform for cultural policy discourse was 
delayed, it was not entirely untimely. Environmental problems were not tradi-
tionallylinked to the agenda of Soviet cultural policy. Moreover, nature had 
been the opposite of culture. In this respect, the Soviet mid-1970s were very 
different from the 1920s and the 1930s, when nature was to be conquered and 
tamed by man (and in turn culture was understood as exclusively artificial or 
manmade).48 From the perspective of governance, the Soviet philosopher at-
tempted to bring culture and nature together for the good of the population. 
Minkeviius argued that “the structure of culture was complicated, and its com-
ponents were not straightforward”; he also pointed out that the protection of 
nature (a “rational relationship with nature”) should be included in the concept 
of socialist culture.49  
This coupling of two binary opposites was largely enabled by the systems-
cybernetic approach. Such a governmental task gave birth to a number of hy-
phenated words. The linguistic sign of a hyphen could be taken as a good indi-
cator that the spheres of knowledge that were previously separated by institu-
tional and disciplinary boundaries were gradually coming closer to each other. 
By the mid-1970s, such words as “bio-social sphere” and “bio-technosphere” 
were increasingly featured in Domains of Culture (as was the previously men-
tioned “bio-techno-socio-cosmo-noosphere”). Beginning in the 1970s, “nature”, 
defined in terms of system, flow, equilibrium (all the terms of the cybernetic 
discourse on governance), became a new source of components for assembling 
Soviet culture.50 Even in his book Culture and Society (1975), Antanas 
Barkauskas, the ideological secretary of the Central Committee (LCP), sug-
gested the expansion of “culture” to include “ecological culture”.51  
In the context of STR, the issue of an agent – human or techno-scientific 
system – became problematic. In the mid-1970s, for Minkeviius it was still 
clearly a man who was an agent: 
 
The contemporary means of mass communication and information create a 
mass culture, and at least technically and superficially remove the privi-
leges from the “cultural elite”, democratise the entire cultural process. ... 
The technicisation of the cultural process is like a stick with two ends. 
Hence, there is no point in asking whether television, a concert transmitted 
                                      
48 Paul Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the 
Natural World (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002). 
49 Minkeviius, “Kultros prieštaravimai,” 17. 
50 The ecological theme was further developed by eslovas Kudaba, who emphasised the impor-
tance of “ethnological landscape” and civilised, cultural uses of nature for leisure. Kudaba in the 
late 1980s was instrumental in establishing the Culture Fund and then Soros’s Open Society Fund, 
and was an active member of the Sjdis liberation movement. eslovas Kudaba, “Gamtosaugai 
reikia kultros ir mokslo,” KB 7 (1977), 13-17.  
51 Jonas Minkeviius, a roundtable “Kultros mokykla ruošia specialist,” KB 7 (1976), 69. 
 203 
on the radio [radiofikuotas] or a reproduced painting are good or bad... The 
role of technology as the mediator in spiritual culture depends on a man’s 
own position.52
 
Thus, mediation had some productive effects (mass culture), but it did not re-
place the subject of governance, a man. However, a few years later, Minke-
viius’s pupil Vytautas Rubaviius pointed out that the role of technology as the 
mediator of culture (and human activity in general) was indeed complicated, as 
any mediation tended to diminish responsibility (the mediator has its own 
agency), and this further escalated the fears that technology “came to enslave a 
man and became uncontrollable”.53  
It can be argued that, by the 1980s, cultural operators came to understand 
that the new technologies, which were intended to increase control, also pro-
duced new, barely manageable risks. As was previously noted, in Lithuanian 
SSR, the first concerns linking environmental issues with cultural policy dated 
to 1974, well before the establishment of country-wide environmental move-
ments (which in the late 1980s played an important role in undermining the 
legitimacy of Soviet regime).54 In texts published in Domains of Culture, an 
“un-polluted” and “ordered” landscape was described as the result of high “cul-
turedness”, an intrinsic part of “national culture” and thus an object for state 
care and preservation. For example, an editorial in 1982 stated that “a cultured 
leader will not allow his enterprise to poison a river that would serve hundreds 
or thousands of future generations”.55 Note that the value of nature (the river) is 
described as a public service. In this way, the value of nature was constructed in 
the same way as that of culture. As described in Chapter III, wide access was 
essential for a “true culture”. Therefore, in the 1980s, nature was inscribed into 
both Soviet projects of democratisation – narodnost’ and kul’turnost’.  
STR’s transformation of labour into a more intelligent entity had conse-
quences on the very notion of culture. STR also transformed nature by making it 
vulnerable. This also had consequences on culture. Because of STR (and STP), 
the understanding of culture was expanded to include “environment” or “na-
ture”:  
 
Scientific and technological progress changes the structure of culture, 
forms its new features. Traditionally, the notion of culture itself does not 
remain the same. It is necessary to formulate new criteria of cultural pro-
                                      
52 Minkeviius, “Kultros prieštaravimai,” 18. 
53 Vytautas Rubaviius, “Mokslas ir humanitarin kultra,” KB 10 (1982), 37, 40. Rubaviius was 
born in 1952, graduated in physics from Vilnius University in 1975, started publishing poetry in 
1979 and was active as a writer, journalist and later scholar in philosophy and culture at LAS. 
54 Misiunas and Taagepera. 
55 “Kultros darbuotojas ir kultra,” KB 7 (1982), 2. 
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gress. There is a pressing need to inscribe issues of culture as a lifestyle 
and an ecological culture into the wider meaning of culture.56
 
It must be emphasised that the ultimate goal – and a challenge in the context of 
STR – for Minkeviius was creating and maintaining man as a rational gover-
nor. This goal was not easy to achieve, as it faced a long series of controversies 
posed by society, which was progressing rapidly: 
 
The real issue in the social governance of human cultural potential is that 
culture not be used for militarism and not be threatened by its dooming 
force; that spiritual culture not lag behind its material basis; that there not 
be technical limitations and paradoxical amorality and spiritual poverty in 
the context of a luxurious material culture; that a society’s value system not 
be deformed by a cult of things and one-sided consumer interests; that a 
man be a clever and far-seeing landlord of his palace of nature and that he 
not destroy and soil that palace – in other words, that he rationally govern 
the product of his activity and not be alienated.57 [The italics are mine – 
E.R.] 
 
When the green movement started to take off, in 1983 Minkeviius voiced his 
concerns in an even more articulate manner and explicitly called for an inte-
grated governance of both “nature” and “culture”.58 He asked, “Is it not so that 
at the end of the 20th century humanity is caught unaware by another great prob-
lem: the necessity to regulate and govern the relationship between culture and 
nature?”59 Here the role of philosophy was seen as exploring this relationship 
and “constructing an optimal model of the relationship between culture and 
nature”. Just as in operational analysis, this would require a “total integration of 
all sciences (natural sciences, technical research and sociology)”.60 There a man 
was defined as a “bio-socio-cultural subject” and his activity as “culture”, di-
visible into “humanities” and “scientist technological”, with the sphere of gov-
ernance further diversified.  
It seems that by the late 1980s, the ecological dimension became a stable 
part of cultural policy discourse. The official discourses on cultural policy in-
creasingly mentioned nature as a part of culture. For example, in 1987, Bielinis, 
the LSSR Minister of Culture, reported that “today a notion of culture is most 
closely related to economics, industry, agriculture, the preservation of nature 
                                      
56 Minkeviius, “Kultros mokykla...,” 36. 
57 Minkeviius, “Kultros prieštaravimai,” 19.  
58 On Latvian debates about nature and culture see Schwartz, Nature and National Identity. 
59 Jokbas Minkeviius, “Kultra ir natra,” KB 6 (1983), 36. I found it quite striking that the 
writer cited Pope John Paul II in the article. 
60 Minkeviius, “Kultra ir natra,” 36, 38. Thus the environmental problems and issues of failing 
governance in the 1980s saw the revival of crossovers between technology and humanities discip-
lines.  
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and everyday life [buitis, byt]”.61 In 1989, another LSSR Minister of Culture 
stated that the main goals of the “rejuvenation of culture” were its “humanisa-
tion, decentralisation, ecologisation, individualisation and historisation”.62 I 
suggest that this minister’s quote, and Minkeviius’s texts, in particular, testify 
to a more complex picture of the Soviet mentality of governance of culture than 
has been acknowledged up to now. If previously the governable sphere of cul-
ture was perceived as complicated, since it involved various professional and 
amateur arts, ideology and lifestyles, in the 1980s it was further expanded to 
deal with ecological problems, which were also largely attributed to the effects 
of STR.  
The “revenge of nature” was coupled with these concerns. As expressed by 
a journalist for Domains of Culture in her interview with the party secretary of 
the Vilnius Factory of Computing Machines, “Technisation, chemicalisation 
and automation can, without sentimentality, act exactly like a press (volas), 
crushing both cultural civilisational heritage and the ecological environment; 
this is why I intuit that, in the very near future, man will have to save himself 
from the revenge of a humiliated nature”.63 Note that the quote did not criticise 
the side effects of industries, but rather actual state policies as programmes and 
courses of action, as it used the “-ation” form.  
In many ways, Soviet Lithuanian definitions and the management of “na-
ture” were similar to those in Latvia. They were recently analysed as a special 
component of Latvian nationalism by Schwartz.64 I agree with Schwartz that the 
couplings of culture and nature in the 1960s and 1970s were instrumental in 
later nationalist discourses (and were largely rooted in the agrarianism of the 
pre-World War II period). However, it is important to point out that since the 
1960s, the Soviet Lithuanian nature/culture connection was largely enabled by 
the rules of system-cybernetic discourse: nature and culture were defined as 
systems, integrated in a discourse of governance.  
STR – The Soviet Idiom of the Modern Condition 
The British art historian Susan Reid has noted that, as early as the Khrushchev 
era (1956-1964), “STR” became “a central term in official pronouncements 
[…], which made it a defining feature of socialist modernity”.65 The term “sci-
entific-technical revolution” and its abbreviation “STR” were used repeatedly in 
the analysed published texts. The abundance of abbreviations in Soviet and 
Fascist political discourses was famously noted by Victor Klemperer as early as 
1947, whilst Fesenko and Fesenko mocked Lenin’s formulas with their own 
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62 Dainius Trinknas, “Kada kultra atgaus prestiž?” KB 12 (1989), 3.  
63 Anel Dvilinskait, “Nevengti kuo drsiausi žingsni,” KB 5 (1986), 4. 
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equation “Soviet language = politicisation + abbreviation”.66 However, I would 
like to point out that in addition to “politicisation”, a good deal of neutralisation 
was at work in assembling the techno-scientific language of Soviet cultural 
policy. For Soviets, modernisation, identified with scientific and technological 
progress, was conceived as being immune to the prevailing political regime.  
Regardless of the realities of the Soviet shortage economy, it seems that 
STR was textually constructed as an overwhelming process, which involved 
everything and went on everywhere, that is, the word – in a full or abbreviated 
form – occurred frequently in the most diverse intra-textual contexts in the 
press. However, in the archived speeches of the LSSR Ministers of Culture, 
STR was used much more sparingly. This discrepancy between the repetitive 
use of the abbreviation STR and the term “scientific-technical revolution” in the 
press led me to examine them in the speeches in a stricter textual sense.67 All 
published Soviet texts had to undergo more or less formalised censorship and 
editing. Books had to be approved by Glavlit, articles – by editors, speeches – 
by the Central Committee. Recently, it has been argued that every Soviet had an 
“internal censor” inside their head.68 Thus, the ministers’ speeches could be 
taken as examples of an anonymous official discourse. Their manuscripts en-
abled the analysis of material traces of editing. 
In 1958, for the first time, science and technology in relation to culture 
were mentioned in an archived document of the Ministry of Culture. The All-
Union project for the branch plan of culture for 1959-1965 stated the need for 
particular attention to “propaganda regarding the achievements of science and 
technology” in films.69 In 1963, a speech delivered at a session of the LSSR 
Supreme Council stressed that “there was no doubt” that the Soviet Union was 
about to complete the development of a “technical basis of communism”; yet 
the construction of “a new man” was lagging behind.70 Thus, technology and 
science were perceived as being ahead of society, which needed to catch up 
with the help of cultural policy. It was only in 1969 that the “epoch-making” 
role of technology in relation to culture was admitted for the first time: the min-
ister announced that “culture had stepped into the age of technology”.71 The 
term “scientific technical revolution” was first used in speeches in 1978. The 
                                      
66 Andrei Fesenko and Tat’iana Fesenko, Russkii iazyk pri sovetakh (New York, 1955), 25 cf 
Pöppel, 28. 
67 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI lingua tertii imperii, a philologist’s 
notebook (London: Athlone, 2000). 
68 I certainly did not assume that it was always the ministers or vice-ministers themselves who 
wrote speeches; the actual texts may have been produced by their assistants. However, I still refer 
to them as “authors” since they authorised the texts, following the definition in Foucault, The 
Archaeology…, 92-4. 
69 “Dokladnaia zapiska o proekte razvitiia otraslei kul’tury na 1959-1965 gody” (December 
1958), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 727, l. 220. 
70 Juozas Banaitis. LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1164, l. 101. The speech suggested that “a new man” 
should be the opposite of the personality imagined by Sigmund Freud and the existentialists as 
well as sparing with his drink. 
71 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1856, l. 40. 
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minister stated that “our life is changing at a rapid pace; there is not a single 
sphere of human activity that would not be influenced by scientific-technical 
revolution”.72 It is quite curious that the exact same text (about amateur art) was 
used in a speech delivered three years later, in 1981. In the more recent manu-
script, “scientific-technical revolution” was crossed out, as follows: 
 
There is no sphere of human activity that would not be influenced by the 
scientific technical revolution. Today’s folk artist, in his education, world 
view and world perception, differs considerably from a carver of gods’ 
sculptures [dievdirbys] at the beginning of the 20th century. We do not re-
gret this; on the contrary, we, are happy because the new social and eco-
nomic conditions have shaped a new creator. [...]  
During the course of a rapidly changing world, the expansion of 
communication and information networks, improved conditions of material 
and spiritual life, and the emergence of new needs, it is only natural that the 
directions of amateur art, its content, forms and methods also have to 
change, the entire system has to be perfected.73  
 
The phrase “scientific-technical progress” and its abbreviation “STP” were first 
mentioned in a 1987 speech. In his opening remarks about museums, the minis-
ter referred back to the 27th Party Congress, which recommended the “accelera-
tion of the social-economic development of the country by optimising the appli-
cation of the achievements of scientific-technical progress”. This Party guide-
line “essentially determined the new perspectives and ways of developing to-
day’s cultural enterprises”.74 In this context, the museums were to construct a 
new man by providing him with “a deep communication” with the past, a “flow 
of history”.75 Indeed, this was also the first time that the word “communication” 
(komunikacija) appeared in the official cultural policy discourse. I found it 
rather odd that the term “scientific-technical revolution” would be used so ex-
tensively in the ministry’s magazine Domains of Culture but that it would be 
such a latecomer and be used so sparingly in official discourses (speeches). 
Moreover, the fact that the STR sentence was crossed out by the speech editor 
probably meant that it was considered nonessential (note above that the phrase 
“the entire system has to be perfected” was also crossed out). Indeed, the entire 
the speech was heavily edited and shortened. My guess is because the speech 
was quite long (29 pages), a decision was made to remove generic ideological 
statements. While reading the manuscripts of speeches, I observed that clichés 
were often crossed out. The examples ranged from “whistling bullets” bravely 
                                      
72 Jonas Bielinis, “Meno saviveiklos vaidmuo komunistinio žmogaus aukljimui” (1978), LLMA, 
f. 342, ap.1, b.3121, l. 64.  
73 Jonas Bielinis, “Meno saviveiklos vaidmuo komunistinio žmogaus aukljimui” (1981), LLMA, 
f. 342, ap.1, b. 3386, l. 72, 79. 
74 Jonas Bielinis, (19 November 1987), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 52. 
75 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 53. 
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faced by post-war cultural operators, to unnecessarily long quotes on Lenin’s 
childhood, which did not deal directly with the main topic of the text. It seems 
that, since these phrases belonged to the STR discourse that developed in the 
1960s, they became a target of scepticism and editing in the early 1980s. To get 
a better idea of what it meant to use or not use the phrase STR, it may be helpful 
to look at its discursive “siblings”. 
STR was often coupled with the phrase “information flow”. As discussed 
earlier, a “flow of information” was regarded by both Wiener and Soviet econo-
mists as a necessary feature of a viable system, be it the economy, culture or 
society. Flows were also enabled by technological networks, first and foremost, 
communication technologies. This phrase often occurred in Soviet cultural pol-
icy discourses and became a keyword, which specified the transformative power 
of the “scientific and technical revolution”. On the one hand, “information 
flow” had to be achieved by human beings, aided by communication machines; 
however, it also marked the general transformation of the Soviet condition. For 
example, at the conference of cultural workers (Vilnius, 1982), a representative 
of the Vilkaviškis council noted that “a flow of cultural information runs unre-
strained; it also changes us”.76 It has to be added that Vilkaviškis was a small 
settlement in a picturesque but rather remote area. Keeping in mind that even 
the LSSR Ministry of Culture did not have computers or copying machines, 
what could Vilkaviškis’s cultural operators possibly mean by saying that “cul-
tural information” changed them? How did this “flow of information” reach 
provincial culture houses and what did it do? Apparently, the information 
“flooded in” via public broadcasting. As a flood, it was held to be excessive. 
Indeed, “culture”, meaning the spheres under the aegis of the ministry, was 
expected to counteract the mass media flows.  
The “flow of information” was perceived as necessary both within an or-
ganisation as well as across a territory (a country). Ideally, Soviet cultural de-
velopment was meant to be the same in both urban and rural areas (hence Vil-
kaviškis’s account, cited above). Its side effect was not only excess but also 
standardisation.77 Both were seen as potential threats to culture. In the 1970s, 
even official accounts of STR warned about standardisation: 
 
Standardisation has penetrated into all spheres of the material life of soci-
ety. At the same time, the danger is that it might also lead to the standardi-
sation of the human personality. In the future, the technological application 
of cybernetics will optimise the industrial management of plants, entire 
                                      
76 “Vilkaviškio rajono pranešimas” (1982), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3478, l. 344. 
77 Indeed, a Central Bureau for Standardisation, the first Soviet regulative body for standards, was 
founded by the initiative of the NOT movement in July 1924. Renamed the Committee for Stan-
dardisation it was chaired, amongst others, by Aleksei Gastev. Beissinger, 1988, 62. As noted by 
Raymond Hutchings, despite initially performing poorly, the roster of All-Union Standards 
(GOST, introduced first in 1925), grew and became more effective in the 1970s. Raymond Hut-
chings, Soviet Science, Technology, Design: Interaction and Convergence (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 111-114. 
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branches of the economy and production as a whole. But will it not also 
deprive man of the freedom of decision and the freedom of choice?78
 
On the other hand, the increasing presence and role of man-made machinery 
identified with STR was seen as an opportunity to reformulate the unique mis-
sion of culture in building a Soviet man and society. Thus in his 1980 speech, a 
minister of culture claimed that the new technologies give a special impetus to 
the arts: 
 
Today a man, who is surrounded by standards, oppressed by the informa-
tion flow, is irresistibly attracted to the world of aesthetic values,79 in 
which an unrepeatable, bright uniqueness gives meaning to the human per-
sonality and fortifies the ideals of humanism.80 [The italics are mine – 
E.R.] 
 
I suggest that STR and flow were used idiomatically to mark the particular, 
ongoing Soviet modernisation. While giving overt tributes to the official teleo-
logical discourse of communist progress, speakers also situated themselves in 
its post-Stalinist stage. To claim that one was transformed by STR or an infor-
mation flow was to signify loyalty to the modernising Soviet society in general 
(as opposed to the indication of an empirical fact or a concrete result, otherwise 
an important constituent of a Soviet minister’s speech about culture). It may be 
argued that the above reference to the scientific technical revolution should be 
understood as a formal rhetorical device, an idiom.81 It was used to indicate 
awareness and belonging to a community that was undergoing a general change, 
but not to specify and describe particular features of the cultural sector. By 
claiming to be transformed by the flow of information, Vilkaviškis’s cultural 
operators saw themselves as modern, that is, exposed and transformed by global 
flows of ambivalent modernisation. Thus, it would be incorrect to say that the 
idiom of STR “did not mean anything” in cultural policy discourses. Indeed, it 
was a case of the performativity of idiomatic language par excellence. 
Conclusion 
As early as 1964, Lithuanian workers at the Elektrnai electricity plant com-
plained to the Minister of Culture that artists painted “only landscapes”, while 
                                      
78 USSR. Scientific and Technical Revolution, 36.  
79 It is critical that, since the end of the 1970s, the issues of aesthetics and taste started to become 
more salient in the minister’s discourse on culture. Quite frequently a war theme – and especially 
post-war realities – were included to demonstrate the courageousness and dedication of art acti-
vists, particularly amateurs. LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3386, l. 56. 
80 Jonas Bielinis (1980), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3323, l. 74. 
81 Similarly “motherland” (rodina) has been analysed as an idiom of Soviet discourse by San-
domirskaja. 
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they were hungry to see the “dignity and romanticism of their own work” cele-
brated.82 Even as late as 1987, the Lithuanian museums were criticised for fail-
ing to organise displays on the technical revolution.83 This chapter has at-
tempted to stress that the lack of STR in Soviet cultural policy was equally im-
portant as its presence. Indeed, every aspect under consideration could poten-
tially be developed into a broader study of its own. However, my goal was not 
to provide an in-depth analysis but, by means of an overview, to discern a more 
general logic of the techno-scientific discourse of governance of culture. The 
major point was that STR, a manifestation of another stage of progress, func-
tioned as a discursive vehicle that, in a peculiar way, provided the Soviet agents 
with both the language and rationale to criticise the existing state of Soviet gov-
ernance. 
This chapter demonstrated how, in many ways, STR was assembled as a 
source of both anxiety and hope in public and official discourses on cultural 
policy. On the one hand, the problems caused by STR were seen as a sign of an 
advanced communist society. As the Soviet philosopher noted, “The lower the 
economic, political and cultural level of society, the fewer problems it has and 
vice-versa”.84 On the other hand, the destructive side effects of industrialisation 
jeopardised the very notion of progress. The risks and dangers brought about by 
STR stimulated further discursive transformations of culture. I have shown that 
“culture” came to merge with its traditional opposite “nature”. The connection 
between the two signalled an ambition for cultural policy to rationalise the ever-
broadening sphere of life. 
As an idiom, STR, within Soviet discourses, functioned as an indicator of 
modernity untamed. Several idiomatic uses of STR were distinguished in the 
chapter. It was used to frame positive changes in cultural policy: improving the 
material base of culture, contributing with better tools for its administration and 
finally, reasserting the need of a cultural policy, as the intellectualisation of 
labour broadened the educated classes, which in turn were to be provided with 
cultured leisure time. To refer to STR in cultural policy discourses signified that 
one belonged to a contemporary community that was competent to face new 
changes.  
STR was understood as both material and nonmaterial. If its material side 
(buildings, machines) was perceived as being somewhat absent from the cul-
tural sector, its nonmaterial side (information, rules of standardisation) was 
more pervasive. It is mainly with regard to the latter that the Soviet modes of 
cultural work, especially in the cultural-enlightenment sector, had to be revised 
and adjusted. Here it is important to emphasise that neither culture nor the lead-
ership of the Communist Party was presented as capable of resolving the fears 
of a techno-scientific “Space Age”. Indeed, none of the analysed texts contained 
an explicit statement asserting that the “wisdom of the Party” would ameliorate 
                                      
82 LLMA, f. 342, ap.1, b.1268, l. 15. 
83 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 31. 
84 Minkeviius, Mokslo ir technikos revoliucija, 99. 
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the negative effects of STR. Instead it was humanities intellectuals, scientists 
and other cultural operators who formulated the definitions of the real and imag-
ined risks of STR, as well as the strategies for coping with them. STR was a 
laudable consequence of progressive Party politics; however, its effects could 
legitimately be publicly discussed, praised or disputed. Arguably, it was held 
that the effects of STR were quite beyond the Party’s control.  
STR’s legacy was very strong and, from the early 1960s onwards, it did 
not diminish. Gorbachev’s push to rejuvenate the Soviet economy through poli-
cies directed towards acceleration (uskorenie) and openness (glastnost’) drew 
strongly on STR’s discursive resources: the free flow of information and inno-
vation. Indeed, it is symbolic that one of the most recent books about STR pub-
lished in Russia (Scientific-Technical Progress: Economy and Governance, 
1988) was written jointly by the nuclear physicist and president of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences Guriy I. Marchuk and the mathematician Abel G. Agan-
begian (schooled in “economic cybernetics”), who served as economic advisor 
to Gorbachev and later became the rector of the National Academy of Econ-
omy. Marchuk argued for the need to “accelerate scientific-technical progress”, 
to which such economic mechanisms as planning should be harnessed.85  
Meanwhile in Lithuania, Gorbachev’s acceleration quickly led to an in-
creasingly explicit and serious questioning of the entire state’s ambition to gov-
ern at that scale, to that extent, and with those instruments.86 In the final chap-
ter, I will show how the calculation-based governance, empowered with the 
material and intellectual machinery of system-cybernetic steering, became a 
target of direct criticism of the society and was identified with the very Soviet 
political system. In other words, the discourse of governance that, by the sus-
tained efforts of Soviet agents, was ideologically and institutionally neutralised, 
came to be re-charged with political meanings. The discursive resources that 
were mobilised to construct clashes between culture, steering and techno-
science eventually opposed the very centre of power in Lithuania – Russian rule 
through the CPSU. In Lithuania, “culture” ceased to be understood as a service 
to the population and once again became a vehicle of the sovereignty of the 
nation. 
 
                                      
85 Marchuk, Aganbegian et al., 14. 
86 For a concise overview of the program of perestroika see Aleksandras Shtromas, “The Inevita-
ble Collapse of Socialism,”in Totalitarianism and the Prospects for World Order: Closing the 
Door on the Twentieth Century, eds. R. Faulkner and D. J. Mahoney (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2003), 109-11. 
 212
VIII. Cultural Policy in Conflict with 
Calculating Communism 
Those active elements (people) make the total formalisation of governance 
into an algorithm on the basis of classical mathematical  
methods impossible.1
 
To satisfy, ensure, educate, enrich, shape.2
 
In 1986, the former Vice-Minister of Culture, Vytautas Jakelaitis, wrote that the 
work of Juozas Banaitis (the LSSR Minister of Culture from 1958 to 1967) 
“was not oriented to a current scientific organisation of labour because no one 
was imposing such requirements at that time”.3 According to Jakelaitis, it was 
self-evident that cultural policy-making in mid-1980s’ Lithuania had to be sci-
entifically organised. Let me recapitulate this ideal model of a scientifically 
organised, post-Stalinist Soviet cultural policy. Thus far, I have argued that the 
construction of Soviet cultural policy was a hybrid process in which economic 
reason and scientific-technical modernisation played an important role. From an 
economic standpoint, the cultural sector was defined as a service; its agents 
were professionals who provided that service. Both administrators and cultural 
operators – artists and cultural workers – were rationalised as “cadres” in the 
Soviet governing mentality, that is, employees of the state with clearly defined 
job descriptions.4 Cultural policy goals were integrated with economic ration-
ales: however, seen as a service, Soviet cultural policy sought to produce the 
very object it served: a socially cohesive population and a competent labour 
force. As stated in the above quote, Soviet cultural policy as a service aimed not 
only to “satisfy” its clients but also to “ensure, educate, enrich, shape” them. 
The persistent need for knowledge about “the current state” accompanied a 
Soviet cultural policy maker. To be known, culture had to be categorised and 
calculated. There was a perception that in order to administer cultural organisa-
tions efficiently, the future of broader social, cultural and economic develop-
ments had to be forecast with the help of mathematised social sciences. If cul-
ture diverged from the “course set by the Party”, this divergence would be de-
                                      
1 Kuzin and Pospelov, “Problemy semioticheskogo…,” 3. 
2 Stas Dilien, “Atsakai už patikt bar,” KB 1 (1986), 2. 
3 Jakelaitis, Juozas Banaitis, 146.  
4 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 728, l. 165-168. 
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tected immediately and steered back to the right path by top-down directives. 
Such was the ideal model of Soviet cultural policy-making.  
I have demonstrated that this interpretation of the steering of the cultural 
sector was embedded in a wider system of Soviet economic planning. It used 
the principles of cybernetic control, which were smoothly translated to man-
agement, initially debated, and eventually accommodated in public discourses 
on cultural policy. Chapter VII demonstrated that the scientific-technical revolu-
tion (STR) brought about a growing awareness of uncertain changes and a need 
for more control but also recognition of the limits of governance. STR blurred 
the traditional boundaries of the governed objects (culture-nature). Programmes 
of cultural policy had to draw on calculated predictions, but its object – the 
practices of both the producers and consumers of culture – were hard to capture; 
they continuously evaded rationalisation into processes in a system. As revealed 
in the above quote, it was difficult to write an algorithm for human behaviour. I 
will now proceed to further probe the Soviet awareness of the limitations of 
techno-scientific governance. 
This chapter argues that there was a growing awareness among Soviet ad-
ministrators and cultural operators that the ambition of the modern state to sub-
sume all subjects to its controlling eye and calculating brain was particularly 
limited in the case of culture. They held that culture was not easily defined and 
quantified. Its boundaries were blurred. It turned into something else. Culture, 
as a system characterised by flows – capital investments, cultural production 
and consumption – was translated into various sets of numbers, which created a 
reality of their own.5 Eventually, the entire paradigm of calculation-based, cen-
trally planned and directed cultural policy came into question. This led to more 
criticisms of the Communist Party monopoly. 
This chapter explores the roots of these scepticisms, which had already be-
gun in the 1960s and 1970s; however, its main focus is on the period after 1986, 
known as the reconstruction (perestroika, pertvarka) period. To cover all the 
innovative aspects of Lithuanian reconstruction debates about Soviet cultural 
policy would go well beyond the limits of this chapter. Therefore, I will focus 
only on the most explicit debates about calculation-based, techno-scientifically 
assisted cultural policy. I will briefly address the issues of nationalism and eth-
nicity, which were traditionally considered as being the most important ones of 
the period. Whilst scholars like Suny demonstrated that the Soviet regime 
stimulated the formation of ethnic identities and thus, that the nationalisms of 
the 1980s did not appear from out of the blue, I will point out that the STR dis-
course also contributed towards the creation of the anti-Soviet nationalist dis-
course.6
                                      
5 For a definition of capital investments and a statistical expression of their growth in Soviet 
Lithuania, see Meškauskas, Lietuvos kis, 168-170. 
6 Suny. 
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Numbers Disenchanted 
As argued in Chapter IV, centralised economic planning demanded many di-
verse cultural statistics. The key economic indicators were set by the State 
Planning Committee, and statistical forms were filled out by cultural organisa-
tions and provided to the Ministry of Culture. The aggregated numbers were 
used in abundance both in planning and public discourses. Soviet officials com-
piled their speeches and articles from the ideological statements that originated 
in CPSU Congresses and from numbers drawn from statistical tables. Such a 
Soviet collage of ideological statements and numbers was widely described by 
scholars as a propaganda discourse directed at both internal and external audi-
ences. Obviously, the use of such numbers was not only a Soviet feature: for 
example, Rose conceptualised the use of numbers as an important political 
technology in liberal democracies. He also noted the political neutralisation 
effect of such discourses of calculation.7
I suggest that the translation of the cultural sphere in a language of num-
bers was an increasingly reflexive act. To begin with, numbers created consid-
erable optimism and were greeted as a measure of success. It seemed that the 
ability to calculate something as amorphous as “culture” was a promise of order 
and progress. For example, the Minister of Culture Šepetys was fascinated by a 
quantitative language of cultural policy in 1966: 
 
It is hard to evaluate and express in numbers the cultural education of a 
man, but sometimes even silent rows of reports also start talking in an im-
pressive, articulated language. 1 million 177 thousand readers at libraries in 
the system of the Ministry of Culture alone, 1 million 652 thousand mu-
seum visitors, 2 million 237 thousand visitors at professional theatres and 
concerts per year!8
 
The minister’s fascination with numbers was on solid ground. Numbers indi-
cated performance; they “said” that the Ministry of Culture was doing good 
work. The statistical figures made many normally invisible practices visible. 
They were performative: the ministry performed its role by producing numbers, 
the numbers indicated the progress of the Lithuanian SSR, and Lithuanian pro-
gress illustrated the victory of communism over capitalism. It has to be noted 
that this performance, backed by the military force of the Soviet Union, was not 
open to external scrutiny from abroad.9 However, the mechanism for the pro-
duction of numbers came to be increasingly visible, as it was discussed in So-
viet Lithuanian cultural policy discourses.  
                                      
7 Rose, Powers of Freedom, 197-232. 
8 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 1604, l. 141. 
9 For an interesting study of the role of international organisations in scrutinizing and constructing 
post-Soviet transition in the three Baltic states, see Matilda Dahl, States under Scrutiny: Interna-
tional Organization, Transformation and the Construction of Progress (Stockholm: Stockholm 
University, 2007). 
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Was it held that numbers suited culture? Some people believed that they 
did. For example, in talking about the possibility of applying Andrei Kosygin’s 
incentive-based reforms in theatres (for instance, a better individual perform-
ance would entail greater financial rewards), the Lithuanian economist and pub-
licist Saulius Razma insisted that it was only “natural for the creative spirit and 
economic wisdom to merge in every theatre”. Nevertheless, he cautiously indi-
cated the reductive power of numbers saying that “of course, no one claims that 
dry statistical data, numbers in financial accounting, and standardised forms can 
fully reflect the results of creativity”.10  
Numbers were intended to help not only policy makers and administrators, 
but also to motivate cultural operators to work more efficiently Statistical com-
parisons were used to inject competition into a lethargic Soviet economy. 
“Friendly socialist competition” campaigns, based on a system of symbolic and 
material incentives (bonuses, receiving a red flag as a symbol of victory) were 
often announced; they had to simulate market competition. It was assumed that 
republics, regions, towns and other administrative units would strive to improve 
their activities in order to submit better numbers. The cultural sector was not 
exempted from socialist competition: for example, cultural houses would com-
pete with each other for better attendance at their events and more visitors to 
their libraries. However, it was difficult to translate socialist competition into 
culture because culture was not seen as being susceptible to Fordist rationalisa-
tion into clear-cut stages: 
  
The process of culture is so specific, so particular that it is not really possi-
ble to divide it into separate time or length segments. A collective farm or a 
factory can tell precisely how much it lost or made last year. We also 
evaluate our work in numbers, but they are a very conditional indicator and 
do not describe the entire essence, meaning, achievements and losses of our 
work.11
 
Not only did numbers contribute with increasing visibility; they also made 
many practices invisible. This problem was often raised publicly by the Soviet 
cultural-policy makers and operators. The Minister of Culture Lionginas 
Šepetys opened his speech about the previous year’s achievements in “the do-
mains of culture” in the early 1970s with the following quote. (He held that it 
was necessary to be aware of the limitations of using numbers and calculations 
in cultural policy): 
 
What is the Soviet socialist Lithuanian culture like today...? It is not easy to 
answer this question. It is easier to sum up results of agriculture or indus-
                                      
10 Saulius Razma, “Teatras ir ekonomika. Polemins pastabos,” Literatra ir menas, 27 July 
1974, 11. 
11 “Ms interviu. Naujj met išvakarse su Lietuvos TSR kultros ministru Lionginu Šepeiu 
kalbasi LM bendradarbis Romas Sadauskas,” Literatra ir menas, no. 52, 1973, 2. 
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try: at the end of an economic year or month they become quite clear. 
Achievements in sports are measured precisely in seconds, minutes, and 
points. Meanwhile, in the cultural sphere, the results are not always com-
pleted within a calendar year and not all indicators directly reflect the ac-
tual state of affairs. And yet even here numbers and comparisons can tell a 
lot. Not in vain, sometimes the situation is paraphrased as follows: there is 
as much truth in a certain phenomenon as it is possible to express it 
mathematically. [The italics are mine– E.R.]12
 
To be able to tell “quite a lot” was not to tell everything. Thus, this quote tells 
us that the highly placed Soviet cultural official did not fully buy into the hege-
monic economic discourse of quantitative measurability. And yet his reserva-
tions were strongly coupled with paying homage to the power of numbers as a 
“language of truth”. In retrospect, Šepetys was very critical about the “blind 
guidelines” of “indicators”. In his recently published memoirs, he described his 
argument with the head of the organisational work department at the Central 
Committee about the distribution of prizes to distinguished artists:  
 
When it came to a ballet dancer, T. Sventickait, our deliberations got 
bogged down in a morass of indicators. “What are the concrete indicators 
of her achievements?” the head [of the organisational work department at 
the Central Committee] kept asking. I kept repeating that she had danced 
many expressive roles and that she was at a high professional level and a 
virtuoso, a temperamental dancer… “If there are no concrete indicators, 
there will be no award”, he stated and cut short the conversation.13
 
Numbers were supposed to stimulate the work of culture. However, making 
numbers was in itself hard work. Processing numbers and circulating them 
within the bureaucratic system was a source of frustration. Even highly placed 
cultural policy-makers had to deal with the massive system of accounting and 
reporting on a daily basis. As Vice-Minister Vytautas Jakelaitis commented 
about the mid-1960s, his last years in the Ministry of Culture: 
 
First, the formalism of the leadership of culture strengthened each year. 
Higher ministerial officers were increasingly suspicious of cultural initia-
tives and demanded various forms [spravki] nearly everyday; inspectors re-
turned again and again. […] I saw how my colleagues were depressed by 
this overwhelming “socialist competition”, having to weigh creative en-
deavours on the basis of points on paper. […] And inspectors had only one 
occupation – counting, writing and counting again – instead of solving 
                                      
12 Lionginas Šepetys, “Nauji darbo barai” (1972), LLMA, f. 342, a. 1, b. 2288, l. 17. 
13 Šepetys, Neprarastoji karta, 60. It took a turn to the means of realpolitik to solve the situation. 
The ballet dancer received the award only after Šepetys complained about Novickas to the higher 
Party members. 
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problems. And everywhere there were demands for “pure ideology” above 
all else! […] One year, we realised that it was already the beginning of 
May and we had not even started working yet; we were only pushing paper 
and sending off forms [pažyma].14
 
Of course, traditional bureaucracies practiced statistical accounting. As argued 
in Chapter V, in the post-1960 Soviet bureaucracy, the statistical flows were re-
conceptualised in system-cybernetic terms and assisted by computerisation. In 
1983, the meeting of the presidium of the All-Union Academy of Sciences 
adopted a new definition of “informatics”: the term ceased to mean the contents 
of databases and instead would refer to the science of communication. The con-
cept of “informatics” absorbed many fields that previously had been included in 
the Soviet definition of “cybernetics” (keeping in mind that the Soviet use of 
cybernetics was more widespread than it was in the West).15 In the mid-1980s, 
Gorbachev felt it necessary to update Lenin’s slogan of “industrialisation” with 
“informatisation” (informatizatsiia).16
I believe that this suggests that although the recasting of the state admini-
stration in cybernetic terms was barely achieved in practice, cybernetic govern-
ance endured in the Soviet mentality as an appropriate mode for governing 
complex spheres. At the end of 1985, the LSSR Minister of Culture argued that 
the principles of ideological work should agree with the contemporary princi-
ples of management and thus combine elements of cybernetics, systems theory 
and sociological research. He viewed them as being based on “scientificity”, 
“complexity”, “differentiated work with separate inhabitants’ groups”, “coher-
ence and systematicity”, and “flow”.17 In 1985, “systemic” work was often op-
posed to “sporadic” or “chaotic” (stichiškas) or “clichéd” (šabloniškas) work.18 
In the same year, the minister stressed that cultural policy-making was about to 
face the changes that were “on an equally great – or maybe even greater scale 
than those that followed the 20th Congress of the CPSU” and called for a “tech-
nical re-arming of museums and libraries”.19 Perestroika was announced at the 
27th Party Congress held in February and March of 1986. A stronger and more 
                                      
14 Jakelaitis, Saulei leidžiantis, 5-6. 
15In explaining the reasons for this change, Lithuanian historian of informatics Voverien quoted 
the head of the Cybernetics Board at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, A. Dorodnitsin, who ar-
gued that “malicious tumours of empty wordiness grew on cybernetics [...] serious people came to 
be ashamed of the name of cybernetician, [...] it appeared necessary to clean away the rubbish of 
chatter.” A. A. Dorodnitsin, “Informatika: predmet i zadachi” Priroda 2 (1985), 27, cf Voverien, 
1996, 107-108. 
16 Shane, 70. 
17 For example, “the activity of a club – an uninterrupted purposive flow of pedagogical impact,” 
LLMA, f.342, ap.1, b. 3645, l. 86. This vision of a club was clearly very normative. As it had 
been noted in an earlier decision of the LSSR Ministry of Culture, the chain “information-
propaganda-effect” did not always work properly in club enterprises. Decision N. 3 (24 April 
1985), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3671, l. 23.  
18 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3676. 
19 “Pranešimo planas” (1985), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3645, l. 8, 14. 
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explicit emphasis on science and technology for cultural governance was intro-
duced. The minister addressed the Collegium of the Ministry of Culture20 by 
saying: 
 
The growing complexity of the socialist society and economy implied the 
need to strengthen the scientific basis of government, to make it adequate 
for the new scale of our economy, to the new requirements of the times. 
The general logic of the development of socio-economic processes puts 
forward the task of uplifting a scientific basis of cultural construction.21
 
I think that the way in which this conviction of appropriate governance clashed 
with everyday reality is quite remarkable. The intellectual machinery of calcula-
tion-based governance was poorly supported by material machinery. Just like 
the limited power of numbers to express the value of culture and effectivise 
cultural-policy making, the failure of the government to provide the cultural 
sector with “cybernetic technologies” was publicly acknowledged. 
The Poverty of Technology 
In this section, I will briefly describe how the technical embodiment of cyber-
netic steering into computer technologies was expected to enter Soviet Lithua-
nian libraries, museums and contemporary music. As mentioned earlier, for 
largely arbitrary reasons, the publishing and broadcasting sectors did not fall 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture; thus, television, cinema and 
radio will be considered here. However, there was a perception that libraries and 
museums needed new, cybernetic technologies just as much as did television 
and radio. Additionally, I will consider an organisation, definitely not one that 
was dependent on the Ministry of Culture but that was essential for providing 
information for the government, namely, the Committee for State Security 
(KGB), which, judging from available documents, was somewhat surprisingly 
ill-equipped technically to conduct surveillance of culture. Hence, the KGB case 
rounds out this section by demonstrating how cybernetic management was 
somewhat more efficiently implemented (although its use was probably still 
limited) in more prioritised spheres (such as KGB surveillance of the popula-
tion) than in less prioritised cultural work (the effectivisation of self-education 
of the population through libraries and museums). 
                                      
20 The Collegium was the highest decision-making body in the ministry, under whose responsibil-
ity fell planning, cadres and reports. It was launched in 29 September 1953, though its regulations 
were passed somewhat later, 13 January 1954. See Lisenkait, 200. 
21 Jonas Bielinis, “Materialy k vystupleniiu na kolegii Ministerstva kul’tury Litovskoi SSR” 
(1986), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3709, l. 51. 
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1) Libraries, Museums, Music 
It was the librarians who invested big hopes in the age of “the flow of informa-
tion”. In the mid-1970s, however, as the polemical-critical articles in Domains 
of Culture revealed, Soviet Lithuanian library work could hardly be character-
ised as a smooth flow. The centralisation of the libraries did create the precondi-
tions required for computerising the sector. The technical equipment of the ma-
jority of libraries, especially in the countryside, was quite poor. Even some very 
basic technical components of librarianship, such as telephones were often 
missing. Although libraries were described as “banks of information”, much of 
the information was often stored, not in printed or electronic databases, but in 
the brain of a librarian. In 1976, an article about the Utena district’s libraries 
complained that:  
 
He [a librarian] uses scarce bibliographical sources and often informs a 
reader “after digging in his own memory”. Without reproduction technol-
ogy (only typewriters were available), the central district library is unable 
to provide the staffs of library branches with information about the avail-
able book resources of the district. [...] Teletype machines would be needed 
to transmit and receive requests, but this seems to be a thing in the distant 
future. At this point, only nine out of 35 village libraries even have a tele-
phone. A very old requirement of librarian scholars (this is also emphasised 
in the documents of centralisation) is that contemporary libraries need tele-
type machines, library buses, machines for copying and duplication, com-
puting technology, specialised librarians – all these good suggestions are 
perceived as unnecessary, as a library is expected to manage even without 
this technological reconstruction. And it is managing. Of course, the read-
ers are suffering.22  
 
The interlibrary loan system was in particular need of “cybernetisation” or 
an automated management system. And even though AMS were introduced into 
cargo transport by the late 1960s, they never reached public libraries (the situa-
tion of scientific libraries with restricted access was somewhat better). As 
Beissinger pointedly observed, in the Soviet offices of the 1970s, 19th century 
technologies, such as manual typewriters, carbon paper and an abacus prevailed, 
while the computerised equipment was reserved for the “production” sphere.23 
Thus, in 1987, the LSSR Minister of Culture criticised the state of computerisa-
tion of libraries: “Systemically, though not quickly, work is being carried out in 
the sphere of a national retrospective bibliography: a republic-wide automated 
library information system, which lays the foundation for librarianship and bib-
liography of the 21st century, is being created”.24
                                      
22 Antanas Staponkus, “Naujus kelius išžvalgant,” KB 4 (1976), 36.37. 
23 Beissinger, 250. 
24 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 31, 35, 33.  
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Like libraries, museums and restoration institutes also voiced the need for 
advanced technology. Since the 19th century, museums have been regarded as 
important sites for the production of scientific knowledge.25 This particular 
function was of utmost importance in the Soviet Union, in particular because 
museums were used for anti-religious propaganda. It can hardly be a coinci-
dence that museums were the only sphere of the Soviet Lithuanian cultural sec-
tor that saw the materialisation of cybernetic rationalisation. First, just like the 
Soviet administrative apparatus of governance, museums themselves were rede-
fined in system-cybernetic terms. In 1987 Bielinis noted that 
 
Scientific-technical progress that opens up new themes and ideas, new ex-
hibits and new means of displays for museums can play an active role in 
helping these institutions protect, propagate and relate today’s traditional 
cultural values to historical experience. It may seem paradoxical that to-
day’s means of mass communications, which can help a person quickly re-
trieve the most diverse information, do not diminish the significance of 
such an immobile source of information as a museum. [...] a museum, be-
ing a kind of a passive storage facility, actively generates and transfers the 
charges of ideas.26
 
Indeed, since the mid-1970s, several published articles have called for the “cy-
bernetisation” of museum work. For example, Romualdas Budrys, the director 
of the Lithuanian SSR Art Museum, stated that an important goal of a museum 
is to “shape museum collections on the grounds of modern science”.27 Of 
course, modern science was impossible without efficient methods for processing 
large quantities of information. Thus, information processing was the first 
sphere to be computerised. The director noted that in “the advanced countries” 
the computerisation of museum catalogues started “30 years ago”. Meanwhile 
the Lithuanian art museum “only recently” initiated rather primitive computeri-
sation using punch cards.  
In 1987, for the first time, the Minister of Culture stressed the importance 
of using “the achievements of science and technology in all spheres of museum 
work”. It was envisioned that “technical and biological systems” would be ap-
plied in the museums’ storage rooms. The “electronic computing machines” 
would be used to create “dynamic systems of information and catalogues”. The 
computerisation of all the country’s museums was necessary in order to create a 
“unified state accounting system of museum values”. Moreover, “audiovisual 
                                      
25 In the 19th century the museums predominantly concentrated on collecting and displaying the 
typical as opposed to the curious and irregular, which was common to baroque collections. See 
Bennett, The Birth of the Museum; Tony Bennett, Pasts Beyond Memory: Evolution, Museums, 
Colonialism (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 64-84. 
26 Jonas Bielinis (16 November 1987), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 54. 
27 Romualdas Budrys, “Elektronin technika muziejuje,” KB 7 (1983), 49. 
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design”, particularly holograms, were to be used in constructing displays.28 The 
minister regretted that despite “the great industrial potential in the spheres of 
electronics, radio technology and television in the republic, it was rare for mu-
seums to be provided with audiovisual equipment and new technologies”.29 
Thus, the Soviet Lithuanian museums lagged about 20 years behind their West-
ern counterparts when it came to the use of computer and cybernetic technolo-
gies. 
Interestingly, computerisation was first introduced at the Palanga Amber 
Museum. Established in 1963, this natural history museum focuses on palaeon-
tology. This case suggests that the logic of economic priority was replicated 
where the natural sciences were seen as superior to culture (the arts). Thus, the 
Amber Museum was seen being as “more scientific” than an art gallery and 
hence more deserving of computerisation. Further, the choice might have been 
motivated by the museum’s discursive role in Soviet Lithuania. Natural history, 
as pointed out by Bennett, had been mobilised by museums in the 19th century 
to construct and govern the social.30 In the Lithuanian context, the Amber Mu-
seum brought the “natural” and the “national” closer together. It studied and 
displayed amber pieces that contained pre-historic fossils and were found in 
Lithuanian territory. In this exhibit, the museum showed the territoriality of the 
country, which extended well beyond the history of its population. In addition, 
historically, the amber trade was one of the major characteristics of the Baltic 
tribes and marked their routes in the historiography. In the 20th century, amber 
was also used as a metaphor for the country. In a poem (a standard part of 
school curricula) by the communist Lithuanian poet Salomja Nris, Lithuania 
was described as a “drop of amber”.31 Material memory, which enabled the 
tracing of both extinct species frozen in amber pieces and the prehistoric Baltic 
trade routes and cultural contacts, was to be translated and hosted by a new 
“electronic memory”.32 However, in addition to a database, new technologies 
for displays were required. One archival document stated that museums lacked 
“audiovisual equipment and new technology, despite the fact that the republic 
has accumulated the potential for technological production in electronics, radio 
technology and television”. 33 As late as 1987, the computerisation of museums, 
along with the creation of a “unitary state accounting system of museums’ val-
ues” and cataloguing with the help of “electronic calculation machines” were 
only part of a plan for the future.34  
Cybernetic technologies were seen not only as machines of governance 
and the production of knowledge but also as tools for creation in culture. Fi-
                                      
28 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 64. 
29 Jonas Bielinis (3 April 1987), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 33. 
30 Bennett, Pasts Beyond Memory. 
31 Gintautas Mažeikis, “Propagandin literatra: Nuo ideologins mimezs iki mitografijos. Vly-
vojo stalinizmo laikotarpio lietuvi literatra,” Darbai ir dienos 48 (2007), 233-260. 
32 Budrys, “Elektronin technika muziejuje,” 50. 
33 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 31, 35, 33.  
34 LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3771, l. 64.
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nally, I would like to consider computer music and electronic instruments, 
which constituted a somewhat specialised zone, which involved only a few art-
ists. However, in the mid-1980s, in addition to libraries and museums, Lithua-
nian electronic music was publicly discussed as another meeting point between 
“traditional culture” and “advanced technology”. As the importance of Lithua-
nian and Baltic electronic music in general in the Soviet Union has already been 
briefly addressed by some researchers, I will limit myself to pointing out that 
1984 marked a tipping point.35 The musicians started to complain publicly 
about the inadequacy of the transformative powers of widely announced STR 
and the actual paucity of technical innovations in their sector. 
In July 1984, Domains of Culture published an article entitled “Music and 
Technological Progress”, which appraised the opportunities provided by com-
puter technologies and complained about the poor state of electronic music in 
Lithuania. It stated that composers “have a difficult time with primitive, some-
times homemade apparatuses”.36 In the next issue, the problem was further ad-
dressed by the vice-rector of the LSSR Music Academy, who also regretted that 
the “tools of a composer working in the cybernetic age are still a sheet of lined 
paper and a pencil, just like 100 years ago”. Arguing that “the union of music-
science-technology would be a positive generator of new artistic expression”, he 
called for the establishment of a republican studio of electronic music.37 In Oc-
tober, the famous composer Osvaldas Balakauskas published a solid historical 
overview of electronic music in the West and presented Lithuanian efforts to 
move “towards electronic music”.38 The composer complained that electronic 
and computer technologies were unavailable to composers. The magazine in-
vited several scientists to comment on the musicians’ complaints: a lecturer on 
programming, the head of the Venta scientific research institute, and a physicist, 
the vice-rector of Vilnius University. Their reaction was quite defensive. The 
lecturer dismissed the musicians’ complaints and suggested that access to com-
puters was not really a problem because the machines were, in principle, avail-
able for public use at the republic’s computing centres. He insisted that the 
“theoreticians of art” themselves were not interested in using electronic comput-
ing machines.39 It would be difficult to speculate on how the composers’ re-
quests for access would have been treated at those centralised centres, which 
were equipped with machinery that was outdated and often in need of repair and 
also had to serve the needs of many economists and scientists. On the other 
hand, as mentioned earlier, the computing centres were indeed often underused. 
The other two scientists agreed that the technical base was not that bad and used 
this opportunity to popularise computer technologies in the pages of Domains of 
                                      
35 See Mark Rais, “Some Notes about Soviet Computer Music,” Leonardo 24, no.5 (1991), 535-
39. 
36 Birut Sinkeviit, “Muzika ir technikos pažanga,” KB 7 (1984), 19. 
37 Juozas Antanaviius, “Perspektyvi sjunga,” KB 8 (1984), 26-28.  
38 Osvaldas Balakauskas, “Elektronins muzikos link,” KB 10 (1984), 7-11. 
39 Ginatutas Grigas, KB 10 (1984), 8-9. 
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Culture. The head of the Venta institute emphasised that new electronic instru-
ments were being developed in cooperation with the Mathematics and Cyber-
netics Institute (LAS).40 Meanwhile, the vice-rector regretted the widespread 
computer illiteracy and emphasised plans to establish computer-related educa-
tion in various university departments.41  
It is important to note that the responses to the musicians’ problems did not 
try to downplay the significance of electronic music. Since the Soviet Union 
could claim the leading role in some spheres of electronic music, especially 
computer algorithms produced by the Russian mathematician and composer 
Rudolf Zaripov (1929-1991), electronic music enjoyed a very good reputation, 
although this apparently did not facilitate its “material base”. Thus, the case of 
electronic music reveals the paradoxical status of culture in the Soviet system. 
Ideologically, it was both an important instrument for governing Soviet citizens 
and a resource for communicating Soviet progress abroad and yet it was not 
exempt from the prevailing low supply or even lack of new technologies. In-
deed, judging from available documents, even the Lithuanian department of the 
KGB could not boast that it had a solid technical base of computer technologies. 
2) The KGB 42  
The movement of information in society has its own specific features.43
 
As Shane pointed out, the KGB, the state security apparatus, was probably the 
main instrument for both circulating and suppressing information about the 
population in the Soviet Union.44 It is no wonder then that the KGB also used a 
system-cybernetic language and technologies. This section presents some new 
data about the system-cybernetic lenses that the KGB used to make Lithuanian 
culture legible and controllable. Culture was assigned particular meanings in 
AMS that was designed for the state security organs.  
It should come as no surprise that the LSSR state security committee 
(KGB) was better equipped with computer technologies than was the Ministry 
of Culture. It is difficult to determine just how good the KGB’s equipment was 
in relation to other institutions, as there is not sufficient documentation available 
at the time of this writing. It has to be emphasised that the documents obtained 
from the KGB archives in Vilnius provide only a very limited understanding of 
the use of computer technology in relation to culture. First, the secret documents 
were regularly destroyed according to the internal rules of the agency. It is very 
likely that many of the surviving documents were exported from Lithuania dur-
                                      
40 Liucijus Kondratas, KB 10 (1984), 9. 
41 Algimantas Bikelis, KB 10 (1984), 10-11. 
42 I am grateful to Arvydas Anušauskas for referring me to Del’ta-Litva. 
43 Afanas’ev, “O soderzhanii…,” 42. 
44 Shane, Dismantling Utopia, 103, 104. Shane quoted a story of how a KGB official himself 
referred to Wiener and called the KGB a “kind of feedback”. 
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ing the period 1990-1991, when the KGB was moving to Russia. Hence, the 
findings presented in this section rely on only a few remaining sources found in 
the Lithuanian Special Archives and therefore should not be regarded as conclu-
sive. Second, at the moment it is nearly impossible to know how and if the 
AMS was even used by the KGB. 
Based on documents at the LSSR KGB archives, I was able to establish 
that no computer equipment was included in acquisitions planned for the early 
1980s.45 Most probably, some computers were acquired in the late 1980s. An 
inventory conducted in 1990 revealed that the Vilnius department of the KGB 
operated with two Xerox copying machines, 64 desk calculators and four mod-
erately powerful “electronic calculation machines” (ESM).46 The archives also 
contained some computer tapes; however the tapes had not been decoded.47 
These documents revealed the existence of an automated information system 
(automatin informacin sistema) known as Del’ta-Litva, which was developed 
and kept at the Information-Analytical Department. The archives contained 
codes or a “normative vocabulary” to be used with Del’ta-Litva, dated 1985. 
The codes were to be entered on punch cards, which were archived; they dated 
from 1987 to 1990.48 I did not found any technical information about the com-
puter, but the name of the system suggests that it was probably based on the 
Del’ta computer (a Soviet clone of a popular ZX-Spectrum computer, produced 
in Great Britain). Data about a similar system has been located in the Latvian 
KGB archives; however, both the Latvian and Estonian KGB archives are un-
available to researchers. It is known, however, that Latvian archivists succeeded 
in decoding their punch cards.49 Thus, it could be rather safely assumed that the 
Del’ta information system was in use throughout the Soviet Union. On the basis 
of available material, the Del’ta-Litva information system could be described as 
a computerised tool for processing information about various actions that would 
concern the KGB. The “normative vocabulary” expressed a fascinating concep-
tualisation of places, types of actions, causes of actions and actants, of which a 
full-fledged Greimasian analysis should be conducted elsewhere.  
The Del’ta-Litva system was not designed specially for the cultural sector. 
Indeed, it was a database of many administrative units in Lithuanian SSR and 
included a coded list of towns, addresses, organisations, objects, motives and 
types of actions. In Del’ta-Litva, culture was constructed in three ways. First, it 
was a place or the location of an action. Second, it was a cause and third, it was 
                                      
45 The plan of expenses for bureau equipment for 1982 allocated financing only for typewriters, 
calculators and copying machines. “(1981) Sekretno. Proekt smety raskhodov na soderzhanie 
Komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti Litovskoi SSR na 1982 god,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. 12, b. 424, 
l. 6. 
46 “Inventorius” (1990), LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-2, b. 30, l. 1, 2. Informal evaluation by Mifodijus 
Sapagovas, 2008. 
47 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-3, b. 1374-1379. 
48 “Perforuotos kortels ‘Deltos’ aparatui. 1987-1990,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. 49, b. 1527. I could not 
access the cards because they contained names of KGB agents and residents. 
49 Information based on conversation with Arvydas Anušauskas, Vilnius, December 2007.  
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the means of an action. For example, the nomenclature for “the type of the 
means for conducting an action” contained a sub-section entitled “the means of 
ideological impact”. Thus “art and literature” were marked with code 23, and 
“printed or handwritten ‘samizdat’ works” – 24.50 Other types included “the 
means of physical impact”, such as weapons, and the “the means of duplica-
tion”, such as photography equipment or typewriters. The domain of the Minis-
try of Culture was also absent from the category known as “categories of infor-
mation source”.51 One category “social status”, contained two applicable cate-
gories: “creatively intelligent” (Code 33) and “cultural operator” (kultros tar-
nautojas, Code 40).52 The vocabulary about “purpose, motive and cause of an 
action” coded several cultural activities, such as the “influence of radio” (11), 
the “influence of television” (12), “film” (13), “completed education” (46) and 
“literature” (14).53 Notably, the fine arts and music were absent from the code. 
The code list also covered cultural organisations and agencies. Thus, the vo-
cabulary for “department subordination” (Žinybinis pavaldumas, 016) indicated 
the Ministries of Culture, both republican and all-union. It also included the 
association for the protection of historical and cultural monuments (139) and 
creative unions (092-097).54 The cultural sphere as a physical and organisa-
tional location was thoroughly coded. The vocabulary for “categories of organi-
sations (objects)” included an ensemble (014), various libraries (056-060), a 
gallery (338), a permanent exhibition (097), a palace of culture (120), a house of 
culture (127), an exhibition hall (177), a concert hall (178), a theatre (514) and a 
ministry (569).55 Further, the coding system included some of Vilnius’s city 
organisations, such as “the agency of culture of the Vilnius gorispolkom” 
(4397), a trust Dail (4282),56 the Philharmonic Society (552, 314), the iurli-
onis String Quartet (798), the State Philharmonic Society Ensemble (Gosfilhar-
monija, 819), the Opera and Ballet Theatre (2022), the Theatre of Youth (1120), 
the Art Fund (763), the Book Palace (541), the Artists’ Union (4327, 915), the 
Writers’ Union (7364), the Art Institute (4324), the Conservatory (616) and the 
editorial board of the newspaper Literature and Art (779). I believe that this 
listing nicely illustrates another numerical guise of culture as it emerged in the 
eyes of the state security surveillants. 
As I noted, at the present time, it is nearly impossible to find out how and 
if the Del’ta-Litva information system was used by the KGB and other institu-
tions. Judging from the archival documents, it is clear that certain actions were 
coded on information cards, for example, a certain individual performed a cer-
tain action by manipulating certain objects and other individuals at a certain 
                                      
50 “Informacin sistema “Delta-Litva” 1985,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 4. 
51 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 10,11. 
52 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 12. 
53 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 17-19. 
54 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 21-44. 
55 LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 71, l. 45-62. 
56 “IAS. Vilniaus m. 
moni, 
staig ir organizacij srašai su informacins sistemos “Delta-
Litva” inf.korteli Nr.,” LYA, f. K-1, ap. B/n-1, b. 77, l. 6, 30. 
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organisation and address. The database was supposed to be searchable on the 
basis of all of these variables. However, as the archived instructions revealed, 
primary information was entered on paper cards by hand, transferred onto punch 
cards and then entered into a computer.57 It can be hypothesised that the infor-
mation on the punch cards was intended for use in Moscow rather than lo-
cally.58 It is difficult to know precisely how much the system was used in the 
Information-Analytical Department. More than the fact that the department was 
small, there is no reliable information about it since a list of its personnel could 
not be accessed. According to an LYA employee, however, only two people 
were employed there.59
On the basis of this very scarce information, it can be contended that the 
Del’ta-Litva automated information system did not introduce any new catego-
ries to the existing cultural nomenclature, defined in the documents of the Min-
istry of Culture. The selection of certain organisations was not obvious to me: it 
was another example of a Borgesian list. However, the “normative vocabular-
ies” project was an open one because new titles and codes were added. In all 
probability, the coded organisations were those with which the KGB was most 
engaged at that time. Thus, Del’ta-Litva was a kind of surveillance and account-
ing system, which made it possible to digitally search information about, for 
example, the types of actions conducted in certain locations, their consequences, 
causes, time, and agents – titular agents and mediators – involved. Notably, 
cultural production, like literature, was listed among the means of possible ac-
tions. 
 
In summary, by the end of the 1980s, some concrete cases of cybernetisation of 
governance and work in the cultural sector emerged. All of them, including the 
Del’ta system at the KGB, were severely limited in a technical sense (and 
probably in actual use). The techno-scientific equipment of cultural organisa-
tions was, from a discursive point of view, closely linked with the very rationale 
of Soviet governance, which was based on economic rationalisation and calcu-
lation. Thus, KGB codified cultural organisations as informational units for its 
policing purposes, whilst the computerisation of museums fell into the eco-
nomic priority of the means of production (natural sciences as the production of 
the means of production). Nevertheless, at the same time, the centralised, ad-
ministratively commanded, Soviet system came under increasingly strong at-
tack. 
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1986 and After: Taking Culture Out of the Bureaucrat’s Briefcase 
Calculation, control and ideology were intertwined in complex ways in the So-
viet cultural sector. In 1950, Gudaitis-Guzeviius, in a private communication 
to an undercover KGB agent, confessed his lack of interest in writing Soviet 
“official literature” (valdiška literatra). Guzeviius said that in these days 
“every accountant could become a writer; all one had to do was calculate all the 
official ‘pros’ and ‘cons’”.60 It is remarkable that even such a hard-line commu-
nist as the former head of the LSSR NKVD contrasted the productive and crea-
tive work of a writer with a calculative manipulator. Two things are important 
here. First, calculation, seeking to meet official expectations, was opposed to an 
ideal of cultural creation as an un-contracted expression of individual talent. 
Second, the authority of the official ideology was questioned: Guzeviius sug-
gested that it was limited and uninspiring. For sure, in the 1940s-1950s, such 
opinions could be stated only in private and then, as in this case, they risked 
being documented in KGB reports. It was only about 30 years later that the 
Soviet calculation-based governance of culture could be criticised openly. In 
this section, I will show how criticism of the Soviet methods of governing cul-
ture intensified to such an extent that the mode was rejected. 
In the second half of the 1980s, my main source, Domains of Culture, pub-
lished many critical articles written by a wide variety of representatives from 
the cultural sector: they ranged from a librarian in a village house of culture to 
an administrator at the LSSR Ministry of Culture. Even though the magazine 
belonged to the official body of the communist government, the ministry, it 
became a channel for the ideas of the Sjdis independence movement and 
sought to provide a forum in which all cultural operators could express their 
views. It is quite curious that I found almost no reference to ongoing cultural 
policy debates in the other Baltic republics or Russia. Thus, the Lithuanian re-
construction debates could be seen as rather self-contained. The liberalising 
programme of perestroika, or reconstruction, announced by Mikhail Gorbachev 
in 1986, did not seek to do away with “scientific governance”. Quite the con-
trary: its important part was the “technological rejuvenation” of the Soviet Un-
ion and, of course, the cultural sector. In his internal address to the Collegium of 
the Ministry, the LSSR Minister of Culture reported that “the general logic of 
the development of social-economic processes posed the task of advancing a 
scientific basis of planning cultural construction”.61 At about the same time, 
“the scientific basis of planning cultural construction” was attacked by cultural 
intellectuals and cultural workers from various sides. However, attacks against 
calculation-based governance of culture began even before the announcement of 
economic reconstruction and openness. 
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As early as 1982, the scientifically and economically rationalised govern-
ance of culture was thoroughly criticised in an internal meeting of the Agency 
of Cultural-Enlightenment Enterprises. The existing statistical calculations were 
criticised for being badly designed and unreliable and for creating the wrong 
incentives. Arguing that “the norms of standards and measurements do not al-
ways fit cultural life”, a participant criticised the role of coefficients in socialist 
competition and its relation to the Party postulate of equality. Let me explain: 
the results of the work of cultural organisations were evaluated on the basis of 
proportional statistical representation. For instance, attendance rates at movie 
theatres were not evaluated in relation to the total average of moviegoers per 
city but per city inhabitant. However, in reality, larger towns always boasted 
higher rates, mainly because the choice of films was greater in these towns. It 
appeared that all towns wanted to reach the coefficients of the capital Vilnius, 
which led to the falsification of numbers. As one cultural worker stated, “By 
ignoring the laws of logic, the result was already evident before the calculating 
even began. As if all the smaller towns had come to a mutual agreement, not 
only did they raise the numbers to the level of those of the large cities, they also 
left them far behind”. In a similar vein, he complained about attempts to use 
points to calculate the achievements of folk art. The points were calculated per a 
folk artist’s participation in an exhibition, not by place of residence. Conse-
quently, Vilnius garnered 860 points because many exhibitions took place there, 
whereas the places where folk artists actually lived and worked – provincial 
towns like Alytus – received no points at all. The speaker argued that the system 
of calculation itself was clearly faulty and was further distorted by unreliable 
numbers. He also claimed that, in general, it made no sense to “compare the 
efforts put into the work and the impact on the republic’s cultural life”.62  
Statistical calculations of the performance of cultural organisations pro-
duced more than the activities initially intended. There were complaints that 
sometimes “secondary indicators” were better evaluated by awarding staff with 
bonuses than “primary” (cultural results). It was seen as unfair that libraries 
with better results in “telephonisation” (succeeding in installing more tele-
phones) received higher awards than those that had a higher level of readership 
per librarian. In the ministry meetings, it was acknowledged that the economic 
incentives stimulated people to strive for higher levels of performance in rela-
tion to certain indicators. However, there was concern that this indicator-driven 
competition would lead to the creation of capitalist relationships inside social-
ism: “a kind of NEP time has arrived – one attempts to complete work in a more 
profitable way and accumulate the dubious capital of socialist competition”.63 
On the other hand, a cultural-enlightenment worker, arguing against the stan-
dardisation imposed by accounting for culture, asked whether “instead of stimu-
                                      
62 Bielskis (1982), LLMA, f. 342, ap. 1, b. 3473, l. 9-10. 
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lating socialist competition, we were bandaging it like an invalid with those 
tables, graphs, instructions?”64
To put it metaphorically, in the 1980s, culture was seen not as a flow proc-
essed by “thinking machines” but as a document locked inside the briefcase of a 
Soviet bureaucrat. Cultural workers complained about being tired of filling in 
detailed accounting forms, which they regarded as pointless because they were 
aware of the wide-spread falsification of the results. They were unhappy that 
their suggestions to improve administrative procedures were met with indiffer-
ence by higher officials. All these issues were encapsulated in an article pub-
lished in Domains of Culture (1987), in which the head of the culture depart-
ment in Kelm district complained about the pervasive formalisation of cultural 
work: 
 
Our everyday life is very much complicated by formalism, the cult of a lit-
tle bit of paper, which has survived in times of reconstruction. It is suffi-
cient to remember that it took an entire month for us to prepare, together 
with district cultural workers, for a discussion about differentiated work at 
the Agency of Cultural-Enlightenment Enterprises. We gathered and stud-
ied the material and proposed, in our view, the most suitable version of a 
system, but it was all in vain. Routine won out. It was recommended to sat-
isfice with… additional logs to mark what, for one or another event was 
noted in a journal. The enormous flow of papers is never-ending; we are 
continuously being asked to provide various certificates and information. 
What else to call this, if not the crushing of independent initiative? And the 
nerve of asking us to carry out continuous check-ups and meticulous cost 
control? Because of inertia, there is still a greater belief in statements on 
paper than real facts. This is how culture is locked inside a briefcase, how it 
is endangered and how it risks being suffocated.65
 
It is hard to overestimate the importance of this dissatisfaction and despair re-
garding the Soviet government’s failure to effectively administer culture in the 
Lithuania of the late 1980s. I would like to stress this aspect in particular be-
cause it has been so grossly overlooked in the studies that focused on ideologi-
cal censorship and control of the cultural creators. It is important to note the 
despair was mutual and present both at the top and at the bottom of the hierar-
chy of cultural administration. While the cultural workers complained that ad-
ministratively commanded culture was “locked inside a briefcase”, the ministry 
officials feared that they were losing their grip on culture in a dusty office. The 
archives of the Ministry of Culture contained a detailed acknowledgement of 
the dysfunctional administration of culture in one of the country’s provinces: 
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The execution of decrees is not controlled. These issues are not properly 
accounted for by the employees of the cultural department and the district 
culture house. No control cards have been made for the implementation of 
decrees. Informational material is not gathered together; it is located in 
various places – in a culture department, in a methodical cabinet, at the 
home of the director of the district culture house.66
 
This 1984 report revealed an organisational bottleneck, which clearly prevented 
the entire “system of culture” from “perfecting itself” (a reference to the speech 
quoted in Chapter VII). A messy local office was indeed a nightmare for a plan-
ner of culture. In line with Glushkov, the bad organisation of information was 
seen as a fundamental obstacle to efficient management. And yet, as the above 
quote informs us, the information was to be “put on cards” and not entered into 
a computer database. Thus, even successful Soviet administration was based on 
the circulation of paper documents and phone calls rather than on electronic 
signals. However, as it turned out, even the smooth flow of reports did not al-
ways entail greater knowledge. As the Lithuanian sociologist put it:  
 
No scientific discipline can fully explore spiritual culture and the condi-
tions of its development on an empirical level alone. The results of general 
theoretical and concrete, applied research – the sociology of culture, the 
economics of culture, ethics, aesthetics, pedagogy, social psychology and 
special disciplines of cultural enlightenment work are needed. [...] But a 
contradiction emerges here: the majority of leading cultural workers and 
practitioners claim that the available scientific information is still insuffi-
cient to form the basis for work plans, methodical organisational work and 
yet... never before has there been so much writing, talk about red-tape, 
overflow and the gratuitous proffering of scripts, certificates and other offi-
cial information!67
 
In 1986, the launch year of “economic restructuring”, the LSSR Minister of 
Culture reported on a proposal, written by a working group at the Institute of 
Art History and Theory in cooperation with the economic planning and finance 
departments of the ministry. In line with a newly fashionable concept, “man-
agement and planning by objectives”, the working group suggested the intro-
duction of purposive indicators into the long-term plan. The purposive indica-
tors were meant to specify the “real” outcomes of cultural participation, which 
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were not revealed by attendance rates.68 In particular, the minister emphasised 
the scientific research that was the underpinning for the recommendations: 
 
In order to define purposive indicators, special research was conducted in 
the republic’s territory in cities and villages and various types of settle-
ments. This research made it possible to account for the specific conditions 
under which culture functions in Lithuanian SSR. The research, which in-
cluded sociological surveys of the population, statistical analyses and ex-
pert surveys of specialists, revealed the cultural needs of various groups in 
the population, factors for activating their interest in cultural values [tsen-
nosti] and opportunities for perfecting the functioning networks of cultural 
and artistic enterprises.69
 
Further: 
 
The recommendations for a long-term plan of cultural construction in the 
republic represent yet another step towards raising the scientific basis of 
the governance of culture. They target the development of culture towards 
its end results, a differentiated approach to the objects of planning, [and] a 
complex solution of socio-cultural tasks.70  
 
Typically, just how “purposive indicators” would help to better measure the 
efficacy of cultural policy was not revealed in the document. Nevertheless, it 
was officially acknowledged that the measurability of culture in statistical data 
continued to be at least problematic and often very limited. The number of such 
tangible economic units, such as organisations, finance flows and employed 
individuals was easy to calculate, but the utility of cultural policy was difficult 
to express in numbers.71 For the Communist Party, the ideological indoctrina-
tion and loyalty of the population was always vital: “first and foremost, an un-
derstanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology and a comprehension of communist 
moral norms and their application in everyday activity”.72 However, even the 
success of propaganda was hard to measure and especially to quantify.73 In her 
account about a “mature” Soviet cultural policy, the candidate-member of the 
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Politburo (LCP) Diržinskait, admitted that “the ideological results of social-
cultural activity can only be measured indirectly”.74  
Taking all of this into consideration, I would like to suggest that during the 
1980s the requirements for measuring culture were the subject of increasing 
criticism. In the course of growing openness, concerns about statistical misrep-
resentations were voiced. First, this was harsh criticism because it dealt with 
intentional deception. Second, even the conceptual basis for measurement was 
criticised. For example, the ability of numbers to collate and generalise small 
processes into one, manageable body was rendered as fairly useless for effective 
governance. In 1986, the party secretary of the Vilnius Factory of Computing 
Machines commented on a new condition for the acceleration policy: 
 
In all chains, one must think realistically, to decide realistically. I can quote 
official instructions from a much high superior: we do not need a proper 
general overview. We do not need it! Neither the proper general overview 
nor the made-up statistics, which are nice to hide. [...] Neither previously 
nor today did we need that equilibristic game of little numbers. We want 
and are able to manage and be responsible for the results of our work our-
selves.75
 
Whilst this quote suggests that macro-governance should be replaced with mi-
cro-steering, it also acknowledges an absence of trust in the mediatory apparatus 
of a number-crunching bureaucracy. Calling for “self-management”, in which 
larger governing bodies would not intervene, the party secretary saw the Soviet 
numeric calculations as a rideau or a ritual, the skilful performance of which 
made it possible to hide the “real” actions. Another article exclaimed that “we 
are extremely tired of that statistical culture, that paper optimism”.76
Reporting the numbers back to a bureaucratic apparatus was a necessary 
part of planning future development and designing forecasts. However, the So-
viet forecasts turned out to be another disappointment. For example, in 1986 the 
head of the Agency for Cultural-Enlightenment organisations at the LSSR Min-
istry of Culture complained about the town of Kapsuka’s low rate of satisfaction 
with its “cultural servicing” (only 6 percent were satisfied). To a journalist’s 
question as to whether a better “prognosis of culture” conducted by the scien-
tific-methodical Centre of Culture at the ministry would help improve the situa-
tion, the administrator replied that it was self-evident that “the centre” always 
lagged behind actual cultural development. Moreover, she doubted the efficacy 
of the use of cultural forecasting in general: 
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A living, changing process of creation can not be captured by methodo-
logical literature! It would be much more expedient to learn from examples 
rather than from statistical accounts [apyrašai].77
 
However, others held that forecasting was not to be abandoned but improved. In 
1987, the former vice-minister of culture and rector of Klaipda University 
wrote the following about “cultural prognosis”:  
 
The errors of the prognoses of culture are particularly painful – they in-
crease people’s disappointment and indifference. We will continue wander-
ing like that until we make the methods of public opinion research, surveys 
and analysis accessible to district workers. [...] Feedback is one of the most 
important stimuli for tomorrow’s activity.78
 
Thus, in a cybernetic spirit, forecasting was formulated as an important compo-
nent of governance. A forecast would provide a meaningful framework for a 
purposive feedback-guided action, the actual work of cultural operators. How-
ever, interestingly enough, this reformulation of reporting back as feedback was 
not capable of rejuvenating the Soviet bureaucracy. For example, in 1987, the 
former vice -minister of culture stated: 
 
The attempts to evaluate every single step do not stimulate creativity - they 
restrict it – this is a psychologist’s idea. There was a time when there were 
fewer criteria and indicators for evaluation and more arguments. A type of 
person appeared, one who lived for the competition, spent days and nights 
counting those points [balai], those steps towards a desired flag. Some-
times the things people needed were not implemented because they would 
not “give points”. There were so many things like these, which do not suit 
a noble notion of culture.  
And what has this competition turned into? Has it come to pass that 
without competition, which is increasingly made of paper [...] it is not clear 
which district works well and which work badly? Has it come to pass that 
things only become clear when they are lined up from 1 to 44? Perhaps, 
this “lining up” has little to contribute if the same names appear frequently 
at the end of a table.79
 
In this way, the numbers were criticised as powerless to represent a job well-
done. They were seen as lacking the force to motivate those who “always end 
up at the end of the list”. They did not necessarily motivate the cultural projects 
best suited to local needs, but those which were preferred by the system of indi-
cators. Regrettably, the work of culture was not carried out for the sake of peo-
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ple but for the sake of vanity and the material benefits of receiving the flag of 
socialist competition. Furthermore, the bureaucratic procedure of producing 
numbers entailed hyper-accountability of “every step”, which limited creative 
manoeuvrability. Disenchantment with similar counter-effects of quantification 
stimulated a Union-wide theatre reform, which was launched in 1986. The lead-
ership of theatres was to be reorganised by expanding the rights of their coun-
cils, and their activities would be evaluated according to the end results. This, it 
was hoped, would reduce “detailed supervision of the creative process” and 
“diminish the plan indicators to a minimum” (leaving 3 out of 11).80
The calculation-based governance of culture was seen as failing to effec-
tively reach its formal goals, but it was regarded as very productive in generat-
ing various unintended side effects. Once “culture” was engaged in performing 
numbers, it was seen as turning into something else. For example, in 1987 a 
Lithuanian philosopher and active public debater argued that: 
 
By defecting to a purely superficial form of activity, a façade culture be-
comes identical with the mere marking of a performed activity. Its meaning 
can be translated in an approximate way: “A habitual procedure is carried 
out; therefore, a work is done”. The participants of such a para-ritualistic 
procedure do not take their own activity very seriously. They feel relatively 
free, almost as if they are participating in a game, but in a game that is un-
interesting and is played not because it would be fun, but out of need. 81
 
On the other hand, the philosopher noted, such superficiality could be quite a 
sophisticated activity, one that required specific skills: 
  
An artificial (not unusually even a coercive) increase in the progress of 
schools, the number of library readers and of audience members at lectures 
or theatres, an organised public review and praise of the works of authors 
(or their friends), the paper implementation of production plans, the fabri-
cation of the results of socialist competition and many other similar actions 
demand considerable efforts, dedication, skill. A para-theatrical playing 
must create an illusion of the real or at least of the probable. As in theatre, 
here acting [vaidyba] is not confused with reality. The arrival of inspectors 
and control commissions to a workplace is usually announced in advance 
(except in those cases where there is a plan to denounce those under con-
trol), and there, of course, façade preparations are made for façade control. 
Previously, the culmination of an inspection usually consisted of a festive 
dinner, during which façade positions would finally be aligned. 
The achievements of a façade culture are not difficult to express with 
quantitative indicators, namely, numbers. When indicating numbers be-
come the main goal, they are quickly achieved. Of course, they are made 
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formally, superficially, in a parade-like manner, but they are made... It is 
held to be normal that a pedagogue, a leader of an organisation “organises” 
the audiences at lectures and concerts by decree ...82
 
The “language of numbers” generated for the purposes of governance gave rise 
to a new type of “culture”. The philosopher despised this type of culture be-
cause it was bad. In his opinion, it was marked by pretence, executed with the 
means of coercion and not free choice. As the philosopher noted, it was not 
quite right that decrees commanded the audiences. Moreover, the need to per-
form well focused not on the “internal goals” of culture (note that this also in-
cluded social and economic goals) but on its measurement machinery. In other 
words, instead of being a medium, the machinery of governance became a goal 
itself. Both cultural workers and their auditors were engaged in performing the 
numbers, but, as the above quote states, in a type of informal agreement rather 
than through scrupulous checks and mathematical calculations. This focus on 
numbers demanded a lot of time and energy, which resulted in a “public fa-
çade”. As was noted by others, this was very standard and, hence, uninteresting. 
In the same year (1987), a method specialist from the house of culture in the 
Kupiškis district criticised the standardising effects of socialist competition in a 
similar manner: 
 
Let’s not talk about socialist competition. I have heard that it will cease to 
exist this year. And that is fair! Perhaps one district achieves more in one 
sphere, another one – in another, there is no need to make everything the 
same at the same time. [....] It is important to strive for exclusiveness and 
uniqueness, not mind-numbing uniformity. The word “typical” does not 
suit culture!83
 
“Typical” was also uninteresting to a Soviet citizen. In the second half of the 
1980s, a Soviet cultural worker was encouraged to increasingly treat citizens as 
clients and consumers. True, the Soviet population still had to be educated or 
enlightened, but more and more often, the means became a matter of choice. 
Thus, for example, the Minister of Culture announced in his speech that a key 
mission of cultural workers in perestroika was still to “educate a man to become 
a conscious citizen and to assemble the conditions needed for maintaining his 
working potential by using the methods available for ideological and cultural 
activity”.84 For the first time in the analysed texts, the freedom of a governed 
subject to choose was acknowledged: 
 
A reconstruction of forces and an ability to work takes place during leisure 
time. It [the leisure time] is used only by a man who, of his own free will, 
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chooses the way he will spend it. And he can choose only when he has a 
supply, when there is a real possibility of choice.85
 
Socialist competition also became the target of criticism. For example, a highly 
placed ministry official argued that the detailed accounting required by competi-
tions was counterproductive: 
 
Let’s take a traditional socialist competition – again we created various ta-
bles, summaries… What for? It is the wrong way… Probably we should se-
lect several criteria, which would stimulate activity and show its results. 
That’s it! And it is not our business how or in what way it was achieved.86
 
The quantitative norms of performance imposed from above were also criti-
cised: 
 
The earth would not turn upside down if every house of culture could 
freely plan their work and not have to implement norms imposed “from 
above”. Why is it that a village house of culture has to organise 20-24 lec-
tures and presentations (and when did a presentation become an event?), 
50-72 theme events, 6-8 theatrical celebrations, 64-105 evenings of dance 
and recreation, 20-28 amateur art concerts, 2-5 professional art perform-
ances, 6-7 exhibitions? Who has measured and on what grounds estab-
lished these norms? Why is it necessary to measure the immeasurable?87
 
It is quite interesting that the authority of the Soviet discourse of calculation-
based governance eroded on so many different fronts. This process took place 
regardless of the official rhetoric of Gorbachev’s techno-scientific rejuvenation. 
I observed that many ministers’ speeches singled out Gorbachev’s acceleration, 
as it “essentially determined the new perspectives and ways of development of 
today’s cultural enterprises”.88 However, the references to scientific research 
and advanced technologies of management were further used in an idiomatic 
way (they were still deleted by editors)89. Eventually, however, the catch-
phrases of policy vocabulary were deconstructed, criticised and abolished by 
cultural workers. One such phrase was “new forms of work”, something which 
was invented by cultural organisations in reaction to the pressures of STR. In 
1987, one article stated that it was popular to blame the “old forms of work” 
when a cultural event did not attract audiences. The lack of interest prompted a 
paper production of those forms: 
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Well, then investigations began and previously unknown and unheard of 
forms of events appeared. Understandably, no one could explain them, but 
after a closer look, it appeared that it was old stuff under a new name be-
cause one received points for new forms of work!90
 
The issue of openness in management was addressed in speeches. On the occa-
sion of the establishment of a Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Art Fund (3 April 
1987) two ministers emphasised new organisational principles in their speeches. 
Among these, a public debate of plans and reports was distinguished as a “de-
mocratic” feature, meant to ensure “a new, flexible organisational form, one that 
would react, with sensitivity, to the changes in society”.91 Stronger statements 
appeared in the press, which explicitly criticised the very ambition to adminis-
tratively steer culture: 
 
It is erroneous and dangerous to think that culture can function if it is bu-
reaucratically governed [valdoma] and regulated in all ways from above. 
There exists a self-regulation mechanism of culture that, for some reason, 
is suppressed by various means. A very important factor, namely, personal-
ity, must be kept in mind – and personality always resists instructions.92
 
I would like to note that it was the mechanical and not cybernetic metaphors 
that were mobilised to criticise centralism and command administrations. I will 
shortly show that at this point in time, cybernetic metaphors were reserved for 
the emerging discourse on national superiority. For instance, the Lithuanian 
philosopher complained that a man turned into “a small mechanical cog in a 
bulky machine of governance” was only expected to implement orders. The 
goal of reconstruction was to replace “an instruction” with “a conscience”, that 
is, external regulation with internal regulation. Of course, the argument was 
based on the proceedings of the CPSU Plenum (June 1987), which stated that 
“the times during which governance [valdymas] consisted only of decrees, pro-
hibitions and incitement [raginimas] have passed. It is clear to everyone that it 
is impossible to work with such methods”. Instead, the Plenum stated, “a pow-
erful system of motivation and incentives” should be constructed.93 Be it exter-
nal or internal governance, this quote clearly demonstrates that the project of 
governing remained an object under active construction. 
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The abolishment of the state-centralised control of culture was first men-
tioned in an official speech in 1988. Speaking about amateur art, Jonas Bielinis 
addressed preparations for a future song festival and pointed out that “now there 
will not be any regulations ‘from above’ – the success of a district or city song 
contest will depend only on their leaders’ industriousness and the artistic level 
of the repertoire”.94 The minister emphasised the need to “remove formalism 
and unprofessional ideas [koncepcija], which took shape during the years of 
stagnation”. For the first time, it was acknowledged that previous cultural statis-
tics had often been falsified and that organisations reported bigger numbers. 
Still it was expected that “contemporary data would better represent reality”.95 
And yet, during this period, grass-roots cultural activity was officially encour-
aged only as long as it did not generate economic profits. For instance, Bielinis 
harshly criticised the mushrooming of popular rock and pop bands, especially as 
their concert activities violated the decree according to which “every concert 
activity that charges entrance fees has to take place through the state concert 
agencies”.96  
Despite the fact that the discourse of reconstruction, and later that of the 
independence movement, was directed against the calculating regime of com-
munism, scientific metaphors were used to highlight positive future develop-
ments. Despite at least two decades of cyberspeak, a member of Sjdis, the 
economist Antanas Buraas, told Domains of Culture that Soviet governance 
was insufficiently cybernetised: 
 
The pace of our development has slowed incredibly because we are still 
guided by a logic of governance [valdymas], which dates back to the period 
of machine industries. Everything is thought through as if it was a compli-
cated machine! But the possibilities of intellectual growth on which both 
the 21st century and our society will have to base themselves demand an 
electronic logic, with activated neuron-based mechanisms that are incredi-
bly fast and individualised. It is no longer a matter of standardised, logical 
thinking, but primarily a new search for solutions […].97
 
Another Lithuanian philosopher went even further when he stated that the 
highly ambitious Soviet scientific governance of culture failed to such an extent 
that at the end of the 1980s, culture “had to be saved by the public Fund of Cul-
ture, informal groups and organisations”. Further, the philosopher indicated a 
general disappointment with the socialist experiment to design “people’s lives 
and culture by putting them into narrow theoretical schemes”; instead, he called 
for a return to an “historically approved elementary force of life, namely, simple 
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self-regulation, which is analogous to the elements of nature, leaving people’s 
lives to the free play of all of their forces”.98 A conscious governance, con-
ducted by a man, would inevitably “spoil and break everything”. The philoso-
pher further attempted to draw a line between “real science” and state govern-
ance. He claimed that Soviet scientific governance had never had anything in 
common with “real science”, which is based on competitive theories and scruti-
nised facts, as it was not interested in real data provided by social research but 
only used it as a means of legitimising itself.99 A year later, Stoškus went even 
further and openly called for a “new cultural policy”, one that would not rely on 
abstract models and would not divide people into educators and those who are 
educated. The imposition of professional culture from above was to be replaced 
by stimulating polilogical cultural expressions from below, whilst the “central-
ised governance of culture” had to give way to the “self-regulation of culture”, 
which would tolerate competition from a diverse group of “schools and trends”. 
Finally, the philosopher wished that the new cultural policy would still be con-
nected with welfare projects. As he put it, the “fostering of spiritual culture” 
should be “related to and united with improvements in every aspect of life”.100 I 
would like to jump ahead and note that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the same philosopher would become one of the most outspoken public debaters, 
equally outraged by both “post-modern” contemporary art and American pop 
culture, among other things.101 The pluralism endorsed by the “new cultural 
policy” turned out not to be quite as expected. Apparently, the pre-1990 toler-
ance for diversity was merely an expression of good will and motivated by a 
lack of experience. 
Criticism also targeted the subjectification that resulted from Soviet scien-
tific governance. In 1988, another Lithuanian philosopher regretted that “people 
were regarded as a work force that implemented plans, the intelligentsia as pub-
lic servants, cadres, and the nation – as a population of a certain territory”.102 To 
an ever greater extent, the ethnic nationalist movement, which was growing in 
strength, redefined the object of state cultural policy as the “Lithuanian nation”, 
the analysis of which, however, requires a separate study.103 I would only like to 
point out that the nationalist discourse was also pervaded by scientific-technical 
metaphors, which originated from the Soviet STR discourse. For example, the 
Lithuanian nation was described as “coded” in both people’s “genetic cells” and 
in an “ethnic field”. With the help of quantum physics, the “ethnic field” itself 
was defined as “energetic waves”.104 Lithuania’s independence was discussed in 
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terms of equilibrium, since the question arose as to whether “the independent 
development of a small nation could be optimal”.105 Some people wondered 
whether Lithuanian national culture was “balanced” or not.106 The rejuvenation 
of Lithuanian nationalism was also framed in the term “ethno-homo-sphere” 
(coined by the Russian thinker D. Likhachev), as Lithuania’s “atoms” were to 
be “gathered and reconstructed, the body cells revived, and the genes of the 
Lithuanian national consciousness restored”.107 Finally, the Lithuanian poet 
Marcelijus Martinaitis, one of the leaders of Sjdis, conceptualised ethnicity as 
an important factor in scientific-technical progress. He argued that homo so-
vieticus “did not manage to create and control [valdyti] sophisticated technolo-
gies” because “sophisticated electronics and ecology demand knowledge that 
was accumulated by ethnic cultures. We could interpret them as complicated 
computers, in which the knowledge that may be needed in the future is pro-
grammed”.108  
To conclude this brief discussion, I would like to note that references to 
techno-sciences in the Lithuanian nationalist discourses were not the result of 
deep scientific consideration or precision. Just as in Soviet “cyberspeak” 
(Gerovitch’s derogative term), “STR-speak” in nationalism was intended to 
symbolise the contemporaneous, up-to-date context of speech, as well as the 
importance and priority status of its subject, culture. It can be argued that by the 
end of the 1980s, just as in the early 1960s, the techno-scientific components of 
cultural policy debates were mobilised as a vehicle to elevate culture in the pri-
ority pyramid of the national economy. 
 
In 1986 and 1987, a public foundation, the Soviet Fund of Culture, was estab-
lished with some assistance from the American philanthropist George Soros.109 
The Fund was to be supported by public donations whilst its board would direct 
support to culture. This was the first Soviet alternative to the state bodies (the 
Ministry of Culture, municipalities, collective farms, trade unions, etc) for fi-
nancing culture. In 1987, a theatre reform liberalised artistic decision-making. 
The year 1988 saw the abolishment of censorship bodies. In 1988, Jonas 
Bielinis left his position and was replaced by the composer Dainius Trinknas 
(who acted as the vice-minister in 1973-88). The year 1989 saw the victory of 
the non-Communist Party in Poland; Hungary took down the barbed wire fences 
from its border with Austria; and the Berlin wall came down. 
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In December 1989, the new minister of culture was interviewed for Do-
mains of Culture. He was eager to announce that during his first year at this 
position, “there were no directives and commands from the Central Committee 
(LCP)”. The goals of the ministry, he said, were “to foster and nurture national 
consciousness, traditions, culture and art”. Building Soviet culture was removed 
from the agenda of the LSSR Ministry of Culture. The actions of the ministry 
were to be grounded in the principles of “humanism and democracy”. Its ambi-
tion to steer culture was explicitly limited: “it […] does not pretend to have a 
cultural monopoly and acknowledges the rights of all other cultural institutions 
and public organisations”.110 The ministry was to be modernised technologi-
cally: a month later, the plans included the development of an automated man-
agement system. However, about three months later, on 26 March 1990 (two 
weeks after the declaration of independence), the LSSR Ministry of Culture was 
merged with the Ministry of Education. The words “cybernetics” and “AMS” 
disappeared from the vocabulary of cultural policy discourses. However, just 
like Gerovitch in his conclusion to the story of Soviet cyberspeak, I would like 
to point out that the principles of calculation-based, cybernetically assisted gov-
ernance eventually were re-imported to the de-Sovietising Lithuania from the 
West, embodied in new rationales, sciences and technologies: machines such as 
computers and their networks, which backed the notions of neo-liberal govern-
ance, expressed in concepts of knowledge and information society and combin-
ing strategic planning with rule from a distance. However, this is already the 
subject of another book. 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the emerging critical attitudes of Soviet cultural policy 
makers, cultural operators and intellectuals towards the calculation-based, scien-
tifically- and technologically-assisted state cultural policy. It has described the 
rise of a calculation-based cultural policy beginning in the 1960s and the cau-
tious criticism that was lodged against it by both highly placed officials and the 
intelligentsia. Such a critical attitude was reinforced by the obvious technologi-
cal poverty of the Soviet cultural sector. The chapter illustrated the limitations 
of the ambitions to provide cultural organizations with products of cybernetic 
techno-sciences. Libraries and museums were redefined as primarily dealing 
with “information”: creating, processing, storing and transmitting it, and yet 
their computerisation lagged. As revealed in the case of the Del’ta-Litva auto-
mated information system, computer technologies were reserved for the state 
security organs, which performed politically sensitive work and were in need of 
“real feedback”. 
Finally, as Gorbachev’s policy of openness, acceleration and reconstruc-
tion opened up opportunities to express criticism more freely, the model and 
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language of Soviet cultural policy found themselves at the centre of attacks 
from the Lithuanian intelligentsia. Notably, the critical texts analysed here were 
written not only by philosophers and cultural intellectuals but also by cultural 
workers and even ideological secretaries of Party organisations. On the basis of 
my analysis of articles from both Domains of Culture and archived speeches, I 
would like to argue that the cybernetic mentality of governance of culture was 
ambivalent. There was an awareness of a great lack of technical equipment in 
the cultural sector and the failure to meet state policy goals; nevertheless, an 
idea of good and proper governance, which would be based on cutting-edge 
techno-scientific developments, still prevailed. Notably, in the 1980s “cutting-
edge” was still largely identified with the word “cybernetics”. 
However, some more general changes also took place. While criticism was 
initially (1986-87) oriented against bureaucratism and inefficient administration 
(“culture in a briefcase”), later, it also targeted the overarching ambition to ad-
minister culture centrally and from the top. It is remarkable that the official 
magazine of the LSSR Ministry of Culture, Domains of Culture, did not publish 
a single text defending the centralised, calculation-based governance of culture. 
When some cultural operators expressed hopes that a better forecast would help 
to organise the state administration of culture, Soviet forecasting practices were 
mainly regarded as a failure. The Soviet definition of “culture as a service to the 
population” was replaced by the notion of “culture as the spirit of a nation”. I 
would like to suggest that this change was yet another bricolage or a profound 
regrouping of the resources of Soviet cultural discourses. I have shown that 
“culture as the spirit of a nation” was conceptualised in line with “STR-speak” 
as a container of genes, a pattern of information. The really new element was 
the incorporation of an idea of national sovereignty in cultural policy dis-
courses. 
With the gradually increasing belief in the possibility of separation from 
the Soviet Union, the techno-scientific aspects of governance lost the public’s 
attention. Identified with central planning, which was to be abolished, techno-
scientific governance became somewhat irrelevant in Lithuanian cultural policy 
debates at the end of the 1980s. Thus, one could conclude that in culture, a dis-
course on sovereignty replaced a discourse on techno-scientific governance. 
However, this is not to say that the debates were exempt from techno-scientific 
metaphors. Quite the contrary: this time, the STR discourse analysed previously 
was mobilised to describe the Lithuanian “national culture”.  
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IX. Conclusions 
What does it mean to govern and what makes culture governable? Hopefully, 
this dissertation has succeeded in disentangling some of the threads, which may 
lead to a better understanding of what it meant for a state to govern culture in 
Lithuania. In all, it could be concluded that the construction of state cultural 
policy in Lithuania was a complex project, in which a special discourse on the 
governance of culture was assembled. In this discourse, the definition of “gov-
ernance” (of culture) was produced by way of borrowing from other fields, such 
as economics and the natural and technical sciences. Thus, on the one hand, the 
“governance” of culture was defined as part of an administrative, bureaucratic 
and calculation-based mode of governance. On the other hand, the definition of 
the “governance” of culture came to include the elements of a new scientific 
theory, cybernetics, and related machinery. I have described this process of 
borrowing as one of translation. In this chapter I will briefly recapitulate my 
argument and reflect on my main findings. 
As I have written in the Prologue, the dissertation could be seen as en-
gaged with the history of state cultural policy in Lithuania in two ways. The 
first story concerned continuities and disruptions in the formation of state cul-
tural policy, an important issue given that Lithuania faced the loss of her politi-
cal sovereignty. My analysis allows us to discern the following trajectory in the 
history of the construction of state cultural policy in Lithuania. As shown in 
Chapter III, in the interwar period cultural operators not only required from the 
state government to increase financial support to culture, but also to establish a 
special administrative body in the central governmental structures, dedicated to 
cultural matters. However, based on the available material, I received the im-
pression that there was little discussion about the meaning of state cultural pol-
icy or the governance of culture in Lithuania in the 1920s-1930s. It could be 
contended that the “governance” of culture or state cultural policy was not a 
particularly distinctive object of reflection at that time. On the other hand, I 
have indicated that the Lithuanian interwar government encouraged the organi-
sationalisation of cultural sector. This development established the conditions 
for the first continuity because a good deal of the cultural organisations estab-
lished in the 1920s-1930s sustained their work after the Soviet occupation. An-
other continuity between the nationalist and Soviet regimes in Lithuania was 
that, just like the Soviet state, the nationalist government of the interwar period 
was a major sponsor of the arts. The difference between the two regimes was 
that in the interwar period state officials considered that situation to be abnor-
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mal rather than desirable. Moreover, the initiatives to establish state administra-
tion for culture originated from the cultural operators themselves and were not 
enforced by the central government, as was the case after the Soviet occupation. 
The Soviet governance of culture differed from the one exercised during 
the period of independence in two major ways. First, the Soviet state govern-
ment had constructed a central administration for cultural matters which both 
financed and supervised cultural work in the country. Second, the meaning of 
“governance of culture” became an object of reflection: it became a sphere of 
scholarly investigation, knowledge production, techno-scientific applications 
and eventually of criticism. The ideal model of Soviet cultural policy was en-
visaged in the Marxist-Leninist spirit as a purposeful, rational and scientific 
activity. Calculation-based governance (planning and organisational manage-
ment) was subdued during Stalinist era, because it was mainly the political 
leaders (first and foremost Stalin), and not experts, who defined the contents of 
policies and their means of implementation. Though political decisions contin-
ued to be decisive in running the Soviet economy (and not forgetting about the 
rules of informality), the understanding that special competence was needed had 
eventually emerged. Techno-scientifically equipped governance was actively 
promoted during Khrushchev’s period, though in reality it was often disre-
garded by Khrushchev himself. In the 1960s, the idea of the political neutrality 
of the sciences was actively cultivated by the scientists themselves, as they 
wanted to escape ideological control, and also by Party officials, because the 
“neutrality” of techno-science legitimised the transfer from the West. Indeed, it 
can be conjectured that in the 1960s there was a hope for the de-ideologisation 
of techno-scientific governance in the Soviet Union. However, techno-scientific 
formulation of both goals and means of governance became unquestionable 
only during the period of economic decline and tightening of political control 
that was retrospectively called “stagnation”, from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1980s. The strengthening of calculation-based governance, which was reformu-
lated with a regard to the scientific-technical revolution, had considerable ef-
fects on Soviet cultural policy. Thus, for the Soviet state to govern culture 
meant not only to structure it through formal organisations and to centrally ad-
minister them in line with political and other goals, but also to shape all these 
activities with the help of new sciences and technologies. 
The second goal of my thesis was to explore how cybernetics, one of the 
most important outcomes of post-World War II techno-scientific development, 
had influenced Soviet governance of culture. To achieve this goal, a broader 
reconstruction of the Soviet governmental rationale of culture was needed, be-
cause unlike some spheres of industrial production, the sphere of culture did not 
immanently require techno-scientifically advanced modes of steering. I sug-
gested that a facilitating mechanism for the cybernetisation of cultural policy 
was the Soviet economic rationale of central planning and administrative com-
mand, which underlined the construction of a vast organisational network, cen-
tralised and hierarchically structured under the Ministry of Culture and the Party 
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organisations. During de-Stalinisation, this network became an arena of transla-
tions from new techno-sciences which were developed during World War II, 
most importantly, cybernetics. The translations from cybernetics and systems 
theory to state governance, I argued, constituted a particular intellectual ma-
chinery, manifest in Lithuanian cultural policy discourses, as explicated in the 
main cultural press and the ministers’ statements.  
I therefore analysed the construction of Soviet techno-scientific govern-
ance of culture as a process of translation. Several important consequences of 
cybernetics’s translation into the governance of culture could be distinguished. 
First, translation from Western cybernetic techno-sciences into the Soviet con-
text was selective. The system-cybernetic approach had to be reconciled with 
materialist philosophy, the ideological and undisputable principles of Marxism-
Leninism. Further, the cybernetic intellectual and material machinery (as in the 
case of AMS) had to be reconciled with existing administrative centralisation 
and Party political structure. In order to be translated intellectually and materi-
ally, the “Western” techno-sciences had to be politically neutralised. Accord-
ingly, techno-scientific modernisation thus was seen by Soviet official ideo-
logues as a non-antagonistic development. Therefore, the Soviet ideologues 
described in detail how dialogical cybernetic feedback control and an open, 
complex and dynamic systems approach could be combined with the principle 
of “democratic centralism”, public ownership of the means of production and 
Cold War securitisation. Second, and consequently, translation took place not as 
a systematic, coherence-seeking rewriting but as a bricolage. In the Lithuanian 
texts analysed I did not encounter a single fully-fledged account of the system-
cybernetic model of governance of culture (despite such a model being devel-
oped by Biriukov and Geller in Russia). But I traced numerous fragments of that 
system-cybernetic approach which regularly occurred in the texts published in 
Domains of Culture and the speeches of ministers of culture. Third, the applica-
tion of the system-cybernetic approach entailed rewriting of the existing eco-
nomic rationalisation of the cultural sector into the language of system, feed-
back, prediction and automation. Thus translation as a bricolage enabled not 
only a discursive transformation, but also reproduction of the centralised system 
of Soviet governance. Fourth, the fragments of translation were used by cultural 
operators not only to make sense of cultural policy, but also to define them-
selves. Some key expressions, especially “the scientific-technical revolution” 
and “information flow” were used in an idiomatic way. Such translations could 
be traced in a variety of guises, such as metaphors (“the brain as a processor”), 
idioms (“the scientific-technical revolution”) or entire models (“tradition feeds 
back”). Their immediate textual context was of the utmost importance. For ex-
ample, “the scientific-technical revolution” (STR) formed a certain idiom, 
which was transported across texts of the most diverse genres and issues. I 
demonstrated in Chapters IV and VIII that cybernetic “machines of governance” 
and electronic equipment generally was scarcely used in the cultural sector in 
Lithuania. Despite this, cultural operators described themselves as “being trans-
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formed” by STR, becoming part of “information flow”. Using “STR” and “in-
formation flow” as idioms of language, cultural operators textually constructed 
themselves as modern subjects: aware and plugged in to contemporary techno-
scientific networks.  
Furthermore, the construction of this techno-scientifically assisted, calcula-
tion-based policy of culture was a reflexive process. In Chapter VI I have shown 
that the translation of cybernetics into culture was already being debated by 
Lithuanian cultural intellectuals in its early stage, the mid-1960s. Whilst cyber-
netic language became a part of the hegemonic discourse of Soviet governance 
in the 1970s-1980s, there also emerged doubts which later intensified into 
strong direct criticisms of the very Soviet mentality of calculation-based gov-
ernance of culture, which was detailed in Chapter VIII. As the language of cy-
bernetic management was politically neutralised in order to meet the conditions 
of translation (technology transfer from the West), it could be legitimately criti-
cised and in this it was different from the language of Marxism-Leninism which 
could not be criticised at all. As shown in Chapters VI and VII, techno-scientific 
governance of culture was questioned by Soviet cultural operators of both high 
and low rank. It had proven to be quite porous and fragile in the 1980s, when 
the techno-scientific, calculation-based mentality of governance of culture re-
ceived harsh criticisms. These criticisms resulted in rejection of the idea of a 
centrally planned and administratively commanded economy, the political sys-
tem of communism and Russian rule, and state control of culture.  
It could thus be contended that cybernetics and systems theory “made cul-
ture governable” in the Lithuanian SSR by providing the conceptual tools to 
envision the cultural sector as complex and relational (connected with the eco-
nomic, but also the natural environment). Rooted in Einstein’s relativity theory, 
the system-cybernetic approach enabled formalisation of the development of 
culture which was otherwise perceived as intrinsically uncertain. In the age of 
cybernetic control culture could be governed by means of predictive calcula-
tions: the future of the cultural sector could be forecasted on the basis of statisti-
cal accounts of its past behaviour. In the case of the Soviet cultural sector, it 
was mainly the education of cadres, consumption of population and outputs of 
cultural organisations which were calculated. But both advanced statistics and 
the material “cybernetisation” of the cultural sector lagged quite far behind the 
industrial sector, as detailed in Chapter V and VIII.  
My empirical material does not provide sufficient ground to draw com-
parisons between the Soviet Russian and Lithuanian cases (and a similar study 
about Russia has not been done yet). But it could be hypothesised that the 
Lithuanian intellectual climate was somewhat less receptive to the intentional 
translation of techno-science to culture. Relatively few engaged in an explicit 
public debate about cybernetics and culture in the Lithuanian SSR. In the mid-
1960s, the debate was driven was Venclova and Trinknas, two young and in-
novative intellectuals, both suspicious in the eyes of Soviet officials. However, 
unlike in the Russian case (Biriukov and Geller), the Lithuanian SSR did not 
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produce its own system-cybernetic theoreticians of the governance of culture. It 
seems that it was Russian thinkers who initiated the broadening of cybernetics’s 
and systems theory’s influence from technical sciences to management and 
subsequently to humanities and the cultural sphere. As revealed in Chapter V, 
the major difference between the pioneers of this discourse (Venclova and Trin-
knas) and later, less conscious users (officials like ideological instructors, but 
also other intellectuals, such as Stoškus), was that the former referred to cyber-
netics as a unique tool for knowledge production in cultural sciences and arts 
criticism. The latter meanwhile referred to cybernetics solely as a theory of 
governance – both state policy towards the entire sector of culture and manage-
ment of particular organisations. It could be contended that cybernetic intellec-
tual machinery was thus transformed from an instrument of scholarly knowl-
edge to a tool of administrative governance. If in the mid-1960s it attracted 
young cultural intellectuals as an alternative to previously dogmatised Soviet 
sciences, in the 1970s it was already part of the Soviet official discourse of gov-
ernance. 
I hope to have made clear that the meaning of the governance of culture in 
the Lithuanian SSR changed from the late 1940s to the 1980s. As discussed in 
Chapter III, from 1944 to the mid-1950s was a period of deportations, purges of 
otherwise-minded individuals and severe economic decline in Lithuania. The 
major concern of the governing bodies, as of 1953 the LSSR Ministry of Cul-
ture, was to see that the established cultural organisations received the minimum 
resources needed to keep functioning and to supervise individual cultural opera-
tors, especially to inculcate them with political ideology. Not scientific steering, 
but political loyalty and willingness to comply with centrally made decisions 
regardless of local constrictions were pursued by government bodies. The 1960s 
in this respect was quite a different era, marked by pacification and relative 
prosperity in the cultural sector as it was already purged of “enemies”, whilst 
the cadres had learned not to question the political legitimacy of the governing 
regime. The major cultural organisations were restored to work. It was also the 
time of revival of the notion of scientific governance based on system-
cybernetic notions of control by feedback and prediction. Cybernetics came to 
be firmly institutionalised in the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Whilst the or-
ganisational structure of culture and the production of cultural services were 
captured by statistically aggregated numbers, there emerged a perception that 
the effects of cultural policy on population should be mathematically measured. 
It was hoped that cybernetic techno-science would help to predict and counter-
act uncertain changes in the cultural sphere. It was not, however, held that inde-
terminate changes should be made more “determinate”. Quite the opposite: by 
the 1970s-1980s Soviet administrators and cultural operators had accommo-
dated the idea of uncertainty. Being calculable, uncertainty was hoped to be 
harnessed by mathematics. To control uncertainty, the 1960s-1970s maintained 
the understanding of the governance of culture as a centrally decided pro-
gramme based on a broad overview of centrally collected data. However, Soviet 
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everyday life was notoriously poor in electronic technologies, Soviet scientific 
research was to a large extent isolated from international science, the civil sec-
tor saw only a very limited spill-over from the ongoing techno-scientific inno-
vations, and finally the mainly traditional media used in arts and cultural or-
ganisations were not well equipped with the latest technologies. Disappointment 
with the promises of techno-sciences, particularly system-cybernetic technolo-
gies, fuelled criticisms of cultural operators which strengthened in the second 
half of the 1980s. As Chapter VIII has revealed, it was precisely calculation-
based, large scale governance which was treated with the utmost scepticism.  
Foucault’s governmentality perspective enabled me to focus on things 
other than terror and repression, which are usually identified as the essential 
features of Soviet cultural policy. The emergence of techno-scientific govern-
ance was also part of overcoming terror-based Stalinist rule. In cultural policy 
this was expressed by an increasing emphasis on cultural planning on scientific 
grounds in accordance with the experts’ decisions. Systematic work was ex-
pected to replace campaign management. Foucault charted the emerging gov-
ernmentalisation of the state as a result of the growing importance of population 
as the major rationale of state governance. Indeed, my case of cultural policy 
demonstrated that not only in Western liberal democracies, but also in the au-
thoritarian Soviet state population emerged as an important nexus of govern-
ance. The re-orientation towards population took place in line with Khru-
shchev’s welfare programme. As I showed in Chapter IV, already at its early 
stage in the 1920s Soviet culture was first and foremost conceptualised as ser-
vicing the population. The importance of servicing the population strengthened 
after de-Stalinisation. I have argued that to “govern culture” in the Soviet Union 
meant not only building loyalty to the Communist Party and ideologically con-
trolling individual expression. As shown in Chapter IV, the foundation of a 
network of cultural organisations and the organisation of their work were tuned 
in with central planning and the broader territorial administration of the country. 
To service population entailed shaping the serviced: cultural policy thus was 
about enlightenment, instruction, discipline and repression. The population in 
Soviet policy discourses was conceptualised primarily as a workforce (some 
scholars have already suggested that the Soviet Union was run like a giant cor-
poration). Indeed, in the late 1980s “population” as a rationale of governance 
became an object of criticism of Lithuanian cultural operators, just like large-
scale comprehensive planning. In the emerging post-Soviet discourse, “popula-
tion” was replaced by “nation” as a rationale for cultural policy.  
By showing how Soviet state cultural policy was constructed by the 
broader mentality of cybernetically assisted calculation-based governance, I 
sought to map an alternative view of the history of Soviet cultural policy which 
so far had been dominated by aesthetics and arts history based studies. Whilst 
such studies focused on the meaning of “culture”, I concentrated on the mean-
ing of “governance” in state cultural policy. How could one meaningfully claim 
to “govern” such a broad and heterogeneous sphere? I hope that this dissertation 
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has made it clear that such a claim was by and large enabled by the available 
techno-scientific resources for formulating a notion of control. Further, it is 
important to note that there was a pervasive conviction that there was a need to 
make a claim for consistent governance. Cybernetic techno-sciences thus could 
be understood as the source of meaning (and not only legitimacy) for Soviet 
rule. 
My principal method of discourse analysis proved to be quite successful in 
dealing with my empirical material. The texts of Domains of Culture were ana-
lysed in relation to other textual and extra-textual materials, such as the devel-
opment of institutions and relevant discourses both elsewhere in the Lithuanian 
press, in archived materials and Russian publications. Of course, a broader em-
pirical study could potentially cast some additional light on my findings. For 
instance, it would be interesting to explore how techno-scientific governance 
and issues of state cultural policy were addressed in Lithuanian techno-scientific 
publications. On the other hand, comparisons with other Soviet republics, espe-
cially with Russian discourses would be especially interesting, but even more 
vital comparisons could be developed by extending the study to Eastern Euro-
pean state socialist countries and Western democracies.  
 
My study of Soviet Lithuanian state cultural policy raises some issues which are 
relevant more broadly to the conceptualisation of modern governance and the 
relation between authoritarian Soviet and democratic Western regimes. My 
analysis of Soviet governance of culture revealed a peculiar relation between 
governance and ordering, meaning and coherence. The production of govern-
ance in discourses of Soviet state cultural policy featured a high degree of inco-
herence from a strictly theoretical point of view. That is, the Soviet notion of 
state governance was not grounded in a thorough, philosophically consistent 
ordering of the subject area. Further, I observed that a certain degree of admin-
istrative arbitrariness was recognised as legitimate as long as it worked in prac-
tice. The administrative constitution of state cultural policy field testified to the 
fact that state governance could freely be imposed on quite random spheres. The 
administrative definitions of “culture” were rather contingently set and this was 
acknowledged by the Soviet agents themselves. Thus in principle they would 
admit that film, television and radio could be seen as a part of “culture”, but in 
public discourses “culture” would usually refer to the Ministry of Culture’s 
sector. A similar lack of coherence in political discourses has been observed by 
Rose in his study of British political discourses.1 Just like Rose, I would like to 
point out that there was hardly any “hidden” coherent system behind the frag-
mentary and heterogeneous discourses of Soviet governance. The techno-
scientific rationality was thus bricolaged into the discourse of cultural policy. It 
was a partial appropriation which resulted in a heterogeneous discourse of gov-
ernance, the parts of which could more or less easily be decoupled from each 
other and still make sense. Similar to a lizard loosing its tail, I think the cyber-
                                      
1 Rose and Miller, 178-81. 
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netic discourse of governance featured an ability to survive in parts, to regener-
ate itself from smaller components, and thus managed to be accommodated 
under different political regimes and areas of governance.2 But further studies 
are needed to produce a more fine-grained comparative analysis of “liberal” and 
“authoritarian” technologies of governance (among other things, of culture). 
Translation of cybernetic control into governance had an ironic destiny. 
From the very beginning cybernetics offered itself for heterogeneous uses, its 
terminology was quick to be disseminated in various contexts. I suggest that 
because of its capacity to be broken into pieces and bricolaged into such differ-
ent fields, in the Soviet Union cybernetics sustained its label of “lzhenauka” or a 
pseudo-science, as it was half-humorously termed even after its rehabilitation. 
Its uses stretching from management to linguistics, Soviet cybernetics was re-
garded as having lost the “purity” of a scientific discipline and therefore was 
looked down upon by natural scientists. As one Lithuanian scientist has put, 
“cybernetics had been and remained a pseudo-science [lzhenauka]”.3 On the 
other hand, the introduction of the rigidity of mathematical language, arbitrary 
coding and subsequent standardisation, all of which increased the possibilities 
of control, were frowned upon by humanities scholars and cultural operators. In 
contrast to this view of the history of Soviet cybernetics as a gradual degrada-
tion of scientific language, I suggested that Soviet cybernetic discourses on the 
governance of culture were a productive sphere in which complex translations 
and hybridisations took place. They were the spaces in which techno-sciences 
were used for assembling governance and finally modernisation itself. From this 
perspective, the post-Stalinist Soviet governance of culture could be regarded as 
engaged in invention and not only oppression, exploitation, crushing, or with-
drawing its repressions (“thawing”).  
While cybernetic techno-science provided a particular way of thinking 
about the process of governance and its object and subject, it also made the very 
act of governance visible, palpable, debatable. In other words, cybernetics did 
not only empower the Soviet governance of culture but also made it doubtable, 
questionable and rejectable. A hypothesis could be raised that cybernetic “gov-
ernance” thus worked as an interface which not only made “culture” visible and 
knowable to the state, but also made “the state” visible and knowable to cultural 
operators. This, I believe, is an interesting issue for future studies to tackle. 
Finally, let us return to the puzzle which I encountered during my pilot 
fieldwork, the complaints of post-Soviet Lithuanian cultural operators about the 
                                      
2 This situated, limited and fragmented presence of discourse nicely corresponds with Wiener’s 
idea about the limited character of order as a “local enclave in the general stream of increasing 
entropy, of increasing chaos and de-differentiation”. Wiener, The Human Use, 95. Of course, I do 
not argue that the rest of the texts contained “entropy,” but rather make a point about the limita-
tion of the organised. Wiener did not write about overlapping or multiple enclaves; it is precisely 
in this way I suggest we understand heterogeneous discourse formations. In addition, “enclave” 
conveys a sense of being shut off and enclosed, but Wiener saw any order as susceptible to disor-
der, thus an open structure. 
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3 Interview with a mathematician, Tomas, Vilnius, December 2005. 
“absence of state cultural policy” (regardless of the presence of the Ministry of 
Culture and its financial and legislative interventions). I suggest that the aware-
ness that it was not enough to have an administrative state body and financing 
(which would have been held to be sufficient in interwar Lithuania) was rooted 
in a particular mentality of governance, which contended that proper state gov-
ernance is a matter of definition, a meaningful discourse. Probably, post-Soviet 
Lithuanian cultural operators understood contemporary state cultural policy as 
incomplete, because after rejecting the Soviet principles of centralised regula-
tion and administrative command it failed to produce and intentionally dissemi-
nate a new articulated discourse of governance. And yet it would not require too 
much effort for a careful eye to spot the on-going production of cybernetic dis-
course on governance in post-Soviet official documents and public arguments. 
But again, this would require another study. 
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XI. Appendix 
Topic questions for the interviews about cybernetics 
 
The interviews were designed to be explorative and evidence-searching. I 
started the first interviews with several questions in mind and finally developed 
a questionnaire which was used in later interviews. My general attitude was to 
try not to impose my definitions on matters related to cybernetics, its signifi-
cance and so on. These were the standard questions that I used in the talks. 
 
What was your personal way into (one's scientific field)? 
How did cybernetics come to Lithuania? 
How was it financed - who financed whom? 
How was education in the field was organised? 
What was the relationship with the Moscow institute and other institutes? 
What about secrecy? Where was it used? 
What about its prestige? 
What disciplines were gathered around cybernetics? 
To what extent was its language universal? 
Who else was interested in cybernetics except mathematicians? 
Were there any commissions from non-military complexes? 
Were there any public debates about cybernetics before? Any controversies? 
Who resisted cybernetics? 
Were there any interdisciplinary projects? Discussion forums? 
Was it used for governance - of the state, organizations, society? 
 
 274
Södertörn Doctoral Dissertations 
 
 
Jolanta Aidukaite, The Emergence of the Post-Socialist Welfare State: The case of the Baltic 
States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 2004 
 
Xavier Fraudet, Politique étrangère française en mer Baltique (1871-1914): de l'exclusion à 
l'affirmation, 2005 
 
Piotr Wawrzeniuk, Confessional Civilising in Ukraine: The Bishop Iosyf Shumliansky and 
the Introduction of Reforms in the Diocese of Lviv 1668-1708, 2005 
 
Andrej Kotljarchuk, In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century, 2006 
 
Håkan Blomqvist, Nation, ras och civilisation i svensk arbetarrörelse före nazismen, 2006 
 
Karin S Lindelöf, Om vi nu ska bli som Europa: Könsskapande och normalitet bland unga 
kvinnor i transitionens Polen, 2006 
 
Andrew Stickley. On Interpersonal Violence in Russia in the Present and the Past: A Socio-
logical Study, 2006 
 
Arne Ek, Att konstruera en uppslutning kring den enda vägen: Om folkrörelsers moderniser-
ing i skuggan av det Östeuropeiska systemskiftet, 2006 
 
Agnes Ers, I mänsklighetens namn: En etnologisk studie av ett svenskt biståndsprojekt i 
Rumänien, 2006 
 
Johnny Rodin, Rethinking Russian Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations 
and Federal Reforms at the Turn of the Millennium, 2006 
 
Kristian Petrov, Tillbaka till framtiden: Modernitet, postmodernitet och generationsidentitet 
i Gorbaevs glasnost´ och perestrojka, 2006 
 
Sophie Söderholm Werkö, Patient patients?: Achieving Patient Empowerment through 
Active Participation, Increased Knowledge and Organisation, 2007 
Peter Bötker, Leviatan i arkipelagen: Staten, förvaltningen och samhället. Fallet Estland, 
2007 
Matilda Dahl, States under scrutiny: International organizations, transformation and the 
construction of progress, 2007 
 
Margrethe B. Søvik, Support, resistance and pragmatism: An examination of motivation in 
language policy in Kharkiv, Ukraine, 2007 
 275 
 
Yulia Gradskova, Soviet People with female Bodies: Performing beauty and maternity in 
Soviet Russia in the mid 1930-1960s, 2007 
 
Renata Ingbrant, From Her Point of View: Woman's Anti-World in the Poetry of Anna 
wirszczyska, 2007 
 
Johan Eellend, Cultivating the Rural Citizen: Modernity, Agrarianism and Citizenship in 
Late Tsarist Estonia, 2007 
 
Petra Garberding, Musik och politik i skuggan av nazismen: Kurt Atterberg och de svensk-
tyska musikrelationerna, 2007 
 
Aleksei Semenenko, Hamlet the Sign: Russian Translations of Hamlet and Literary Canon 
Formation, 2007 
 
Vytautas Petronis, Constructing Lithuania: Ethnic Mapping in the Tsarist Russia, ca. 1800-
1914, 2007 
 
Akvile Motiejunaite, Female employment, gender roles, and attitudes: the Baltic countries 
in a broader context, 2008 
 
Tove Lindén, Explaining Civil Society Core Activism in Post-Soviet Latvia, 2008 
 
Pelle Åberg, Translating Popular Education: Civil Society Cooperation between Sweden 
and Estonia, 2008 
 
Anders Nordström, The Interactive Dynamics of Regulation: Exploring the Council of 
Europe’s monitoring of Ukraine, 2008 
 
Fredrik Doeser, In Search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy 
Change in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993, 2008 
 
Zhanna Kravchenko. Family (versus) Policy. Combining Work and Care in Russia and Swe-
den, 2008 
 
Rein Jüriado, Learning within and between public-private partnerships, 2008 
 
Fredrik Hårdeman, Exploring the Metagenome of the Baltic Sea Sediment, 2008 
 
Lars Forsberg, Genetic Aspects of Sexual Selection and Mate Choice in Salmonids, 2008 
 
Egl Rindzeviit, Constructing Soviet Cultural Policy: Cybernetics and Governance in 
Lithuania after World War II, 2008 
 276
Dissertations published at the Department of 
Culture Studies (Tema kultur och samhälle, 
Tema Q): 
 
 
1. Lindaräng, Ingemar: Ett jubileum i tiden. Birgittajubileet 2003 som historiebruk. 
Licentiatavhandling, 2005 
 
2. Johansson, Carina: Mellan ruinromantik och partyfabrik? En etnografisk studie av 
Visby i bild, berättelse, fantasi och minne. Licentiatavhandling, 2006 
 
3. Hillström, Magdalena: Ansvaret för kulturarvet. Studier i formeringen av det kul-
turhistoriska museiväsendet i Sverige med särskild inriktning på Nordiska museets 
etablering 1870-1920. Doktorsavhandling, 2006 
 
4. Gunnarsson, Andreas: Genetik i fiktion. Licentiatavhandling, 2006 
 
5. Seifarth, Sofia: Råd i radion: Modernisering, allmänhet och expertis 1939-1968. 
Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
6. Lindaräng, Ingemar: Helgonbruk i moderniseringstider. Bruket av Birgitta- och 
Olavstraditionerna i samband med minnesfiranden i Sverige och Norge 1891-2005. 
Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
7. Harding, Tobias: Nationalising Culture: The Reorganisation of National Culture in 
Swedish Cultural Policy 1970-2002. Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
8. Egeland, Helene: Det ekte, det gode og det coole. Södra Teatern og den dialogiske 
formasjonen av mangfoldsdiskursen. Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
9. Kverndokk, Kyrre: Pilegrim, turist og elev. Norske skoleturer til døds- og konsen-
trasjonsleirer. Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
10. Kåks, Helena: Mellan erfarenhet och förväntan: Betydelser av att bli vuxen i ung-
domars livsberättelser. Doktorsavhandling, 2007 
 
11. Brusman, Mats: Den verkliga staden?: Norrköpings innerstad mellan urbana idéer 
och lokala identiteter. Doktorsavhandling, 2008 
 
12. Eskilsson, Anna: På plats i historien. Studier av hembygdsföreningar på 2000-
talet. Doktorsavhandling, 2008 
 
13. Holt, Kristoffer: Publicisten Ivar Harrie. Ideologi, offentlighetsdebatt och idékritik 
i Expressen 1944-1960. Doktorsavhandling, 2008 
 
14. Nyblom, Andreas: Ryktbarhetens ansikte: Verner von Heidenstam, medierna och 
personkulten i sekelskiftets Sverige. Doktorsavhandling, 2008 
 277 
 
 
 
